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Abstract 
 
This study is situated in feminist and poststructural theory. The focus of the study 
is heterosexual relationships. In particular, the study investigates the shaping 
effects of patriarchal discourses on the relational subjectivity of a woman partner; 
how a woman partner responds to and refuses this shaping; and why and how a 
man might change his positioning in relation to his partner. The data were 
generated through focus group discussions with women, and individual interviews 
with men. An initial women’s focus group generated core data for analysis, which 
was followed by interviews with men, and then a final focus group of women. 
Documentary practices, derived from narrative therapy, were used to capture and 
bridge discussions between these three stages of data generation. A poststructural 
analysis investigated the production of relational subjectivity in the context of 
heterosexual relationships. Analysis of data included a focus on relational 
subjectivity as reported by one of the initial focus group women. A deconstructive 
analysis of material from the initial focus group showed the shaping of women’s 
relational subjectivities at the intersection of dominant patriarchal and resistant 
practices. This deconstructive analysis is supported by analyses of material from 
the men’s interviews, and from the final focus group of women. Further, based in 
knowledge generated from the initial women’s focus group, an idea for 
heterosexual relationship as egalitarian is developed in the analysis. The thesis 
argues that heterosexual relationship is often dominated by patriarchal ideas and 
practices that privilege the male partner. The thesis offers a philosophical location 
with the potential to reposition heterosexual relationship to a safe and egalitarian 
place. An exploration is offered about how men might take up ethical practices so 
that the repositioning of heterosexual relationship can be maintained, and 
patriarchally sustained male privilege held accountable. The thesis suggests that 
the ethical ideas and practices offered for egalitarian heterosexual relationship 
might be extrapolated to gender relations in general. My accountability as a male 
researcher is embedded in the process of the study, with feminist supervisors, in 
the research methodology with the final focus group of women, and in critical 
reflexivity in the data analysis. In particular, an example is provided which shows 
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the researcher reflexively analysing one moment in the data generation where a 
research participant was offered a possible non-preferred position. The 
contribution of this study is to bring Derridean ideas on ethical action to relational 
subjectivity in heterosexual relationship. Its timeliness is evidenced by the 
demand from the women participants, and others, for men to engage in respectful 
and ethical relationship practices. At the same time the study argues that its 
timeliness is still in the making, produced in the democracy to come that is being 
brought into existence when the potential for respectful and ethical relationship is 
enacted in practice. The responsibility for inventing such practices rests with men.     
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Three stories and an introduction 
 
I have come to understand that heterosexual relationship is a prominent site for 
the production of patriarchal ideas and practices, which thus sets it up as a site for 
inequity and oppression (Butler, 1990/2006; Dickerson, 2013; Hollway, 1995; 
Jeffreys, 1990). It is the argument of this thesis that this inequity and oppression 
in heterosexual relationship generally transpires along gendered lines, where men 
as a group tend to be privileged by patriarchal ideas and practices, and women as 
a group tend to be oppressed by those same ideas and practices (Connell, 1987, p. 
183; Hare-Mustin, 2004; Pease, 2010, pp. 93-97; Rankin Mahoney & Knudson-
Martin, 2009; Weedon, 1997, pp. 2-4). I recognise there is a risk of an 
essentialising binary in constituting men as a group as privileged and women as a 
group as oppressed, and that there are local reversals of patriarchal practices and 
effects (Connell, 2005, p. 74). However, I take the risk based on this study’s 
foundation in the idea that patriarchy produces male privilege and female 
oppression in heterosexual relationships. My interest in studying heterosexual 
relationship has origins that are both personal and professional. 
The three stories  
My interest in this study started with three events that unfolded in my life. I 
identify these as the narratives of my heterosexual marriage, my counselling 
practice with heterosexual couples, and a desire for more satisfying theoretical 
and philosophical grounding for counselling heterosexual couples. 
In regard to my own marriage, my partner demanded I give her space to have 
equal say in co-shaping our relationship practices. I reflected on my own actions 
and returned to the dialogue with new suggestions and hope that I could change. 
However, I found it difficult to change in a way that satisfied both my partner and 
I. I had no idea of the patient and hopeful position my partner held for our 
relationship at the time. 
I worked in Adelaide, South Australia, as a counsellor educator at a private 
tertiary educational institution and often received inquiries into my knowledge of 
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narrative therapy. I became curious about narrative therapy and participated in a 
workshop with Michael White in early 2006, and I remember thinking at the time: 
“If narrative therapy can have such effects of respect for Michael White, then I 
want to learn narrative therapy”. I had been trained in Emotion Focussed Therapy 
(Greenberg & Johnson, 1988), and had only known of counselling theory and 
practice developed from psychological theory and practice. Psychological theories 
and practices formed and informed much of my teaching practice of counselling 
heterosexual couples. In narrative therapy I heard the engagement Michael White 
made with a number of philosophers as the basis for its theory and practice.   
The narratives of my attempted shifts in the marriage with my partner and the 
development of new counselling practices initiated a migration story. A shift from 
modernist essentialism to socially constructed discursive paradigms opened up for 
me, so I searched and (re)searched to understand the philosophical underpinnings 
that shaped narrative therapy practices.  
This study captures the many shifts I brought about as I set out to research the 
topic, heterosexual couples, gender discourse, and the production of relational 
subjectivity. 
Early theoretical shaping of the study  
Very early in the process of preparing for this study I read Weedon (1997) which 
gave me a solid introduction to the philosophical underpinnings for socially 
constructed discursive paradigms. Drewery (2005) provided me an understanding 
of the dominant part the use of everyday language plays in the constitution of 
relational subjectivity and positioning. In regard to discourse and its constitutive 
practices and positioning, I discovered Davies (1998) and Davies and Harré 
(1999), and for discourse and power in the context of heterosexual relationship, I 
started with Benjamin (2003), Hare-Mustin (1991, 1994) and Hollway (1984, 
1995). Patriarchy and its shaping effect for heterosexual relationships became an 
important focus for my study. 
In addition to this feminist poststructural literature I was informed by the work of 
Connell (1987, 2002) and Pease (1997, 2000, 2002a) in regard to patriarchy and 
its dominant production of men as privileged in relation to women. Because of 
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this privileged positioning of men, and in conjunction with feminist poststructural 
thought on the discursive production of language and gender, as an ethical 
response to these ideas and practices I decided to explore women’s experience of 
heterosexual relationship, and engage with men separately in individual 
interviews. From the context of psychotherapy, Downing (2000) introduces 
thought that was beginning to emerge for me in regard to the ethics of 
heterosexual coupledom. He argues that psychotherapy needs to be balanced with 
philosophical skills and knowledge otherwise assumptions can be made which 
have questionable ethical implications. 
Connecting with a history 
An important historical work which this study aligns with in recognising the 
collective privileging of men in the joint domination of women is that of Lerner 
(1986). Lerner has painstakingly conducted an analysis that maps the historical 
processes by which patriarchy became established and institutionalised in western 
civilisation (pp. 8-11). This establishment of patriarchy in western civilisation, 
Lerner argues, occurred in the Ancient Near East over a period of 2,500 years up 
until approximately 600 B.C. (pp. 7-8). With the development of patriarchy, 
Lerner suggests the oppression of women occurred through two means, 
“educational deprivation . . . and male monopoly on definition” (p. 219). Of 
particular interest to this study is the male monopoly on definition. Male voice 
and thought has dominated history, subsuming almost anything that might 
resemble female initiative and enterprise: “women’s thought has been imprisoned 
in a confining and erroneous patriarchal framework” (pp. 220-221). In her second 
book (1993), which analyses the 1,200 hundred year period up until the year 
1870, Lerner highlights how women’s thought and voice has been marginalised or 
ignored in that period, illustrating further the domination of patriarchy as 
privileging male experience and perspective. All this begs not only an 
acknowledgement of the history of patriarchy and its effects for women but also 
reference to the history of heterosexual relationship as a production of patriarchy.  
In the work by Coontz (2005) on the history of marriage, one can clearly ascertain 
that throughout history marriage has privileged the male partner in various ways, 
which suggests its production by patriarchy (see pp. 79-82, 140-142, 159-160, 
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176, 237-238). Coontz (2005) details how marriage has changed throughout 
history from being commitment-based for external political, social, or economic 
reasons to the current era of being love-based and dependent on negotiation 
between the couple. While, according to Coontz, love and negotiation might be 
the new hallmark requirements of a heterosexual relationship, this does not mean 
that patriarchy no longer produces heterosexual relationships. Heterosexuality has 
been critiqued for the way “love” is expressed which results in control of the 
female partner and harm being done to her. This critique has not only come from 
the early feminists (see Beauvoir, 1949/1953; Benjamin, 1988; Firestone, 1970; 
Friedan, 1963; Millett, 1970), but also from later works on heterosexual 
relationship practices (see Jenkins, 2009; Sinclair & Monk, 2004; Toye, 2010), 
which suggests patriarchy still finds ways to produce heterosexual relationships.  
An ethical stance 
With this patriarchal production of heterosexual relationship in mind, where 
patriarchal ideas and practices tend to be privileged, and ideas and practices that 
do not fit within a patriarchal framework, usually those of women, tend to be 
marginalised or demeaned, this study takes up a dual ethical stance. One aspect of 
this ethical stance is to deconstruct patriarchal practices of heterosexual 
relationship. The other aspect of this ethical stance is to offer possibilities of an 
alternative heterosexual relationship based in ideas, generated by a particular 
group of women, that concern egalitarian ethical practices of relationship. This 
dual ethical stance is made possible by theory that I introduce in the next chapter. 
Strategic essentialism and relational externalising 
The construction of a binary along traditional gender categories, and the naming 
of male privilege and the oppression of women, has much support in the literature 
on gender (see Banyard, 2010; Connell, 1987, 2009; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 
1990a; Kimmel, 2008; Knudson-Martin & Rankin Mahoney, 2009b; Magnusson 
& Marecek, 2012; Pease, 2010). This binary position is important for recognising 
and addressing the inequalities and power differential between men as a group and 
women as a group. In locating my study within a poststructuralist paradigm, I 
locate the inequalities and power differences in heterosexual relationships in 
patriarchal discourses. Men in heterosexual relationships take up privileged 
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positions offered by patriarchal discourses that can limit and define their partner’s 
subjectivity and agency (Dickerson, 2013; Hare-Mustin, 1991; 2004; Hollway, 
1995). Throughout this thesis, I refer to both patriarchy and men in regard to the 
privileged positions that are oppressively consequential for women in 
heterosexual relationships. At this stage, it is important to clarify my position on 
referring to men in a way that does not blame them for their privilege but that 
does invite to take responsibility for addressing privileged positions that produce 
harm. 
Spivak (1988, 1990), a postcolonial feminist, suggests the idea of “strategic 
essentialism” as one way to achieve justice for those who are marginalised. With 
this idea, the groups involved, those perpetrating injustice and those who are 
oppressed, are given an essentialised quality or name that is then strategically 
used in an effort to gain justice for the oppressed group. In my study, strategic 
essentialism is used to name male privilege and the oppressive effects of this 
privilege for female partners in heterosexual relationships. I use strategic 
essentialism to name the entry point of patriarchy into heterosexual relationships 
so that men can be offered a space to seek appropriate ethical approaches to 
relationship. This differs from essentialism which, while it may be used to address 
issues of justice, also incorporates blame without recognition of discursive or 
historical and socio-cultural factors in the constitution of people and relationships.  
A further conceptual and practical tool to set alongside strategic essentialism, in 
the playing out of this study, is the practice and theory of externalising language 
(White, 1993), or relational externalising (Bird, 2000). These two tools serve the 
same purpose of using language in such a way as to linguistically and 
experientially separate a person from a problem. Instead of viewing a person as 
the problem, these tools help to understand a person as having a relationship with 
the problem, which is intended to provide them with agentic space to address the 
problem. In my study, externalising language offers a means to strategically 
position men, and women, to examine patriarchy and its practices in ways that 
make it possible for the man to be in a position to take action against the 
oppressive behaviour without taking action against his own “nature” (White, 
1993, p. 31). Secondly, relational externalising language may help a man see 
where his own pain has derived from, while still acknowledging the oppressive 
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practices toward women and working toward changing those practices. Relational 
externalising may take the politics out of men’s pain (McLean, 1996) by setting 
the foundation for that pain in context. An idea that sits well with relational 
externalising, in this context of taking the politics out of men’s pain, is Spivak’s 
idea for achieving justice for those oppressed by privilege – “unlearning one’s 
privilege as loss” (1988, p. 295; 1990, p. 10). Through the use of relational 
externalising, men in heterosexual relationships can unlearn their loss of privilege 
as disadvantage and pain and see the oppressive effects of their privilege for their 
heterosexual partners. The man may then give priority to changing his oppressive 
practices knowing that his pain and oppressive practices are not dichotomous but 
are founded in the same discursive practices and ideas (McLean, 1996, p. 25). As 
Gremillion puts it, “the point of externalising conversations is to create a 
discursive space to name, unpack, and detail the relational and ideational contexts 
of problems . . . that keeps conversation in the realm of discourse and practice” 
(2004, pp. 188, 190). This externalising makes room for a person to perceive 
themselves as in relationship with the problem (Bird, 2000, pp. 9-11), and thus 
having responsibility for actions taken in producing change.  
In my study, the essentialising use of the plural nouns men and women are used, 
not to condemn men or to victimise women, but to help recognition of the 
injustice that is perpetrated on women. The reference to men is best understood 
alongside the theory of relational externalising in regard to patriarchy, so that men 
can experience agency in regard to addressing women’s oppression as founded in 
patriarchy, not in men’s “nature”, or as dichotomous to men’s pain. 
Gender relations   
To help situate this thesis in the broader location of gender relations I introduce 
some recent material on unequal gender relations and the call for equality between 
women and men. During the process of completing this study there have been a 
number of calls for (Australian) men “to act in concert with women” (Pease, 
2010, p. 107) toward egalitarian gender relations. I note that these calls came as a 
result of recognition that gender relations are far from equal. For example, 
Australia’s first female Prime Minister was castigated and oppressed because she 
is female (Summers, 2013). This overt abuse was unlike any that a male politician 
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might be subject to because of his sex. In a recent news article (King, 2014, 8th 
March), the sex discrimination commissioner in Australia, Elizabeth Broderick, is 
reported as saying: in regard to Australia’s political climate, “Power in a country 
like Australia, in fact any country in the world, sits largely in the hands of men”; 
then in regard to the inclusion of women at leadership levels in society and public 
life, “If we don’t intentionally include women, what we do is unintentionally 
exclude them”; and finally, in regard to gender equality in general, “If we want to 
create change we need men . . . taking the message of gender equality to other 
men”.  
These examples are indicative of “public sphere” gender relations that can often 
have effects for “private sphere” (heterosexual relationships) gender relations 
(Rudman & Glick, 2008, p. 289).  This study acknowledges that relation. 
Research questions 
My study, however, focused on the “private sphere” of how gender discourses 
produce relational subjectivity for heterosexual couples. In the process I became 
interested in how couples change subject positions. I shaped my research curiosity 
in the following research questions that guided my (re)search:  
1. What are the available discourses by which heterosexual couples live their 
relationships? 
2. What are the discursive practices (language and positioning) of 
heterosexual couples that produce relational subjectivity? 
3. How can I help heterosexual couples to investigate the discursive 
production of relational subjectivity in my work as a counsellor?  
4. What are some of the ideas and practices required for an egalitarian 
heterosexual relationship?  
5. How do people change subject positions within a heterosexual 
relationship? 
I explored heterosexual relational subjectivity as reported by two focus groups 
(Wilkinson, 1998b, 1999, 2004; Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, 2011) with 
women participants and individual interviews with five men. As I introduce each 
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of the results chapters below I give a brief outline of the methods I employ in 
analysing the data. I now proceed with an outline of the chapters in this thesis.  
Introducing the chapters 
The literature review is contained in Chapter Three. I review the feminist critique 
of family therapy theory and practice and, by association, heterosexual couple 
counselling. This critique zeros in on an absence of recognition of the socio-
cultural basis for the construction of gender-power-relations that privilege men. A 
review of popular literature which, I suggest, is formative in the construction of 
heterosexual relationships, indicates assumptions of equality between women and 
men. These assumptions are set within the context of liberal humanist essentialist 
ideas. The focus of the feminist critique on gender-power-relations that privilege 
men is continued by taking up a feminist poststructural analysis of gender 
construction. Gender, rather than being founded essentially as with liberal 
humanist ideas, is situated in discourse. In this way, gender is understood as 
complex and heterogeneous, not tied to sex, and therefore shifting and changing. 
A review of self-help and academic literature on heterosexual coupledom shows 
how gender is constructed through essentialist ideas and patriarchal norms and 
practices. A review of feminist poststructural literature on heterosexual couple 
counselling indicates the gender constructive power of patriarchal discourses, and 
the possibilities for movement and difference by engagement with other 
discourses.    
In Chapter Four I discuss an outline of the research methodology. In conjunction 
with the ideas advocated by the feminist poststructural literature, the first focus 
group began with discussions concerning the women’s experience of 
conversational practices in their heterosexual relationships. This approach was 
taken because the control of conversations by the male partner produces and 
reproduces patriarchally informed heterosexual relationships. The discussions in 
the first focus group highlighted the effects these practices had for the women. Six 
women participated in the first focus group, and the group produced a document 
that I then used as a source for individual discussion with five men. 
In engaging with men separately to women I hoped to put the possibility of a 
social justice agenda in place. In keeping with the feminist agenda for this study, 
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and with recognition of me as a man constituted by patriarchy, as a form of 
accountability (see Pease, 1997) a second focus group were recruited to complete 
the data generation process. This second focus group of women reflected on the 
document from the initial focus group and a document summarising the content of 
the men’s interviews. The data generated from these three stages of the data 
generation process provoked a curiosity for theory, particularly from 
poststructural sources. 
In Chapter Five, the first of the results chapters, the relational subjectivity of one 
participant of the first focus group is explored using the concepts “decomposition” 
and “mo(ve)ment” (see Davies, Browne, Gannon, Hopkins, McCann, & 
Wihlborg, 2006). These concepts help name and describe the “messy 
decomposing” process for a woman as she develops mo(ve)ment in and between 
discourses in response to her partner’s oppressive conversational practices. While 
this chapter only focuses on one women’s experience, it serves to introduce the 
harsh effects that patriarchally produced language practices can have for a woman 
– effects which are often invisible to the male partner.  
Chapter Six is the mid-point of three chapters that zero in on the data from the 
first focus group as a concerted effort to understand and deconstruct patriarchally 
constituted heterosexual relationship and its effects for the six women involved. 
The relational subjectivity of the group participants, in relation to certain language 
practices from their partners, is discussed in Chapter Six. In this chapter, I argue 
that in the light of Deleuze’s “ontology of difference” (May, 2005, pp. 26-71; 
Deleuze, 1962/1983; 1966/1988a; 1968/1990), the focus group discussions 
provided small “rhizomatic” spaces (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1988) for the 
women’s voices and identities to be performed. Performativity of gender (Butler, 
1990/2006) is a poststructural theory that I draw on to assist in deconstructing 
gender, for breaking down the stereotypes that male equals man, and female 
equals woman. Performativity of gender is used to analyse data from the first 
focus group in Chapter Six. 
In Chapter Seven, the deconstructive effort is intensified with the use of 
deconstruction as double (Derrida, 1967/1974, 1972/2002; Lather, 2007). The 
deconstructive process is aided with the use of Foucault’s (1980) ideas on the 
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relationship between power and knowledge as constitutive of each other, and a 
particular interpretation of this relationship (see Davies, Britt Flemmen, Gannon, 
Laws, & Watson, 2002). The women of the first focus group had conceptualised 
an idea, a knowledge of the possibilities for heterosexual relationship as 
egalitarian, that I explicate in Chapter Seven. I argue that this knowledge gives the 
women hope for their heterosexual relationships in the midst of patriarchal power 
relations and domination. Hence, the women constantly adjust to their partner’s 
position in the relationship by changing their subject positions in an effort to keep 
the relationship and hope alive. In the analysis of the data I draw on double 
deconstruction to interpret both the knowledge and hope the women have for 
egalitarian heterosexual relationship, and the patriarchal practices of heterosexual 
relationship they constantly adjust to, or had adjusted to. The deconstruction 
shines the light on how patriarchal power privileging the male partner is 
produced.   
Deconstruction as double continues in Chapter Eight. This time it is applied in 
application to data from the men’s interviews. I utilise a number of theoretical 
positions to support the thesis of this chapter. Following the work of Levinas, 
(1961/1969) I theorise the women of the first focus group and their ideas and 
knowledges as Other, to whom ethical priority must be given. In the light of 
ethical priority of the other (Levinas, 1961/1969), in the context of Derrida’s 
“democracy to come” (Derrida 1993/1994, 2003/2005a; see Caputo, 1997a; 
Critchley, 2007; Smith, 2005), women are regarded as Other, toward whom 
hospitality, justice, and ethical relationship must be practised. I suggest the 
knowledge the first focus group women have of an egalitarian heterosexual 
relationship equates to a democracy to come. Hence, I make suggestions, based in 
poststructural ethical ideas (see Caputo, 1993; Diprose, 2002; Jenkins, 2009; 
Ziarek, 2001) and with the use of material from the men’s interviews, for how 
men in heterosexual relationships can relate with their partner in an egalitarian 
manner. Supplementing deconstruction as double and as a refusal to let go of hope 
that a “democracy to come” is possible, I use deconstruction as affirmative 
response to the other (Derrida, 1995a), and offer an invitation to men to change 
their position in heterosexual relationships. With this method, I take into account 
a history of patriarchy that marginalises the voices of women (Lerner, 1986, 
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1993), and the patriarchal domination of the institution of heterosexual 
relationships (Coontz, 2005; Sinclair & Monk, 2004; Toye, 2010; Jenkins, 2009; 
Weedon, 1997). 
The responses of the second focus group of women, to the document generated by 
the first focus group and the document summarising the men’s interviews, are the 
focus of Chapter Nine. The second focus group of women express solidarity with 
the first focus group with resistance stories to patriarchal oppression.  
In Chapter Ten I use the ideas on accountability from Butler (2005), who situates 
the emergence of ethical subjectivities within a socially and culturally aware 
framework that is dependent upon relational scenes of address. With these ideas, I 
address my accountability to the first and second focus group of women. As an act 
of accountability, I pause at one moment in the data generation where discourse is 
in operation. I theorise that moment of conversation between a participant of the 
first focus group and myself using a number of strategies.  
In the final chapter I summarise the core contribution of each of the results 
chapters, Five through Ten. I then set the contribution of this thesis in the context 
of an interpretation of Derrida’s view of ethical action and responsibility 
(Mansfield, 2006). I conclude the thesis with argument that while the “democracy 
to come” (Derrida, 1993/1994, 2003/2005a) is still in the making, it is being 
brought into existence every time patriarchal privilege is recognised by a man and 
he engages in ethical conversation with a woman.  
The three stories and this study      
At the beginning of this introductory chapter I referred to the feminist and 
poststructural philosophical ideas invited to this study, and I identified three 
events that unfolded in my life, namely, narratives of my heterosexual marriage, 
my counselling practice with couples, and a desire for more satisfying theoretical 
and philosophical grounding for counselling heterosexual couples. 
The stories were left discontinued at the point of convergence. In part, these 
stories may have been continued in the remainder of this introductory chapter with 
reference to some of the ideas used for analysis in each chapter of this thesis. 
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However, the more thorough continuation of these stories is this thesis and the 
study on heterosexual relationship it concerns. Chapter Two, as the next in this 
thesis, introduces more thoroughly the feminist and philosophical ideas utilised 
for analysing the data of this study, and thus, the continuation of the three 
converged stories that brought me to this space.  
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Chapter 2. A double ethical position 
 
This chapter introduces the work of philosophers and theorists that is central to 
this thesis. It is a philosophical chapter that puts in place explanations of the 
conceptual tools I use for the analysis in the results chapters, Five to Ten.  
Discourse and patriarchy 
This study is situated in a feminist poststructural paradigm which utilises 
discourse for specific purposes. I turn now to Foucault, who first introduced the 
concept of discourse for understanding how power and knowledge are related and 
shape the social world. In his archaeological work on the emergence of the human 
sciences, Foucault decentres the human subject as the purveyor of truth and 
knowledge (Foucault, 1969/2002a, pp. 16, 154; Macdonell, 1986, pp. 83-94; 
McNay, 1994, p. 52-56; Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005, pp. 845-849), and gives 
priority to discourse. In the context of Foucault’s archaeological work, discourses 
are “discontinuous practices” (1970/1981, p. 67), localised in an historical period, 
appearing in messy accidental ways (1971/2000b, p. 374), “that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak” (1969/2002a, p. 54).  Later, as part of his 
genealogical method (1975/1991, 1976/1998, 1971/2000b), Foucault made a 
“theoretical shift” (1984/1990, p. 6), giving more prominence to “the material 
conditions of discourse”, and the “operations of power, particularly as they target 
the body to produce knowledge and subjectivity” (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 46; 
see Foucault, 1980, pp. 113-117; McNay, 1994, pp. 85-100; Scheurich & 
McKenzie, 2005, pp. 849-857). The more theoretical work in archaeology is 
joined with the practical work of genealogy to produce a clearer picture of 
discourse (Best & Kellner, 1991, pp. 46-47; McNay, 1992, p. 27).  
Taking into account these theoretical and practical developments by Foucault in 
explicating discourse, I offer a concise definition. Discourse is a “specific regime 
of power” that generates knowledge (McNay, 1992, p. 27), which Foucault names 
“games of truth . . . a set of rules by which truth is produced” (1984/2000c, pp. 
296-297). These “games of truth”, produce human subjectivity, discursively 
positioning people to see themselves on the terms that language and knowledge 
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authorise (Danaher, Schirato, & Webb, 2000, p. 40; Davies, 1990-1999, pp. 43-
44; Weedon, 1997, pp. 21-26, 95, 105). 
This understanding of discourse fits with a feminist use of poststructural theory 
for “conceptualising the relationship between language, social institutions and 
individual consciousness [subjectivity] which focuses on how power is exercised 
and on the possibilities for change” (Weedon, 1997, p. 19). This thesis argues that 
men exercise power in heterosexual relationships by utilising language and 
knowledge from patriarchal and liberal humanist discourses in ways that 
unhelpfully constitute their partners’ subjectivities. Possibilities for change exist 
in women using alternate discursive repertoires to those available for their 
partners. But more significantly for this study, change exists in men taking an 
ethical position which, first, recognises discourses that disadvantage their 
partners, and second, locates their practices in alternate egalitarian discourses.  
Both terms, patriarchy, or patriarchal discourses, are used in this study. To help 
ground understanding of patriarchal discourses and how they might be present in 
ways that disadvantage and oppress women I mention here a few of their effects. 
Patriarchal discourses are present in violence and sexual coercion or rape (Gavey, 
2005; Jenkins, 1990; Pease, 1997), and the unequal domestic and social division 
of labour (Dixon & Wetherell, 2004). Patriarchy is present in everyday relational 
practices where male opinions are privileged and regarded as objective truth 
(Kimmel, 2008, p. 8), along with language practices such as interrupting people 
with answers to problems (Nylund & Nylund, 2003). In adapting the work of 
McIntosh (1988/2010) on white privilege, Schacht (2003, p. 169) lists a number 
of situations where he is or has been privileged. Some of these situations can be 
read as examples of patriarchal privilege that directly disadvantage women: higher 
salaries than women in equivalent employment roles; as students a male can often 
be given higher priority by a teacher or lecturer; and the acknowledgement and 
validation of men’s voices in preference to those of women when in conversation 
with women. 
Liberal humanist discourse is aligned with patriarchal discourses because it masks 
the effects of patriarchy (Weedon, 1997, p. 41). Gender discourse is mainly 
invisible in liberal humanist discourse, and because of this invisibility liberal 
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humanism commits the error of assuming equality between men and women. This 
gender invisibility and assumption of equality in liberal humanist discourse leaves 
power out of the equation in social relations between men and women (Hare-
Mustin, 1991, p. 65). Foundational to this assumption in liberal humanism is that 
“every (ungendered) individual” (Hare-Mustin, 1991, p. 65) has an essentialised 
human nature which is the “basis . . . for equality of opportunity and the right to 
self-determination” (Weedon, 1997, p. 77). In the light of this argument 
concerning liberal humanist discourse Weedon, a feminist poststructural scholar, 
writes: 
The principle of equality of opportunity for women and men in education 
and work, once established, has not proved any great threat to the balance of 
power in a society where patriarchal relations inform the very production 
and regulation of female and male subjects. It is possible for liberal 
discourses of equality to work against women’s interests and it is only by 
looking at a discourse in operation, in a specific historical context, that it is 
possible to see whose interests it serves at a particular moment. (1997, p. 
108) 
To show the inequality that patriarchal and liberal humanist discourses produce, 
in this study I follow Weedon’s advice and look at discourses in operation to 
ascertain whose interests they serve. By looking at discourses in operation, and 
the politics of such, I expose the workings of discourse that privilege men and 
disadvantage women in heterosexual relationships. An important contribution to 
this study’s ethical stance and to its exposure of the workings of discourse is the 
practice of deconstruction. 
Deconstruction 
I use five applications of deconstruction in this study. Beginning with 
deconstruction as double, I proceed with an explanation of these. 
Deconstruction as double 
Deconstruction in this study is a practice of the “double” (Derrida, 1972/2002, p. 
38; Lather, 2007, p .14). In this study, double can have a number of applications, 
but there are two that are core. Derrida’s early work, where he introduces 
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deconstruction, is an investigation and critique of western metaphysics (Culler, 
1982; Derrida, 1967/1973a, 1967/1974, 19671978, 1972/1981, 1972/1982a; 
Norris, 2004). Western metaphysics is founded upon presuppositions that shape 
everyday language and practices of living (Derrida, 1972/2002, pp. 18-19; Norris, 
2004, p. 15), and among these is the practice of creating and thinking and living 
with binary oppositions. Of particular interest to Derrida is the hierarchical nature 
of these oppositions, where one of the pair is regarded as superior to the other, and 
connected to some a priori essence, or being, or self-existent origin. The other of 
the pair is regarded as opposite to the superior one, or at best, a complicated 
flawed version of it (Culler, 1982, pp. 92-93; Derrida, 1977b, p. 93; Johnson, 
1981, p. viii; Lechte, 1994, p. 106). The first meaning of double is that Derrida 
stands within this metaphysical system to critique and deconstruct it. It is from 
within the system that Derrida “problematizes” (Reynolds & Roffe, 2004, p. 2) or 
deconstructs the system (Derrida, 1967/1974, p. 24; Norris, 2004, pp. 15-16). 
Nealon refers to this action as “the double necessity of working from within the 
institutional constraints of a tradition even while trying to expose what that 
tradition has ignored or forgotten” (1993, p. 101).  
The second meaning of double relates to how Derrida deconstructs the binary 
oppositions foundational to western thought. Because Derrida regards the 
hierarchy of these oppositions as violent, because “one of the two terms governs 
the other (axiologically, logically, etc.)”, one of the tasks of deconstruction is to 
“overturn” this hierarchy (1972/2002, p. 39). This step is important as an effective 
intervention in the violent hierarchy. However, in reversing the hierarchy Derrida 
acknowledges he is creating a new hierarchy within the same conceptual order 
(western metaphysics) that he is endeavouring to displace (1972/1982a, p. 329; 
1972/2002, p. 39). Thus, to suitably deconstruct the conceptual order, the new 
reversed hierarchy “must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure” 
(Spivak, 1974, p. lxxvii); “a new ‘concept”’ inscribed, that never was and never 
can be included in the previous system, “thereby disorganizing the entire inherited 
order and invading the entire field” (Derrida, 1972/2002, p. 39). In his 
investigation of western metaphysics, the prototype of deconstruction offered by 
Derrida is his overthrowing of the speech-writing hierarchy, where deconstruction 
challenges the privileging of speech; then he introduces the new concept of 
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writing within speech (Spivak, 1974, p. lxxvii), which is understood in his 
neologism, différance (1968/1973b, 1972/2002, 39-41), which I describe later in 
another application of deconstruction. 
Deconstruction as double is applied in this study in the deconstruction of 
heterosexual relationship. I do this, as someone who is committed to a 
heterosexual relationship. I am a man who has been, and still is at times, caught in 
patriarchal practices that constitute patriarchal domination of heterosexual 
relationship. It is from this position that I deconstruct patriarchal heterosexual 
relationship practices in this study. This orientation connects to the second 
meaning taken from deconstruction as double, as I intend to expose what the 
tradition of heterosexual relationship “has ignored or forgotten” (Nealon, 1993, p. 
101). The second meaning taken from deconstruction as double in application to 
this study does not follow the perhaps formulaic order for deconstruction outlined 
above, where overturning of hierarchy is followed by erasure of the reversed 
hierarchy, followed by finding a new concept. Derrida himself questions the idea 
of chronological phases for practising deconstruction, but nonetheless he makes 
use of a (formulaic) approach for explanatory purposes (1972/2002, p. 39). In 
application to this study, because of complicating power relations, I erase a 
hierarchy first by deconstructing both patriarchal expressions of heterosexual 
relationship and a preferred expression offered by a group of women. Following 
this, the reversal of hierarchy is put in place in conjunction with the inclusion of a 
new concept. The new concept comes from ideas offered by women about the 
possibilities of egalitarian heterosexual relational practices. The reversal of 
hierarchy involves men stepping back from their privileged position to one of 
affirmative engagement with the new concept offered. Woven in with this 
reversed hierarchy are suggested practices that open space for the affirmative 
engagement in a non-hierarchical egalitarian heterosexual relationship.  
Deconstruction is not annihilation 
Deconstruction is not annihilation, but a rethinking, “troubling” (David, Coffey, 
Connolly, Nayak, & Reay, 2006), or problematising (Pease, 2010, p.177; 
Reynolds & Roffe, 2004, p. 2). I emphasize what deconstruction is not because it 
can be misunderstood as destruction of one position or system in favour of 
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another. But, as can be ascertained from the previous discussion on deconstruction 
as double, as Derrida developed it, destruction is not a goal of deconstruction. 
Deconstruction can be regarded as a disorganising or an invasion of an inherited 
order without completely destroying that order (Derrida, 1972/2002, p. 39). 
Derrida makes this very clear in his Letter to a Japanese Friend (1985/2008, pp. 
1-6) where he clarifies his reasons for choosing deconstruction as the word in the 
French language to describe the process he was developing. The French “term 
‘destruction’ too obviously implied an annihilation or a negative reduction” 
(1985/2008, p. 2). Hence, Derrida chose the French term deconstruction which is 
connected to a mechanical sense of disassembling the parts of a whole, 
deconstructing or dismantling a machine for transportation elsewhere (1985/2008, 
p. 2; Peeters, 2010/2013, p. 160). To use words such as troubling, problematising, 
or, as Derrida does, the idea of invasion (1972/2002, p. 39), suggests that the old 
system is still accessible but it is sufficiently infiltrated or undone that it will no 
longer occupy its original hegemonic place of authority and power. Via 
deconstruction, the old system has been dismantled and transported to another 
place, where it exists again, but without the hegemonic structures and supports 
that were originally part of that system. In the context of this study, heterosexual 
relationship still exists after my deconstruction of its patriarchal practices, but it 
has the potential to exist in a new format, one ordered from non-patriarchal ideas 
and practices. Deconstruction is not annihilation, quite the contrary; it is 
affirmation of an ethical position, particularly in response to the other (Caputo, 
1997a, p. 53; Critchley, 2007, pp. 28, 41; Derrida, 1995a, pp. 167-168; Smith, 
2005). 
Deconstruction as affirmative response to the other 
Derrida’s deconstruction of binary oppositions that uphold western metaphysics is 
a response to the other, which is regarded as the lesser, within those oppositions. 
In an interview, Derrida speaks clearly about deconstruction as affirmation of the 
other: 
Deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an alterity which 
necessarily calls, summons or motivates it. Deconstruction is therefore 
vocation – a response to a call. The other, as the other than self . . . precedes 
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philosophy and necessarily invokes and provokes the subject before any 
genuine questioning can begin. It is in this rapport with the other that 
affirmation expresses itself. (1995a, p. 168) 
With reference to the work of Levinas (1961/1969, 1974/1998; see Caputo, 
1997a, p. 127) on ethical relationship with the other, Derrida makes this clear 
connection between deconstruction and the call of the other. Later in this chapter I 
develop Levinas’ ideas of the other that are helpful for this study. This 
development will further explain the idea of the other as it is introduced here, and 
used in this study. In conceptualising heterosexual relationship within the context 
of a hegemonic patriarchal framework this study takes the other to be women. In 
this way, this study, in deconstructing heterosexual relationship, has an 
affirmative response to women as the other in patriarchal heterosexual 
relationships.  
Deconstruction as plurality of meaning 
Différance is the neologism coined by Derrida (1968/1973b) that best explains the 
possibility of plural meanings for a signifier or word.  Différance – combining 
difference, differing, deferring – refers to both the difference, or the gap between 
signs, that produces signs, and the difference of the sign to the thing or concept 
signified, and the ongoing deferral of full meaning in regard to the signified 
(Culler, 1982, p. 97; Derrida, 1968/1973b; Johnson, 1981, p. ix).  
In agreement with Saussure (1915/1974, pp. 118, 120), the forerunner of 
semiotics and structuralism, Derrida argues that signs in language are not 
positively related, producing meaning in themselves, but rather, a sign is nothing 
in itself until related to a different sign (Culler, 1982, p. 99; Derrida, 1968/1973b, 
pp. 142-143; 1972/2002, pp. 23-24). Signs are not only an effect of the difference 
between them, but the movement or ongoing difference between signs produces 
difference (Culler, 1982, p. 97; Derrida, 1968/1973b, p. 138). This production of 
difference is first related to what the signifier signifies. In critiquing the dominant 
western metaphysical assumption that speech provides direct access to 
consciousness, and in disagreement with Saussure (1915/1974), where “the voice 
is consciousness itself” (Derrida, 1972/2002, p. 20), Derrida argues that the sign 
and the signified are separate. The signifier, whether in speech or writing, is 
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different to the signified, hence it cannot provide direct access to the signified 
(1968/1973b, p. 138-141). This leads to the final understanding of différance, as 
the production of deferral, or continual postponement, of complete meaning. A 
positive way to say this is that différance suggests there is the possibility of a 
plurality of different meanings attached to the signifier. “[D]ifférance is . . . the 
possibility of conceptuality” (Derrida, 1968/1973b, p. 140). This does not mean 
that any meaning can be arbitrarily connected to the signifier. Rather, multiple 
possible meanings relates to “an openness to the other” (Derrida, 1995a, p. 173), 
that is not random, but relates to that which the system has “ignored or forgotten” 
(Nealon, 1993, p. 101). Inclusion of “other” meaning challenges and disturbs the 
fixed identity or system (Stocker, 2006, p. 176). In my study, deconstruction as 
multiple possible meanings produces different interpretations of heterosexual 
relationship, a patriarchal version, and more ethical egalitarian versions.  
Deconstruction as the subject inscribed in language 
Not unlike Foucault (1980, p. 117; 1969/2002a, p. 54) who regards the subject as 
constituted, or spoken into existence through discourse, Derrida regards the 
subject as being “inscribed in language” (1968/1973b, p. 145; 1995a, p. 175). In 
the context of Derrida’s deconstruction of western metaphysics and the place of 
the subject in such, he says, “The subject is not some metalinguistic substance or 
identity, some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in language. My 
work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it simply tries to resituate it” (1995a, 
p. 175). In my study the subject is taken to be situated and inscribed in language. 
The subject experiences their subjectivity as a result of how they position 
themselves, or how they are positioned, in conversations with their heterosexual 
partners. The subject inscribed in language also means the subject must use 
language to present a version of their subjectivity.  
Deconstruction in my study thus has five applications. Deconstruction is 
understood as a double action of being within an institution while deconstructing 
or destabilising that institution. The reversal of a hierarchical relationship while 
placing that reversal under erasure and applying a new concept to the relationship 
is another application of deconstruction as double. Second, deconstruction is not 
annihilation but a troubling or disabling of the original hierarchical system so that 
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alternatives to that system’s position are possible. In destabilising the system, the 
third application of deconstruction for this study is to affirmatively respond to the 
other, the lesser of the hierarchical pair. The other is that which the system has 
ignored, which is its “very condition of possibility” (Lechte, 1994, p. 107). 
Related to being for the other in deconstruction is the possibility of multiple 
meanings because of différance in language. This multiplicity of meanings is 
guided by the other whom the system does not adequately recognise. Finally, 
deconstruction means that the subject is not present without language. This 
implies that language not only inscribes the subject, but that the subject must use 
language to present a version of their subjectivity. My interpretation and analysis 
of the versions of subjectivity offered in this study is guided by “an openness 
towards the other” (Derrida, 1995a, p. 173). I now move from these applications 
of deconstruction, to the means by which deconstruction is applied in this study.  
The means of deconstruction 
In this study there are five means by which deconstruction is applied. Beginning 
with positioning theory, I proceed with an explanation of these.  
Positioning theory 
Positioning theory (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999) and its constituent concept 
subject position posit subjectivity as multiple and contradictory, and hence open 
to change and political agency (Davies & Harré, 1999, pp. 35, 49; Gavey, 1989, p. 
464; Weedon, 1997, p. 21). The concept, subject position, was first introduced 
into the social sciences by Hollway (1984) in her study on heterosexual relations 
and gendered subjectivity: 
Discourses make available positions for subjects to take up. These positions 
are in relation to other people. Like the subject and object of a sentence . . . 
women and men are placed in relation to each other through meanings 
which a particular discourse makes available. (p. 236)  
I explain this concept, subject position, in the context of heterosexual relationship. 
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Subject position and relational subjectivity  
In the context of heterosexual relationships, the moment one partner speaks in a 
conversation, with language that makes sense, they use discursive material 
because they use words that have a common meaning. They are producing, or 
reproducing, and entering into exchanging discursive material (Winslade, 2005, 
pp. 352-353).  As they speak, they either tacitly or intentionally (van Langenhove 
& Harré, 1999, pp. 22-23) enunciate with “illocutionary force” a speaking 
position from which they expect the other person will respond (Winslade, 2005, 
pp. 352, 362, fn. 2). This initial speaking by a partner structures the relationship at 
that moment according to a moral sense of who has the speaking rights, and who 
has a duty to respond in a certain way (Harré, Moghaddam, Pilkerton Cairnie, 
Rothbart, & Sabat, 2009, pp. 7-8; Linehan & McCarthy, 2000. p. 442; van 
Langenhove & Harré, 1999, p. 20; Winslade, 2005, p. 353). Hicks (1996, p. 107), 
uses the term “moment to moment ‘oughtness’”, which I think helpfully names 
this moral sense that two partners have in responding to each other in a 
conversation (Winslade, 2005, p. 353). To connect this “moment to moment 
oughtness” to discourse, I refer to Parker, who offers an analogy using Althusser’s 
(1971) thoughts on the appeal of ideology. Parker writes “the discourse is hailing 
us, shouting ‘hey you there’ and making us listen as a certain type of person . . . 
[directing] what we are expected to do when addressed” (1992, pp. 9-10). 
“Moment to moment oughtness”, the hailing shout of discourse, highlights the 
discursive power that is present in conversations when one partner speaks, 
intentionally or implicitly, from a subject position that demands the other partner 
respond from an asymmetrical subject position. Even though I have made use of 
conversation here as a discursive product to illustrate positioning, as that is where 
it is most relevant to my study, positioning occurs in all the forms discourse takes.   
A heterosexual couple can speak from symmetrical subject positions. But that 
which this study initially explores is the “production of relational subjectivity” 
(Drewery, 2005), where patriarchal discourses tend to make asymmetrical subject 
positions available, offering a woman partner subject positions subordinate to her 
male partner. I use the verb offering as, even though there is a “moment to 
moment oughtness” in the conversations, the offered subject position can be 
refused, making way for alternate positions to the one initially offered (Davies, 
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1991; Davies & Harré, 1999, pp. 39-40; van Langenhove & Harré, 1999, pp. 16-
20).  
Positioning theory as a means of deconstruction has three important consequences 
for this study. Language is understood as “a site of political struggle” (Weedon, 
1997, p. 79), as meanings are not fixed, but are open to contestation and 
deconstruction. Language gains power and meaning from its discursive context, a 
context which can also be deconstructed (Derrida, 1972/1977a, p. 12). Similarly, 
subjectivity cannot be fixed as it is dependent upon the discursive context and the 
moment to moment hailings.  
In this study a central political interest, to take Weedon’s (1997, p. 40) phrase, is 
patriarchy and its expression in heterosexual relationship. Discourses of 
coupledom represent various political interests, “vying for status and power” (p. 
40). Heterosexual coupledom then, as a site of a contest for power, shapes 
available subjectivities for men and for women. It is the concept of positioning 
that offers possibilities for the woman partner to be “an active but not sovereign 
protagonist” (Weedon, 1997, p. 40) in the contest for her subjectivity.  
Decomposition and Mo(ve)ment 
“Decomposition” (Barthes, 1977; Davies et al., 2006) is a helpful poststructural 
tool for addressing the complexity and messiness of the slow process of 
transforming the effects of a dominant discourse on the material body. 
“Mo(ve)ment” (Davies et al., 2006) refers to the moment by moment 
transformation that takes place at the same time as decomposition, from one non-
preferred discourse to a preferred discourse, or at least to a subject position that is 
more agentic. Davies et al. (2006) take the term, decomposition, from Barthes 
(1977, p. 63), who proposed decomposition as a means to change, given the 
impossibility of there being anywhere to go outside of discourse and its 
constituting effects. Barthes (1977, p. 63) writes:  
In order to destroy, in short, we must be able to overleap. But overleap 
where? Into what language?  Into which site of good conscience and bad 
faith? Whereas by decomposing, I agree to accompany such decomposition, 
to decompose myself as well, in the process: I scrape, catch, and drag.  
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Barthes (1977, p. 63) uses the metaphor of breaking down a lump of sugar in a 
glass of water to illustrate decomposition. Davies et al. (2006) join decomposition 
with deconstruction and mo(ve)ment: in their particular situation, as feminist 
writers they are transforming from a liberal humanist discourse to a 
poststructuralist position. 
In this mo(ve)ment, we see the possibility of a different discursive 
constitution opened up, first through a critical poststructuralist 
deconstruction, and second through work on comprehending the processes 
of our own subjectification and decomposing those areas of fixity that are 
tied to discourses we are working to make unthinkable. (p. 100) 
Davies et al. connect deconstruction to mo(ve)ment and decomposition in the 
transformation process. Decomposition and mo(ve)ment add to deconstruction by 
providing a graphic and visceral sense of the complex and difficult transformation 
process involved in movements from one discourse to another.   
Mastery and submission/Utilisation and accommodation  
In conjunction with decomposition and mo(ve)ment, I utilise Butler’s (1997a) 
concepts of mastery and submission, which originate with Althusser (1971) and 
are explicated and applied by Davies (2006). Mastery and submission are 
concepts that shed light on how individuals become subjects of discourse, both as 
a result of direct constitution through discursive power (submission), and then the 
redirection of power from the subject as effective agentic work (mastery).  
In the context of this study, as a male researcher studying women’s subjectivity 
and heterosexual relationships, I prefer not to use the words mastery and 
submission, as they are affiliated with patriarchal meanings. Davies, in 
commenting on Butler’s work and its application for practice writes: 
What Butler does not do, as a philosopher, is link her analysis to the details 
of everyday lives in educational or other settings. That linkage is left to 
those of us working in the professions, who want to see what implications 
her thought has for practice. (2006, p. 425) 
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For me, a male researcher studying women’s subjectivity, Davies’ comment 
provides a means of escape from using Butler’s terms, “mastery and submission”, 
to applying terms that more appropriately fit with my study’s context.  However, 
before changing, for this study’s purposes, the words mastery and submission, I 
explain what Butler means by them, in acknowledgement of their conceptual 
contribution to this study. 
Foucault suggests that there is a paradoxical double action in forming the subject 
(Bendix Petersen, 2008, p. 59; Davies, 2006, p. 425). Foucault writes:  
It is a form of power that makes individual subjects. There are two 
meanings of the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his (sic) own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and 
makes subject to. (2002b, p. 331) 
Butler elaborates on Foucault’s work here in explaining the paradoxical double 
action of forming the subject, particularly with reference to the words, “of 
power”, in the last sentence:  
 Power acts on the subject in at least two ways: first, as what makes the 
subject possible, the condition of its possibility and its formative occasion, 
and second, as what is taken up and reiterated in the subject’s “own” acting. 
As a subject of power (where “of” connotes both “belonging to” and 
“wielding”), the subject eclipses the conditions of its own emergence; it 
eclipses power with power. The conditions not only make possible the 
subject but enter into the subject’s formation. They are made present in the 
acts of that formation and in the acts of the subject that follow. (Butler, 
1997a, p. 14) 
While power can appear as though it originated with the subject it is on these 
terms a resignification of the power that has originally formed the subject from 
discourse (Butler, 1995, p. 135; Stern, 2000, p. 113). It is to this paradoxical 
double action of power on the subject that the terms mastery and submission are 
applied by Butler. “What Butler’s theoretical work has so powerfully elaborated 
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are the paradoxical conditions through which the accomplishment of subjecthood 
is made possible” (Davies, 2006, p. 425). 
The individual emerges as a subject within a discourse, by accommodation to the 
dominant discursive repertoires, and then skilfully utilising knowledge of those 
repertoires agentically. The words, accommodation to discourse, and utilisation of 
discourse, replace submission and mastery in this study. Drewery refers to this 
same accommodation and utilisation of discourse: “With the benefit of Foucault’s 
work it is possible to think about knowing how to go on as part of being an 
accomplished discourse user, or as knowing the discursive context” (2005, p. 
314).  
Performativity of gender 
An important means of resisting patriarchal discourses and their constituting 
effects is to deconstruct gender. To do this deconstructive work I employ Butler’s 
(1990/2006) theory of performativity. 
In developing her theory of performativity, Butler challenges the conventional 
view that sex and gender are naturally derived from the biology of human beings. 
Butler argues that sex and gender are discursively and culturally constructed, with 
sex itself being gendered (Butler, 1990/2006, pp. xxx-xxxi; Jagger, 2007. pp. 1-2). 
The theory of performativity stands on the argument that gender identity is not the 
stable category of the masculine and feminine, or man and woman, as the 
heterosexual matrix2 and phallogocentrism would have it. Gender identity is not 
ontologically prior to language, but is rather a performative effect of language 
(Butler, 1990/2006, pp. 22-34; Chambers & Carver, 2008, p. 41; Jagger, 2007, p. 
18). The heterosexual institution has set up the binary gender system of woman 
and man assuming as an ontological fact, prior to language, a natural and ordered 
relationship between sex, gender, and desire (Butler, 1990/2006, p. 31). If sexual 
and gender identity is not metaphysically prior to language, but is the result of 
language and the heterosexual and phallogocentric urge to power, then “gender is 
always a doing . . . not a noun” (Butler, 1990/2006, p. 34) that occurs from the 
                                                 
2 There is an assumption that gender expresses sex, that both sex and gender are stable with male 
expressing a masculine gender and female expressing a feminine gender with their binary sets of 
characteristics, which are hierarchically defined and practiced in heterosexuality. 
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“repetitious citations of what we understand culturally as sex and gender” 
(Chambers & Carver, 2008, p. 43). Or, as Butler states, “There is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively 
constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (1990/2006, p. 
34). Heterosexual and phallogocentric institutions, through power, condone 
certain practices, and punish others, which result in the setting up of gender 
discourses, in which people do gender performatively, from which is produced the 
idea/performance of gender as natural and normal behaviour for male and female 
(Butler, 1990/2006, p. 190).  
Agency within performativity 
The theory of performativity calls forward a poststructural understanding of 
agency. Any “subject” or “doer” of the deed (Butler, 1990/2006, p. 34) is 
swamped by discourse. Consequently, Butler writes “gender performativity 
involves the difficult labour of deriving agency from the power regimes which 
constitute us, and which we oppose” (1995, p. 136). The subject is historically and 
culturally constituted by discourse – “power regimes” – and not apart from them. 
In another context Butler writes, “The historicity of the discourse implies the way 
in which history is constitutive of discourse itself. It is not simply that discourses 
are located in histories, but that they have their own constitutive historical 
character” (1993, p. 282, fn. 7). By grasping how one has been historically 
constituted as a certain gender – to act and speak in certain gender normative 
ways which fit with a specific historical and cultural milieu – the possibility of 
agency as the reworking of that historically constitutive signifier now has 
potential.   
This reworking of the historically constitutive signifier, or resignification, is the 
required action that performs agency for the subject. In order to theorise agency 
and transformation within discursive regimes (Jagger, 2007, p. 68), I employ 
further Derridean concepts – iterability, temporality, and citationality (see 
Derrida, 1972/1977a, 1982b; Butler, 1995, p. 134; Jagger, 2007, pp. 31, 65-69) – 
which I explain in the following paragraphs.  
The term performativity is taken by Butler from Austin (1976; Butler, 1995), and 
it is Derrida’s reformulation of this term’s meaning that guided Butler’s use of it. 
 28 
Derrida responds to Austin’s (1976) idea that the intention of the speaker appears 
to be the binding power of an act, such as the pronouncement of a marriage at a 
marriage ceremony, the opening of a meeting, or the launching of a ship. Derrida 
argues that the power is due to the idea that the words are a “‘coded’ and iterable 
utterance . . . identifiable as conforming with an iterable model . . . identifiable in 
some way as a ‘citation’” (19721977a, p. 18). It is because the words are a 
citation, for a specific repeatable and temporal purpose, that power is attributable 
to them. Butler takes up this idea, writing:  
The binding power . . . is more properly attributable to a citational force of 
the speaking, the iterability that establishes the authority of the speech act . . 
. . [E]very “act” is an echo or citational chain, and it is its citationality that 
constitutes its performative force. (1993, p. 282, fn. 5) 
Iterability is Derrida’s notion, following différance, which conceives the 
difference and deferral of meaning in the performativity of language (1972/1977a, 
pp. 12, 17-18). Citationality is thus reformulated, not as mechanical repetition of 
the same meaning, but as an iterable performative language event involving the 
possibility of difference or otherness of meaning each time citation occurs (Butler, 
1993, p. 245, fn. 8; Jagger, 2007, pp. 67-68). In the context of the performativity 
of gender discourse then, citationality concerns the repetition of gender norms and 
conventions. Iterability as part of citationality concerns the repeatability of those 
norms, but always with the possibility of alteration and difference. Butler writes: 
By virtue of this reiteration . . . gaps and fissures are opened up . . . as that 
which escapes or exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined 
or fixed by the repetitive labor of that norm. This instability is the 
deconstituting possibility in the very process of repetition. (1993, p. 10)  
Because a subject is only temporarily constituted, Derrida’s notion of temporality, 
in the context of gender discourse, refers to the requirement to performatively 
repeat gender norms so the subject is continually a certain gender. However, 
iterability, as the possibility of an “‘impure’ performative” (1972/1977a, p. 17) of 
discursive gender norms, makes room for agency in the gaps between gender 
norms and the performative actions of the subject. Butler (1995, p. 135) 
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summarises this whole process of repetition of norms to resignification as the 
condition for agency: 
That this is a repeated process, an iterable procedure, is precisely the 
condition of agency within discourse. If a subject were constituted once and 
for all, there would be no possibility of a reiteration of those constituting 
conventions or norms. That the subject is that which must be constituted 
again and again implies that it is open to formulations that are not fully 
constrained in advance. Hence, the insistence on finding agency as 
resignification. . . .  [I]f the subject is a reworking of the very discursive 
processes by which it is worked, then “agency” is to be found in the 
possibilities of resignification opened up by discourse.   
For the purposes of this study, performativity of gender is understood as the 
repetitive practice of gender norms, dictated by the heterosexual matrix and 
phallogocentrism – common gender discourses, which constitute the subjectivity 
of the subject. What looks like the expression of a naturalised gender is the 
repetition of gender norms which constitute gender subjectivity. Performativity 
provides agency by its relationship to unstable historically-based gender 
discourses, and the potential for resignification of the subject either between 
discourses or within a discourse. This resignification potentially comes about in 
the moments when gender norms are repeatedly expressed, or iterably cited, 
because they are temporal in their constitutive effects on the subject.  
The power/knowledge nexus 
In poststructural terms, power and knowledge are intimately connected, being 
productive of one another (Davies, et al., 2002, p. 297; Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 
27; Gavey, 2005, p. 86). The “power/knowledge nexus” (Gavey, 2005, p. 86) is 
discursively located (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 100). Of the two French words for 
knowledge that Foucault utilised in his work, savoir is the word that is enmeshed 
with power. Savoir can be defined in English as “implicit knowledge”, “specific 
rationalities”, or “rationalities of power” (Davies, et al., 2002, pp. 294-295; 
Foucault, 1966/2000d, p. 261; 2002b, p. 329). Savoir is a special, popular, often 
assumed, implicit social knowledge that is different to the formal and academic 
knowledges found in institutions of learning and academic texts, what Foucault 
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(1966/2000d, p. 261-262) calls connaisance. Implicit knowledge is common 
knowledge that works together with power to shape relationships and constitute 
identity. Power and implicit knowledge cannot be separated in the relationship 
between discourse and subject.  
Power relations 
In Foucauldian terms, power does not have an essence nor is it monopolised by 
one group over another. Deleuze writes of Foucault’s view of power: 
Power has no essence; it is simply operational. It is not an attribute but a 
relation: the power-relation is the set of possible relations between forces, 
which passes through the dominated forces no less than through the 
dominating. (1986/1988b, p. 27) 
Elsewhere Deleuze explains Foucault’s view of power-relations as lines in a 
relationship which can be broken: “Foucault talked of lines of sedimentation but 
also of lines of ‘breakage’ and of ‘fracture’” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 159). In 
Foucault’s words, “as soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of 
resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its grip in 
determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy” (Foucault, 1977/1996, 
p. 224).  
One of the ways Foucault explains power relations is with the French word that 
translates into English as “agonism” (2002b, p. 342). Agonism, which Foucault 
based on the Greek agōnisma, meaning “a combat” (2002b, p. 348, n. 3), suggests 
“a relationship of mutual incitement and struggle”, not so much confrontation but 
“permanent provocation” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 342). In this study, agonism as 
“mutual incitement and struggle . . . [a]permanent provocation” refers to the 
struggle between patriarchal and egalitarian practices of heterosexual relationship, 
along with the adjustments that a woman partner makes in an effort to keep her 
hope for egalitarian practices alive.   
States of domination 
For Foucault (1984/2000c, p. 283), power relations are “mobile, allowing the 
various participants to adopt strategies modifying them”. In contrast, he discusses 
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“states of domination in which the power relations . . . remain blocked, frozen”. 
This state of domination comes about, Foucault says, “by economic, political, or 
military means” (1984/2000c, p. 283). Foucault continues in explaining what he 
means by “states of domination”:  
When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power 
relations, immobilising them and preventing any reversibility of movement 
by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be 
called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of 
freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained 
and limited. (1984/2000c, p. 283) 
Foucault makes it clear that “power relations understood as strategic games 
between liberties” (1984/2000c, p. 299) are different from states of domination, 
where there is limited freedom, and a great deal of constraint. I think this 
difference between power relations and states of domination is worth noting in the 
light of possible ambiguity, where, at times, Foucault seems to imply a 
relationship between them (see Foucault, 2000a, p. 225; 1984/2000c, pp. 283, 
299). Best and Kellner (1991, p. 65) offer a succinct summary of Foucault’s 
position on power and domination:  
He continues to hold that all social relations are characterized by power and 
resistance . . . but he distinguishes now between power and domination, 
seeing domination as the solidification of power relations such that they 
become relatively fixed in asymmetrical forms and the spaces of liberty and 
resistance thus become limited. 
I would hold to this view of the difference between “power relations” and “states 
of domination”, and apply it in this thesis. Domination is applied in this study as 
the constraint of freedom and limited space for resistance.      
Davies et al. (2002, pp. 298, 310, 312) have also applied “states of domination” to 
Foucault’s reference to “a relationship of violence [that] acts upon a body or upon 
things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it closes of all possibilities” 
(Foucault, 2002b, p. 340). Foucault’s definition of “a relationship of violence”, 
appears to fit within the parameters for a state of domination where resistance is 
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“blocked, frozen”. Davies et al. go on to show how “states of domination” arise 
not only through “economic, political, or military means”, which may include 
violence, but they can also occur through non-violent means: “the repeated, 
minute accretions of everyday practices [that] generate sedimentations of lines of 
force” (2002, p. 312).  
Productive power 
In Foucauldian terms power is not only negative, constraining and limiting, but it 
is also a positive force, it produces pleasure and possibilities (Davies et al., 2002, 
p. 297). Foucault says: 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to 
say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes 
power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t 
only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. (1980, p. 
119) 
The constitution of productive power is understood with the Foucauldian concept 
of governmentality (see Foucault, 1978/2002e; McNay, 1994, p. 113, 124; Rose, 
1998, p. 29).  
Governmentality 
Foucault defines governmentality as the encounter between technologies of power 
and technologies of the self. Technologies of power concern the conduct of the 
conduct of others. Technologies of the self concern the operation of the self on the 
self, with or without the direct help of others, for the purposes of transformation 
to a preferred mode of conduct and state of existence (Foucault, 2000a, p. 225). 
Through governmentality, Foucault developed a theory to demonstrate how 
people are disciplined productive units for the state or society. Technologies of 
power and of the self became the way the state governed or regulated and 
produced its citizens, through the ‘“conduct of conducts’, and a management of 
possibilities” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 341).  
In applying Foucault’s technologies and governmentality in this study, I turn to 
two definitions by Rose (1998, 1999a). Rose defines technology as “any assembly 
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structured by a practical rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal” 
(1998, p. 26). And, governmentality is defined “as ‘the conduct of conduct’: 
programmes, strategies, techniques for acting upon the action of others towards 
certain ends” (1999a, p. xxi). The relationship between the definitions of 
technology and government is clear with the dual reference toward some goal or 
ends. The technology supplies the knowledge which is presided over by a goal. 
And government is the conduct of others’ conduct through, “programmes, 
strategies, techniques”, toward the goal defined by the technology.  
As well as technologies of power and of self, Foucault refers to two other 
technologies that are useful for analysis in this study. These two other 
technologies are technologies of production, and technologies of sign systems. 
Technologies of production permit production, transformation, or manipulation of 
things, and technologies of sign systems permit the use of signs, meanings, and 
communication systems (2000a, pp. 224-225).  It needs to be noted that the 
technology of production is completely separate from power as productive.  
While Foucault primarily related governmentality to the encounter between 
technologies of power, and the self, the other two technologies, production, and 
sign systems, can be inferred from his work as involved in governmental 
processes (see Foucault, 1971/2000b, pp. 337-339; 1978/2002e, pp. 219-220; 
McNay, 1992, pp. 124-126; Pritsch, 2004, p. 138). Rose’s definition of 
government (1999a) further supports the inclusion of the two technologies, 
production, and sign systems, for analysis of the data. Of the technologies of 
production and sign systems, Pritsch (2004) says they are “considered to be 
‘political technologies’ that install relations between the self and sociopolitical 
institutions” (p. 138). This relationship between the self and sociopolitical 
institutions, and the associated technologies of production and sign systems, is 
important for understanding governmentality in this study, where heterosexual 
relationship is regarded as a sociopolitical institution.  
From deconstruction as ethic to shaping an ethical 
relationship 
The main focus in this chapter up until this point has been on an ethic of 
deconstruction which is open to the other. The final section of this chapter has as 
 34 
its focus shaping an ethical relationship with the other. In between these two main 
sections of this chapter, is the next section, which engages some of Deleuze’s 
thinking as an intersection between deconstruction as an ethic and shaping an 
ethical relationship. 
An ontology of difference 
In chapter six I begin an analysis of the data from the first group of women 
involved in this study. To do this analysis I make use of Deleuze’s “ontology of 
difference” (May, 2005, p. 26; see Deleuze, 1962/1983, 1966/1988a, 1968/1990), 
and “the rhizome” figuration (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1988). Traditional 
western metaphysics has conceived of ontology as investigating what exists 
(being) with the assumption that there is a transcendent Being or essence behind 
what exists. It is this idea that Derrida questioned through his deconstruction of 
the binaries that western metaphysics employed in support of its position on a 
transcendent essence. Deleuze, however, does not deconstruct the binaries that 
have been created from the idea of a transcendent essence. Rather, Deleuze 
develops a whole new ontology which discards the transcendent, replacing it with 
“immanence of life” (Colebrook, 2002a, p. xxiv), which is the presence of being 
(life) without any divisions or hierarchies (Deleuze, 1968/1990, p. 178; May, 
2005, p. 34).  
Within Deleuze’s new version of ontology, difference is no longer conceived as 
qualitative difference between entities such as the case with hierarchical binaries. 
Difference is conceived as the living multiple expressions, and potential 
expressions, of the living immanent being (no longer transcendent and removed) 
which is involved and complicated in all that is in the world (Deleuze, 1968/1990, 
pp. 16, 175-176; May, 2005, pp 38-40). To enable his new ontology to work 
without reverting back to the traditional view of a transcendent being behind all 
that is, Deleuze arrived at ideas that could integrate potential and possibilities with 
that which is actual and sensible in the world. These ideas are called the virtual 
and the actual (Deleuze, 1966/1988a). 
The virtual and the actual 
The virtual and the actual are to do with a new arrangement of time, which works 
in conjunction with all that is in the world, and all that can be. The virtual is the 
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past that is the common ontological immanent being of all that is in this world. 
The actual is the many different expressions of that virtual past, but that past is 
still present for there to be a present. The past and present exist differently, and 
they coexist. In Deleuze’s words:  
The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two 
elements which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, 
and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all 
presents pass. (1966/1988a, p. 59) 
It is in the present that the virtual past is actualised and experienced directly (May, 
2005, pp. 19, 47). May (2005, p. 38) offers an analogy from Japanese origami 
which explains in a tangible way Deleuze’s ontology of difference. Japanese 
origami is the folding of a single piece of paper into different arrangements 
resembling anything such as animals, plants, or people. The analogy is useful if 
the focus is on the paper and the folding: paper folding and unfolding itself. The 
flat piece of paper, before any folding or unfolding, is likened to being, or the 
virtual, or virtual difference (May, 2005, p. 60). This piece of paper exists with 
potential to be actualised into any number of different possibilities which are not 
fixed but temporal. As the paper folds, unfolds, and refolds into new arrangements 
these arrangements are likened to the paper’s modes, the expression of the paper, 
or the actualising of the paper’s virtual difference. But these arrangements are still 
the original sheet of paper itself, which helps explain immanence and the co-
existence of the past and the present. Each expression of the paper is part of a 
process of becoming, not a completed being or substance. The arrangements, or 
expression, of the original flat sheet of paper are likened to identities that exist in 
the present. These are spatial differences or identities – “difference in degree” 
(Deleuze, 1966/1988a, p. 38). Whereas the piece of paper before, and during its 
folding, unfolding, and refolding is analogous “of difference in kind; it is a virtual 
and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers” (Deleuze, 
1966/1988a, p. 38). With that sheet of paper lies all virtual difference when it 
comes to the potential actual temporal differences, arrangements it can fulfil in the 
present (May, 2005, p. 55).  
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Virtual difference is also the future. Deleuze (1962/1983, p. 48) says the future is 
the repeat of the past, not a repeat as in the same events or actions, but a repeat of 
difference. Virtual difference lies in the future as it does in the past. “What recurs 
eternally is difference itself. What faces us always is difference, difference in 
kind, difference that has yet to be congealed into identities” (May, 2005, p. 60). 
Returning to the origami to illustrate the virtual difference, the potential for 
different arrangements will always be past, present, and future, and the only time 
there will be an actualised arrangement will be in the present.  The past is 
constituted by difference in kind, the present is constituted by actualised 
difference, and the future is constituted by the return of difference (May, 2005, p. 
62).  
Not only is this outline of Deleuze’s ontology of difference intended as a basis for 
understanding his thinking, but it is foundational for the understandings I offer of 
the original (virtual) significance of the ideas and knowledges of a group of 
women who participated in this study. In Chapter Six Deleuze’s ontology serves 
as a philosophical basis for giving preference to the (virtual) ideas and 
knowledges of those women for this study. This preference continues to be 
applied in Chapters Seven and Eight.   
The rhizome figuration 
After the development of his ontology of difference, Deleuze, along with Guattari 
(1972/1977, 1980/1988) and Parnet (1977/2006), applied this ontology in political 
and social thought (Colebrook, 2002a, p. 34; May, 2005, pp. 134-135). In the 
application they develop a number of figurations. These figurations are commonly 
used by subsequent employers of their material in application to a number of 
disciplines and to research (see Davies, 2009b; Davies & Gannon, 2009; Lather, 
2007; Mazzei and Jackson, 2009; Mazzei & McCoy, 2010; St Pierre, 2002; 
Winslade, 2009; Wyatt, Gale, Gannon & Davies, 2010). One such figuration that I 
utilise often in this study is that of the “rhizome” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1988).  
The essence of the rhizome is connections; connections between diversity and 
difference, that is, connection between anything where connection is viable 
(Grosz 1994, pp. 199-200). There are three important features of the rhizome as 
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connection. First, there is the multiplicity of connections that can come about 
from all the different possible actualisations that lay in the virtual. Second, any of 
these multiplicity of connections can be broken, by disruptions, breaks, 
discontinuities, thus opening potential for other connections and potential. An 
actualisation can be unfolded, making way for another different actualisation to be 
folded in. Third, the rhizome is based on experimentation, searching for 
actualisations, previously not thought of, from the virtual.  
In regard to the application of Deleuze’s work, Mazzei and McCoy (2010, p. 504) 
advise researchers: “Use the figurations presented by Deleuze to think research 
and data differently. . . . [T]hink with Deleuzian concepts in a way that might 
produce previously unthought questions, practices, and knowledge”. The rhizome 
figuration offers me an opportunity to provide such analysis of the data this study 
generated, particularly in Chapter Six. Deleuze’s concepts not only provide a link 
between deconstruction as ethic and shaping an ethical relationship, they also 
contribute to a theoretical basis for the emergence of that relationship, as I go on 
to discuss now.  
An ethical and egalitarian heterosexual 
relationship 
One of the ways Deleuze’s concepts, the virtual and the actual, help in the 
analyses in this study is to provide part of a theoretical basis for subverting the 
historically dominant practice of a patriarchal framework interpreting women’s 
thought and voice (Lerner, 1986, 1993). With Deleuze’s theory, the ideas and 
knowledges of a group of women becomes the virtual from which all else in this 
study is actualised. One virtual idea that this study actualises is an ethical and 
egalitarian heterosexual relationship. I now turn to the theoretical basis for 
shaping such relationship.  
The democracy to come 
In writing on the “democracy to come” Derrida applies the principle of différance. 
Derrida states that this “‘idea’ as event . . . will never present itself in the form of 
full presence” (1993/1994, pp. 81-82). Derrida does not mean democracy in the 
more familiar usage, as in democratic elections of governments, or governments 
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governing democratically. Rather he is talking about relationships with the other, 
people regarded as unlike or different from a populist norm. He alludes to war 
refugees and asylum seekers as an example of this other (2003/2005a, p. 149). 
Derrida does not mean that the democracy to come is some “indefinitely remote 
future assigned by some regulative Idea” (2003/2005a, p. 90). Rather, it seems 
that Derrida means the democracy to come, in his usual play with signs, can be 
understood as the democracy toward the other to come, and this event can happen 
in “a here and now” (2003/2005a, pp. 88-92, 148-149). The event of the 
democracy to come can occur where there is “an openness towards the other” 
(1995a, p. 173). This openness to the other has four important conditions which 
are applicable to this study.  
The first of these conditions is the other. I explain this condition of the other 
following the introduction to the other three conditions, but I name it first, as it is 
core to Derrida’s conceptuality of the democracy to come, and to this study. The 
second of the conditions for an openness toward the other is the offer of 
unconditional hospitality (Derrida, 1993/1994, pp. 81-82; 2003/2005a, p. 149). 
Derrida writes: “Unconditional hospitality exceeds juridical, political, or 
economic calculation. But no thing and no one happens or arrives without it” 
(2003/2005a, p. 149). The third condition is “the unconditionality of the gift or of 
forgiveness” (2003/2005a, p. 149). Unconditionality, is the operative word here, 
where the gift or forgiveness is given without any pre or post conditions for this 
event. The final condition for openness toward the other is that of justice 
(1993/1994, pp. 211-212; 2003/2005a, p. 88), which concerns fair and equal 
relationship with the other. St. Pierre in reference to the democracy to come, 
arrived at through these conditions, succinctly and attractively crystallizes its 
ethos:  
a promise those who work for social justice cannot not want. I think about 
this democracy often since it promises the possibility of different relations – 
relations more generous than those I live among, fertile relations in which 
people thrive. (2005, p. 972) 
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I model Derrida’s conditions for an openness toward the other in the democracy to 
come with two ethical norms that encompass a number of ethical and egalitarian 
practices. I detail these norms later in this chapter.   
I return to the first of Derrida’s conditions, the advent of the other. In my study 
when I refer to the other I am calling on both Derrida’s (1995a) and Levinas’s 
(1961/1969, 1974/1998) use of this term to first of all define who has been treated 
as inferior to, or colonised by, the dominant group. This use of the term “other” is 
not a reproduction of inequality but a device to name inequality that has been 
concealed by, or within, the dominant. Secondly, following Derrida and Levinas, I 
continue to use the term other as a title, but I use it with the philosophical intent of 
Levinas in redefining and giving priority to the other as a person, unique in their 
own right, and appropriately acknowledged apart from any dominant group. In my 
study the other is women in heterosexual relationships. To show the strategic and 
ethical importance of this term in this study, from this point on I will use the 
upper case “O” when referring to the Other of women in heterosexual 
relationships. In continuing to develop this concept of the other I turn to Levinas 
who, with his ideas on the other, has influenced poststructural thinkers and 
changed the course of philosophical thinking in the west (Lechte, 1994, p. 115; 
Derrida, 2001, p. 202).    
Levinas – ethics as first philosophy 
Levinas’ two major works (1961/1969, 1974/1998) argue for the priority of ethics. 
In his argument for “ethics as first philosophy” (Levinas, 1984/1989), Levinas 
critiques the history of western philosophy where the study of being, ontology, 
and the priority of knowledge over ethics had resulted in a philosophy that did not 
consider difference, the other, as separate and unique in their own right. Levinas 
(1961/1969, p. 43) writes, “Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: 
a reduction of the other to the same”. Atterton and Calarco (2005, p. 10) expand 
this argument and make Levinas’s critique palpable:  
By being placed under a concept, the Other falls within my powers, and is 
thus exposed to violence and disrespect. . . . It pertains to every philosophy 
that, as ontology, seeks to comprehend the otherness of the Other by 
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subsuming him or her under a concept that is thought within me, and thus in 
some sense the same as me. 
Ethics as first philosophy does not speak of temporality, as in ethics-came-in-
time-before-ontology-or-epistemology, but conceptually and functionally, as the 
most important idea and practice for understanding human existence (Morgan, 
2011, pp. 129-131). Ethics of a relational and social nature are first, because of 
“the breakdown of moral, religious, and philosophical certainty” (Atterton & 
Calarco, 2005, pp. 2-3; Levinas, 1995, pp. 194-195). This same ethical argument 
is called on in regard to human relations in addressing identity assumptions 
emanating from western philosophy, where the subject attempts to subsume under 
the subject difference, that is, anyone who is not the subject, thus making them the 
same as the subject. This same identity assumption in heterosexual relationship – 
the dominance and subsuming of a woman partner by the male partner through 
patriarchal practices – is what the work of Levinas will be called on to address in 
this study. Specifically, I utilise the work of Levinas in regard to women and their 
ideas and knowledges in heterosexual relationship as Other, where I argue that 
considerations of the Other become first priority, the ethical priority, in 
relationship. And this ethical priority is a response to the initiation or call of the 
Other. I now develop further a philosophical understanding of the other so that its 
ethical and conceptual importance for this study can be finely grasped. 
The singularity of the other in relationship  
An ethical heterosexual relationship, on the terms of Levinas’ ethics of the other, 
is thus dependent upon a “nontotalizable relation with the other” (Critchley, 1996, 
p. 41). Perpich argues that the complete alterity, or more precisely, the 
“singularity” (2008, p. 18) of the other is produced only after the nontotalizable 
relationship is established with the other. She states “singularity is not what this 
relationship recognizes, but what it produces” (Perpich, 2008, p. 189). When the 
subject engages with the other in a “nontotalizable” relationship, it is then that the 
other, “singularity”, is produced. 
It is important to note Levinas proposes that the relationship with the other is 
established by the initiating call of the other, and it is in response to this call that 
the “I”, the subject, then turn toward the other in relationship (Levinas, 
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1961/1969, pp. 194-201, 215). This turning toward the other by the subject is 
what interests Levinas, because it is then possible for an ethical relationship to be 
established, and the complete singularity of the other produced.  
The complete singularity of the other means there is no comparison between the 
subject and the other. The other is an “initiative” completely apart from the 
ontological self, totally separate and different, “other with an alterity constitutive 
of the very content of the other” (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 39). Perpich establishes 
this alterity, or singularity, in the human context:  
Each human being is a unique, irreplaceable self, irreducible to any of the 
attributes or qualities that could be used to describe her and would 
inevitably reduce her to what she has in common with others. (2008, p. 188) 
Singularity is a production of the social face to face relationship (Perpich, 2008, p. 
75). As Eco suggests, “Ethics are born in the presence of the Other” (2012, p. 89). 
Responding to the singularity of the other is one of the primary ethical stances in 
poststructural ethics. 
Caputo, a poststructural scholar researching and applying the work of Derrida and 
Levinas, states “ethics ends where singularity begins” (2000, p. 190). For Caputo, 
this means: ethical rules are provisional; ethical universals are inaccessible to the 
singular person; the future will need ethical responses we cannot foresee in the 
present; and generous giving of the gift, particularly love, in excess is required. 
Ethics is not dependent upon some abstract premise, but occurs “in the singular, in 
the unprecedented and unrepeatable situations of individual lives” (Caputo, 2000, 
p. 174).  
Following Caputo’s emphasis on ethical action for unique “individual lives”, 
Benhabib’s “two conceptions of self-other relations” in the form of “the 
generalised other” and “the concrete other” (1987, pp. 86-87), provide further 
development of Levinas’ ethics of the other. The generalised other standpoint 
tends to regard the moral worth of the other from the position of the subject – the 
values, desires, affects, and so on, that are held in common. There is an 
expectation that both parties are entitled to expect the same from each other – an 
assumed equality of rights and obligation. In contrast to the generalised other 
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standpoint, the concrete other standpoint seeks to understand the other from their 
unique position, and not from any level of commonality. Equity and 
complementary reciprocity are the norms that govern the relationship where the 
focus of behaviour is on the other person as a recognised, individual human being. 
While the concrete other is recognised as present within general humanity, their 
uniqueness and individuality is the focus of relationship, where their rights and 
requirements for life are recognised and given priority with actions depicting 
friendship, love, and care (Benhabib, 1987, p. 87). In what perhaps offers a 
summary of this discussion on the ethics of the other, Roffe writes “an ethical 
relation is based on avoiding all forms of totalisation, and responding to the call of 
the other without thereby reducing otherness to sameness” (2004, p. 41).  
Criticisms of Levinas’ work  
I have outlined thus far how I understand Levinas’ ethics of the other, and how 
this ethic is applied in this thesis in giving priority to women and their ideas and 
knowledges as the Other in heterosexual relationships. However, within Levinas’ 
work, either by its presence or its absence, there is material that seems to 
contradict his central thesis. I outline criticisms of this material before stating my 
position on those criticisms. The criticisms of Levinas’ work come mainly from 
feminist philosophers, who address possible contradictions in his thesis and his 
expression of it. These criticisms and contradictions can possibly collide with my 
use of Levinas and therefore require attention.    
First, there is argument that Levinas offers descriptions of the feminine that are 
defined through the masculine, or as secondary to the primary other (Chanter, 
1991; Irigaray, 1991; Sikka, 2001; see Levinas, 1961/1969, pp. 155-157, 258-
263). Secondly, Butler makes two observations on Levinas’ ideas of the ethical: 
First, the other who is persecuted in the context of violence or war is called on to 
be responsible for the persecutor as other and be reconciled to them (Butler, 2005, 
p. 92; see Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 111); second, Levinas’ seems to regard the 
religions of Judaism and Christianity as the authentic sources for ethical relations, 
while regarding the rise of other religions as a threat to this authenticity  (Butler, 
2005, p. 94; see Levinas, 1963/1990, p. 165). 
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A second group of criticisms of Levinas’ work are founded in an absence of 
material within his work rather than in a contradictory presence. This group raise 
questions in regard to Levinas’ application of his ethics. The first criticism of 
Levinas here is that he does not address gender at all and by not doing this he is 
participating in patriarchal discourse (Grosz, 1990, 1995; Loewenthal & Kunz, 
2005, p. 2). Related to this criticism, for those seeking justice, is Levinas’ refusal 
to specifically represent the other in conjunction with his idea of radical alterity 
(Sikka, 2001). 
I take different stances on each of these two groups of criticisms. In regard to the 
first group of criticisms, I agree, and distance myself from Levinas’ thought that is 
the focus of those criticisms. Perpich, a Levinas scholar, acknowledges that 
Levinas has “misrecognized [groups and] distorted [their lives] in fundamental 
ways by his remarks” (2008, p. 180). In the context of my study, I state 
specifically that women in heterosexual relationships as Other are not called on to 
forgive or be reconciled to their partners. My study represents women in 
heterosexual relationship as the Other based in the notion that priority is to be 
given to the Other and their ideas and knowledges because they have been 
subsumed by patriarchal ideas and practices.  
The second group of criticisms can be addressed by clearly understanding 
Levinas’ concept of alterity, and the associated politics that come as a result of 
recognition of alterity as the other. I draw on the work of Perpich (2008, pp. 180-
198) in addressing the second group of criticisms.  
The two criticisms of Levinas’ work in the second group tend to refer to alterity as 
difference in contrast to singularity. When the arguments mean alterity as 
difference there is always something used as the referent for comparison or 
contrast of that which is regarded as different. The referent in these arguments is 
often white masculine and middle-class as the norm for comparison or contrast 
with difference (Brown, 1993, p. 395; Perpich, 2008, pp. 183-184). Two examples 
for gender-based difference between men and women will help here. One of 
Sikka’s arguments, in her criticism, is that “with Levinas’s portrait of the 
feminine . . . he fails to imagine this Other as another like himself . . . as a subject, 
and to constitute her alterity on the basis of this recognition” (2001, p. 105). This 
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point reflects an understanding of alterity that is marked only against the referent 
of something else – white-middle class male in this case – and not in singularity. 
The second example from Chanter (1991) highlights the importance of, but 
difficulty in defining women without essentialising, and without contrasting them 
with men.  She concludes by suggesting that in defining woman in a fixed 
essentialised way, woman’s definition will “still be governed by its opposition to 
men” (Chanter, 1991, p. 144). Thus, in addressing this second group of criticisms 
of Levinas it is important to understand alterity as complete singularity, and not 
qualitative difference between groups or individuals. This understanding is 
foundational for responding to the criticisms, and it opens the way for a second 
argument in addressing them, specifically, the seeking of justice with the use of 
Levinas’ concept of radical alterity.   
The second argument relates to how justice can be achieved by marginalised 
different groups. The idea that affirmative recognition of social group differences 
will bring about justice is effectively challenged in the work of Brown (1993), 
Fraser (1997), and Nealon (1998). In brief, they argue that while arguments from 
difference will bring about some form of support for the marginalised groups 
because they are clearly disadvantaged, the argument from difference alone can 
depoliticize the group and assimilate them back into a system that requires deeper 
transformation. This form of “identity politics” can result in an antagonistic 
backlash toward the marginalised groups from the privileged, thus increasing the 
vulnerability of disadvantaged groups. While qualitative difference between 
groups is not to be ignored, this argument highlights the dangers of basing the call 
for justice solely on difference, because, as Nealon says, “identity politics remains 
unable to deal with the other as other; it continues to thematise differences among 
persons, groups, and discourses in terms of (the impossibility of their) sameness” 
(1998, pp. 6-7). As with the concerns cited in the previous paragraph in regard to 
gender equality, identity politics uses as a referent the dominant group, and the 
lack of “sameness” of the marginalised group. My argument, in joining with 
Nealon and Perpich, is that through understanding alterity as the complete 
singularity of the other justice might then be able to follow.  
As Levinas argues (1961/1969, p. 215), singularity is recognised in the 
relationship with the other. Once a relationship with the other has been entered 
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into, the complete singularity of the other as a unique human being in their own 
right can be recognised: then, representation of the other and the group to which 
they belong can be exercised. In this process, justice begins with relationship, 
followed by recognition of the complete singularity of the person and the group to 
which they belong, and then representation of the group to the wider community 
in the cause of justice. This understanding can be called “alterity politics” 
(Nealon, 1998; see Perpich, 2008, pp. 193-198). This argument does depend upon 
stronger dominant groups responding ethically to the call of the marginalised. If 
the dominant groups do not respond appropriately then the marginalised may well 
be forced to activate means other than alterity politics for justice. But, in the 
context of Levinasian ethics, his challenge is to the dominant, to hear the call of 
the other, and in consideration of the other’s demands, respond responsibly. The 
argument from alterity politics to achieve justice builds on the foundation to 
recognise alterity as the unique singularity of the other. I suggest that this 
argument addresses Levinas’ refusal to represent the other in gendered terms or in 
the cause of justice for marginalised groups. Levinas was first of all concerned 
with relationship, which then recognised alterity, before any political or social 
representational work occurred. 
However, I briefly return to the first group of criticisms of Levinas’ work above. 
Levinas did not always practise his own philosophy: establishing relationship, 
recognising alterity, and then putting in place political work for justice. When 
Levinas has inappropriately and stereotypically used feminine and other images 
and ideas in his work (see for example Levinas, 1961/1969, pp. 155-157, 258-
263; 1963/1990, p. 165) he has fallen prey to representation outside of his own 
ethical thesis. He has represented based on certain cultural and religious values 
without engaging in relationship that opened him to radical alterity, the complete 
singularity, of the other. 
In concluding my summary and response to the criticisms of Levinas’ work, I 
agree with criticisms that identify where Levinas has clearly not practised his own 
philosophy of giving ethical priority to the other, particularly in regard to his use 
of feminine images and prejudiced religious opinion. I argue that the idea of the 
other and radical alterity need to be understood as complete singularity: a person, 
or group of persons, are unique in their own right apart from any other person or 
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group, and on this basis they deserve justice and fairness. While the criticisms of 
aspects of Levinas’ work can be understood as valid, or a misrepresentation of his 
concept of alterity, I do not think these criticisms require a change to the 
application of his most prominent thesis, giving ethical priority to the other when 
the other is marginalised in being subsumed by the dominant.   
Ethics of the other as a response to the patriarchal domination of 
heterosexual relationship  
As stated previously, a contention of this thesis is that heterosexual relationship 
has been dominated by patriarchal ideas and practices which set it up as a site for 
inequity and oppression for women (Butler, 1990/2006; Dickerson, 2013; 
Hollway, 1995; Jeffreys, 1990). To support this position I join it with Lerner’s 
(1986, 1993) conclusions from her historical analysis of women in history that 
“women’s thought has been imprisoned in a confining and erroneous patriarchal 
framework” (1986, pp. 220-221). I draw a relationship between these ideas on the 
historical oppression of women in heterosexual relationship and the imprisonment 
of women’s thought in patriarchy, and with the ideas of Levinas on the historical 
and philosophical subsuming of the other of ethics into ontology (1961/1969, p. 
43). As Levinas argues for a new priority to be given to the other of ethics 
historically and philosophically, so I argue for a new priority to be given to 
women and their ideas and knowledges as the Other in heterosexual relationships. 
That is, in contrast to practices and ideas throughout history, an ethical priority in 
heterosexual coupledom should now be the thought and knowledges of each 
individual woman as “concrete other” (Benhabib, 1987, p. 87) in heterosexual 
relationships. The ideas and knowledges of individual women, who came together 
to discuss these and their experience of heterosexual relationship, is a focus of this 
study. Collectively, these women voiced knowledge and an idea for ethical 
heterosexual relationship practices, represented in the results chapters.     
Two forms of poststructural ethics  
In the context of women in heterosexual relationship and their ideas and 
knowledges as the Other, I next introduce two particular forms of poststructural 
ethics that serve as a theoretical basis for the discussion that follows on how men 
might respond to their heterosexual partners. Within poststructural understandings 
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of ethics there are two lines of inquiry (Caputo, 1993, pp. 55-62; Ziarek, 2001, pp. 
6-7). Caputo names them heteromorphism and heteronomism. Heteromorphic 
ethics concern openness to becoming different possibilities, “the love of different 
forms” (1993, p. 55). Heteronomic ethics are about respect for difference, “the 
love of the other” (1993, p. 60). Ziarek names these respectively, “the ethos of 
becoming and the ethos of obligation” (2001, p. 6). She associates these ethical 
lines of inquiry with, among others, in the first form, Deleuze and Foucault with 
their work on people as becoming, not as fixed essences; and in the second form, 
Levinas and Derrida with their initiative in regard to the other as those who 
express difference and are thus unjustly marginalised and excluded. A feminist 
poststructural ethics cannot ignore either of these two lines of ethical inquiry. In 
the case of this study each is particularly helpful for defining an ethical response 
from men to their heterosexual partners. In drawing on these two forms of ethics 
in this next section I connect them to love as an important relational response to 
the Other. Realising that love has a tarnished history in heterosexual relationships 
I then speak to this concern, clarifying what I mean by love. I then conceptually 
develop a discussion of two forms of love that I think are a solid ethical basis for 
men’s response to their heterosexual partners. 
Love(s) as response(ible) ethic 
Caputo, with reference to Derrida’s idea of the gift as a condition for the 
democracy to come, and with allusions to ethics ending where singularity begins, 
suggests an appropriate relational response to the other is one of “letting love 
break out” (2000, p. 183). I join this idea of love, with the two forms of 
poststructural ethics that Ziarek names – “the ethos of becoming and the ethos of 
obligation” (2001, p. 6) – renaming them, becoming love and obligatory love. I 
develop a discussion with reference to a number of poststructural writers in regard 
to these two forms of love, but first, I must speak to the history of tarnished love 
in heterosexual relationships.  
The intimate relationship between certain practices of love and patriarchal 
interests in heterosexual relationship is well documented (see for example 
Hesford, 2009; Toye, 2010). The work of many early feminists critiqued 
heterosexuality as a social institution for the way it resulted in the domination of 
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women, and the way that “love” expressed in heterosexual relationships resulted 
in control of women and their feelings and lives (see Beauvoir, 1953; Benjamin, 
1988; Firestone, 1970; Friedan, 1963; Millett, 1970). Emotions were recognised 
“as a source and conduit of power”, resulting in many heterosexual women 
feeling “a conundrum of contradictory feelings”, with some form of love 
conflicting with “feeling trapped and alienated in family life” (Hesford, 2009, pp. 
10-11). Perhaps the most common way to name this love, that is questionable as 
love because it is a technique for abuse, is “romantic love” (Firestone, 1970, pp. 
165-175; Hesford, 2009, p. 10; Millett, 1970, pp. 36-37). This term is still used to 
name a discourse of love that is particularly harmful for heterosexual women (see 
Sinclair & Monk, 2004, p. 339; Toye, 2010, p. 52). Jenkins (2009, p. 24), who is 
renowned for his work in the field of counselling men who abuse, has given the 
name “domestic love” to something that sounds very much like this romantic 
love. Jenkins writes: 
Domestic forms of love . . . reflect a kind of capture by dominant cultural 
interests. These concepts of domestic love prescribe requirements for 
commonality and sameness, along with the suppression of difference. . . . 
Domestic love is not always repressive but can prescribe ownership and a 
sense of entitlement to correct the other and enforce sameness.  
This description of domestic love connects with Levinas’ description of 
philosophy as reducing the other to the same (1961/1969, p. 43), with one 
consequence being the suppression of difference. My contention is that love 
should be contrasted to domestic or romantic love, giving space for difference (the 
singularity of the Other) to flourish, and for participation with that difference in 
egalitarian ways. My ideas of obligatory love and becoming love are intended as 
concepts that give space to, and guide men towards egalitarian participatory 
practices with the Other of women in heterosexual relationships.  
With these concepts of love, vastly different from those of romantic and domestic 
love, I join with Toye (2010, p. 39) in arguing that “‘love’ needs to be taken as a 
serious, valid and crucial subject for academic study”. Such study, Toye suggests, 
needs to be set in the context of “poststructuralist feminist ethics . . . especially by 
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those invested in discourses of the other” (2010, p. 41). Toye (2010, p. 41) 
continues:  
we need . . . to engage in the possibility of reconceptualizing our notions of 
love in order that  we can formulate new concepts of love that can be used 
as necessary grounds for ethical and political relations with others – our 
family, friends, significant others, communities, neighbours, and nations. 
Toye’s conjoining of love with “ethicaI and political relations” is crucial to the 
concept of love that I develop in this study, and in my analysis of men’s response 
to women’s thought.  
A number of authors, including Deleuze, have associated love with an ethics of 
becoming.  A Deleuzian understanding suggests that love is creative, productive, 
and open to possibilities beyond what we know of it in life. Love is not reducible 
to how it is practised in everyday life, but it can go beyond what is current, toward 
new horizons (Colebrook, 2002b, p.17; Deleuze, 1964/2000, pp. 71, 140; Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1980/1988, p. 278; Protevi, 2004, p. 191-192). Colebrook, a 
poststructural scholar on the work of Deleuze among other thinkers, offers a 
description of love:   
Love is the encounter with another person that opens us to a possible world. 
This concept does not take a form of love – the couple – and then say that 
this is what love is. The concept of love as ‘a possible encounter with an 
other as a whole new world’ allows us to think of forms of love that are not 
yet given, that are not actual but virtual. (2002b, p. 17) 
I use Colebrook here, in the context of Deleuzian thought, to join with Toye’s 
thought that love needs to be reconceptualised. Colebrook is opening love to new 
concepts by stating these concepts may well still be in the virtual (in the realms of 
possibility), yet to be actualised into present practice. The concepts of love 
Colebrook refers to can, I suggest, fit with concepts of obligatory love and 
becoming love. “Love as ‘a possible encounter with an other”, fits with a 
description of obligatory love that I offer. And love “as a whole new world” fits 
with a description of becoming love that I employ. Jenkins too, takes up these 
ideas from Colebrook, calling them “generous love”. He regards generous love as 
 50 
both a creative expansive love and a love that embraces difference and reaches out 
to the Other (2009, pp. 24-25), which equates to the concepts I employ, becoming 
love and obligatory love. 
I turn now to specifically develop the two forms of love I have introduced so that 
there is clarity as to their ethos. This development further separates them from 
dominant romantic and domestic forms of love, and their tarnished histories.  
Obligatory love   
Obligation and love are two words and concepts that have perhaps not been 
regarded as complementary. But, with reference to Toye (2010), this possible 
difficulty is only dependent upon our conceptions of love. With obligatory love I 
am engaging with new formulations “of love that can be used as necessary 
grounds for ethical and political relations with others” (p. 41). Caputo (1993), in 
his description of heteronomic ethical practice, gives insight into the concept of 
obligatory love which I propose, and which I envisage men practising toward their 
heterosexual partner:   
There is no squinting here over obligation, no anxiety about gravity and 
heavy weights, no hand-wringing about being tied down. Here the love of 
difference is the love of the other and being held hostage by the other is not 
considered demeaning, degrading, ignoble but rather uplifting and 
challenging work. The other is not rival, competitor, something to be 
appropriated, but the law and the measure by which freedom measures 
itself. Freedom is frightened not by the weight of responsibility but by the 
murderousness of its own aggressive forces, which love to dominate others. 
Freedom is concerned not with its own free discharge but rather with letting 
the other be free. (p. 60) 
Comte-Sponville (1996/2003), in his treatise on virtue ethics, contextualises this 
obligatory form of love within one of the four Greek words for conceptualising 
love – agapē. He writes: 
This kind of love is the rarest of loves, the most precious and miraculous. 
You take a step back? He takes two steps back. Why? Simply to give you 
more room, to avoid crowding you, invading you, or crushing you, to give 
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you more space and freedom and to let you breathe, and the weaker he feels 
you are, the more freedom he gives you. He steps back so as not to impose 
on you his power, or even his joy or love, so as not to take all available 
space, all available being, or all available power. (p. 276)  
These descriptions of what I call obligatory love are intended to give space for 
heterosexual women as Other to equally contribute to and co-shape relationship 
practices in ways that have not been possible with the patriarchal oppression of 
women in heterosexual relationships. In the context of Levinasian ethics I state 
clearly that this love is not initiated by the subject but by the Other – this love is 
in response to the call of the Other (Levinas, 1982/1985, pp. 87-89). And, in the 
context of this study, what Caputo and Comte-Sponville contribute to this 
obligatory response to the initiative of the Other is to set that response within the 
possibility of love. This does not mean that the male subject cannot initiate 
obligatory love, but rather, because of the material proximity of the Other, the call 
of the Other, it becomes possible for the male subject to practice obligatory love 
toward the Other. This obligation is not law that is enforced on the male subject 
from the outside, but rather, it is a self-imposed measure on his actions, so that the 
Other has a freedom that is contained only by her preferred ethics.  
Becoming love  
Love and becoming are two concepts that more readily sit together than love and 
obligation. This is particularly so when becoming love is connected to an idea of 
creative expansiveness for those in relationship (Jenkins, 2009, pp. 24-25). As I 
employ it, becoming love involves the conversations that heterosexual couples 
conduct, with particular emphasis on the male partner’s approach to conversation. 
This conversational emphasis is particularly important for this study, where a core 
contention is that language is regarded as significant in the construction of 
subjectivities and practices for those in heterosexual relationships.  
Becoming love is taken from Bakhtin’s (1984, 1986, 1990, 1993) dialogic 
approach to conversation. Some Bakhtinian scholars refer to the dialogic process 
as an artistic and loving process (Emerson, 1997, p. 221). A part of this artistic 
and loving process is an approach to conversation that interactively evaluates 
historically and socially situated interpretation, and thus, provides opportunity to 
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contribute value to those in dialogue (White, 2009). From this dialogical context, I 
propose becoming love as an approach to conversations which primarily 
recognises that two people, with their different social histories and interpretive 
experiences, can constitute each other in their conversations. This constitution can 
be for better or for worse, but the act of becoming love, in recognising this 
possibility, looks to respectfully and carefully join in conversation with the Other.  
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Table 1:  
The major theorists and key ideas used in application to the data in the results 
chapters 
Chapter Theorist Idea Applied to 
5 Davies & Harré  
 
Barthes;  
Davies et al. (2006) 
 
Butler; Davies  
Positioning theory 
 
Decomposition  and 
Mo(ve)ment 
 
Mastery and Submission 
Sue. A participant 
in the first focus 
group. 
 
 
6 Deleuze;  May 
 
Deleuze & Guattari 
 
Butler  
Ontology of difference  
 
The rhizome 
 
Performativity of gender 
The first focus 
group 
7 Derrida  
 
Foucault  
 
Deleuze  
  
 
Foucault  
 
Foucault  
 
Davies et al. (2002) 
 
 
Foucault  
Deconstruction 
 
Power/knowledge 
 
Lines of sedimentation, 
breakage and fracture 
 
Agonism 
 
States of domination 
 
Sedimentation of lines of 
force 
 
Governmentality 
The first focus 
group  
8 Derrida  
 
 
Levinas  
 
Caputo; Colebrook; 
Comte-Sponville; 
Toye;  Ziarek 
 
Bakhtin 
Deconstruction and The 
democracy to come 
 
The other 
 
Poststructural ethics as 
obligatory love and 
becoming love 
 
Dialogical conversation 
as becoming love  
The men 
interviewed 
9 White  
 
Denborough 
 
Bakhtin 
Double listening 
 
Double story 
 
Dialogical conversation  
The second focus 
group 
10 Butler  Ethics as giving an 
account of oneself 
Myself  
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The emphasis of this chapter 
The overall theme of this chapter has been that this study is based in a double 
ethical response to patriarchally produced heterosexual relationship and the 
oppressive experience of women in such. There are doubles in this chapter, from 
my suggestion of deconstructing heterosexual relationship as a man who is 
involved in a heterosexual relationship, through to the suggested double ethical 
response of love from a male partner to a woman partner in heterosexual 
relationship. However, the central double ethical stance of this chapter has been to 
suggest that patriarchal heterosexual relationship needs to be deconstructed, and 
then an alternative form of heterosexual relationship offered, located in ethical 
egalitarian practices, that respond affirmatively to women’s ideas and 
knowledges. It is this double ethical stance of deconstruction that is developed in 
the analysis offered in chapters Five through Ten of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3. Literature review 
 
In Chapter One I located this study in my own professional and personal life, and 
in the wider history of patriarchally-dominated heterosexual relationship in 
western society. I noted that the heterosexual couples therapy approach I had 
adopted for practice carries, like many therapies, a gender blindness that assumes 
an equality between partners that does not acknowledge lived experience. This 
despite decades of feminist scholarship across a range of disciplines –  including 
psychology and family therapy – grass roots activism, and efforts of many women 
and men in their daily lives.  
In this chapter I introduce the feminist critique of family therapy practice and, by 
association, a critique of heterosexual couple counselling practice. The terms of 
this critique – a blindness to socio-culturally produced gender-power-relations in 
family and heterosexual couple relationships – are taken up and applied to 
literature on heterosexual coupledom. I extend the feminist critique of family 
therapy and heterosexual couple counselling practice, by taking up a related 
critique offered by feminist poststructural theory and practice. Taking up a 
discursive reading of gender-power-relations, feminist poststructuralism holds 
onto the feminist position that power relations are socio-culturally produced, and 
it furthers this critique by locating the construction of gender across multiple 
locations in discourses. Thus, feminist poststructuralism addresses the political 
gaps left by liberal humanist gender essentialist approaches to understanding 
gender and heterosexual coupledom. Some of these political gaps are noted in a 
review, conducted through a feminist poststructural lens, of both self-help and 
academic literature on heterosexual coupledom and counselling. Feminist 
poststructural approaches for conducting heterosexual couple counselling are 
reviewed and located in the multiple discursive possibilities for constructing 
gender and heterosexual relationship practices.   
A feminist critique of family therapy practice  
Of particular interest to this study is the scholarly contribution of feminists within 
family therapy. As a practice, heterosexual couple counselling emerged from 
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family therapy, and the two are closely connected theoretically (Goldenberg & 
Goldenberg, 2008). Hence, the feminist critique of family therapy practice has the 
same political relevance for heterosexual coupledom. Beginning with Hare-
Mustin (1978), a significant number of leading North American feminist 
therapists drew attention to the patriarchal nature of heterosexual coupledom, and 
to how heterosexual couple counselling and family therapy perpetuated 
patriarchal practice (see for example, Bograd, 1986; Goodrich, Rampage, Ellman, 
& Halstead, 1988; Goodrich, 1991; Luepnitz, 1988; McGoldrick, Anderson, & 
Walsh, 1989; Walters, Carter, Papp, & Silverstein, 1988).  
Arguments were made that the application of systems theory to the family 
supported patriarchal ideas and practices. These arguments made visible that 
gender and power relations were not included in the theory and practice of family 
therapy. Because gender-power-relations were not taken into account in family or 
heterosexual couples therapy theory and practice, interventions favoured men and 
disadvantaged women partners. In a text regarded as highly significant in raising 
issues of gender for the family therapy field (see Denborough, 2001, p. 86; 
Silverstein, 2003, p. 19), Walters et al. (1988) argue that in the application of 
systems concepts to a family, men were favoured and women partner’s 
pathologised because of the non-recognition of the social, cultural, and political 
construction of family organisation and function (pp. 20-26). While interventions 
were theorised as taking a gender-neutral stance – an assumption of gender 
equality – in practice, no intervention is gender-neutral, given the context of 
couples and family life. Goldner (1985) offers a similar critique, with “the 
overinvolved mother and peripheral father” (p. 31) being regarded as a clinical 
problem, without any recognition of this function as a characteristic of socio-
historical processes. A non-gender-aware family therapist would attempt to 
restore the father’s patriarchal authority by the implicit blaming of mothers for the 
father’s non-involvement (Goldner, 1985, 1988, p. 55). Thus, Goldner (1988) 
builds convincing argument for the inclusion of gender in family therapy models 
and theory so that women are not treated unfairly and unequally in clinical 
practice. 
As suggested in these arguments from Goldner, power is inseparable from gender 
in the feminist critique of family therapy theory and practice. Central to these 
 57 
arguments were the idea that power is produced in families and between 
heterosexual couples from a patriarchal socio-cultural context that privilege the 
male partner (Goldner, 1991; Hollway, 1984; Hare-Mustin, 1991; Lerner, 1988). 
A poststructural analysis of these gendered power relations further defines the 
assumptions that supported the production of patriarchal power. Discourses 
related to assumptions about equality between the heterosexual couple, the male 
sexual drive, and the ownership and protection of women by men (Hollway, 1984; 
Hare-Mustin, 1991), point to male privilege and female subordination in 
heterosexual coupledom. Hare-Mustin (1994) applied these discourses in an 
analysis of case examples from a number of therapists, indicating the ease and 
danger of reproducing patriarchal discourses in therapeutic practice.  
In Australia and New Zealand similar arguments were made in regard to gender-
power-relations as being unrecognised and unaddressed in family therapy practice 
(see James & McIntyre, 1983; Pilalis & Anderton, 1986; Pilalis, 1987). For 
example, Pilalis and Anderton concluded that: 
So pervasive are the predominant patriarchal myths out of which most 
theories of human change and development have been built, that any 
traveller journeying to the junction of feminist family therapy needs to be 
positively paranoid about the resistance to real change in the power relations 
between women and men in the family context. (pp. 112-113)  
In attempting to address the pervasiveness of patriarchy, within the Just Therapy 
team from New Zealand (Tamasese & Waldegrave, 1994; Waldegrave, Tamasese, 
Tuhaka, & Campbell, 2003), the male therapists as a group are accountable to 
women therapists for their practice with women. Emerging from the Australian 
and New Zealand context were Narrative Therapy (White & Epston, 1990), and 
related approaches to working with men who abuse and for understanding 
gendered practices (Jenkins, 1990; McLean, Carey, & White, 1996). Narrative 
therapy is one of the few recognised approaches to therapy that applies the ideas 
upon which feminist poststructuralism stands (see Freedman & Combs, 2002; 
Goldenberg & Goldenberg, 2008, pp.369-371; Weingarten, 1995; Zimmerman & 
Dickerson, 1996).  
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The persistence of gender and power blindness  
Since the publication of this seminal feminist literature, the argument has 
continued to be advanced, in the face of ambivalence, that gender-power-relations 
in family therapy and heterosexual couples theory and practice are central 
concerns to be addressed in regard to family and heterosexual couple relationships 
(see for example, Goodrich, 2003; Haddock, McPhee, & Zimmerman, 2001; 
Knudson-Martin, 2008; Knudson-Martin & Rankin Mahoney, 2009a; Nutt, 2005; 
Rampage, 2002; Silverstein, 2003; Zimmerman, 2001). Despite the contributions 
and critiques from the original feminist literature and the later contributions, 
however, much gender and power blindness persists across the literature on 
heterosexual couple relationships and counselling.  
In a relatively recent edited Australian publication (Shaw & Crawley, 2007), for 
example, there are no specific chapters on feminist therapy models, and questions 
of gender and power receive little robust attention. The exception is Jenkins 
(2007) who addresses domestic violence and abuse, and joins a feminist critique 
with the statement, “Apolitical counselling for [heterosexual] couples has the 
potential to overlook, or minimise, the political disadvantage of women, through 
the inference of psychological and interactional explanation and practice” (p. 
231).  Other chapters in this text (Brown, 2007; Paterson, 2007; Percy, 2007; 
Ravalico, 2007) briefly mention gender, power, patriarchy, or a focus on equality 
between heterosexual couples as a goal for therapy, but do not give gender-power-
relations significant space as key players in the construction of heterosexual 
relationships or in the therapeutic endeavour. The concern with a text like this, 
that addresses gender and power only in the context of domestic violence and 
abuse, is that unless there is obvious physical violence in a heterosexual couple 
relationship, gender and power blindness on the part of practitioners may prevail. 
Popular self-help couples literature and gender and power 
blindness  
Perhaps an even more significant contribution to the absence of a focus on 
gender-power-relations in heterosexual coupledom is the popular self-help 
literature for heterosexual couples (Zimmerman, Holm, & Starrells, 2001). I 
suggest this genre is playing a significant role in the construction of heterosexual 
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relationships, as colleagues have often spoken of self-help texts as helpful for use 
with clients or in teaching counselling. Clients and students have also referred to 
these texts. Zimmerman et al. state, “Many therapists frequently assign self-help 
books as part of their plan. . . . [I]ndividuals and couples in therapy may read self-
help books before entering therapy and may discuss their reading with their 
therapists” (2001, p. 165). The texts I have chosen as representative of the self-
help heterosexual couples literature have populated the relationship, family, or 
self-help shelves in bookstores, suggesting they are commonly available and 
hence contribute to how couples shape their heterosexual relationships.  
Since the work of Maslow (1954) the idea that people have psychological needs 
has held enduring popularity within and outside the field of psychology (see 
Cherry, 2014). Heterosexual couple relationship theory is no exception. The 
meeting of psychological or relationship needs in heterosexual relationships tends 
to be constructed in terms of each partner doing something for the other partner 
that leaves the recipient feeling loved (see Chapman, 1995; Harley, 1986). Both 
these authors argue, based in their couple counselling practice, that human beings 
have specific inbuilt psycho-social needs that require being met by another 
intimate human being – through heterosexual relationship practices. However, 
both texts assume equality between men and women and therefore do not address 
gender-power-relations, their gender and power blindness perpetuating 
inequalities. By not addressing gender-power-relations the authors open the 
possibility for their ideas to be misused; for example, when a male partner 
produces power in a demand for his needs to be met.  
The idea of the unconscious as the cause for heterosexual couple relationship 
problems is made popular by Hendrix (1988). Hendrix explains that power 
struggles occur between heterosexual couples when a partner unconsciously tries 
to get their partner to heal the damage from childhood experiences and the other 
partner does not respond in the required healing mode.  His argument for the 
cause of the power struggle and for addressing it do not include gender and 
power. The arguments made within feminist therapy and feminist family therapy 
at the time of this book’s publication are surely relevant here: “as long as gender 
remains an invisible category in our clinical work, they [women] will remain 
submerged” (Goldner, 1985, p. 45).   
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A text highly regarded in both professional and lay circles in Australia is 
Schnarch (1999). Schnarch’s text takes up the concept of differentiation from 
Bowen (1978) who developed it within his family systems theory. This concept is 
applied to the couple’s sexual relationship which, according to Schnarch, acts as 
barometer for the health of the whole couple relationship. Differentiation as 
Bowen proposes it has been critiqued for its closeness to the ways men are 
traditionally socialised as emotionally distant and separate (Leupnitz, 1988). In 
the process of differentiation the need for togetherness is used to explain an 
undifferentiated person, which can make invisible the value and importance of 
connection to human development (Knudson-Martin, 1994). Along with these 
feminist critiques Schnarch can also be critiqued for his inaccurate understanding 
of power in the context of gender. Schnarch (1999, pp. 265-266) makes it clear in 
theorising power from the context of oral sexual relations between a man and a 
woman that he understands power to be the power of submission. Along with this 
understanding, he suggests he takes feminism and power issues seriously. 
However, Schnarch has turned one understanding of power, the politics of 
gendered power and inequality, into another completely unrelated understanding 
of power; the power of submission when partners agree to certain sexual activity. 
Apart from the implications for power abuse with Schnarch’s depiction of power, 
the deception is that he misrepresents patriarchal gendered power, reducing it to 
something that is mutual and even enjoyable, thus keeping invisible the unequal 
production of gender-power-relations in heterosexual relationships.  
Arguably one of the most popular texts on heterosexual couple relationships is 
Gray (1992), having spent 243 weeks in the New York Times bestseller list 
(Zimmerman, et al., 2001, pp. 174-175). Gray argues that male and female are 
inherently different in what they value and how they engage in relationships. With 
this inherent difference thesis between male and female Gray exposes why there is 
conflict between a couple in a heterosexual relationship and hopes that this 
exposure will help heterosexual couples understand their differences and relate 
more lovingly with each other. While Gray has essentialised and made universal 
his view of gender differences, he has not addressed the politics of gender that 
disadvantage women. Addressing gender difference without addressing power can 
create an understanding of “gender as mere difference” (Hackett, 2008, p. 211) 
 61 
and not as a relation of power. In essentialising gender difference without any 
acknowledgement of power relations and its potential concomitant outcome 
abuse, power and abuse can also be essentialised and hence legitimated as 
naturally determined. For example, Gray writes that men “value power, 
competency, efficiency, and achievement. They [men] are always doing things to 
prove themselves and develop their power and skills” (p. 16), whereas women, 
“value love, communication, beauty, and relationships” (p. 18). In suggesting 
possible reasons for the popularity of this text and others which have an 
equivalent thesis Zimmerman et al. write: 
It is possible that these books are popular because they confirm and support 
the dominant discourse of a status quo in which men and women are viewed 
as being inherently different and in which men ultimately hold more power 
than women. (2001, p. 173) 
Despite the critique offered by feminists on gender-power-relations in 
heterosexual relationships, the absence of attention to these power relations 
continues in the construction of heterosexual coupledom in the popular literature. 
This reference from Zimmerman et al., while offering an explanation for why 
some texts are popular in heterosexual couple literature, also introduces another 
factor at work in the construction of heterosexual coupledom; the discursive 
construction of men and women as essentialised gendered beings where power is 
a man’s rightful possession. Feminist poststructural theory and practice addresses 
this political anomaly.    
Feminist poststructural theory and practice   
Feminist poststructural theory developed during and after the initial feminist 
critique of family therapy (see Davies & Gannon, 2005; Gavey, 1989; Hare-
Mustin & Maracek, 1990b; Weedon, 1997, p. vi) and the development of feminist 
approaches to therapy. With the use of feminist poststructural theory I take further 
the critique on gender-power-relations offered from the feminist critique of family 
therapy. Feminist poststructural theory takes a more complex and heterogeneous 
view on gender.   
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Gender as complex and heterogeneous  
Gender is regarded as multiply-located and constantly shifting within discourses. 
Hence Butler (1995) suggests, for example, that gender categories such as 
“women” continue to be used but not as a fixed and designated field. Rather, 
gender identity can be designated as an “undesignatable field of differences, one 
that cannot be totalised or summarized by a descriptive identity category . . . 
[gender is] a site of permanent openness and resignifiability” (p. 50). Taking up 
this position on the discursive construction of gender identity, Mouffe (1992, p. 
372) explains:  
We can . . . conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of 
“subject positions” that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of 
differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses among which there is 
no necessary relation, but a constant movement. . . . The “identity” of such a 
multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and 
precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions 
and dependent on specific forms of identification. It is therefore impossible 
to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, 
homogenous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality, dependent 
on the various subject positions through which it is constituted within 
various discursive formations. 
This discursive, complex and heterogeneous reading of gender identity not only 
joins the feminist critique of family therapy by continuing to locate power in 
socio-cultural conditions, but it takes the critique further, by situating gender 
construction in discourse. In this way, gender is no longer located in human 
beings as an essential quality, and the assumptions of gender equality have to be 
examined at the local level in each gendered encounter. With its discursive, 
multiple and complex reading of gender the ideas of feminist poststructuralism are 
both theory-based and practical for application at the local level. 
After critiquing structuralist interpretations that resulted in binary positions on 
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class, where multiple positions and 
knowledges are available, Larner suggests that the question one should be asking 
is not to do with who develops a theory or the epistemological basis for a theory, 
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“but rather, what kinds of struggle does it [theory] make possible” (1995, p. 187). 
Feminist poststructuralist theory and practice is concerned with power produced 
from discourses in diffuse and decentralised ways that are constitutive and 
governing of subjectivities at a local level (Pease, 2000, pp. 32-33; Weedon, 1997, 
p. 107). With a view of gender as discursively constructed in multiple and 
complex ways, feminist poststructural theory and practice opens up understanding 
of struggle at the local level, at sites where subjectivities are produced, and 
resistance to dominant productions of power take place (Weedon, 1997, p. 71).  
At this point, to set this development of feminist poststructuralism in the context 
of a political response to liberal humanist gender essentialism, I provide an 
overview of gender essentialism and its persistent and popular hold on 
understanding gender.  
Boasting a long history within the development of western philosophy 
“essentialism is . . . defined as a belief in true essence – that which is most 
irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or thing” 
(Fuss, 1989, p. 2). As noted by the popularity of texts written on the “unique 
qualities” of the male and/or the female (see for example Biddulph, 2010, 2013a, 
2013b; Bly, 1990; Moir & Moir, 1998; Pease & Pease, 2002) gender essentialism 
“has struck a resonant chord among a broad section of the population” (Petersen, 
2003, p. 66).  
Even though gender essentialism has been subject to robust critique from those 
within a number of disciplines (see Fausto-Sterling, 1992; Fine, 2010; Johnson, 
1997; Pease, 2000, pp. 26-28; Sayer, 1997; Wilson, 1977), the arguments for 
gender essentialism persist (Grosz, 1995, p. 47-49).   
Common with these arguments is the location of gender “as internal, persistent, 
and generally separate from the on-going experience of interaction with the daily 
sociopolitical context of one’s life” (Bohan, 1993, p. 7). Hence, it is important to 
note the point that Hare-Mustin and Marecek make:  
The psychological literature on male-female differences is not a record of 
cumulative knowledge about the ‘truth’ of what men and women are ‘really’ 
like. Rather, it is a repository of accounts of gender organised within 
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particular assumptive frameworks and reflecting various interests. (1994, p. 
535) 
When the socio-political context of gender goes unrecognised gender essentialism 
is often based in assumptions and reflects political positions that are not 
acknowledged.  In support of this position, Brown is explicit in joining essentialist 
ideas with humanism and the obstructive functions of such:   
Humanism begins with some notion of an essence of humankind, its basic 
nature or innate properties, and proceeds to deduce from this the way things 
must or will be. In spite of the lofty aims apparently espoused by humanism 
. . . this doctrine invariably functions as a theoretical and political obstacle. 
(1990, p. 45) 
With a position on gender that makes visible the socio-political, discursive 
construction of subjectivity and identity, feminist poststructuralism speaks into 
the assumptive and political space produced by the persistent and popular liberal 
humanist ideas of essentialism. In particular, feminist poststructuralism hones the 
focus of a universal application of patriarchy to local applications “of individual 
women in society and the ways in which they are both governed by and resist 
specific forms of power” (Weedon, 1997, p. 71). In practical terms for this study, 
this means that the conversations heterosexual couples conduct are a location for 
political struggle (Weedon, 1997, pp. 23, 79), and thus, a site where 
transformation can begin.    
In the light of this discussion on feminist poststructuralism and gender 
essentialism I apply a feminist poststructural position on gender-power-relations 
to both popular and academic literature that takes an essentialist approach to 
gender. To guide me in this review I use questions informed by feminist 
poststructural theory from Mouffe:   
If the category “woman” does not correspond to any unified and unifying 
essence, the question can no longer be to try and unearth it. The central 
issues become: how is “woman” constructed as a category within different 
discourses? [H]ow is sexual difference made a pertinent distinction in social 
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relations? [A]nd how are relations of subordination constructed through 
such a distinction? (1992, p. 373)  
Heterosexual couple literature through the lens of 
feminist poststructuralism 
Informed by these questions, I look for: how women and men are constructed in 
heterosexual relationship; the practice of tying specific practices to one’s sex, thus 
essentialising those practices to sex; and how the essentialised distinctions made 
in the literature favour the male sex, or construct both male and female in ways 
that do not helpfully contribute to democratic and egalitarian relationships.      
Rabin (1996) is a text written “to facilitate the incorporation by therapists of the 
experiences of successful equal partners into work with couples” (p. 59). The text 
arises from research interviews with heterosexual couples whose interview 
material fitted the criteria for assessing the couple as equal partners. Equal 
partnership is defined as couples “equal sharing of power which would result in 
more equal sharing of housework and parenting tasks. . . . [T]he ultimate goal is 
for both partners to reassess their relationship in totality . . . as a fair one” (p. 
116). This is an important text with its argument for heterosexual partners to work 
toward equality. However, the text does reduce heterosexual relationship equality 
to sharing of housework and parenting tasks, and makes possible the 
essentialising of gender to sex. Early in the text Rabin states, “Gender and power 
are like the air we breathe. We rarely think of how our behaviour is conditioned 
by our sex” (p. 16). In a footnote (p. 257, fn. 4), Rabin makes reference to gender 
and power being socially generated in favour of men, but she does not elaborate 
further on what she means by behaviour being conditioned by one’s sex, thus 
leaving open the idea that gender is essentialised with biology. Because it is 
possible to read gender as essentialised to one’s sexual characteristic, the 
production of power that privileges the male partner is left unaddressed, and the 
possibility is made available for assuming power can be equally produced 
between couples without taking socio-political contexts into account.  
Considering Rabin’s text in the light of the second and third of Mouffe’s 
questions above, sexual difference is made a pertinent distinction in heterosexual 
couples by the assumption of equality that comes with tying gender to sex, and 
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thus not recognising the socio-political context. Because of this assumption and 
absence of recognition, “relations of subordination” (Mouffe, 1992, p. 373) that 
are constructed from discursive formations can be held in place. An example of 
this assumption of gendered equality and absence of recognition of discursive 
contexts is illustrated with power being connected to a couple’s communication 
practices. Rabin ties the communication practice of withdrawing or distancing to 
the male partner and critical engagement with the female partner (pp. 100-106). 
Following this, a suggestion is made that equal power rests on bridging the gap in 
the communication practices of men withdrawing and women criticising. This 
appears to teach that inequality can be changed through communication strategies 
that are already shaped by gender discourses. With such an approach, the plurality 
of subject positions and their concomitant production of power available to both 
the female and male partners are not taken into account. For example, the male 
partner may not always withdraw when communicating with his partner. Or, if 
both partners do change their communication approach the production of power is 
not necessarily addressed, as there are other subject positions available, other than 
withdrawing during communication, for the production of power. Unless the 
production of power that privileges the male partner is recognised and addressed it 
is difficult to envisage equality when it comes to housework and parenting. In 
conjunction with role-sharing, equality can be developed through recognising and 
addressing inequity in the production of power and the subject positions made 
available in the conversational practices of heterosexual couples.   
Weiner-Davis’ (1998) text is a self-help book for women in heterosexual 
relationships and is aimed at helping them change their partners without their 
partners knowing it. My concern with the text is the inclusion of examples and 
language practices that are constitutive of men and women in a way that can be 
interpreted as disrespectful and demeaning. I find problematic Weiner-Davis’ 
reproduction of the dominant idea that women should stop “nagging” as one tactic 
to change their partner. In regard to changing men, Weiner-Davis refers to these 
practices as behaviour modification which is similar to “dog-training” (pp. 109-
122); “what works with dogs also works with men” (p. 110). These metaphors and 
language practices are distancing and objectifying of both women and men, 
producing human heterosexual relationships as master-dog relationships. In a 
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different context to heterosexual relationships, but just as pertinent, Hokowhitu 
(2007) relates how Māori masculinity has been defined in its colonial 
constructions as hyper physical and non-thinking with limited space for moral 
action. The same effect is available through Weiner-Davis’ text with heterosexual 
men being produced as non-thinking Pavlovian subjects of animal trainers. 
Weiner-Davis’ approach raises the ethical question in regard to the kind of 
relationship that might make it possible for men to produce the “democracy to 
come” (Derrida, 1993/1994; 2003/2005a; see Chapter 2) with their partners. For 
heterosexual men and women to produce the democracy to come in their 
relationship they require high regard for each other, valuing the relationship as 
ethical and egalitarian, and not as a one-sided trainer trainee relationship.  
Another text aimed at changing men is Alter (2006). This text is written directly 
to men and comes out of Alter’s counselling experience of working with men. 
While Alter takes a “tough” approach in confronting men about the need to 
change how they engage in heterosexual relationships (pp. 12-13), he also exhorts 
a man not to consider himself as “bad, low, ordinary” (p. 88), but to have respect 
for himself. Alter indicates recognition of the socio-economic conditions that can 
leave men feeling trapped without a clear way out (pp. 88, 99). He addresses 
men’s use of demeaning terms for women (p. 121). The text is an admirable and 
comprehensive attempt to address the problems of men’s unfair and abusive 
heterosexual relationship practices.  
However, with its essentialising approach the text reproduces patriarchal power 
relations. In regard to what men need to learn, Alter writes, “There are techniques, 
and there is a technology. A woman actually does come with an instruction 
manual, and a man can learn it” (2006, p. 6). A woman is likened to a machine 
which a man can learn to drive or control, and in doing this, the man will have 
corrected his faulty approach to the relationship and his partner will then “fulfil all 
your dreams of love. She’ll help and support and take care of you and praise and 
thank and appreciate you” (pp. 7-8). The couple are constructed as driver (or 
owner) and machine. Patriarchal power relations are reproduced with the clear 
implication that the driver (a man) drives and works on the machine through 
learning new skills and techniques that his partner apparently prefers, and the 
machine (a woman) responds with gratitude through her appreciation and support 
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of him. The instruction manual metaphor for heterosexual relationship can 
potentially produce ideas and practices that are too close to patriarchal and 
romantic love ideas of a man “knowing” what is best for his partner, and the 
expectation that a woman partner will respond gratefully.  
Alter describes his therapeutic approach with men, “I will teach, coach, exhort, 
correct, confront, judge, joke around, and argue with a guy. I’ll talk over him and 
around him. . . . When I have to, I’ll yell at him. I’ll take the guy on” (p. 12). 
Unlike Jenkins (2009) who, for ethical reasons, strongly advises against 
reproducing patriarchal power relations when working with men who abuse, Alter 
reproduces power as a tactic for change. This approach is confrontational, almost 
bullying, reflecting something of the patronising and coercive approaches that can 
be practised in male to male relationships, and thus, reproducing patriarchal 
practices. While the text addresses important concerns about the production of 
inappropriate and unethical male behaviour in heterosexual relationships it 
constructs men, women, and the heterosexual relationship in a way that does not 
fit with the ethical relationship of a democracy to come.    
In a text that initially appears to be equally addressing the practices of women and 
men in their heterosexual relationships, Real (2007) uses language that reproduces 
patriarchal power in constructing women as responsible for the poor state of 
heterosexual relationships. Real’s hypothesis is that the feminist movement has 
effected changes in many areas of society and, particularly, for women in 
heterosexual relationships. Hence, women are rightfully demanding more from 
those relationships, but men have not changed and do not know how to meet that 
demand. Real offers a program for helping couples negotiate this gap. My concern 
with Real’s approach is that his hypothesis for the problems in heterosexual 
relationships does not recognise patriarchal power and reproduces it through his 
not too subtle use of language. In introducing the approach his text takes, Real 
states that it offers “a new set of rules that can help men become more responsible 
and more emotionally available while helping women become less resentful and 
more effective” (p. 9). With this stereotypical construction of women as angry and 
resentful, and ultimately, the inference that the women’s movement was unhelpful 
in regard to heterosexual relationships (pp 6-9), Real reproduces patriarchal 
power. He writes, “while women’s new empowerment may well equip them to 
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stand up for themselves, it does a terrible job of teaching them how to stand up for 
the relationship” (p. 8). By not recognising patriarchal power as an important 
ongoing player in heterosexual relationships, Real is caught into producing 
patriarchal power himself with his clear inference that women are the initiators 
and sustainers of the new problem in heterosexual relationships. This text 
indicates the inseparable relationship between the production of power and 
language. By connecting the women’s movement with women not valuing their 
heterosexual relationship, Real has potentially constructed “woman” as a category 
in the discourses (Mouffe, 1992, p. 373) of heterosexual relationship as 
responsible for the problems heterosexual couples face.   
In reviewing these four texts I have shown how the categories “man” and 
“woman” are constructed through essentialising language in ways that can hide or 
reproduce power relations. Essentialist constructions of gender that hide or 
reproduce patriarchal power relations are unhelpful and unethical for a democratic 
egalitarian approach to heterosexual relationship. From a feminist poststructural 
position, Davies refers to these democratic possibilities which can be applied in a 
heterosexual relationship:   
It is possible to imagine locating ourselves not as halves of a metaphysical 
dualism, not as divided off from each other according to the genitals we 
happen to have, each half taking its meaning in opposition to the other, each 
needing/desiring the other to fill its own lack, but rather as beings capable of 
developing new storylines, new metaphors, new images through which we 
can live our lives. (1990-1999, pp. 41-42) 
Gottman’s research on heterosexual relationship   
Gottman’s work on heterosexual relationships differs from that of the popular 
self-help literature. Where much of the self-help literature research on 
heterosexual relationships consists of developing theory from the author’s 
counselling practice, Gottman’s approach fits within an academic, modernist, and 
structuralist paradigm.  His work is seminal in stimulating interest in couple’s 
therapy, (Long & Young, 2007, p. xvii), and for the longevity, thoroughness, and 
mass of research he has completed on heterosexual coupledom (Bambling, 2007, 
p. 54; Gottman, 1999, pp. 26-30; 2011, pp. 12-14; Gottman, Schwartz Gottman, & 
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DeClaire, 2006; Gottman & Silver, 2000). I review Gottman’s approach to 
researching heterosexual couple relationships. I then connect aspects of his 
research to my study with a view to critique any constructions of gender, power, 
or heterosexual relationship that might hide or reproduce patriarchal power 
relations.    
Gottman’s approach to research is to observe heterosexual couples in as natural 
environment as possible. He writes:   
The basic assumption of my approach, laid bare, is that what we need is a 
real theory of how marriages work and fail to work, and that theory ought to 
emerge from a study of what real couples do to accomplish the everyday 
“tasks” of being married. (1999, p. 7) 
To achieve this observation and development of theory Gottman and colleagues 
(1999, pp. 26-30) built an apartment laboratory that housed a couple for a 24 hour 
period with cameras viewing their behaviour between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. The 
couples were requested to do what they would normally do on a Sunday in their 
own home. In this apartment laboratory a multi-method approach was used to 
measure the couples in the areas of: interactive behaviour, perception, and 
physiology. At the time of the publication of his text (1999), Gottman had been 
conducting research in the apartment laboratory for 23 years. The research 
findings come from a variety of studies conducted during that period of time. 
While Gottman conducted other research with couples, the main focus of his 
research stems from his work in observing couples in the apartment laboratory.  
Gottman’s findings focus on four areas: predictors of divorce, or what keeps 
couples unhappy when they are attempting to resolve conflict; signs of happy, 
stable relationships; from these two areas, a theory involving seven principles of 
why couple relationships either work or do not work was developed; and finally, 
trust between partners has recently been included in this theory as an essential 
ingredient to building a sound couple relationship (2011, pp. 15-40).  
The relationship of Gottman’s research to my study  
There are two particular sets of findings from Gottman’s research that are relevant 
to my study.  Both these sets of findings are to do with the dominance of the male 
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partner in defining his partner’s experience and the practices of the relationship. 
Because Gottman names this dominant defining by the male partner as power or 
influence, I articulate the different understandings of power from his work and 
mine. While I take the feminist poststructural position of regarding power as a 
production from patriarchal discourses that favour men, Gottman conceptualises 
power as related to the influence the man or woman has to define how the 
relationship is experienced and played out in practice (1999, p. 52; 2011, pp. 394-
395, 428). He seems to regard power as something that is inherently available to 
either partner in defining experience and relationship practices. This approach 
suggests power can equally be produced by both partners, thus, Gottman takes up 
the assumption of gender equality offered by liberal humanism.    
However, in contrast to this assumption, Gottman’s research indicates that the 
male partner is pivotal to how well, or not, the heterosexual relationship works. 
Heterosexual couple relationships “will work to the extent that men accept 
influence from, share power with, women” (1999, p. 52). Gottman suggests that 
80% of those relationships where men did not accept their partner’s influence or 
share power with them ended up separated or divorced. More recently, Gottman 
established “why male dominance is detrimental to trust and love in close 
relationships” (2011, p. 394). In heterosexual relationships, where the male 
partner is influential through his destructive emotional expression and the female 
partner cannot influence him with her own experience of hurt and painful 
emotion, then trust and love are more likely to be undermined (2011, pp. 430-
432). Even when the male partner is more influential in defining relationship 
practices in combination with his positive emotions, while it does not appear to 
affect trust and love in the relationship, Gottman suggests, it “seems to be a highly 
negative thing” for the heterosexual couple relationship (2011, p. 395). While 
Gottman constructs power as equally available for both men and women in 
heterosexual relationship, some of his findings can be taken to support the 
position of my study; that privileged male power has a major constituting effect 
on heterosexual relationship experience and practices. 
Even though aspects of Gottman’s work can be taken to support my study, 
overall, in the literature, despite the feminist critique of family therapy, and the 
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critique from feminist poststructuralism, liberal humanism has kept a strong grip 
on the conceptualisation of heterosexual coupledom and the practice of 
heterosexual couples counselling. This grip features essentialist ideas about 
gender and equality that lack attention to discursive productions of power. 
Feminist poststructural approaches to heterosexual 
couple counselling 
While liberal humanism maintains a grip on understanding heterosexual 
coupledom and the practice of heterosexual couple counselling, this grip is highly 
contested, as I show from literature that takes a feminist poststructural position. 
Sinclair and Monk (2004) take an approach to working with heterosexual couples 
that situates in different discursive positions the expectations a couple take up 
during conflict. This approach provides a process for the couple to explore the 
conflict without blaming each other. With this approach, the authors practice what 
they call “temporary essentialism” (p. 341) where they strategically locate 
themselves in an “equity discourse” for addressing the oppressive practices 
reproduced from patriarchal discourses that privilege men. In conjunction with 
temporary essentialism, the authors practice “discursive empathy” (p. 342) which 
is used to join with the couple in helping them locate the discursive positioning 
they hold in the conflict. Finally, building on the work of temporary essentialism 
and discursive empathy, deconstructive questions (p. 343) are used as a practice to 
explore both the clients’ and the therapist’s assumptions and cultural frameworks 
for practising relationship. I include an example from Sinclair and Monk of a 
deconstructive question that addresses the culturally derived romantic love 
notions that can lead to a woman putting aside her professional aspirations for a 
male partner. The question is addressed to the woman partner: “Where did you get 
the idea that it was a good idea to sacrifice your career prospects and move to 
[name of state] to support [your partner’s] career?” (p. 344). 
In a similar manner, Dickerson (2013) outlines an approach she takes in working 
with heterosexual couples that aligns with narrative therapy and feminist 
poststructural ideas on discourse. Dickerson is concerned about approaches to 
therapy where power relations may not be addressed. Hence, she “attend[s] to the 
words the couple uses in their conversations . . . [to] unmask the operations of 
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power and [male] privilege” (p. 104). Dickerson’s aim is to notice “the influence 
of patriarchy” and respectfully and sensitively deconstruct “its effects on couples” 
(p. 104). She concludes the introduction to her approach:  
Rather than essentialist thinking about how men and women “are,” noticing 
the effects of patriarchy allows the couple to be curious about how it is each 
wants to be, how each prefers to act and relate to his/her partner, and how 
each wants to be seen and appreciated. (p. 105) 
In following a feminist poststructural approach to conceptualising heterosexual 
coupledom and the practice of counselling heterosexual couples, both the above 
examples indicate recognition of the discursive production of power relations, and 
open possibilities for a heterosexual couple to practice their relationship according 
to preferences that may not be constrained by essentialist constructions of gender.   
In a final example of an approach to counselling with heterosexual couples that 
contests essentialist ideas and practices, I refer to the work of George and Stith 
(2014) with intimate partner violence. In their practice, George and Stith hold 
onto a feminist position of patriarchy as a dominant discourse that favours men. 
However, they also take an intersectional position where they find that other 
discourses, which include economic factors, race, ethnicity, class, health, can 
challenge dominant patriarchal discourses and contribute, in some situations, to 
the development of unsafe symmetrical violence between intimate partners. Thus, 
George and Stith (2014, p. 191) suggest that “it is important to be aware of gender 
and culturally essentialist conclusions” that can limit socially just practice with 
heterosexual couples.   
This thesis joins with the work of these three examples of feminist poststructural 
approaches to heterosexual couple counselling, and speaks into the philosophical 
and political space left by liberal humanist gender essentialist ideas of equality 
that leave the socio-cultural production of power relations unrecognised. I take a 
feminist poststructural approach that recognises the dominance of patriarchy that 
privileges men as a group, but I maintain a focus at the local level, on patriarchy 
as “historically specific discourses” (Weedon, 1997, p. 104) that are reproduced in 
oppression, particularly in the area of conversations in the construction of 
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heterosexual relationships. In conjunction with this focus on patriarchal 
oppression at the local level, I recognise competing discourses reproduced in 
resistance in the conversations heterosexual couples conduct. This position fits 
with a “poststructuralist account of modern power [that] places us all in the place 
where power relations are produced and reproduced – that is, in daily 
conversation” (Monk, Winslade, & Sinclair, 2008, p. 186).   
In contrast to the liberal humanist literature that is dominant in the construction of 
heterosexual relationships as gender blind, and the limit of power to a personal 
commodity through essentialism, feminist poststructural theory and practice offers 
an understanding of the experience of women at a local level where there are 
diverse productions of gender-power-relations which shape their lives. Thus, 
feminist poststructural theory makes it clear that there is no singular uniform 
category that is woman. With an understanding of discourses, the production of 
knowledge and power through a plurality of subject positions, feminist 
poststructural theory and practice offers unique analytical tools to work with in 
understanding productions of heterosexual relationship, and the possibilities for 
egalitarian ethical practices in such. 
  
 75 
Chapter 4. Method 
 
The recognition of local and diverse productions of power and the dominance of 
patriarchal discourses in disadvantaging women were instrumental in planning a 
research design that limited, as much as possible, the production of power for all 
participants through this study. Hence, the data generation for this study was 
divided into three consecutive stages: Stage one was a focus group involving six 
heterosexual women; stage two was separate interviews with five heterosexual 
men; stage three was a focus group involving three heterosexual women. These 
stages were linked by carefully detailed documents that summarised data from the 
preceding stages.  
While the methodologies used for data generation are inseparable from the ethics 
that prompt their use, I discuss each of them separately: First, I provide an 
overview of the data generation process; second, I develop the ethical basis for the 
methods employed in data generation; finally, I conclude this chapter with 
discussion of the process by which data were selected and analysed.     
Stage one  
A first focus group was made up of six women who were each in a heterosexual 
relationship at the time of the data generation, or at some stage before it. The 
women participants were recruited by written invitations that I had left at the 
reception of a number of counselling centres and at a private tertiary educational 
institution. When a woman indicated interest in participating in the study by 
contacting me by email or telephone, I posted to her three documents: a document 
with information on the research; a research consent form; and the form for 
notifying withdrawal from participation in the research (Appendices, A, B, C). 
The document with information on the research contained information on me; the 
reasons for the research; research topic and method; safeguards and 
confidentiality practices; and participant requirements.  
If after reading the information on the research, a woman was still interested in 
participating in the study she then returned to me the signed consent form. The 
research consent form included space for each participant to notify me of their 
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preferred way for written communication between her and me during the data 
generation process. I then responded by either email or telephone with a welcome 
and appreciation, and clarified with them their preferred days and times of the 
week for meeting as the focus group. After six women were recruited I then 
contacted them with a proposed date and time to begin the first focus group.  
My position in the focus group discussions was guided by the co-research 
metaphor named and developed from therapeutic practice by Epston (1999). This 
co-research metaphor informed me to practice respectful and curious inquiry, 
without understanding too soon (Weingarten, 2003, p. 198), in regard to the 
participants’ different experiences and knowledges. I explain this metaphor and its 
application to the data generation for this study in the second section of this 
chapter. 
The first focus group met three times for approximately two hours each time, with 
one month between the first and second, and the second and third meetings. One 
of the members, Annie, was unable to participate in the third and final meeting 
due to an unforeseen family commitment.  
After the first and second meetings of the focus group I transcribed the audio 
recording of the meeting. Then, from that transcription I prepared a narrative 
research document of the meeting in line with narrative letters utilised in narrative 
therapy for post-interview reporting on interviews for clients (White, 1995; White 
& Epston, 1990). The narrative research document was either emailed or posted 
(using each participant’s preferred method) to the focus group members after the 
first and second meetings. At the beginning of the next focus group meeting, the 
group discussed the document and suggested any additions or deletions. Other 
topics were then discussed. 
After the third and final focus group meeting I transcribed the audio recording and 
prepared another narrative research document that differed from the previous two 
documents in that it did not provide questions for further discussion. I sent this 
document to the focus group participants with the request that they return it to me 
within twenty one days as either confirmed, or with any suggested additions or 
deletions. I also indicated that the bridging document (Appendix D), for taking 
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material from the first focus group discussions to the second and third stages of 
the data generation process, would be sent to the women by a set date, for their 
review, editing, and confirmation.  
After receiving back the reviewed narrative research document of the third focus 
group meeting, I completed the bridging document and either emailed or posted it 
to the first focus group participants. I requested that they review this document, 
and respond to me within twenty one days, indicating their acceptance of it, or 
that they had concerns about the document and wanted change. Annie, who was 
not present in the third and final focus group meeting, was included in this 
accountability and reviewing process. Each focus group participant responded 
affirmatively to the bridging document.  
The bridging document introduces, to the second and third stages of the data 
generation process, ideas and practices on heterosexual relationship that “caught 
my attention in surprising ways in the [focus] group discussions” (Appendix D, 
bridging document, p. 1). As well as ideas and practices discussed in the focus 
group meetings, this document offered some reflexive observations on my part in 
regard to my learning from the first focus group women. I discuss the bridging 
document in more detail in the third section of this chapter.    
Stage two 
The second stage of the data generation process comprised interviews with five 
men who were in heterosexual relationships. I sent invitations to a number of 
social groups I have contact with, or they were passed to a man via someone who 
knew of the research. After a man contacted me to indicate interest in the 
research, I posted him a document outlining information on the research; a 
research consent form; along with the form for indicating notice of withdrawal 
from participation in the research (Appendices, E, F, C).  
When I received back the signed consent form, I telephoned the man to introduce 
myself, and indicate I would be posting to him the bridging document for reading, 
with the indication that this document would be the basis for his discussions with 
me. A date and time for the interview was also agreed upon at this time.  
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One change was made in the practice during the data generation from that 
indicated in the information on the research document sent to the men. The 
information on the research document stated that along with each man’s interview 
transcript to be checked I would provide a letter which covered relevant themes 
from the man’s interview along with those identified in the literature. While I 
provided individual transcripts for checking, I did not send a letter outlining 
relevant themes from the man’s interview or the literature. Instead of including 
this procedure, I negotiated with each man that after all transcripts were revised, 
as stated in the information on the research document, I would send a combined 
letter to the men. I made this adjustment because I think it held less potential for 
individualistic blame, while still maintaining opportunity for ethical reflection on 
the material from the interviews.  The combined letter is named in this thesis as 
the men’s interviews document (Appendix, G), and is discussed in more detail in 
the following paragraph. 
Each interview lasted approximately ninety minutes. While discussion of the 
bridging document was the initial focus of the interview, discussion included the 
men’s experiences of their heterosexual relationship(s), and the conversational 
practices employed with their partners. After each interview I transcribed the 
audio recording of the interview and emailed or posted a copy of the transcript to 
the participant who was invited to check it for accuracy and respond back to me 
with acceptance or adjustments. After I had received all five transcripts back from 
the men, I then prepared as noted above, in the form of a narrative research 
document, the men’s interviews document. The men’s interviews document 
includes responses to the bridging document, and other themes the men thought 
were important for heterosexual relationships. In a right hand margin of this 
document I included questions and some reflexive comments that were intended 
to invite further thinking and possible ethical action by the men. This document 
was then posted or emailed to the men with a request that if they wanted anything 
changed or added they get back to me within two weeks of receiving it. The 
bridging document from the first focus group, and the men’s interviews 
document, were both taken to the third stage of the data generation for discussion 
by a second focus group of three women.  
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Stage three 
The second focus group of women were recruited through invitations to 
participate that I left at the reception area of different counselling centres, and a 
private tertiary education institution. When the invitation was acknowledged by a 
woman, I posted to her three documents: a document with information on the 
research; a research consent form; and the form for indicating notice of 
withdrawal from participation in the research (Appendices, H, I, C).  
Once the research consent forms were returned signed I made contact with the 
participant either by email or telephone with a welcome and appreciation for their 
response. I also indicated I would be posting or emailing them three documents to 
guide our discussions. These documents were: the bridging document; the men’s 
interviews document; and a two page document summarising the research design 
and offering outsider-witness questions (Appendix J) to guide the discussions in 
the focus group. While I initially had hoped to recruit six women in the second 
focus group, I facilitated the group with three women because of the slowness of 
responses to the invitations to participate. In regard to the number of participants 
for a focus group, a general consensus in the literature is that six to ten are best 
suited (see Asbury, 1995; Kreuger, 1995; Morgan, 1995; Wilkinson, 2004). 
However, Wilkinson (2004, p. 178) is flexible with this number, suggesting as 
few as two participants can serve the purpose of a focus group. Kreuger (1995, pp. 
529-530), and Morgan (1995, p. 517) both suggest numbers fewer than six can be 
more suited to topics that deal with complex experiences and areas where 
participants have expertise. Thus, in regard to the topics of this study for 
discussion by the second focus group, I concluded that a group of three could 
create meaningful discussion and responses. 
The second focus group of women met for a one off meeting that went for 
approximately two hours. The main purpose of the second focus group, as the 
final stage of the data generation process, was to give women a final say on the 
generated data as recorded in the two documents they had received from the 
previous two stages. After the completion of the second focus group meeting I 
transcribed the conversations from an audio recording of the meeting and sent a 
copy to each of the three participants. I requested that they review, and revise if 
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necessary, their contribution to the discussion, as long as other participants’ 
contributions and meanings were not altered. I requested that they return the 
revised transcript within twenty one days. Along with the transcript, I sent the 
participants two questions with reference to the focus of their discussions on 
heterosexual relationship experience and practices, which they could respond to if 
they chose: If you were a woman in the first focus group what would you 
appreciate about our discussion if you heard it? And, what hopes would you 
carry/hold that our conversation would have for men in the interviews, or the men 
in your own relationships? All transcripts were returned, and two of the 
participants responded to the two questions. 
Argument for the methods 
“The choice of one method over another is not simply a technical decision, but an 
epistemological and theoretical one” suggests Wilkinson (1999, p. 222). In the 
same vein, Thompson (1992) argues that before the elements of a research 
methodology can be regarded as useful for achieving a feminist goal they require 
examination in regard to their correspondence with that methodology. The 
elements are: the agenda of the research, the epistemology of the methodology, 
and the ethics of how and why knowledge is accessed from research participants. 
To these three elements Dankoski (2000) adds a fourth, methods used in data 
gathering. 
Based in argument that the elements of this study correspond ethically and 
epistemologically I introduce the methods – focus groups and interviews – with 
the inclusion of outsider-witness practices, narrative documents, and the co-
research ethos from narrative therapy.  
The agenda of this study was highlighted in Chapter One: to explore the 
subjectivity of women in heterosexual relationships as addressed in the 
conversations conducted in those relationships; secondly, to hear the dreams, 
hopes, and aspirations those women have for their heterosexual relationships. In 
Chapter Two I introduced feminist poststuctural epistemology. This epistemology 
takes up the principle that discourse and not the individual is the “structuring 
principle of society, in social institutions, modes of thought and individual 
subjectivity” (Weedon, 1997, p. 40). Power and knowledge are intimately linked 
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in discourse (Foucault, 1980) so that certain knowledge is prescribed as central to 
the particular discursive way of knowing, and other knowledges are hidden or not 
regarded as important to that particular discourse. Hence, with the dominance of 
patriarchy, a woman’s experience, knowledges, skills, and subjectivities receive 
very little, if any space as important. That is, unless those experiences, 
knowledges, skills, and subjectivities fit within certain patriarchal parameters as 
acceptable for a woman. Conversely, a male’s experience, knowledges, skills, and 
subjectivities, are regarded as important and given priority through patriarchy but, 
only if they fit within the patriarchal parameters of what it is to be a man.  As a 
result of patriarchal dominance, “power is exercised within discourses” in the 
constitution and government of women’s and men’s individual subjectivity 
(Weedon, 1997, p. 110). Specifically, in regard to this study patriarchy, as a 
dominant discourse, privileges men in relation to women in the exercise of power 
(Weedon, 1997, pp. 105, 120, 122; Pease, 2010, pp. 95-97), and the expression of 
what is acceptable knowledge.  
In a feminist study, method must recognise and address this patriarchal production 
of power as a matter of ethical concern. I took steps for holding myself ethically 
accountable when engaging with participants. Ethical accountability is also 
required for the relationship between two groups of participants, the women in the 
first focus group and the men in the second stage interviews. The combination of 
methods I chose for the data generation in this study are not only designed for 
constructing knowledge, but they also serve to minimise re-production of power 
that disadvantages the participants, particularly the women participants.   
Ethical epistemological practices – focus groups 
From the 1950s focus groups have been utilised by feminist scholars and activists 
as consciousness raising groups (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005), and since the 
mid to late nineties they have been advocated as a constructive research method 
for researchers operating from a feminist poststructural epistemological position 
(Asbury, 1995; Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, 2011; Madriz, 2000; Wilkinson, 
1999). Focus groups reduce the production of power between a male researcher 
and the female participants (Wilkinson, 1999), and allow for more creative 
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interaction among participants and for the co-construction of meaning (Wilkinson, 
1998b, 1999, 2004). 
Ethics: Researcher and gendered power 
I chose to have all-women focus groups. As the researcher I was the sole man 
present when these groups met. As a male researcher, in following a feminist 
poststructuralist methodology, I recognised the need to continue working 
reflexively (D’Cruz, Gillingham, & Melendez 2007; Shacklock & Smyth, 1998). 
In guarding against the subtle exercise of power: I took care to speak respectfully 
when guiding the direction of discussions and in asking questions about a 
woman’s story or a topic being discussed; I took care as to how my larger 
physical body was present in the group; and I made sure evaluative comments 
addressed concerns of injustice or unethical practice, and not peripheral matters. 
My role was to facilitate the process of discussion through respectful curious 
questioning. Because there were more women present, the production of power 
between me and them would have a greater chance of being minimised, in 
contrast to an interview or a traditional positivist experimental setting (Dankoski, 
2000; Wilkinson, 1998b, 1999). The ethics of choosing focus groups is not only 
concerned with power between me as a male researcher with the women 
participants, but also with the process by which data is generated.  
Ethics: How data is generated 
Kitzinger (1994), and Wilkinson (1998a, 1998b, 1999) argue that focus groups, as 
part of a feminist research methodology, fit with a naturalistic method, become a 
social context for developing meaning, and reduce the possibilities of 
exploitation. An all-women focus group helps minimise the reproduction of 
patriarchal power, makes possible the facilitation of knowledge from the women 
of the focus groups in an unencumbered way as possible, reducing the threats of 
exploitation, subjugation, and retribution.   
The agenda for this study, the respectful approach required to accomplish it, the 
predominance of women in the focus group, and the focus group method, were 
steps taken towards the ethical co-production of knowledge. The focus group 
method has the potential for serving women participants by providing them a 
space to contribute to this study. Thus, it is possible for them to share their 
 83 
collective stories, common experiences of power and domination, resistance 
practices and ideas, in a safe and supportive environment (Madriz, 2000, p. 839; 
see also Espin, 1995; Norris, Nurius, & Dimeff, 1996).  
Ethical epistemological practices – interviews 
The two options I had before me as methods for discussing with men the bridging 
document and their own heterosexual relationship were interviews or focus 
groups. I chose interviews over focus groups with the men based in ethics inferred 
from the literature. 
Ethics: Men speaking apart from dominant masculine culture    
Allen (2005), in her research on the construction of young men’s sexual identity 
during focus group discussions, speaks of the young men fluidly constructing both 
hegemonic versions of masculinity, and less hegemonic constructions that 
indicated enjoyable relations with women separate from sexual relations. The 
young men’s hegemonic expressions of masculine identity policed the less 
hegemonic because the presence of male peers created a vulnerability around the 
expression of the less hegemonic constructions (pp. 43-49). While Allen’s 
research is with young men about sexual identity, I think it helpfully illustrates the 
power of peers and patriarchal discourses to constitute men’s talk and 
subjectivities, even when they occasionally step into positions outside of 
dominant patriarchal constructions of masculinity.  
The advantage men gain from patriarchal privilege and their difficulty in 
recognising that privilege (Connell, 2009; Pease, 1997, 2000, 2002a), are part of 
the patriarchal constitution of men’s talk and subjectivities that make it difficult to 
transform gender inequality. Two of the factors that contribute to the difficulty in 
recognising male privilege are the pain men experience, and not acknowledging 
that women are oppressed (Johnson, 1997, pp. 18, 234). While I acknowledge 
men’s pain, and that men can have difficulty in seeing women as oppressed, in a 
focus group where I could be in the minority with the position I hold on gender 
inequality, I did not want to risk getting involved in arguments about these points. 
The potential for competition and abuse of power in a focus group context with 
men trying to persuade each other, or the alternative, of peer-pressured easy 
submission to other men’s ideas, is delimited in one-on-one interviews. I did not 
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want to risk the social justice agenda for the second stage of the research with 
male participants being overrun by their expressions of pain, or the practices that 
many men embrace, such as competition and domination of relationships (see 
Pease, 2000, p. 50).  
Gaddis (2006) sums up my reasons for one-to-one interviews with men.  In 
respect to adolescent boys, he argued that with an invitational focus for his 
interviews adolescent boys were more amenable to speak of experiences, feelings, 
and ethics that are outside of dominant culture. In an interview with an 
invitational focus there is more opportunity for men to speak of experiences 
outside dominant discourse than when they are in a group where they might be 
expected to perform dominant versions of masculinity.  
Ethical epistemological practices – outsider-witness practices  
Outsider witness practices are a therapeutic practice (Weingarten, 2003, pp. 203-
204; White, 2007, pp. 190-192) that I have shaped as a research method for 
particular purposes. Part of the purpose for the second and third stages of the data 
generation process was to fulfil the role of outsider-witness to the first stage focus 
group of women through the bridging document.  
The bridging document was prepared by me after the final meeting of the first 
focus group.  In that document I highlighted the material from the first focus 
group discussions that I was “most drawn to”, that surprised and “moved” me, 
from which I gained a sense of what the women in the focus group “accord[ed] 
value to in life” (White, 2007, p. 190, 194-196). In regard to the witnessing done 
by the second and third stages of the data generation process my hope was that the 
participants in these stages might also be drawn to, and moved by, material in the 
bridging document that would contribute toward achievements such as: gaining a 
new perspective on their identity; reconnecting with important values for their 
life; initiating new steps in their life not previously considered; thinking 
differently to their routine ways of thinking.  
In regard to the second stage of data generation particularly, outsider-witness 
practices served a social justice agenda for this study. This agenda follows a 
developing social justice focus in qualitative research inquiry (see Denzin & 
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Giardina, 2009). By asking men in the second stage of data generation to witness 
to the women of the first stage, the purpose was to do my best to open possibilities 
for those men to witness their own position in patriarchal discourses, and be 
transported (moved) to a different more just place in understanding and practising 
gendered relationships. Research that produces change was my hope for the 
outsider witness component of this study.  
Ethical epistemological practices – narrative research documents 
The use of narrative research documents is supported by their use in research with 
women in regard to therapy and abuse (Dixon, 1999), and in research on teaching 
practice (Crocket & Kotzé, 2012). Narrative research documents are used in this 
study, particularly in preference to transcripts for the first focus group, because 
they serve to integrate therapeutic practices in the data generation process while 
also fulfilling the role of a research method.   
Narrative research documents follow the procedures of narrative letters developed 
by White and Epston (1990) in narrative therapy. Narrative letters have four 
guidelines of relevance to the development of narrative research documents in this 
study: Narrative letters render lived experience into a meaningfully coherent and 
lifelike story, in contrast to discontinuous apparently unrelated events; narrative 
letters make the therapist more accountable to the person(s) who are consulting 
the therapist; the letters are a shared construction with the person(s) consulting the 
therapist, who can contest, amend, or confirm the letter; the therapist is required to 
co-create a letter which includes the voice of all parties involved in the 
conversation, while at the same time avoiding exclusive professional language 
(White & Epston, 1990, pp. 125-126).  
The narrative research documents are the three which were written following each 
of the meetings of the first focus group, the bridging document, and the men’s 
interviews document. The narrative research documents prepared after each of the 
three first focus group meetings, along with the bridging document, made possible 
the acknowledgement of, and responses to the women’s experiences of 
heterosexual relationship throughout this whole study. After each of the three 
meetings of the first focus group I wrote a narrative research document that 
included an accurate précis of the transcripts which included questions I had asked 
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and quotes from members of the group in regard to identified key themes 
discussed. I also gave an invitation for focus group members to raise any concerns 
about important topics and words that I may have omitted from the narrative 
research document. Excepting the document written after the third focus group 
meeting, I included questions that could be used to facilitate further discussion in 
the next focus group meeting.  
Because the men had individual interviews, and hence, only a small portion of the 
interview transcript and the ideas discussed might be included in a narrative 
research document, the men first read and confirmed their individual transcripts 
before I prepared the men’s interviews document. The men read their transcripts 
as a means of checking their accuracy, whereas the women in the first focus group 
confirmed the narrative research documents – which I had written – as an accurate 
representation of the three focus group meetings.  
Ethical epistemological practices – co-research 
Co-research is a narrative therapy practice initially developed by Epston (1999) in 
the context of working with families who had a child suffering with chronic, 
excruciatingly painful, skin disorders. Because his empathic responses to these 
families and children were limited by his own limited experience of such pain, 
and the idea of coming to them with “expert knowledge” had been exhausted by 
others working with these families, Epston decided on the co-research metaphor 
as a possible way of “seeking out fellow-feeling” with those suffering. The 
suffering of these people became “the designated problem” for which Epston 
developed the co-research metaphor (p. 140). Epston says “[the co-research 
metaphor] brought together the very respectable notion of research with the rather 
odd idea of the co-production of knowledge by sufferers and therapist . . . in 
which the problem was a problem for everyone – and here I included myself” (pp. 
141-142). The co-research approach is most often marked in narrative therapy by 
a respectful and curious form of inquiry by the therapist based “on the 
presumption of difference rather than commonality” (Drewery, 2005, p. 310). Co-
research, in the data generation for this study, was marked by this same form of 
respectful, sometimes naïve, and curious form of inquiry regarding the 
participant’s different experiences and knowledges.  
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While my approach to inquiry with the participants in each of the three stages of 
data generation was respectfully curious, the co-research practice as described by 
Epston, was produced mainly during the first stage. In response to my inquiries on 
the topic of how conversations in the women’s heterosexual relationships 
constituted their subjectivities and the relationship, the problem the whole study 
would focus on was disclosed. In much the same vein as Epston’s approach to 
“the problem”, the problem(s) the women articulated concerning their experiences 
of their heterosexual relationships became shared problems, in that they became 
the problem the remainder of the study explored and sought to address. This co-
research practice fits with a feminist method that encourages co-construction and 
diversity of meaning, and limits the exploitive potential of the researcher. 
Post data generation reflection on the methods  
I briefly reflect on the effectiveness of focus groups, narrative research 
documents, and the men’s interviews for generating the data in this study. The 
focus groups were highly effective. I refer in the next section to my response of 
surprise to the data generated by the first focus group. The capacity of the focus 
groups to generate data on gender inequality, the effects of this inequality, and the 
participants’ hopes and dreams for heterosexual relationship, is a major 
contribution to this study. The use of narrative research documents is valued in 
this study where there were requirements for connection and development of story 
and ideas between the first focus group meetings, and then between the three 
different stages, where those stages were required to relate without participants 
physically meeting. While constructing the documents is a time consuming 
process, they have the capacity to communicate succinctly and clearly the 
significant stories and ideas within a stage and between stages, while at the same 
time stimulating further thought and discussion. The narrative research documents 
are also a permanent record of data that has been developed and accepted at each 
relevant stage.  
The main area of doubt I hold is in regard to the men’s interviews, particularly, 
whether the social justice agenda was achieved. The first point of doubt is the 
approach taken by some of the men in reading and absorbing the bridging 
document. Some of the men had clearly read and absorbed the content of the 
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document and at the interview reported processing new understandings of 
heterosexual relationship and thinking about engagement with new ethical 
practices. Others did not appear to engage with the document at the level of 
grasping the effects of their practices on their partners, and addressing the 
possibility of personal change for the relationship. In retrospect, I put this 
difference between the men down to the different discourses each of the men were 
subjected to. This leads to the second point of doubt with the men’s interviews: 
my skills and knowledge in being able to articulately and effectively challenge 
their thinking and practices. At the time of the data generation I was relatively 
new to understanding male cultures and poststructural ideas and practices, such as 
discourses and the constitutive nature of language. This limited knowledge and 
skill, in turn, limited how I worked with the men in their interviews in regard to 
invitations to alternative ways of thinking about heterosexual relationship 
practices. Perhaps, the men’s interviews document (Appendix G) more fully 
served the purpose of a social justice agenda than my interviewing. That 
document certainly reflects some of my own learning and development during the 
data generation of this study.  
Data analysis 
I now proceed with introducing the means that guided my selection of data for 
analysis, and a method that best explains the process of analysis. 
Selection of data for analysis 
The first focus group women’s answers to my questions on conversational 
practices and their effects on the women formed much of the material in the 
bridging document, and guided my selection of data for analysis. Because 
feminist poststructural theory recognises the constitutive power of language my 
first questions of the first focus group concerned language. Four of these 
questions can be found on the first page of the narrative research document from 
the first meeting of the first focus group (Appendix K): Can you share with us the 
kind of words and tone of language you and your partner use, or used, when 
talking about an important decision to be made? Would this tone and words be the 
same for all conversations about important decisions? Would there be differences 
depending on the decision to be made? Are there situations where either of you 
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controlled the conversation? These questions and developments of them, asked at 
different times during the three first focus group meetings, formed the basis for 
the discussions by the first focus group which, in turn, became the topics recorded 
in the bridging document that represented those discussions.    
The bridging document  
In summarising the bridging document, I comment first here on my attention 
being captured in surprising ways by what the women in the first focus group 
disclosed (Appendix D, bridging document, p. 1). The word “surprise”, best 
articulates at the time of the focus group meetings and the construction of the 
bridging document the emergence of a new story or a new subjectivity for me. In 
language already articulated in this thesis the bridging document indicates the 
peeling away of my own gender blindness. In retrospect, the word “surprise”, 
covers the rare and unexpected opportunity I had to move into new territories for 
learning and ethical development.  I learned from the first focus group women’s 
discussion knowledge that I needed to practice in my relationship with my 
partner, and with any woman I engaged with. While some of the women’s 
answers were not new information when it comes to women’s experience of men 
and heterosexual relationship, the readiness to enthusiastically engage with each 
other, and with a male, about their knowledges and experiences contrasted with 
dominant masculine culture where there is limited if any knowledge of such 
matters. If there is knowledge, it is often articulated in a blaming way of one’s 
partner. This thesis, particularly the results chapters, best develop my surprise into 
what I hope is an adequate ethical response to the ideas and knowledges 
articulated by the first focus group women.  
Along with my sense of surprise to the discussions of the first focus group the 
bridging document can be regarded as having three important points to make: A 
description of the first focus group women’s experience of conversational 
practices in heterosexual relationship; their hopes and dreams for what 
heterosexual relationship could become; and my own learning from the first focus 
group women in application to the heterosexual relationship with my partner. It is 
the first two of these points that guided me in the selection of data from the first 
focus group to analyse, and in what I chose to analyse from the men’s interviews. 
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The first focus group women named three experiences of heterosexual 
conversational practices that had effects for them: being “shut-off” by the male 
partner in conversations, that is, a woman is stopped from contributing to the 
conversation, or not consulted for knowledge that can contribute; a woman is 
called a “nag”, or her response named a “nagging” response, when there are no 
other options left for her to gain her partner’s attention; the relationship, and the 
language practices therein, have the effects of contributing to the woman partner’s 
identity, for good or for ill.   
In response to the question, “what can men do to help grow the hope for equal 
space in relationship?” in the narrative research document written after the first 
meeting of the first focus group, the focus group women coined an idea, “a safe, 
sacred place”. This idea was discussed often in the second and third meetings of 
the first focus group, and reflects their hopes and dreams for egalitarian and 
equally-intimate heterosexual relationship practices. This idea plays an important 
part in the analysis. Hence, I include here words that allude to a safe, sacred place 
from each of the women participants during the second and third meetings of the 
first focus group.  
Ali: For women I think we seek that from our friends and sometimes we do 
find that through our friendships, but what we are really wanting is that 
same level of intimacy in the conversation with our partner. . . . It makes me 
feel like who I am is important . . . it’s almost like you take away from that 
place a sense of yourself. . . . Your contribution, your language, your ideas, 
your thought, your personality, your creativity, all these things are valued in 
that place because someone else is giving you the time to do that . . . what 
could be better in life? That’s such an amazing place! 
Carmen: [In regard to her relationship with her partner] I believe that God 
does want to bring us to an egalitarian relationship which is more of a 
partnership and an equal thing. 
Hannah: I was thinking about the intimacy in relationships zone . . . where 
you can feel really genuine, authentic, who you are, yourself . . . free to be 
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yourself and not have to protect yourself or protect the other person. . . . For 
me, it is all stuck together, [with] intimacy in the relationship.  
Sarah: What actually makes that strong connection is that equal discussion, 
that space where you both feel accepted and loved and I think that is not an 
easy thing that just happens, but that is something I have always wanted. . . . 
I think the biggest problem was that early on I actually did not know that 
was what I was looking for. . . . [We have] named it over these discussions. 
Sue: [In response to a number of comments] that is what you are saying, 
such a precious place to be . . . I totally agree with you . . . talking, listening, 
really understanding each other. . . . I think it’s a wonderful thing when you 
do. 
Annie: This is the language I have learned [from a counseling course]. I 
didn’t have the word for it before, but he’s [Annie’s partner] not connecting 
emotionally. . . . I realize, just from learning, that’s what’s missing.    
Finally, the bridging document included some of my own learning with my 
partner, which was a direct effect of the conversations with the women of the first 
focus group. The voices of the first focus group women were active reminding me 
of “shut-off” and its effects while I was effectively in the process of shutting-off 
my partner in a conversation. I was able to stop myself and get involved in the 
conversation in a more helpful, respectful, egalitarian manner.  
A rhizomatic method  
As I introduced in Chapter Two, Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1988) concept of 
the rhizome has become a helpful metaphor for understanding the unforeseen 
development of the theory and meaning that is applied in the results chapters of 
this study.  Lechte (1994, p. 95) says the rhizome represents “horizontal thought, 
thought always in movement”. The rhizome is a figuration that has been taken up 
by a number of scholars in application to research and writing. Among those 
scholars is Grosz (1994), who suggests the rhizome figuration can be utilised as a 
method that is “concerned with what can be done; how texts, concepts and 
subjects can be put to work, made to do things, make new linkages” (p. 200). 
Grosz suggests that the rhizome method is akin to cartography or mapping. That 
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is, it is not about the tracing or reproduction of a model, but rather, it is 
experimentation, the exploration of new territories and practices (pp. 199-200). In 
this study, the rhizomatic method helps conceptualise the unforeseeable route of 
making linkages between data and theory – so that new territory is stepped into. 
The idea of the rhizome opens space for grasping the complex and unpredictable 
adventure of writing research.  
Kamler and Thomson (2006) in their work on doctoral supervision suggest the 
term “writing up” research is unhelpful because it constructs writing as “ancillary 
or marginal to the real work of research” (p. 3). They go on to say the complexity 
is obliterated by the phrase “writing up” (p. 3). Kamler and Thomson suggest 
instead, “I’m writing my research, where the present continuous verb writing 
implies a continuous process of inquiry through writing” (p. 4). This thinking is in 
line with the ideas offered by St.Pierre (2011, p. 622), “It is impossible to 
disentangle data, data collection, and data analysis”. The process of inquiry 
through writing, entangling data with theory in data analysis, sits with a 
rhizomatic method, and best describes the approach I have taken in the data 
analysis in this study.  
The analysis in the following chapters is an ethical response to the unfair 
constitution of women’s subjectivities in heterosexual relationships through the 
patriarchally dominated conversational practices of their heterosexual partners. In 
the analysis: I explore the effects for the relational subjectivities of the first focus 
group women when their partners take control of conversations; I give priority to 
the ideas and knowledges of the first focus group, particularly an invitation to 
men to step into a safe, sacred place; I explore and detail possible ethical 
responses from men to that invitation; I emphasise women’s responses from the 
second focus group to data generated in the bridging document and the men’s 
interviews document; and I discuss in detail a moment of discourse in operation as 
a possible colonising action. Even though I use theory from a range of sources and 
philosophers, the analysis fits with feminist poststructural theory and practice. 
Chapter summary 
The research method, guided by feminist literature on gender and power relations, 
safe and ethical practices for data generation, and narrative therapy ideas, is 
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designed to fulfil the agenda set for this study. The selection of data for analysis is 
guided by the two criteria, hearing women’s knowledges and experiences in 
regard to their relational subjectivity, and their hopes and dreams for egalitarian 
heterosexual relationship practices. The theory applied in the analysis, while 
rhizomatic and unforeseen in its emergence, is an ethical response on my part 
intended to contribute to and support the nine women involved in this study, and 
make visible possible ethical and egalitarian responses and initiatives from men.   
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Chapter 5. A story of decomposition and 
mo(ve)ment 
 
This first results chapter takes the ideas of “decomposition” and “mo(ve)ment” 
(see Davies et al., 2006), and applies them to two episodes from the data. These 
episodes are within the transcript of the first focus group. In the first episode Sue 
speaks of a retreating partner who would not engage with her on subjects that 
were precious to Sue. I theorise this first episode from poststructural perspectives, 
using the concepts “mastery and submission” – reworked as discussed in Chapter 
2 – in regard to being subjected to discourse while using it masterfully for one’s 
purposes (Butler, 1997a). From a feminist position, a much more extensive 
theorising of the first episode of Sue’s story is then unfolded, explicating 
decomposition and mo(ve)ment as processes for change. The second episode 
further develops decomposition and mo(ve)ment, and mastery and submission, as 
my analysis shows how Sue works toward agency with her partner in pursuing 
what is precious to her.  
The purpose of this chapter is to recognise and show the complexity of 
subjectivities when a woman is subjected to patriarchal discourses in heterosexual 
relationship, and the adjustment and manoeuvring of discourses required for her 
interests to be addressed. Each of the nine women involved in the data generation 
for this study report experiences of struggle and oppression with inequitable and 
subjugating conversational practices in heterosexual relationship. This chapter 
serves to highlight and theorise that struggle and oppression from the position of 
one woman, who could be any woman. 
Sue’s story – first episode 
The first episode I report is based on Sue’s account of trying to engage her partner 
on important familial concerns, then her withdrawal to engage with more 
supportive discourses, before attempting to re-engage with her partner. 
My partner and I will try to have these discussions, and it will turn into me 
being frustrated because I want to talk it out. And he [would] just retreat. . . 
. It was frustrating, and there were times that I would get so angry because 
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there were things, especially to do with the kids, that we needed to get 
sorted out. I would just go and sit in the loo [toilet], literally shut the door 
with pencil and paper and write all these things like: “Did you hear him 
God? What a so and so!” I would read and think “well, he wasn’t quite that 
bad. Well, he was!” Then I would rip it up and throw it away. Then I would 
be calm enough to go out, and have a sensible conversation.  
A first postsructural interpretation of the first episode of Sue’s 
story 
I elaborate on a development that provides agency for Sue as she manoeuvres the 
discourses that she has available to her for conducting herself in the context of a 
heterosexual relationship.  
In an initial reading, the concepts of “submission and mastery” as developed by 
Butler (1997a, p. 116) from Althusser (1971), and explicated and applied by 
Davies (2006), appear illuminating for a poststructural understanding of Sue’s 
actions. Submission and mastery are concepts that Butler (1997a) utilises to shed 
light on how individuals become subjects of discourse, both as a result of power 
constituting the subject and power as an effect through the subject from discourse. 
Because the words submission and mastery can be used in the context of control 
and abuse by men, I change them to the terms accommodation to discourse, and 
utilisation of discourse (see chapter 2). The individual emerges as a subject within 
discourse, by their accommodating to the dominant discursive repertoires, and 
then skilfully utilising their knowledge of those repertoires agentically.   
In returning to the excerpt from Sue in the first focus group, a brief reading from a 
poststructural position alone can illustrate the accommodation to, and utilisation of 
discourse.  In retreating, Sue’s partner is enacting power from the patriarchal 
discourse that provides a position of control for the conversation (see Rankin 
Mahoney & Knudson-Martin, 2009, pp. 19-20). Sue, with feelings of frustration 
and anger, is antagonised by this expression of power, but she sees no other way to 
deal with it than to leave and accommodate this formative expression of discursive 
power. To openly oppose it, with a full enactment of her anger, or simply 
challenge her partner’s withdrawal as an act of power and control, might have 
been too risky for Sue to achieve her goals. At this point Sue’s accommodation to 
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the patriarchal discourse comes into play, or as Drewery’s (2005, p. 314) 
conceptualising would suggest, Sue is now comprehending “how to go on as part 
of being an accomplished discourse user”. This accommodation to the discourse 
has “a certain flexibility” (Drewery, 2005, p. 314) as Sue finds a way within 
acceptable discursive practice to utilise the discourse for her purposes.  In 
accommodating to the discursive display of power Sue is able to access power that 
the discourse offers her in the relationship. In going into the toilet and secretly 
expressing her anger about the situation, Sue is, in one moment, accommodating 
the power of the discursive control as exhibited in her partner’s behaviour, and she 
is utilising an approach that can acceptably subvert that power. This 
accommodation to, and utilisation of discourse, is to express privately the anger 
she feels, calm herself, and then “have a sensible conversation”, that might be 
acceptable on patriarchal terms. While this reading of the excerpt from Sue briefly 
illustrates the poststructural concepts I have termed accommodation and 
utilisation, a more developed understanding and meaning is possible. In the 
following reading, I slow the first episode of Sue’s story down to a frame-by-
frame reading. With this slower reading, the nuanced effects of a patriarchal 
discourse are noticed, and the concepts, decomposition and mo(ve)ment, are used 
to give Sue’s story further significant meaning and clarity.    
A further feminist reading of the first episode of Sue’s story: The 
first frame – responsibility for the children 
The first frame, from a feminist perspective, I suggest, is the responsibility that 
Sue feels for the children while her partner retreats from this topic for discussion. 
These actions fit with a finding that women are often the parent in a heterosexual 
relationship who will take the major responsibility for childcare in families 
(Gerson, 2010, pp. 171-173; Hochschild & Machung 2003; Kimmel, 2008, pp. 
149-151). While Sue’s specific mention of their children as the topic for 
discussion allows the issue of gendered childcare to be mentioned here, her story 
does not indicate that this is what frustrates her. It is clear from Sue’s account that 
there are a number of topics that she brings to her partner for discussion and he 
retreats. It is the retreating by her partner from Sue’s efforts to have a conversation 
that frustrates her. I regard her partner’s retreating as a silencing tactic (Benjamin, 
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2003) employed from a dominant discourse to marginalise or oppress those 
operating from a subordinate discourse.  
The second frame – silencing by dominant discourse 
Another frame in Sue’s story from a feminist perspective is that discourses limit 
what can be said and by whom, thereby limiting access to a discourse (Mills, 
2004, pp. 87-88). In the context of Sue’s conversation with her partner, silencing 
is a speaking position offered by a patriarchal discourse that excludes certain 
topics or experiences from entering a conversation so that they cannot be spoken 
or, if spoken, cannot be heard (Benjamin, 2003, p. 9; Lorde, 1984, p. 124). The 
discourses at work in Sue’s story provide a means to understand gendered 
oppression through this silencing practice. Within heterosexual relationships, 
Benjamin (2003) suggests that the power struggle is between two different 
meaning structures, or in poststructuralist terms, two different discourses that 
provide different ways of speaking into existence and understanding heterosexual 
relationships. A feminist meaning structure – in Benjamin’s terms – challenges 
and resists oppression of women in whatever form that oppression may take. A 
hierarchical meaning structure, or hegemonic patriarchal discourse, protects and 
justifies gender hierarchy including the oppression of women. In connecting this 
theory specifically to heterosexual couples, the idea of “ongoing” (Cultrane, 1989) 
and “open” (Benjamin, 1998, 2003) couple conversations are an important practice 
enabling couples to develop equality and negotiate the conduct of daily tasks 
required in heterosexual coupledom. To silence the conversation, as Sue’s partner 
has done here, is one oppressive practice of a hierarchical meaning structure 
within heterosexual relationships (Benjamin, 2003). 
Davies and Harré (1999), in their work on positioning theory, connect oppressive 
conversational practice with attempts to resist such: 
One speaker can position others by adopting a storyline that incorporates a 
particular interpretation of cultural stereotypes to which the others are 
“invited” to conform, indeed are required to conform, if they are to continue 
to converse with the first speaker in such a way as to contribute to the 
storyline that the first person has opened up. Of course, they may not wish 
to do so for all sorts of reasons . . . [one of those reasons being] as an 
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attempt to resist. Or they may conform because they do not define 
themselves as having choice but feel angry or oppressed or affronted or 
some combination of these. (p. 40)  
While Sue’s partner is not the first speaker in a linear sense, he is the first speaker 
in a hierarchical sense. He has taken control of the conversation and the available 
speaking positions by his retreating silent response to Sue’s invitation to a 
conversation. Paradoxically, his control of conversation by silence requires Sue’s 
silence. Sue’s response appears to be one of conforming to her partner’s initiation 
for silence, which is a response marked initially by anger, and then by her 
physical retreat to the toilet. I suggest Sue’s response is one of taking a position of 
resistance to her partner’s invitation to conform to his control of the conversation 
with silence.   
Third frame – how anger is expressed 
The anger that Sue feels and expresses is yet another frame that feminist thinking 
can offer this story. Though the work of Lerner (1985) can be regarded as dated, I 
think it is still relevant to the way patriarchally constituted men can respond to 
women who openly express anger. When women openly express anger, especially 
toward men who are patriarchally constituted, they are often regarded in ways that 
are demeaning and the expression is treated with disdain and dishonoured. The 
language often used to condemn women when they openly express anger is 
disparaging and marginalising. They can be regarded as irrational, “unloving and 
unlovable . . . [c]ertainly, you do not want to become one of them”, Lerner (1985, 
p. 2) suggests, with sad irony. Lerner (1985, p. 2) further makes the point that 
profane and derogatory language that “names” women is nearly always used to 
refer to any persons who openly express anger. With these discursive conditions, 
it may be risky for Sue to express the anger. In the light of the discursive 
conditions that women might experience in regard to the feeling and expression of 
anger, it could be seen as surprising that Sue acknowledged the anger and was 
prepared to express it in some way. This point leads into the second view on 
anger: how it can be utilised by women. 
Benjamin (2003) makes a number of points about the helpfulness of emotions in 
connecting to alternate discourses, and about anger in particular, as a resource that 
 99 
supports the contesting of the dominant discourse. In regard to emotion, Benjamin 
(2003, p. 12) writes, “If we are able to connect emotionally to a source of an 
alternative discourse – through a person, book or media message – this source 
becomes a power resource that can enable us to unsilence avoided topics in our 
relationships”. And in regard to anger, Benjamin (2003, p. 13) writes, “The 
emergence of anger is simultaneously a state in which alternative meaning 
structures become more powerful and a state that reinforces contestation. Further, 
anger tends to signify the reluctance to accept positioning by others”. 
While, from Sue’s account, the anger cannot be expressed openly with her 
partner, it is an emotion she acknowledges feeling and begins to utilise 
effectively. The anger opens an agentic opportunity for Sue to separate from her 
partner who at this point is the representative of a hierarchical meaning structure. 
In physically separating from her partner Sue is able to find “a room of her own” 
(Woolf, 1928/2009) where she has space to connect with some other meaning 
structure that can become a supporting resource for her to “unsilence avoided 
topics” – on Benjamin’s terms – with her partner. Anger is a tool that Sue utilises 
to refuse the positioning offered her by her partner. The anger has supported 
agentic mo(ve)ment for Sue to re-position herself in contesting the hierarchical 
meaning structure. This new positioning is made available from another meaning 
structure that is far more agreeable to what Sue holds precious in life. The 
meaning structure which helps facilitate Sue’s mo(ve)ment becomes noticeable as 
she connects with it in this “room of her own”.  This room is another feminist 
frame to her story. 
Fourth frame – “a room of her own” 
The idea of women having a room of their own is taken from Virginia Woolf 
(1928/2009). Woolf, upon being invited to speak on women and fiction in two 
locations in Britain, realised that for women to write fiction they must have 
financial means and a room of their own. Woolf found, in the society she 
observed and the literature she read, a great inequity between women and men. It 
is this inequity that she focussed on in her speeches, “women and fiction”, to her 
audiences in Britain in 1928. These speeches were later published as “A room of 
one’s own” (1928/2009). Woolf’s purpose in giving the speeches was to 
 100 
encourage women to write, and to do so with pride, so that they could eventually 
have money and worthy rooms of their own to write in. If women were to do this 
writing, their obscurity and poverty would be alleviated, Woolf hypothesized. A 
room of one’s own, with the hope Woolf speaks of, sits as a metaphor which 
contrasts with Sue’s “room of one’s own”. Sue’s room, the toilet, sits in direct 
contrast to what Woolf hoped would eventually occur for women. This could say 
any number of things about Sue’s rights and privileges, or rather, lack thereof, in 
this house. But to comment on this would be to make presumption, about the size 
of the house, the privacy of other rooms in the house, aspects of Sue’s and her 
partner’s living arrangements and relationship that I know very little about. What 
can be addressed is dominant discourse, and its power to marginalise and make 
invisible the life of those who refuse its specifications for conducting relationship 
and conversation.  
The toilet is an invisible place in many houses. Visitors to a home often need to 
ask where the toilet is, not only because they need to use this amenity, but because 
the toilet is rarely built in a publicly visible part of the house. The toilet is a room 
in a house that is meant for privacy, which is very different to Sue’s need for 
privacy. The toilet is rarely if ever a celebrated room in a house, where visitors are 
invited to be and admire the décor – as they might be to the kind of room of one’s 
own Woolf envisaged. The toilet is meant for one person behind a closed door 
clearly cut off from the rest of the house. Often the toilet door is closed whether 
the room is occupied or not. The toilet is a room within a house that is 
marginalised by nature of its purpose and thus the perception people have of that 
room, particularly in our “respectable” and “decent” western culture. It is to this 
room that Sue disappears from her partner and the dominant hierarchical 
discourse that he is enacting through the silencing tactics that exercise power to 
refuse conversation. Paradoxically, it is in this invisible and marginalised place 
that Sue finds connection and possibility with another discourse that is for her far 
more egalitarian and sustaining in her pursuit of what is precious to her. Foucault 
(1987) provides a metaphor here that I think is helpful: 
As in judo, the best answer to an adversary maneuver is not to retreat, but to 
go along with it, turning it to one’s own advantage, as a resting point for the 
next phase. (p. 65) 
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I use this judo analogy from Foucault, Benjamin’s (2003) silencing interpretation 
of anger, and Butler’s (1997a) ideas of mastery and submission to theorise Sue’s 
actions while in her “room”. Sue retreats, rests, and prepares for the next phase 
with her partner. She accommodates to the dominant discourse and utilises that 
discourse to achieve what is precious to her. To use the language of 
decomposition and mo(ve)ment, Sue decomposes the effects of the hierarchical 
discourse while in the same moment movement occurs as she accesses an 
alternative discourse that offers new meaning and knowledge to reengage with her 
partner. While the room of Sue’s own is one frame a feminist interpretation of her 
story offers, within that frame there is another frame that can shed further light on 
her story as one of decomposition and mo(ve)ment.  
A Sub- frame within the fourth frame – God, pencil and paper, as 
points of resistance 
The words Sue uses to name her actions when she gets to the toilet are, “I would . 
. . literally shut the door with pencil and paper and write all these things like: ‘Did 
you hear him, God? What a so and so!’ I would read and think ‘well, he wasn’t 
quite that bad. Well, he was!’” Within the toilet, God, the pencil and paper, are 
resources for Sue that provide a safe and accepting environment, where she draws 
support, before returning to her partner to work within the hierarchical meaning 
structure and its oppressive tactics. The toilet room, the pencil and paper, provide 
Sue with tools to see from a distanced position what is happening with her 
partner. In the safe environment of the toilet, away from a hierarchical meaning 
structure, Sue is able to openly express, with pencil and paper, her partner’s “bad” 
position toward her. With this reference to her partner as “bad” Sue is 
acknowledging her experience and not discounting it. This stands in contrast to a 
possible gendered alternative where Sue could discount her experience of her 
partner, regard herself at fault for the problem with him, and take responsibility 
for his behaviour. The pencil and paper, the allocation of “badness” to her partner, 
provides Sue a sense of agency that makes available a subject position for 
reengaging with her partner that is not based on guilt, but in what is precious to 
her.  
I suggest that the most helpful way to understand Sue’s reference to God in her 
story is to look at it from what is apparent within her account. Sue does not give 
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any overt theology or commentary on God. But by her statement and reference to 
God within the context of her account it might be assumed that for Sue, God can 
bear the anger she is expressing. Because Sue speaks as if God is listening and 
interested in her problems it might be taken that for Sue God is a helpful resource 
and support. Certainly, in this account, God appears as without judgement of her, 
which is quite contrary to how Sue positions God in relation to her partner and the 
hierarchical discourse. It might be understood that Sue’s reference to God also 
invokes a spiritual resource.  
Hunt (2006) makes the point that spirituality can be both conspiring and a form of 
resistance. By resistance and conspiracy Hunt does not mean the type of 
resistance that takes an oppositional or critical stance to that which is being 
opposed. Hunt suggests that when resistance in the terms of opposing arguments 
or critique is practised the dominant paradigm being resisted may have its 
dominance reasserted (p. 53). Hunt goes on to say: 
Critique has so far served us well in challenging and opposing oppressive 
theories and practices, but it is essentially one-dimensional: it operates 
within a particular way of knowing that is often deliberately disconnected 
from the lived experience of everyday life, including imagination and spirit. 
(2006, p. 56) 
If Sue were to resist the hierarchical patriarchal meaning structure with open 
critique and overt oppositional practices it may perpetuate the dominance of that 
discourse in her relationship with her partner, where he could maintain his 
position of silencing power. For Sue to resist overtly may well be a disconnect 
from her everyday lived experience of life. It may separate her from her preferred 
way of conversation with her partner. Or, another possibility, as narrative therapy 
suggests (White, 1995), if lives are multistoried, then this may be only one story 
of her partner’s responses. In other stories he may not retreat but may engage. I 
suggest that Sue is resourcing a way she can respond to her partner that she 
values, and that fits with her experience of life, but at the same time, how Sue 
responds begins the subtle diminution of the hierarchical meaning structure in her 
relationship. Sue, in the secrecy of her own room, is addressing her God as 
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someone who is safe and resourceful for her, as a co-conspirator, to utilise 
spirituality as resistance to the hierarchical meaning structure.  
In the terms of gender discourses, Sue calls on her God as witness to the 
patriarchal practices of her partner – thus, also calling God into a patriarchy-
disrupting position by invoking a pro-feminist witnessing God. By invoking a 
God who witnesses and acknowledges her position one could say a definitional 
ceremony occurs for Sue that provides “a context for rich story development” 
(White, 2007, p. 165), and invites fresh access to what Sue values, and opens 
possibilities for resisting the dominant discourse. Myerhoff (1986, p. 267), 
provides a relevant description of the purpose of definitional ceremonies: 
“Definitional ceremonies deal with the problems of invisibility and marginality; 
they are strategies that provide opportunities for being seen and in one’s own 
terms, garnering witnesses to one’s worth, vitality, and being”. While Sue does 
not report her sense of worth being affected, the events in the toilet, and her God’s 
witnessing her situation from an acknowledging position, help deal with the 
invisibility and marginality imposed on her as a result of her partner’s patriarchal 
practices.    
The toilet, Sue’s God, the paper and pencil, all serve as part of an alternative 
meaning structure, to decompose the effects of the hierarchical meaning structure, 
and to provide mo(ve)ment for hopeful re-engagement with her partner on what is 
precious to Sue.  This frame-by-frame reading of decomposition and mo(ve)ment 
within Sue’s story has slowed the story down so that nuanced effects of the 
patriarchal discourse can be noted and the imaginative resources of alternate 
resistant discourses are recognised. 
Sue’s story – second episode 
The second episode of Sue’s story comes after her account in the toilet room, with 
pencil, paper, and her God. In this second episode Sue uses the metaphor of a 
gopher to describe her partner’s reticence to engage with her. Sue provides the 
metaphor of “swooping around” a gopher to describe the part she plays in the 
relationship:  
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I think there was somebody that told me once that some people are like little 
gophers, these little – you know, an American friend – that pop up and when 
they see information pop down again, and others are swooping around you 
know. I’m swooping around with it, and he’s popping up and going, “grrrr”, 
(Sue laughs). [I would] swoop and talk and then he’d disappear again. So I 
thought, “I’ve got to tempt him out of here”, so yes I used to, I think I used 
to play games to try and get him out of it. I can remember the making of 
little nibblies and a nice drink or something, wine, and [he would] come 
over. [I would ask him] “let’s talk, what do you think about. . .?” [I would] 
get him to talk to me first about things he wanted to, and then gradually 
work him around. You know, women are very manipulative. 
In the analysis that follows, I have taken the “swooping” metaphor to mean a bird 
“swooping around” the gopher.  
Multiple positionings in Sue’s multistoried account  
The term multistoried means people have many experiences in their life which can 
potentially be linked together in story form as a way of giving meaning to their 
experience (White, 1995, 2007). Some experiences are not storied because they do 
not fit with meanings offered by dominant discourse from the person’s social 
history or society. The story the person develops generally determines which 
experiences will be highlighted and performed to the world (Monk, 1997). A 
person generates their story and makes meaning of their experiences and the 
world from the discourses available to them (Drewery & Winslade, 1997). Within 
these discourses people can take up positions from different discourses at the 
same time – “multiple positionings” (Drewery & Winslade, 1997, p. 38; Weedon, 
1997, p. 94). My analysis here highlights the multiple positionings that Sue is 
taking up in her gopher-and-swooping-bird story. 
Positioning within the broader field of patriarchal power relations 
Sue is positioned “within the broader field of patriarchal power relations” 
(Weedon, 1997, p. 71), and takes up positioning in another discourse in an effort 
to get her interests addressed. Weedon elaborates on the multiple positioning of a 
woman, such as Sue, their constitution in patriarchal power relations, and their 
strategic resistance to those constitutive powers: 
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Poststructuralism’s concern with the discursive construction of subjectivity . 
. . the heterogeneous forms of power governing social relations is motivated 
by a primary concern with understanding the position of individual women 
in society and the ways in which they are both governed by and resist 
specific forms of power. This involves not a devaluing of women’s 
experience but an understanding of its constitution and its strategic position 
within the broader field of patriarchal power relations. (p. 71) 
The “broader field of patriarchal power relations” is dominant in Sue’s story 
through its positioning her in a disadvantaged relationship with her partner. Sue’s 
story is a response to patriarchal practices that makes it possible for her interests 
to be addressed in the relationship. Sue’s disadvantaged positioning contrasts with 
her partner’s who has the advantage of re-producing patriarchal power in ways 
that suit his interests and relationship practices.  
Sue is also shaped by patriarchal power relations in the way she calls on familiar 
language to describe herself as a temptress, manipulator, and in playing games, 
when she says, “I’ve got to tempt him out of here”, “I used to play games”, and 
“women are very manipulative”. These words and descriptions, offered by 
patriarchy of relationship practices, are required of the female partner when 
patriarchy dominates a relationship. Patriarchy, by its dominance, produces the 
need for the practices that these words name, but with the use of these words to 
name the practices, the practices are belittled and demeaned, and the production of 
power left invisible. Often, women who make use of these so called, tempting, 
playing games, manipulative practices are accused of enacting power, thus, power 
is essentialised and the focus kept away from patriarchy and its dominance.  
The demeaning words used in the telling of Sue’s story can very easily be 
interpreted to devalue – in Weedon’s terms – Sue’s experience, and thus leave 
unrecognisable the constitution of her experience “within the broader field of 
patriarchal power relations”. When terms such as “tempt”, “playing games”, and 
“manipulative” are used to name or describe women’s actions in heterosexual 
relationships, what is required is not a devaluing of their experience, but an 
understanding of women’s positioning within “the broader field of patriarchal 
power relations”, and thus, “the ways in which they are both governed by and 
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resist specific forms of power” (Weedon, 1997, p. 71). I suggest that Sue, in 
telling her story, is positioned by patriarchy to name required relationship 
practices in ways that do not do justice to the discursive events taking place in her 
story. 
A strategy of traversing multiple-positions 
The discursive context that Sue is positioned in does not support a direct approach 
to her partner. Such an approach is fraught with the risk of further dominant 
patriarchal positioning that could limit Sue’s interests being addressed. However, 
what Sue can engage with in getting her interests addressed is “a hindrance, a 
stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 101) to patriarchy. To do this resistance, Sue 
calls on her imagination, which Hunt (2006, pp. 52-53, 56) connects with 
possibilities for resistance to dominant paradigms. In calling on her imagination 
Sue accesses another discourse, a liberal-humanist discourse, which emphasises 
an essentialist nature for human beings (Weedon, 1997, p. 77). In Sue’s story, the 
essentialism relates to the metaphors of the swooping bird and the gopher, as 
descriptions of Sue’s and her partner’s “relational natures”. These essentialised 
metaphors help provide Sue with a humanist agency in understanding her and her 
partner’s relationship and a strategy for changing the relationship practices. In 
conjunction with these metaphors, Sue then uses patriarchal terminology – tempt, 
play games – to name her agentic actions that make possible a conversation with 
her partner where she can begin to get her interests addressed. Sue is still 
positioned in a disadvantaged position by patriarchy, but she has now strategically 
called on another discourse and skills that are agentic as “a hindrance, a 
stumbling-block, a point of resistance” (Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 101) to 
patriarchal constitution.   
Hence, Sue is obliged to traverse multiple positions from different discourses in 
her strategic attempt toward achieving what is precious to her. Sue is required to 
stay governed by patriarchy because a direct approach to her partner potentially 
puts her interests in jeopardy. Thus, Sue tentatively approaches her partner, with 
the re-production of another discourse and skills learned in how to work within 
patriarchy. With these two strategies Sue is resisting the “specific forms of 
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power” produced through her partner’s actions. In this way, Sue has effectively 
positioned herself to have a conversation with her partner that can potentially 
achieve her purposes. Being an effective discourse user, Davies (1991, p. 46; 
1998, p. 136) argues, is a strategy for agency. And this, I suggest, is what Sue has 
done with her multiple-positioned approach to her partner.   
Sue’s telling of her story, and the story itself, indicate how a person’s life can be 
multistoried with multiple subject positions available to them. It indicates the 
insidiousness of patriarchal intrusion into heterosexual relationships and everyday 
language practices, and the power of patriarchy to constitute subjectivities. My 
analysis indicates the strategic, multiple positioning required of a woman to move 
toward achieving her interests within the broader field of patriarchal power 
relations.   
Accommodation and utilisation 
The strategic, multiple positioning required of women “within the broader field of 
patriarchal power relations . . . in which they are both governed by and resist 
specific forms of power” (Weedon, 1997, p. 71) resonates with  Butler’s (1997a) 
ideas of mastery and submission, or as suggested for this study, utilisation of, and 
accommodation to discourse.  
Foucault (1984/2000c, p. 292), says “in power relations there is necessarily the 
possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of 
violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), 
there would be no power relations at all”. Weedon has effectively utilised these 
thoughts from Foucault in introducing recognition of the practice that women are 
strategically positioned as being both governed by and resisting specific forms of 
power (p. 71). And, I suggest that application of Butler’s (1997a) development of 
the concepts mastery and submission to the second episode of Sue’s story offers a 
different, but germane, understanding of this reference from Foucault. Butler 
(1997a, pp. 116-117) writes:  
Submission and mastery take place simultaneously, and this paradoxical 
simultaneity constitutes the ambivalence of subjection. Though one might 
expect submission to consist in yielding to an externally imposed dominant 
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order and to be marked by a loss of control and mastery, paradoxically, it is 
itself marked by mastery . . . the lived simultaneity of submission as 
mastery, and mastery as submission, is the condition of possibility for the 
emergence of the subject. 
These ideas are applicable to Sue’s account of the gopher and swooping bird 
story. There are four interconnected points I look at in development of Sue’s 
accommodation to, and utilisation of patriarchal discourse, which lead to the 
emergence of a new subjectivity. First, in Sue’s telling of the gopher and 
swooping bird story I see evidence of this simultaneous accommodation 
(submission) to, and utilisation (mastery) of patriarchal discourse. Second, in 
looking at Sue’s story I grasp something of what Butler might mean by the 
“ambivalence of subjection”. Third, the metaphor which Sue accesses in her story, 
and which enables her resistance, is situated within her culture or social group. 
Fourth, the story is just one of the “culturally sanctioned signifiers” (Davies, 
2006, p. 433) that Sue operates from that indicates her accommodation to, and 
utilisation of discourse to achieve what is precious to her. 
Accommodation to and utilisation of discourse 
In the telling of the account of the gopher and swooping bird, Sue tells the story of 
resistance to patriarchy’s tactics to silence and control her in relation to her 
partner. In applying the metaphor to the relationship Sue has utilised a means to 
open the relationship with her partner to a place of conversation on topics that are 
precious to her. The application of the metaphor to the relationship and to her 
partner, and Sue’s subsequent telling it to the focus group, is an agentic act of 
utilisation of discourse. In the telling of the story to the focus group, there are still 
the accommodation points to patriarchy with the use of words such as “I used to 
play games”, and “women are very manipulative”. The telling of the story and the 
story’s use of patriarchal commentary are, I suggest, signs of utilisation of, and 
accommodation to patriarchal discourse. 
I suggest there is a vacillation, or an “ambivalence of subjection” (Butler, 1997a, 
p. 116) in the story when it comes to patriarchy. Sue is both subjected to 
patriarchy through her disadvantaged position in the relationship with her partner, 
but she is still in a position to resist, and work within patriarchy towards achieving 
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her purposes. This two-way positioning is what Butler refers to as “paradoxical 
simultaneity” where “submission and mastery take place simultaneously” and 
there is the “possibility for the emergence of . . . [a new] subject” (1997a, pp. 116-
117).   
Culture or social group as the source of Sue’s metaphor 
At the beginning of the account of this story, Sue mentions to the focus group 
how she had learnt from someone the analogy of people being either like gophers, 
or like “others swooping around”. Foucault talks about his interest in how people 
constitute themselves from ideas or models taken from outside their self, in 
society. He says of these constituting practices, “They are models that he (sic) 
finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, 
his society, and his social group” (Foucault, 1984/2000c, p. 291). Sue’s model of 
the gopher and the swooping bird comes from her culture or social group. I would 
suggest it is an acceptable model to Sue, developed from the pursuer-distancer 
cycle utilised for understanding coupled relationships (Lerner, 2001, p. 54). It is 
helpful because it has explanatory power for Sue in regard to her relationship with 
her partner. But I would like to suggest this explanatory power and metaphor that 
Sue has received are viable because they fit the dominant cultural paradigm 
shaped by patriarchal influence – measurement, control, evaluation, essentialising 
practices; hence, Sue’s accommodation to patriarchal discourse in utilising this 
metaphor to resist the patriarchal hold on her relationship. The metaphor is useful 
to Sue because of her imaginative skill in utilising it for what is precious to her. I 
suggest that the gopher and swooping bird metaphor, that Sue imaginatively 
turned into a story to benefit her relationship, fits within what Davies (2006, p. 
433) calls “culturally sanctioned signifiers”. 
Culturally sanctioned signifiers 
 Davies (2006, p. 433) writes:  
The accomplishment of mastery is not simply an act of willing submission . 
. . subjects may be involved in taking up subject positions for which they 
have little or no first-hand knowledge. Their accomplishment of mastery 
involves both an imaginary capacity to form themselves out of the not-yet-
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known, and a set of culturally sanctioned signifiers of the thing they see that 
they must become. 
The “culturally sanctioned signifiers” here refers to what Sue knows is culturally 
acceptable for her to become in a heterosexual relationship. The story Sue uses is 
a culturally sanctioned signifier because it makes sense in the context of her 
culture and the relationship with her partner, where, as a woman who is the 
pursuer in this story of relationship, she is responsible for connection. Other 
possible “culturally sanctioned signifiers” that may have guided Sue are assertions 
such as: women don’t overtly express anger to their partner; women do not bully 
or push their partner too hard; women look after their partner’s feelings; male 
partners need to feel they are in charge. These are especially so if a woman wants 
“to keep” their male partner. Sue hints at some of these signifiers, recorded in the 
first focus group transcript, straight after the first episode of this story – her retreat 
to the toilet – discussed earlier in this chapter:   
And I talk to him about it later. And it’s like all the anger’s gone. Because 
we lived in the bush, and so there was nobody else to talk to. So you only 
had, it was me and God you know, and him, who I love, but made me mad 
at times. 
This quote highlights the dual subjectivity tightrope Sue is traversing, of being 
“both governed by and resist[ing] specific forms of power” (Weedon, 1997, p. 
71), as she works on changing her relationship, while maintaining it as a 
relationship that is acceptable to her partner. I suggest Sue has accommodated to 
the culturally sanctioned signifiers of not expressing anger to her partner, looking 
after his feelings, and being responsible for relational connection. While Sue is 
accommodating to these patriarchal signifiers, at the same time she utilises these 
to achieve what is precious to her – being able to talk with her partner about her 
concerns. Sue, perhaps, in accommodating to the patriarchal signifiers, could 
foresee that the anger would be an impediment to her partner hearing her or, to her 
being able to articulate herself clearly. If Sue looks after her partner’s feelings by 
not expressing anger with him, she invites her partner into a listening position and 
into relational connection. In accommodating to and utilising these patriarchal 
 111 
signifiers Sue is paradoxically emerging as a new subject (Butler, 1997a, pp. 116-
117).  
Emergence of a new subjectivity 
This emergence of a new subjectivity for Sue is what Davies (2006, p. 433) refers 
to as “an imaginary capacity to form themselves out of the not-yet-known, and a 
set of culturally sanctioned signifiers of the thing they see that they must 
become”. The “not-yet-known” is now this new skilful subject that can 
accommodate to and utilise discursive signifiers, without recognisably threatening 
the production of power that patriarchy has privileged the male partner with. If we 
are to look at Sue’s story in this chapter as a story of an emerging subjectivity, 
then one can say that at the beginning of the story where Sue first encountered 
patriarchal power through her partner, she was at the beginning of “an imaginary 
capacity to form . . . [herself] out of the not-yet-known”. For Sue, the toilet, God, 
the paper and pencil, the gopher and swooping bird metaphor, were all part of her 
imaginary capacity to accommodate to and utilise patriarchal discourse skilfully to 
achieve what is precious to her – conversation with her partner on important 
topics.  
The complex work of decomposition and 
mo(ve)ment 
Decomposition and mo(ve)ment provide a graphic and visceral sense of the 
complex and difficult transformation process for a woman in a patriarchally 
dominated heterosexual relationship. My account of the two episodes of Sue’s 
story, on the terms of decomposition and mo(ve)ment, are intended to highlight 
the complex and multistoried nature of (Sue’s) subjectivities in (her) heterosexual 
relationship. The analysis has recognised the discursive production of power 
which has subjugated Sue’s interests. The adjustment and traversing of positions 
required by Sue in using different discourses to get her interests addressed in the 
relationship with her partner has been theorised to show both governance by 
patriarchy and resistance to it. Sue’s story, while unique to her situation, could be 
any woman’s story for “understanding . . . its constitution and its strategic 
position within the broader field of patriarchal power relations . . . the way in 
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which they are both governed by and resist specific forms of power” (Weedon, 
1997, p. 71).   
Because of the dominance of patriarchy in constituting heterosexual relationships, 
particularly when a male partner is not respectfully responsive to a female 
partner’s position, if the female partner wants to keep the relationship she has to 
work from within patriarchal restrictions. Butler (2004, p. 45) refers to a power 
that can be attributed to patriarchy: “We are outside ourselves, constituted in 
cultural norms that precede and exceed us, given over to a set of cultural norms 
and a field of power that condition us fundamentally”. With this understanding I 
think it is bordering on miraculous that change happens at all in heterosexual 
relationship when, as it would seem is often the case, only one partner appears to 
be decomposing the effects of discourse and moving toward change for an 
egalitarian relationship.  
Can patriarchal practices be moved?  
The patriarchal practice of controlling conversations seems ubiquitous and 
incessant. Is there hope that such practices can be moved, particularly in 
heterosexual relationships? As I have written in Chapter Two, Butler (1990/2006) 
argues that gender is always a performative action, or as Chambers and Carver 
write, the “repetitious citations of what we understand culturally as sex and 
gender” (2008, p. 43). Hence, gender, in Butler’s terms, is a citational enactment 
of culturally accepted norms for male and female (1990/2006, p. 190; 1993, p. 
282, fn. 5). I suggest the controlling of conversations by Sue’s partner, either by 
silence or other means, is a citational enactment of gender norms re-produced by 
men from patriarchy. However, because gender norms are a citational enactment 
each time they are performed the possibility of change is available within the 
necessity to citationally repeat the gender norms. Taken from Derrida 
(1972/1977a, pp. 12, 17-18), “iterability” is the action within citationality that 
makes possible alteration and difference during the repetition process (Butler, 
1993, p. 245, fn. 8). Hence, Butler writes:  
[By] virtue of this reiteration . . . gaps and fissures are opened up . . .  as that 
which escapes or exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined 
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or fixed by the repetitive labor of that norm. This instability is the 
deconstituting possibility in the very process of repetition. (1993, p. 10) 
To illustrate Butler’s point I draw on a final comment from Sue in regard to the 
conversational practices produced by her partner:         
When he realised that was what he was doing, cutting us off, because we got 
to the stage, my daughter and I, we would just go, we would start asking or 
talking about things with him, and he would cut us off, not meaning to. But 
it would shut us down. And it just took all the joy out of it. We [would] 
think, “What did I say?”. . . He finally realised, and he said to us one day. “I 
keep ending the conversations don’t I? I keep spoiling this.” So he has learnt 
to sit back, and now he says, “Oops, I’ve been doing it”. Which is really 
good, and it lets us explore.   
I suggest Sue’s partner, in the reiteration of the gender norm, conversational 
control, has noticed, or practised the   “gaps and fissures” which make it possible 
for that gender norm to become unstable in his relationship practices. In so doing, 
he can work toward “deconstituting” the gender norm of conversational control in 
their heterosexual relationship, in turn constituting more egalitarian 
conversational practices with Sue. This brings hope that patriarchal practices of 
conversational control can be moved, especially in heterosexual relationships. 
As a result of her partner resisting and working toward transforming patriarchal 
conversational practices, Sue’s final few words perhaps indicate what is important 
for her in conversation with her partner, something that Sue has worked toward in 
her story recorded in this chapter – “it lets us explore” [have a conversation 
without the patriarchal control].  
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Chapter 6. The first focus group as 
multifunctional 
 
In this chapter I continue to focus on relational subjectivity as I introduce the 
experienced and preferred relational subjectivities of the other five women in the 
first focus group, Sarah, Hannah, Ali, Carmen, and Annie.  
In the introduction to their chapter on focus group research Kamberelis and 
Dimitriadis (2011, p. 545) state that in 2005 they argued that focus group 
researchers are strategic in configuring the intersections of “pedagogy, activism, 
and interpretive inquiry”. In 2011 they build upon and extend their work 
“troubling the idea that the intersection of pedagogy, activism, and inquiry is 
always or primarily strategic” (2011, p. 545). Along with this new proposal for 
their chapter, they explore “both new possibilities . . . and new dangers faced by 
focus group research . . . especially in relation to debates around the politics of 
evidence” (p. 545). In building upon their work and exploring the possible futures 
of focus group research Kamberelis and Dimitriadis engage in reimagining focus 
group work as “almost always multifunctional” and situated “within a 
performative idiom” (p. 545). They refer to the “performative” as a form of 
qualitative inquiry for reading the texts of people living out or performing their 
lives in the context of cultural complexity and the ambiguous routines of everyday 
life (p. 547).  
I take up the idea of troubling the intersections of pedagogy, activism, and inquiry 
as being strategically configured in my research to understand how the first focus 
group is multifunctional and performative. In the overall design of my study I 
followed up the first focus group with interviews with men as well as a second 
focus group of women. These stages were linked by the bridging document. This 
practice was strategically, or politically and pedagogically propelled by the 
inquiry with the first focus group. However, the formative material brought to the 
three first focus group meetings by those involved was not planned.   
Some of this formative material is used in this chapter to show the 
multifunctionality of the first focus group. The inquiry function of the focus group 
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includes comments from five of the women in regard to their knowledge claims 
and experience of relational subjectivity. The political function concerns a 
rhizomatic development that came toward the end of the second of the three 
meetings of the focus group. This development came as a surprise to me, and in 
retrospect, I recognise it as a political function of the focus group because the 
women performed some of their relational subjectivity knowledges as gendered 
subjectivities. The final material in this chapter that I highlight from the first focus 
group involves both a pedagogical and a political function. Pedagogically the 
focus group provided me an opportunity to reflexively engage with my own 
performance of gender. This analysis of the performative has political 
consequences for the construction of gender and the production of patriarchal 
practices. In addition, I value the political function the first focus group offered 
me, the researcher, through the meetings and in the writing of this chapter.    
Deleuzian concepts  
As introduced in Chapter Two, the values that propel this study are derived from 
the ideas of Deleuze, his colleagues, and others who have applied his work.  In 
regard to the use of Deleuzian ideas, Mazzei and McCoy (2010) state “use the 
figurations presented by Deleuze to think research and data differently . . . think 
with Deleuzian concepts in a way that might produce previously unthought 
questions, practices, and knowledge” (p. 504). The three Deleuzian concepts of 
importance to this chapter are the virtual, the actual, and the rhizome. The virtual 
is regarded as the meetings of the first focus group from which all else in this 
study is actualised. This chapter is one actualisation of the first focus group 
meetings. But also, within this chapter are other actualisations, which can be 
regarded as rhizomatic because they are connections from the first focus group 
meetings that were unforeseen and unplanned at that time. These rhizomatic 
connections relate specifically to the political and pedagogical functions of the 
focus group. Later in the chapter I introduce another Deleuzian concept “the fold” 
(1986/1988b, 1993) as a metaphor to explain the effects of the political and 
pedagogical functions of the focus group.  
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The function(s) of the first focus group 
In regard to the report of their experienced relational subjectivities from Sarah, 
Hannah, Ali, Carmen, and Annie; it was initiated by my inquiry with questions 
concerning the kinds of conversations they had with their partners when important 
decisions were to be made, and whether either of the partners took control of the 
conversation (see Appendix K). The questions were asked in a spirit of naïve 
inquiry. I did not understand a priori the political and pedagogical ramifications 
of the questions, or the responses they might produce.  
The inquiry function – relational subjectivities  
The following excerpts are taken from the transcripts of the second meeting of the 
focus group. I include comments from five of the women in regard to their 
experience when in conversation with their partners. The women also refer to 
their preferred positions for relational subjectivity.  
Sarah shares about a preferred practice from her partner of creating safety by 
listening when she is “sounding things out”:   
Sometimes it helps if your partner understands that you as their female 
partner are just sounding things out. . . . [Initially Sarah’s partner says] “O 
no, we can’t do that”. . . . Sometimes it takes this kind of negotiation, 
[where I say], “I’m not saying we definitely have to do it, I am just actually 
talking about it. . . . It’s in that period [of] negotiation that there is this 
moment when . . . part of me thinks, “is it worth explaining or justifying 
why I’m explaining this, or should I just leave it and talk to someone else”? 
. . . I feel more hope when I know that it’s a safe forum for me to sound 
things out. 
Hannah shares information about her personal experience of being shut-down by 
her partner, and her preference for sharing with him in conversation and decision-
making:   
Then you have this big distance, that’s what happened with me . . . [in a 
number of relationships] I have tried to start. When they shut me down then 
you are getting further and further apart, you eventually break-up. You can 
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either make your decision on your own or, if they won’t participate, you just 
get a girlfriend. 
Ali talks about being shut down, but then helping her partner see the importance 
of what she wants from him, which, in this case, is information from him about 
meetings he has attended that are of interest to Ali:   
Me being quite specific about how frustrated I feel when I don’t get back 
information, and that sense of being shut down. . . . [Ali would say to her 
partner] “This might not be important to you but it really is important to me, 
and I need you to do it”. To be really clear like that, and hopefully you’re 
connected and love somebody. . . . [They think] “O maybe it will make a 
difference, I’ll try it once”. Then it happened once and he’s like, “wow!” 
Carmen talks of her vulnerability with her partner and how his shut downs hurt 
her. Carmen accommodates this problem with the idea that men and women 
process things differently:  
I can tend to embellish . . . I’m just so vulnerable with him [Carmen’s 
partner]. That’s why, when he shuts me down it really hurts. It’s like this 
stranger. [Carmen would say to her partner], “you are not normally like this, 
what’s going on, that hurts you know”. But . . . my husband would say to 
me, “look, it’s just that I don’t need to hear . . . the whole story”. . . . They 
[men] process things so differently, whereas we [women] . . . are creative.   
Annie had spoken of her partner “not connecting emotionally” with her. In 
response to this practice by her partner Annie develops her position in regard to 
her preference for emotional connection.   
I have never really described men as thinking like women until recently . . . 
and the men I like are actually men who think like women. . . .  I had a 
conversation . . . on the weekend with . . . a man [I know, but] . . . haven’t 
really connected with him. . . . He revealed how he felt and described things 
about himself. When I see him again I [can] go, “I know him, how he feels 
and thinks and everything”. Not just what job he does, where he lives, how 
many kids he has got . . . which is how a lot of men talk.  
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Each of these comments are painful to read, and as a man, as I reflect on them, 
somewhat confronting. While each of these comments command an individual 
response and analysis, I choose to group them together for the purpose of pointing 
to “collective testimonies” (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2011, p. 552) of women’s 
experience in their heterosexual relationships, in the same way as the bridging 
document (Appendix D) does. With these comments, each of the women name 
preferred positions in the relationship with their partners – being listened to 
without shut-down, with safety and emotional connection between them and their 
partners. While the type and topic of conversations differ, the positioning of each 
of the women’s partners is the same – taking control of the conversation and 
relationship practices. This control, while enacted in different forms, shuts down a 
woman partner’s preferred practices for relationship. This shut down invariably 
leaves a woman partner with the responsibility of trying a different conversational 
approach; or finding someone else who can have the conversation with her; or 
accommodating to her partner’s position with explanations of natural difference 
between men and women. The male partner’s responses produce effects that limit 
the space and contribution a woman can make to relational subjectivity.  
This material on their relational subjectivities from the focus group is a response 
to my inquiry that points to the patriarchal dominance of heterosexual 
relationships. The way this material is then complemented by other content from 
the focus group is unpredictable and indicates political and pedagogical functions. 
Kamberelis and Dimitriadis report of a project they had involvement with that 
began with a focus “primarily on inquiry” that soon “took on communitarian, 
political, and pedagogical valences” for both researcher and research participants 
(2011, p. 558). As a result of the discussions of the women in the first focus 
group, in response to my inquiry, the pedagogical and political functional 
possibilities for the whole study began to emerge. I note in the bridging document 
(Appendix D) the effects of the focus group discussions for me, which can be 
regarded as both pedagogical and political. The bridging document in-turn had 
political and pedagogical effects for the men’s interviews and the document that 
resulted from those interviews (Appendix G). While the first focus group was 
multifunctional in the effects on the following two data generation stages of this 
study, it also had multifunctional effects within its own meetings that continue 
 119 
into the writing of this thesis. Hence, I highlight and discuss a political episode in 
the first focus group; further highlighting its multifunctionality while illustrating 
the performative.   
The political function  
“Either from necessity or for strategic purposes, feminist work has always taken 
the constitutive power of space into account”, Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2011, 
p. 552) state as part of their argument on the political function of focus groups. I 
use “space” in regard to the locations where the first focus group women produce 
and perform different subjectivities. The comments above on relational 
subjectivities from Sarah, Hannah, Ali, Carmen, and Annie, relate to heterosexual 
relationship space where a man producing patriarchal practices is present. I now 
move to another space, which is not the intimate space where heterosexual 
relational subjectivities are produced, but it is a space where gendered 
subjectivities are produced as a political function of the focus group. This second 
space is part of the process in a first focus group meeting where the women 
develop the meeting in a direction I had not envisaged. In this second space, I 
suggest, the women perform with their gendered subjectivities some of their 
preferred relational subjectivity knowledges from their heterosexual relationship 
space.   
The performance of some of their relational subjectivity knowledges from a 
gendered subjectivity position by the women aligns with Kamberelis’ and 
Dimitriadis’ (2011, p. 547) idea that focus group work, and any form of 
qualitative inquiry, no longer serve as methods “to solve problems defined a 
priori”; rather, they serve as a performative space to recognise and ask new 
questions of complex and ambiguous routines of daily life and practice. As Soyini 
Madison and Harera (2006) state, “when we understand performance beyond 
theatrics and recognise it as fundamental and inherent to life and culture we are 
confronted with the ambiguities of different spaces and places that are foreign, 
contentious, and often under siege” (p. xii). Taken from the final minutes of the 
second meeting of the first focus group, the following episode indicates the 
ambiguities of heterosexual relationship and focus group space, as both spaces 
become contentious and are under siege through the women performing 
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knowledges of their preferred relational subjectivities with their gendered 
subjectivities.   
A rhizomatic development  
When I suggested we close off the meeting, there were some quiet comments 
from some of the women about time and clocks, and just general talk that is 
difficult to define from the audio recording of the meeting. Then a spontaneous 
development of the meeting occurred that could be described as rhizomatic, as it 
was unforeseen, and took the meeting in a fresh direction. The women in the 
group wanted to continue the meeting. I take up the transcript where Sue speaks 
up. 
Sue: In a scale of women’s relationships, if we were alone like this even 
with you; if we were sitting here with a cuppa [cup of tea] talking, we would 
go beyond even this wouldn’t we? [There are sounds of agreement with this 
on the recording] We would be exploring Annie and trying to help her [with 
her] hurting [a reference to earlier in the meeting where Annie expressed 
pain about a family situation]. 
Sarah: And we’d be trying to sort each other out, like, what happened with 
you Ali? This was happening here when you were talking about your family 
[a reference to another of the focus group members, possibly Annie].  
Brian: There is something special about this. . . . I really appreciate your 
honesty about that. Maybe I needed to let you go a bit more and sort out 
some of the issues [to which there was laughter and unclear comments of 
support].  
Annie: I even think it would be hard for you [Brian]. . . . I actually counted 
in my head how many were here and you, and then thought, if it was me and 
six men (Someone: it would be really hard) it would be completely different 
negotiating for me. I’ve been doing a lot of negotiating with a man and I got 
him to apologise but boy it took twenty five minutes of backward, forward, 
backward. In the end, he said “what do you want from me?” (Someone: an 
apology). Yeah, basically! I had to put the words in his mouth. . . . I didn’t 
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actually think about it being so different for you. . . . I put myself there with 
six men, but “Oh”, it is really different for you.  
After Annie spoke, I intimated that while it is different for me, the power 
differential that exists between men and women makes it necessary for me to 
respond to women differently than if the gender balance in the focus group was 
reversed with a woman doing research with men. The meeting continued for a 
brief period after this as the women shared common concerns about relationship.  
Before analysing this rhizomatic development as whole event in the context of the 
focus group meeting I comment on Annie’s response to me as one man in a group 
of six women. Annie’s response could be explained from a number of different 
perspectives: such as, caring is what women do naturally (Gilligan, 1982); or it is 
an action of “emphasized femininity” as a result of Annie being constituted by 
patriarchy to care for men (Connell 1987, pp. 183, 187-188). However, I suggest 
Annie is making a political statement about her preferred relational subjectivity 
knowledges.  
When I review Annie’s record of her preferred relational subjectivity in the 
emotional connection with her partner, she illustrates this with a gendered 
subjectivity experience of emotional connection with a man who shared 
emotionally situated knowledge with her. Subsequently, in this space at the end of 
the focus group meeting, Annie is performing her preferred relational subjectivity 
knowledges with a gendered performance. Annie talks of standing-up to a man 
who has difficulty understanding and connecting with the position she holds. She 
uses this as an example to illustrate the envisaged difficulty for her of working in 
a focus group with six men. She then uses these examples, from her life of 
standing-up to a man and the envisaged focus group position, to connect with me 
in regard to what she perceives I might be struggling with in a focus group with 
six women. In a reflexive act Annie attempts to make emotional connection for 
me as she has experienced its lack in her lived and envisaged situations. At the 
time of Annie’s attempted connection for me I only recognised the power 
differential that favours men in her envisaged focus group. I did not recognise the 
attempt at emotional connection for me, while now, it is an action that I 
acknowledge and value. Annie’s political statement comes within the overall 
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political function that the focus group takes on at this rhizomatic moment of the 
meeting.  
This spontaneous rhizomatic development, which focuses on the focus group 
women caring, listening, and working to help each other, serves a political 
function and separates from the predictable, inquiry direction of the meeting. 
Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2011, p. 550) note the difference women can make to 
focus groups: “women reconceptualising them [focus groups] in fundamental 
ways and with simple yet far-reaching political and practical consequences”. I 
now use Deleuzian concepts of space to develop and understand the micro spaces 
– inquiry-based function and political function – within the larger macro space of 
the focus group meeting. Understanding these micro spaces helps clarify the 
politics of the focus group women in the performance of their relational 
subjectivity knowledges with gendered subjectivities.  
Smooth space emerging from striated space 
I refer to Davies (2009a, p. 20), who, in Deleuzian terms, captures what is 
happening in the rhizomatic development:  
Life is emergent in Deleuzian philosophy, it continually evolves through the 
flows and intensities of each new encounter. One may remain within a 
habitual repeated series, or take off from the already-known in new lines of 
flight. Deleuze generates the concept of the smooth space as the space in 
which such lines of flight take place, in which places locked into the 
striations of habituated repeated series, might be set loose – de-
territorialized.  
The focus group in an inquiry based function, can be regarded as striated space or 
an “habituated repeated series”, up until the rhizomatic development performed 
by the focus group women. Up until this rhizomatic development I had performed 
researcher, shaped by patriarchal practices, with a clear inquiry based approach to 
the focus group. While I had been respectful of each participant, the idea that I 
was leading the meeting was apparent, until this rhizomatic development. After 
Sue and Sarah speak at the beginning of this development, I respond with “maybe 
I needed to let you go a bit more and sort out some of the issues”. The idea of me 
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letting the women continue is yet another patriarchal performance of a man 
attempting to lead the discussion. Along with this patriarchal performance, I 
acknowledge that what happened in the focus group is “special”, and the idea that 
the focus group can continue without being inquiry-based – to “sort out some of 
the issues” – is one I was invited to value. The language I use indicates my 
shaping by both a patriarchal discourse, and a competing discourse reproduced in 
the focus group at this point. I exhibit an uncertainty about the purpose and 
direction of the focus group, and experienced, as Kamberelis and Dimitriadis 
(2011, p. 545) argue, in focus groups researchers are not primarily strategic at the 
intersection of pedagogy, activism, and inquiry.  
The striated space in the first focus group is inquiry-based, and a smooth space is 
what emerged with the intervention by the first focus group women. Hickey-
Moody and Malins (2007, p. 11) write, “Striated spaces are those which are . . . 
structured and organised, and which produce particular limited movements and 
relations between bodies”. Striated spaces, while necessary, with their structure, 
organisation, security, and predictability, are not productive of freedom for new 
encounters and difference. However, striated spaces are a place from which 
smooth spaces can emerge and provide a space for “new movements [to] become 
possible . . . where new connections can occur; where experi-mentation can open 
up a new line of flight” (Davies, 2009a, p. 21). The striated space of the focus 
group meeting up until this rhizomatic development produced necessary content 
through inquiry about the women’s experiences, and preferences for relational 
subjectivity. The smooth space to come after, in this rhizomatic development, is 
understood in the light of the content on relational subjectivity from the striated 
space. 
During the inquiry-based content function of the focus group the women had 
articulated their preferred relational subjectivities for their heterosexual 
relationships by giving examples of where those preferences were not valued. 
Referred to earlier in this chapter, those preferences not being valued were when a 
woman was shut-down by her partner, and/or there was a lack of emotional or 
conversational connection. Each of the five examples given by the women are 
indicative of a woman partner not being able to exercise agency in the relationship 
as she would prefer. The implication from the language used in these examples is 
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that their partner listening and being emotionally connected to them are 
preferences for how care and love might be practised in their heterosexual 
relationship.  
In the rhizomatic development toward the end of the focus group meeting these 
preferences are practised by the women with each other in a performance of their 
gendered subjectivities. Opening space to give and receive care from each other, 
listening without shut-down, and developing conversation in conjunction with 
what the previous speaker said, is a political act of resistance to patriarchal 
control, and are agentic performances by the women of some of their preferred 
relational subjectivity knowledges. Hence, the rhizomatic space toward the end of 
the focus group meeting is a smooth space, as “lines of flight” have taken place, 
“places [preferred subjectivities] locked into the striations of habituated repeated 
series . . . [are] set loose – de-territorialized [agentically performed]” (Davies, 
2009a, p. 20). The first focus group crossed the functionality threshold from an 
inquiry function to a political function. Or, as Williams (2003, p. 60) writes, “Real 
difference is a matter of how things become different, how they evolve and 
continue to evolve beyond the boundaries of the sets they have been distributed 
into”. 
The pedagogical function 
The first focus group also developed a pedagogical function in “evolve[ing] 
beyond the boundaries of the sets” of being inquiry-based for achieving its 
multifunctional purpose. This pedagogical function, which has political 
consequences, concerns the group providing me an opportunity to reflexively 
engage with my own performance of gender. Because of this opportunity, I was 
able to study and analyse the detailed movement of a performance of gender in the 
moment. The moment is my gendered performance in the first focus group after a 
statement Annie made to me during the break in the second meeting.  
Before I explore the statement that I reported Annie making to me during the 
break, I acknowledge a patriarchal practice in reporting this statement to the focus 
group meeting without the permission of Annie. To assume public disclosure of 
private comment often occurs with the privilege that patriarchy gives to men. 
Because Annie and the other women in the focus group accepted my disclosure of 
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this statement and allowed me the commentary on it, I use it here to compliment 
what I have already written on the performance of gender. 
I report Annie’s statement as I understood it, and then continue with my response 
to it at the time: 
It’s interesting, Annie just said to me, “I know what you are about, you are 
trying to think like a woman”. That is true, but let me say, I think it is 
because . . . I want to, and because . . . for me personally, I don’t know why. 
. . . I think men can share power and move into egalitarian relationship 
because they have been the dominant gender in society. . . . What do we 
need to do to try and be egalitarian? That is basically what I am trying to 
learn, and in some ways that is what this PhD is about. . . . I really 
appreciate your input. 
This statement speaks of gender discourses which I now address. 
Performativity of gender  
To deconstruct gender is an important means to resisting patriarchal discourse and 
its constituting effects on people. Davies, clearly suggests “the incorrigibility of 
the male-female dualism and its construction as a central element of human 
identity . . . [is] the problem” (1989, p. ix). The male-female dualism is both a 
constitutive effect of dominant gender discourses and a tool utilised for their 
continuance. In deconstructing gender, it is Butler’s (1993, 1995, 1997b, 
1990/2006) theory of performativity of gender, utilising Derrida’s (1972/1977a, 
1982b) work on citationality, iterability, and temporality, that I apply to Annie’s 
statement as reported by me and my response to it.  
Competing discourses     
The statement I report Annie making to me in the focus group break, “I know 
what you are about, you are trying to think like a woman”, is in itself a 
compilation of different discursive statements. Implied in this statement is that 
women think differently to men. The statement is essentialising, suggesting that 
women think in a certain way, and men in a different way. This essentialising 
reflects common binary thinking in western societies, “whatever a ‘woman’ is has 
to be ‘female’; whatever a ‘man’ is has to be ‘male’” (Lorber, 2008, p. 15). 
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Gender-based difference is situated in the gender discourse that propagates 
female-equates-to-woman gendered practices and thinking, and male-equates-to-
man gendered practices and thinking (Kimmel & Aronson, 2008, p. 7). This 
female/male discourse is a most pervasive gender discourse (Lorber, 2008). It is 
this discourse that gets reproduced in Annie’s comment.   
Annie’s statement also points to a competing discourse, a discourse that allows for 
distributed non-essentialising thinking by women and men. Annie’s intention here 
may also suggest that I am trying to change my thinking. Whether the change is 
possible or not is not clear in the statement, but that the statement is made 
indicates a discourse that suggests changing one’s gendered way of thinking is 
possible. In this one statement then, two contrasting discourses are present. The 
more dominant discourse that gender is fixed to biology is present in the 
essentialising of gendered ways of thinking, and the less dominant discourse 
present is that gendered ways of thinking can be changed regardless of biological 
sex. This is an example of performativity of gender (Butler, 1990/2006) that 
supports, and opens understanding, when it comes to changing gendered thinking 
and practice. 
Variation of a gender norm as deconstruction and agency for change 
In response to Annie’s statement, I first of all say, “That is true”. I agree initially 
with Annie that I am trying to think like a woman. Here is a moment, be it all too 
brief, where I am actually subverting gender norms – a man acknowledging he is 
trying to think like a woman. This lasts but a second or two, as I realise what I am 
saying, and I follow it with:  
but let me say, I think it is because . . . I want to, and because . . . for me 
personally, I don’t know why.  
As I read these lines in retrospect, I realise I was trying to say that I agreed with 
Annie, but I really could not bear to fully agree with her, so I compromised the 
position of completely agreeing with Annie. At this point, power from patriarchal 
discourses has begun its work of keeping me gendered as a male man: “being a 
man means ‘not being like women’” (Kimmel, 1999, p. 112). Butler’s idea that 
“gender is a performance with clearly punitive consequences” (1990/2006, p. 190) 
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is evident here. I do wonder what people, not present in this group, would think if 
they knew I agreed to try to think like a woman. While different discourses can 
have punitive consequences when a person does gender outside the gender norms; 
in my case, I think the fear of punitive consequences are produced from 
patriarchal discourses. I, citationally, am being performatively constituted by 
patriarchy’s normative threats. But, performativity does provide opportunity for 
agency, and even in this compromise and constitution by patriarchy, agency 
through iterative resignification can be found.  
Immediately after the above section of my response to Annie, I state the following 
as to why I agree in part with Annie that I am trying to think like a woman: 
I think men can share power [with women] and move into egalitarian 
relationship because they have been the dominant gender in society. . . . 
What do we need to do to try and be egalitarian? That is basically what I am 
trying to learn.  
Even though I compromised my original agreement with Annie in regard to 
thinking like a woman this thought is still given some space as to how I might 
learn to act egalitarian in relationship with women. To use Butler’s and Derrida’s 
terms, I have participated in citation, iteration, and resignification, in this whole 
moment. I have citationally acted on the patriarchal gender norm that a man shall 
not think like a woman. But my citation of that gender norm is, in Derrida’s 
terms, an iteration of the norm. It is not a pure repetitive citation of that norm but 
a variation of the norm through iteration. This is seen in my conflicting response 
to Annie’s idea that I am trying to think like a woman. This conflict is both 
citation and iteration of gender norms. It denies I am trying to think like a woman 
– citation – but, at the same time it introduces why I am trying to think like a 
woman – iteration – citation with difference. In this moment of “variation on that 
repetition” of the gender norm there is agency or resignification (Butler, 
1990/2006, p. 198). The resignification has come at this moment in the focus 
group as a result of my growing knowledge of feminist discourse, and the 
invitation of the focus group women who have created a safe non-punitive place 
for gender to be varied and re-iterated differently. I can deny I am trying to think 
like a woman to be like a woman – a strongly patriarchal gender norm at work. 
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But, I can, in the same moment, say I am trying to think like a woman for the 
cause of justice and equality between men and women. There is a variation, an 
iteration of a gender norm, which is resignification of that norm, and which 
provides agency for me to pursue values of justice and equality between men and 
women.  
My response to Annie’s statement, even in a group with six women who had 
created a safe non-punitive space, indicates the subtle and complex political play 
of gender discourses in constituting a man. I can see clearly the power of 
discourse and gender norms at work in constituting subjectivity, and in resisting 
the transformation of that subjectivity. I can also see how transformation of 
subjectivity can occur through small variations of those gender norms. Butler 
(1990/2006, p. 198) summarises the process from citation as the performance of 
gender to resignification as the possibility for agency:    
When the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the subject 
is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the 
intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not determined by the rules 
through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but 
rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and 
enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing 
effects. . . . All signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion 
to repeat; “agency,” then, is to be located within the possibility of a 
variation on that repetition.  
In this chapter, the inquiry function of the first focus group focuses on the report 
of the women’s relational subjectivities, both experienced and preferred. The 
preferred relational subjectivities are based in safety, listening, and emotional 
connection with their partners. In the rhizomatic development at the end of the 
meeting I suggest the women performed gendered subjectivities as a political 
function of the focus group in regard to the knowledges of their preferences for 
relational subjectivity. A pedagogical function was permitted by the women of the 
first focus group with my response to the statement made by Annie, and in the 
analysis that has followed. This pedagogical function also served a political 
function, because it concerned the performativity of gender norms, and variation 
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on those norms, by a man who reproduces patriarchal practices. These inquiry, 
political, and pedagogical functions of the first focus group have been central in 
this chapter to an understanding of the work of the first focus group. I now 
address why the “intersection of pedagogy, activism, and inquiry” [was not] 
primarily strategic” (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2011, p. 545), but was an 
unforeseen rhizomatic event. 
A deconstructive reading (writing)  
In regard to the work of deconstruction, Caputo (1997a) writes: 
The misbegotten notion that deconstruction is some kind of random 
intellectual violence, a merely destructive and negative assault on anything 
still standing, arises from a failure to see what deconstruction affirms. (p. 
128) 
[Deconstruction] always settles into the distance between what the author 
consciously intends or means to say . . . that is, what she “commands” in her 
text, and what she does  not command, what is going on in the text, as it 
were, behind her back and so “sur-prises,” over-takes, the author herself. 
That distance, or gap, is something the deconstructive reading must 
“produce”. (p. 78) 
In this chapter, deconstruction is “a moment of affirmation” (Derrida, 
1992/1995b, p. 167) for what the first focus group women have produced, in the 
political and pedagogical functions of their group, which have surprised and over-
taken me as the “author” of this study.  
In Chapter Two I introduced the Deleuzian concepts of the virtual and the actual 
for understanding the importance of the first focus group women to this study, and 
for giving preference to their ideas and knowledges. The first focus group is the 
virtual life of this study from which all else in this study becomes actualised 
living expressions. I also introduced the rhizome as one figuration that helps 
understand and name the connections between the virtual and the actual, 
particularly connections that are unforeseen or outside known strategies of the 
researcher – that which has surprised and overtaken me.  
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In conjunction with the virtual, actual, and the rhizome, the Deleuzian idea, 
becoming through writing, contributes to developing and understanding the 
“distance, or gap” between what I planned for the first focus group and what I 
have recorded in this chapter as being produced. 
Deleuze’s idea of “becoming” (1962/1983, pp. 23-24; May, 2003, 2005, pp. 59-
60) is his response to traditional philosophy’s understanding of being as a fixed 
state or identity. Becoming does not replace being. In Deleuze’s ontology 
“becoming is the affirmation of being” (1962/1983, p. 24), not as a fixed identity, 
but as a continual process of difference – “all becoming is the unfolding of 
difference” (May, 2003, p. 150). And, on becoming in relation with writing, 
Deleuze writes “writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in 
the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived 
experience. . . . Writing is inseparable from becoming” (1993/1998, p. 1).  
I now bring these concepts together in offering a deconstructive analysis of the 
events and functions of the first focus group that are addressed in this chapter. My 
response to the rhizomatic development toward the end of the second meeting of 
the first focus group was to acknowledge it as “special” while not being sure how 
to understand it. My response to Annie’s suggestion, that I was trying to think like 
a woman, was equally unsure, even with the declaration of important values at the 
end of my response. I suggest now, this lack of surety, based in Kamberelis’ and 
Dimitriadis’ (2011) idea that the multifunctionality of focus groups is not always 
strategically planned, is because I came to the data generation stage of this study 
with a singular line of focus on inquiry. With only an inquiry function for data 
generation operating for the researcher the political and pedagogical functions can 
be unrecognised when they present. At the times of both the rhizomatic 
development at the end of the focus group meeting and the response to the focus 
group about Annie’s statement, I was confused and unsure because the political 
and pedagogical functions were unrecognised.   
As recorded in the bridging document (Appendix D), in a conversation with my 
partner after the first focus group meetings, I recognise the pedagogical and 
political thrust of the first focus group women’s voices in the area of “shut-
down”. This recognition concerned my specific action of shutting down my 
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partner, not the politics of the first focus group in regard to their preferred 
relational subjectivities. Until the writing of this chapter, I did not recognise the 
political and pedagogical thrust of the first focus group women’s preferred 
relational subjectivities that were performed as part of the process of the meeting 
through their gendered subjectivities.  
The writing of the bridging document was one rhizomatic connection of the 
virtual life of the first focus group to the expression of its actualised life. The 
writing process of this chapter is a rhizome that connects the virtual life of the 
first focus group to the actual life of its political and pedagogical functions. Thus, 
the focus group is continually becoming actualised, and as the researcher, I 
become different, through the pedagogical and political function of the virtual life 
of the first focus group meetings, and through the actualised life of the first focus 
group in the writing of this chapter. Writing has provided an opportunity for 
reflexivity that has shaping effects on my becoming and on the becoming of the 
function(s) of the focus group; as Deleuze writes, “Writing is inseparable from 
becoming” (Deleuze, 1993/1998, p. 1). 
The political and pedagogical functions of the first focus group that were present 
but unrecognised in the virtual life of its meeting have, through this writing 
become actualised and recognised. Thus, this chapter is a deconstructive reading 
(writing) that produces the gap or distance between what the author planned for 
the first focus group and what overtook and surprised him that was not 
strategically planned. As Kamberelis and Dimitriadis write, “Understanding focus 
groups and their dynamics through multiple lenses of vision forces us always to 
see the world in new and unexpected ways” (2011, p. 560). As a metaphor for 
understanding how subjectivity is formed, “The fold” (St Pierre, 2002, p. 61) 
provides a final example of the multifunction of the first focus group.   
The fold 
In writing about her own research and the subjectivity of research participants St 
Pierre (2002) stands on Deleuze’s concepts that have been beneficial for her in the 
process of working ethically with research participants in her writing about that 
research. One such concept is that of “the fold” (St Pierre, 2002, p. 61). St Pierre 
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uses the concept of the fold to elucidate how her subjectivity has been folded in 
from the work she has done with her research participants. 
The complex and paradoxical relationship between matter and mind, the interior 
and the exterior, as both separated and entangled, with “the fold” as the mediator 
in these complex relationships, is part of a Deleuzian ontology (see Deleuze, 
1986/1988b, 1993; Deleuze & Straus, 1991; Watson, 2009). In the context of 
human social relations, “the fold” has been used to conceptualise the subject 
folding the outside world into their body thus forming the movements, emotions, 
and subjectivity that are perceived as uniquely theirs (Boundas, 1994, p. 114; 
Malins, 2007, p. 157). The fold is a metaphor for understanding the intertwining 
that occurs between the subjective inside of our bodies and the “outside” world, 
the breaking down of the “interiority-exteriority binary” (St Pierre, 2002, p. 61). 
There is an intimacy and strong correlation between the inside of the body and the 
outside of the body (Badiou, 1994, p. 61; Deleuze, 1986/1988b, pp. 96-97): 
“Bodies enfold that which surrounds them and, at the same time, they fold out 
into the world to shape the spaces they encounter” (Hickey-Moody & Malins, 
2007, p. 12). 
Following St. Pierre, the fold is applicable to the first focus group becoming 
different, and how my subjectivity is becoming, both as a result of the first focus 
group meetings, and the writing of this chapter. The fold, as understood in this 
way, has important political ramifications.  
The first focus group’s ideas and knowledges, both from the meetings and through 
this writing have been enfolded into my body in a political and pedagogical act of 
my becoming different. The first focus group women, by participating in this 
study have folded into each other’s subjectivity. This is illustrated in the 
rhizomatic development where they practise caring and connection as a political 
statement. The first focus group as a multifunctional group folds knowledges of 
their relational subjectivities into gendered subjectivities. In doing this, they make 
the personal political and invite the folding of this study out into this researcher 
and beyond as a political and pedagogical statement on (their) relational 
subjectivities, both experienced and preferred, in (their) heterosexual 
relationships.   
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Chapter 7. Heterosexual relationship: A 
double deconstruction 
 
Deconstruction as double serves as the starting point for analysis in this chapter. 
However, aspects of the deconstruction vary from Derrida’s (1972/2002) original 
ideas as I align my deconstruction with Foucault’s (1980) power/knowledge 
nexus in application to the first focus group women’s accounts of their 
heterosexual relationships. 
As introduced in chapter two, deconstruction as double has two applications for 
this study. The first is deconstructing an institution from within that institution 
(Derrida, 1967/1974, p. 24; Norris, 2004, pp. 15-16). The second application has a 
two-step process: first, it involves reversing the binaries that are foundational to a 
conceptual order; second, the new hierarchy is displaced with the inclusion of a 
new concept that both deconstructs the hierarchical conceptual order and is 
foreign to the original system (Derrida, 1972/2002, p. 39). In this chapter I follow 
the first application of deconstruction as double by deconstructing expressions of 
heterosexual relationship as someone who is within the institution of 
heterosexuality, and who at times gets caught into patriarchal expressions myself. 
In regard to the second application of deconstruction as double, I suggest there is 
a link between patriarchal expressions of heterosexual relationship and the first 
focus group women’s preferred expression – a safe, sacred place. Because of the 
link between these two positions on heterosexual relationship, I manipulate the 
two-step application of deconstruction as double to address the unethical 
patriarchal production of power.  
Foucault’s (1980) power/knowledge nexus (see Davies et al., 2002, pp. 294-295) 
is a means to deconstruction that gives explanation of the link between the 
patriarchal expressions of heterosexual relationship and the focus group women’s 
preferred  expression. In my analysis, I suggest the focus group women are 
subjected to patriarchal expressions of heterosexual relationship, and various 
forms of power, as they hold onto their implicit knowledge of a “safe, sacred 
place” as hope for their preferred expression of heterosexual relationship. Because 
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of this link between the implicit knowledge of the women’s preferred expressions 
of heterosexual relationship and the power of patriarchal expressions, both 
expressions of heterosexual relationship are deconstructed. In so doing, as my first 
step of deconstruction I do not overturn the hierarchy, rather, I put under erasure 
any hierarchy in heterosexual relationship. This erasure is because, as I argue 
from the first focus group transcripts, the power of patriarchy is dominant and 
generally unrecognisable in its work of producing patriarchal expressions of 
heterosexual relationship.  
My second step of deconstruction as double involves combining Derrida’s first 
step (overturing the hierarchy) and part of his second step, the inclusion of a new 
concept. My second step is introduced toward the end of this chapter, with 
preference given to the women’s ideas in the new concept, their preferred 
expression of heterosexual relationship. How this second step addresses power 
and is played out in heterosexual relationship is the focus of the next chapter 
(Eight).  
The means to deconstruction 
The deconstruction in this chapter is informed by Foucault’s power/knowledge 
nexus, which includes different applications of power relations. The 
understanding of knowledge I use is informed by the work of Davies et al. (2002) 
on the emergence of feminine subjectivities through the actions of power and 
knowledge. Davies et al. (2002) delineate their approach:  
We focus on the ways in which our subjectivities are shaped in terms of 
rationalities of power – on the ways we become governable and actively 
engage in the conduct of our own and others’ conduct. (p. 295) 
To understand how relations of power are put and held in place we examine 
. . . the specific forms of knowledge, or “rationalities”, that make any form 
of power seem reasonable and inevitable. Research into lived experience, 
the archaeology of the everyday, necessitates the excavation of the 
rationalities that underpin these events. (p. 298) 
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We do not intend to rail against the powers of patriarchal oppression, but 
rather to look (below) at the forms of rationality through which the 
particular relations of power . . . are constituted and maintained. (p. 299)  
I follow this approach from Davies et al. in my analysis of the first focus group 
women’s accounts of their heterosexual relationships. I take two perspectives in 
this analysis. One perspective looks “at the forms of rationality through which the 
particular relations of power manifest” in the first focus group women’s 
heterosexual relationships; second, through the lens of governmentality, I look at 
“the ways [the women] become governable and actively engage in the conduct of 
[their] own and others conduct”. This analysis of the women’s accounts of their 
heterosexual relationships can be conceived, in the language of Davies et al. 
(2002, p. 298), as an archaeological dig of the rationality that underpins the 
everyday events of the women’s subjection to patriarchal control and effects in 
their heterosexual relationships. These means to deconstruction tell the story of 
how patriarchal positioning unjustly constitutes the subjectivities of the women.   
Rationalities, subjectivities, power, and 
governmentality in the first focus group  
I now proceed with the deconstructive process of both heterosexual relationship 
controlled by patriarchal practices and the focus group women’s preferred 
expression of heterosexual relationship.  
State of domination 
Early in the first meeting of the first focus group Hannah refers to being “shut 
down all the time” in her intimate relationship. This is one of the major means of 
power production in the relationship between the women and their partners that 
the women described (bridging document, Appendix D). Hannah says:  
Then you can’t make decisions with your partner. . . . If you are shut down 
on every front then there is no partnership anymore. I’ve been told, “shut-up 
or you will be physically attacked”. When you get told that several times, 
when you get threatened and when it starts happening, you then realise that 
that will be followed through . . . so you don’t have a choice. 
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Hannah introduces two factors that play a major part in the relationship with her 
partner. The production of power is one factor, and the other factor is the 
knowledge she holds for a preferred egalitarian heterosexual relationship – 
sharing decisions with her partner in partnership. This preferred expression looks 
akin to what came to be known by the first focus group as a “safe, sacred place”.   
The action on Hannah by her partner fits with a state of domination (Foucault, 
1984/2000c, p. 283). Hannah’s subject positions within the relationship and 
opportunities to modify power relations are limited. Foucault writes: 
When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power 
relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement 
by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be 
called a state of domination. In such a state . . . practices of freedom do not 
exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited. 
(1984/2000c, p. 283)  
Hannah’s relationship is indicative of the important difference between “a state of 
domination” (Foucault, 1984/2000c, p. 283) and “a relationship of violence” 
(Foucault, 2002b, p. 340). While “a relationship of violence . . . closes of all 
possibilities” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 340), “a state of domination” may leave room 
for “extremely constrained and limited” practices of freedom (Foucault, 
1984/2000c, p. 283). Hannah’s heterosexual relationship is violent, but the one 
freedom she does have is access to the opportunity to leave her partner and end 
the relationship. This option is a noticeable possibility in a society that openly 
condemns domestic violence and creates places for the safety of a women partner 
who is abused. However, in Hannah’s situation she is constrained, the escape 
option is limited, by a number of forces that constitute her as the one to repair the 
relationship, and make it egalitarian.  
Later in the first focus group meeting Hannah reveals where she learned her 
knowledge that guided her preference for how heterosexual relationship should be 
expressed:   
I’ve found, when its women friends, we tend to ask each other, and talk over 
and over until we both feel that we have had equal time and we feel okay. 
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My parents actually did that as well together . . . as a couple they talked 
things over and over. I always saw that modelled, and I always expected 
that; that things would be mulled over and over and over until there was 
consensus and both people were happy. . . . Once I got married I felt that 
was the most sacred and the closest relationship, and I guess for myself, I 
just gave that the most significance on my part. 
Hannah took into her heterosexual relationship knowledge, learned from her 
parents and in relationship with friends, that heterosexual relationship is safe, in 
that it involves practices guided by consensus and the happiness of both partners. 
I suggest this knowledge of what heterosexual relationship can be has hailed 
Hannah into believing the same is possible for the relationship with her partner. 
This knowledge works in conjunction with a discourse that constitutes Hannah as 
the caring and responsible wife who can make the relationship better. 
Weingarten (2010) has developed a construct called “reasonable hope” that is not 
considered an individual attribute but rather, it “flourishes in relationship” (p. 8), 
and refers to the actions a person takes. “Reasonable hope . . . suggests something 
both sensible and moderate, directing our attention to what is within reach more 
than what may be desired but unattainable” (p. 7). With reference to Hannah, I 
suggest that the hailing of the knowledge of what heterosexual relationship can 
be, and the constituting discourse of a responsible wife, have called her into an 
unreasonable hope. This unreasonable hope is not sensible or moderate, and it 
desires what is unattainable. In Hannah’s situation, the hope for the violence to 
cease and the repair of the relationship do not fall within the construct of 
reasonable hope because Hannah’s partner does not participate in the hope. 
Because of the hailing knowledge, the constitutive discourse, and unreasonable 
hope, Hannah is placed in a vulnerable subject position in regard to the production 
of power and a state of domination. 
During the third meeting of the first focus group, by which time the idea of a safe, 
sacred place had gained recognisable momentum in the discussion, Hannah 
confirms why she remained in the relationship for sometime after the controlling 
and violent behaviour had begun. The following snippet from the transcript begins 
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with Sue. She is responding to Ali, who has just described the benefits and 
importance of a safe, sacred place. 
Sue: It’s true, and it is so important because this is the person that is most 
important in your life and that’s why you were taking from him [a reference 
to Hannah staying in the violent relationship while maintaining a hope that 
her partner would change].  
Sarah: And perhaps that’s why you stayed because it’s that mental process 
of, sort of, thinking “well, I know I can make this better. I am going to keep 
working at it”. 
Hannah: Yeah that’s right, I kept trying, and trying, and trying. 
The hailing knowledge, a constitutive discourse, and unreasonable hope, kept 
Hannah in the heterosexual relationship, subjected to a state of domination, 
continually “trying, and trying, and trying” toward a safe, sacred place 
relationship with her partner. This did not happen. After many attempts at couple 
counselling, which her partner did not attend, Hannah realised that he would not 
fulfil his side of the relationship as she hoped, and that her safety was in danger. 
Eventually Hannah left the relationship, in her words, “I just packed up and 
disappeared”. Packing up and disappearing was the only strategy of power 
Hannah had left to her, not only for changing the relationship, but for her survival. 
As I have shown here, a state of domination is one form of patriarchal constitution 
of heterosexual relationship.  
Agonism 
Another form of patriarchal constitution is “agonism” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 342), 
incitement and struggle between partners. Foucault says of agonism, “Rather than 
speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’ – 
of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle” (2002b, 
p. 342). A cursory understanding of agonism with its emphasis on mutual struggle 
as a form of power relations might suggest the mutual production of power in the 
relationship. But this is not necessarily so. In the following accounts from Ali and 
Sarah, agonism depicts agentic, and at times, provocative responses to the unequal 
production of patriarchal power by their partners. This agency is practised to 
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achieve relationship goals of which one is egalitarian practices where connection, 
safety, and respect are paramount.  
During the second meeting of the first focus group Sarah had talked about 
discussing things with her partner in an open way where she was “sounding things 
out”, and how her partner early in this process would attempt to shut her down. 
Sarah reported that she persisted with her approach in the face of the attempted 
shut-downs. I suggest that this persistence by Sarah and the attempted shut-downs 
by her partner are a form of agonism. In the following excerpt from Sarah’s 
account, even though her partner’s shut-downs are not mentioned, Sarah is 
offering a brief description of this agonism:   
It’s almost like you feel you’ve got . . . these little secrets and you can see 
how potentially it could help not only you, but them [male partners], and the 
relationship. And you can see all this thing, in a whole matrix thing, it 
makes sense, you can see it all. If only they will just understand and come 
and meet you in this place, it will all kind of make sense. But getting them 
to come into [this place] . . . it’s not [easy].   
Sarah is referring to implicit knowledge she wants to apply, which her partner 
does not appear to engage in. Sarah’s use of the word “secrets” in the context of 
this excerpt suggests knowledge that is distinctive but not secretive for helping a 
relationship become mutually beneficial. Her use of the words “whole matrix” 
suggests a knowledge that can see the whole picture of what relationship could 
become. Sarah also connects the “little secrets” and the “whole matrix” to a place 
where she and her partner can meet and the relationship will “make sense”. 
However, the above account also indicates a difficulty for Sarah in getting this 
type of relationship to work with her partner. This account can be read as 
agonistic as Sarah tries to achieve with her partner the relationship she envisages 
and he resists. While there appears to be a mutual incitement and struggle between 
Sarah and her partner it is important to note the production of patriarchal power in 
his reported resistance to Sarah’s initiative.   
After the above account from Sarah, Ali reflected on her comments with some 
questions: “What specifically is it that makes sense? What is it, do you think, that 
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stops men from understanding and meeting their partners in this place, and what is 
this place like?” Ali then responded with a diagram which she had drawn to 
describe this place. Because I do not have this diagram I will quote Ali’s words 
from the transcript: 
I was imagining. Do this little diagram. This little male-female thing . . . so 
you have got male and female meeting, and then in a relationship, and then 
this sort of crossover bit, it’s what I see is like that place. And I think if men 
come into that and they feel like they have put their imprint on top of the 
relationship, like that’s the dominance, the cultural thing, and sometimes 
men, not all men, but some men bring . . . [are] the power person in the  
relationship. That it’s really hard for them to step back and see that place as 
building the relationship of two people. . . . You are actually building a new 
connection in relationship, and that is a place that needs to be sacred and 
respected from both people. . . . So I am just thinking that maybe women 
see that place as the respectful part of the relationship, that we can both 
bring things to meet it.  
As I have recorded on the fourth page of the bridging document (Appendix D), 
Ali, after this reference, described a safe, sacred place further with its benefits and 
positive contribution to subjectivity and life. While Ali describes this place and 
notes that she had experienced it at times, she also acknowledges “that would be 
the ideal”. What is clear from this interaction between Ali and Sarah is the 
implicit knowledge they have of what might make a heterosexual relationship 
work as an equal and respectful partnership. I have shown a brief part of the 
transcript that indicates Sarah’s agonism with her partner concerning a mutually 
beneficial relationship. I now discuss agonism from Ali’s experience reported 
during the first focus group. In this account agonism takes a different form.   
In this part of her account Ali is responding in the second focus group meeting to 
a question I had written in the narrative research document from the first focus 
group meeting. Ali had indicated in that first meeting that she used email at times 
to communicate with her partner when he was at work. Ali also responds to a 
conversation that had previously occurred in the second meeting concerning the 
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idea that men prefer crisp “dot point” communication, whereas, women tend to 
embellish and want to discuss topics more widely:  
I think it relates to one of the questions that you asked about email as a 
method of communication, and what Sue said about dot points . . . you 
know, men wanting that dot point thing. That, made me think of . . . email in 
terms of shutting down. You don’t have the opportunity because the 
person’s not there . . . it is a much more clipped communication tool. . . . I 
don’t tend to embellish and give the flourish that I would if I verbalised it 
because I often go off on tangents [in speaking], and then come back. . . . It 
gives the space for him as a male to take that stuff on, sometimes solve it, 
but sometimes just reflect for a bit longer on what I said. Because I have 
been a bit more succinct maybe it meets his need for not having the 
embellishment that he sometimes finds frustrating.  
Ali reports adjusting positioning in regard to her partner around certain 
conversational practices. The use of email by Ali, in contrast to spoken 
communication, avoids her being shut down, controls her embellishing, makes 
room for her partner to absorb what is being communicated, and keeps his 
frustration away from the communication process. The new positioning by Ali in 
communicating with her partner, and the resultant changes, could initially be 
conceived of as agonism in the relationship but, upon a closer reading, Ali is 
adjusting to the production of patriarchal power from her partner. Further, in the 
light of Ali’s preference for a connected, safe, and respectful expression of 
heterosexual relationship I suggest she has adjusted her positioning to keep the 
hope alive for this preferred expression.  
After the above comments, Ali continues to explain why email with her partner 
works: 
I think there is a opportunity to be a bit cheeky . . . keep it light, and not get 
emotional. . . . You can write something and put an exclamation mark. . . . 
You can say what you mean by being kinder and you don’t have that chance 
to be angry, or one of the kids come in and [interrupt]. 
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The adjusted position in the conversation with her partner gives opportunity for 
Ali to engage in what can be regarded as agonism, with her use of cheekiness and 
the exclamation mark. Agonism, with its focus on “mutual incitement and 
struggle” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 342), in this account of Ali’s, is not to be equated 
to the equal production of power. Rather, agonism can be evident where one 
partner is practising agency even when the other partner has more opportunity to 
produce power relations. It seems to me that this agentic agonism is what Ali is 
involved in. She adjusts her position to keep in effective contact with her partner, 
without losing an agentic position in the relationship, while still holding onto her 
hope for connected, safe, and respectful relationship practices. One more example 
from Sarah will further illustrate agonism in the power relations of heterosexual 
couples.  
About half-way through the third meeting of the first focus group Ali, in 
contributing to the conversation on “nagging” and power, quoted someone from 
her work place situation: “nagging is the language of powerlessness”.  In the 
following piece from the meeting Ali gives a personal comment on this statement, 
which is followed by Sarah’s agreement and further comment:  
Ali: That’s probably how I feel when I am nagging. . . . I can see the 
situation slipping away here so I am just going to go hell for leather until 
something changes. . . . And I think men do view it as a threat. 
Sarah: It is a threat. . . . But, I think the issue becomes if the woman also 
doesn’t realise that she is trying to force something by doing so [nagging]. 
When we are talking about that place where you can talk if you’re nagging, 
and you’re pushing, you are trying to force . . . there’s a force . . . I have had 
to learn to let things go. . . . I think [it] wasn’t going to work in lieu of 
having that safe space where he could talk. . . . But I would let it go, and I 
would come back to him later, and he would be like, “o yeah I can see that”. 
I had to learn to be patient, and not forceful, because if I did I would have 
lost that situation. 
Here Sarah is talking about a process of conversation with her partner, showing 
the “mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that 
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paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 342). 
This example of agonism reveals the “struggle” for Sarah, to which she responded 
by changing positions, so that she could achieve her relationship goals. 
The first move in the interaction above appears as though it comes from Sarah 
with her “pushing” or using “force” to move her partner. However, a valid reason 
for Sarah beginning with force is because her partner has not moved on the topic 
they are discussing, either on this occasion or previously. In this relationship of 
agonism, Davies et al. (2002, p. 297) explain further, “The ‘dominated’ are not in 
binary relation to those who exercise power, but are themselves integral to and 
operating through the relevant lines of force”. Both Sarah and her partner are 
operating at this time through “relevant lines of force”. These agonistic lines of 
force were not working for Sarah so she changes her position.   
After talking of this force form of power Sarah says, “I have had to let things go”. 
What Sarah let go was her position of overt force that threatens. Sarah then takes 
up a position of safety or non-threat for her partner. Instead of an overt agonism 
through force, Sarah changes her position and employs an approach to her partner 
that is informed by her knowledge of his practices. The agonistic relationship is 
still present in Sarah’s account but it is covert. Sarah says in regard to her 
changing position, “I had to learn to be patient, and not forceful, because if I did I 
would have lost that situation”. Patience instead of force now describes Sarah’s 
position in the relationship. The agonism still exists as power relation as there is 
still a “situation” not to be “lost” for Sarah. The agonism as “provocation” is not 
so overt when patience, in contrast with “force” and “pushing”, is involved in the 
adjusted positioning. 
In conjunction with this change in position, which alters the agonism of the 
relationship, it is apparent that Sarah employs implicit knowledge to help instigate 
her changing position. This knowledge, referred to in Sarah’s response to Ali, and 
in her own account, relates to the threat a woman vigorously voicing her position 
can be to a man, which works in conjunction with knowledge that a safe space 
will re-position both Sarah and her partner differently.  It is through her 
knowledge that Sarah can adjust her position in regard to power and create a 
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different agonistic relationship to gain the “situation”. Power relations and 
relations of knowledge are interdependent (Deleuze, 1988b, pp. 82-83).  
Unlike domination and violence, agonism is a power relation where a woman 
partner can have an agentic voice in the constitution of the relationship in 
response to the patriarchal production of power exercised by her male partner. 
Significantly though, as the examples from Ali and Sarah clearly demonstrate, to 
achieve certain goals in the relationship, a woman partner will often have to 
change positioning and subjectivity before the male partner will change. While 
these goals maybe “everyday” requirements for the relationship, I suggest that Ali 
and Sarah also adjust position because they maintain a hope for a relationship that 
is akin to a safe, sacred place.  
Sedimentation, breakage and fracture 
Somewhere in between a state of domination and agonism in regard to power 
relations is Foucault’s idea of the sedimentation of a relationship. The possibility 
of resistance to this sedimentation is available with it, and is spoken of as “lines of 
‘breakage’ and of ‘fracture’” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 159).  
Just after a short break half-way through the second meeting of the first focus 
group I suggest to the group that each person respond to whatever they would like 
from the narrative research document I had written from the first meeting. Sarah 
begins this process. One of her highlights is how she and her partner are working 
on being respectful in their conversations with each other. Carmen first of all 
picks up on Sarah’s ideas about being respectful in conversations, saying “[how] 
positive and beneficial [this is] compared to my generation, married thirty three 
years ago, that wasn’t available”. Carmen, with this context, then continues to talk 
about her heterosexual relationship from its inception to what is currently 
happening for her within the relationship, highlighting her change of positioning 
and subjectivity:  
When you begin a relationship you take the roles where the husband is the 
provider, and you’re at home doing whatever needs to be done whether it’s 
the finance or this and the other. But then again through the years, what I 
can see is my husband in particular will want to try and reclaim the role of 
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male, and take control [of what] he had handed over. So, therefore it’s like, 
his own manhood . . . had been challenged . . . it touches his insecurities. . . . 
[He had] abdicated some of the roles and some of the authority by allowing 
the woman to make a lot of the decisions and things like that . . . and he was 
challenged by this and at times [try to take back these roles]. At this point, 
I’m saying “no, this is not okay anymore!” [This is] causing a few 
problems. 
In response to the “sedimentation of husband-wife practices and knowledges” 
(Davies et al., 2002, p. 310) over the years, Carmen endeavours to fracture these 
practices with new positioning that has caused a “few problems” in the 
relationship. Carmen continues to describe why this is happening: 
For so many years I thought my role as a woman was to be quiet and just do 
whatever needs to be done. Therefore, that is a point after thirty three years 
that we have been challenged with the lack of . . . that understanding [of] 
initially growing into a relationship and a partnership. And now, [I’m] 
thinking “hang on a minute, this matters to me. I want to get along well with 
you and you need to know [what] the sort of things I said mean, the way 
you speak back to me. . . . I don’t want to do this anymore. I want to share 
that with you. . . . I carry the worry and the burden . . . it’s like a non-
involvement [until] it becomes an insecurity or a challenge [for you].  But 
I’m now saying we are a team, we’re a family, and I want to share this with 
you as well . . . two is better than one”.  
Carmen is now being more explicit about the daily sedimented practices of being 
a woman in a heterosexual relationship: She is “to be quiet and just do whatever 
needs to be done”. Carmen then talks about why she wants the change that helps 
her fracture the sedimented practices of power. In a monologue to her partner, as 
if he is present, Carmen describes why the change is wanted, and what she wants 
from the relationship; an implicit knowledge, akin to a safe, sacred place, is 
introduced with words that challenge her partner’s privileged position and suggest 
relational equality, sharing, and teamwork.    
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Carmen continues, this time, in answer to a question from the narrative research 
document about the possibility of men offering their partners preferred alternate 
positions to the asymmetrical positions patriarchy produces. As researcher, I 
respond at times to attain clarity. 
Carmen: [The preferred position] is respect and be respectful. 
Brian: That would be ideal if he would do that? 
Carmen: exactly . . . but heh, “I’m not against you”. . . . That is where I try 
and communicate. 
Brian: Yeah, but he doesn’t see. . . ?  
Carmen: No, he doesn’t see it, and it’s like a blockage there. 
Brian: He sees it more as a power thing? 
Carmen: Exactly, so he puts a wall up. He thinks I am trying to gain power, 
but I already have that power. . . . We’re on the same side together and he is 
not hearing that. [When he reacts to me] . . . first of all I feel shock . . . and 
then because of my CBT studies I try and analyse it and put it into 
perspective . . . and try to [sort it out with him]. . . . But he shuts me down, 
with “there goes your counselling thing again” in a loud voice. In the past 
that would really hurt me, then I would close up in my emotions. So now I 
feel more empowered, and what I say is, “look do you realise what you are 
doing, you are shutting me down”.  
The fracture of Carmen’s resistance to the sedimented power relations, where her 
partner had privilege and priority, occurs in conjunction with Carmen’s implicit 
knowledge that part of an equal and shared partnership is her partner practising 
respect toward her. The tone of Carmen’s position in this portion of the transcript 
is that of an invitation to egalitarian relationship, where she resists her partner’s 
efforts to control the conversation. In this story of Carmen’s new positioning, 
challenging her partner’s position, agonism can be noted as a new feature in the 
relationship. Agonism can occur where the less privileged partner is re-
positioning herself toward a possible egalitarian relationship. The relationship 
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between power and implicit knowledge in Carmen’s story did not originate in a 
vacuum. Carmen reveals above that her story is connected to other stories from 
which she learned and re-visioned her relational possibilities. 
Silence to unsilencing with Carmen’s story  
Carmen’s story fits well with Benjamin’s (2003) theory of how women transform 
themselves in response to hierarchical power in their heterosexual relationships. 
Benjamin explicates three levels by which women reposition themselves from a 
place of silence to “unsilencing” (p. 1). The first of these levels is being able to 
contest “the hierarchical meaning structure” (p. 8) that a woman’s partner is 
operating from, and which keeps a woman in an oppressed position. This 
contesting comes about when a woman partner connects to an alternate meaning 
structure, such as a “feminist meaning structure” (p. 8). From this alternate 
meaning structure they can gain new meaning about their personhood, and for 
heterosexual relationship. This new meaning structure “becomes a power resource 
that can enable [women] to unsilence avoided topics in [their] relationship” (p. 
12). The second level follows on from the first in that it enables a woman partner 
to distance herself somewhat from the emotions of her partner as he reacts to his 
partner’s unsilencing process. A woman partner’s connection with the alternate 
meaning structure enables her to manage the social cost associated with her 
partner’s reaction to her, which may include exclusionary and rejecting actions (p. 
13).  
Finally, the third level of unsilencing is maintaining the transformation the female 
partner is undergoing, particularly in regard to “emotion management” (Benjamin, 
2003, p. 13). This emotion management includes work with fear and guilt, which 
may arise as a result of the hierarchical meaning structures’ past hegemony in her 
life, and detaching from old emotion work of placating her partner’s anger and 
efforts at control. The new emotion management is strengthened by a female 
partner’s connection to an egalitarian or feminist meaning structure (p. 13-14). 
One other point from Benjamin (2003, p. 13), of relevance to Carmen, is naming 
the “silenced experiences so that they can be validated”, hence they are no longer 
kept silent or remain invisible. I now connect these three levels of unsilencing to 
Carmen’s story. 
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From the above transcript extracts it is apparent that Carmen has had contact with 
counselling education and studies in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). 
Carmen acknowledges training in these areas as providing her with the skill to re-
appraise her interactions with her partner and respond to him from a position of 
unsilencing. At the end of the third focus group meeting Carmen also 
acknowledges two other meaning structures that may have contributed to her re-
positioning from silence. Carmen talks for a long period about these, but I 
highlight a small portion. Carmen begins by responding to a question about 
whether the focus group has been of any benefit to her: 
I sort of expected to come and talk and not really learn. But I have picked 
up and learnt a few things for myself and seen some things about aspects of 
my earlier life. I can see that I married someone that was . . . controlling, 
dominant, making decisions, all those sort of things. . . . What has happened 
through the years, and especially having become Christian is that you then 
change. . . . I find that my greatest growth is my own Christian faith and 
finding my value. 
Through contact with these alternate meaning structures, CBT and counselling 
studies, the focus group, and Christian faith, I suggest Carmen has experienced “a 
power resource” that has enabled her “to unsilence avoided topics in [her] 
relationship” (Benjamin, 2003, p. 12). Through these alternate meaning structures 
Carmen has gained implicit knowledge of herself as a human being, and of her 
relationship possibilities, that contribute to her repositioning in the relationship 
with her partner.    
At the second level advocated by Benjamin it appears that connection to these 
alternate meaning structures has enabled Carmen to distance herself from her 
partner’s reactions, manage the hurt and, to use Carmen’s words, “[not] close up 
in my emotions”. Carmen has been able to manage the social cost of her partner’s 
exclusionary reactions. In much the same terms as Benjamin (2003, p. 13), 
Carmen says, “So now I feel more empowered”.  The third level, Benjamin 
suggests, is a continuation of the transformation that has begun at the second 
level. From the transcript it is clear that at the time of the focus group meeting this 
transformation continues for Carmen. In naming her own silencing experience, 
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which Benjamin says is important to do at the third level, Carmen uses the 
language of shut-down from the first focus group. In speaking to her partner, 
Carmen reports that she says “do you realise what you are doing, you are shutting 
me down”.  
In appropriating Benjamin’s three levels of women’s repositioning from silence to 
unsilencing in heterosexual relationships, I show an explicit process by which 
sedimentary practices and knowledges can be fractured, “where thought might 
insert itself” in a new way (Rose, 1999b, pp. 276-277) so that “thinking altogether 
differently” (Derrida, 1982b, p. 326) about heterosexual relationships may occur.    
“The weak points and lines of fracture” (Rose, 1999b, pp. 276-277), in the 
hierarchical meaning structure, come from Carmen’s connection with alternate 
meaning structures. These alternate meaning structures, offer Carmen license and 
knowledge to think differently about her relationship and about herself as a 
human being. It is a strategic strength that these new meaning structures are 
continually connected with for support through the third level of moving to 
unsilencing. Through these alternate meaning structures Carmen gains implicit 
knowledge that make it possible for her to think “altogether differently” (Derrida, 
1982b, p. 326) about the relationship with her partner. This new thinking and 
implicit knowledge can be seen in Carmen’s words where she changes her 
position from that of subservience to one of challenging oppressive acts. A 
statement such as “no, this is not okay anymore” indicates new positioning for 
Carmen in relation to her partner’s controlling position.  
In Carmen’s account of her heterosexual relationship the implicit knowledge of a 
safe, sacred place, in equal and shared partnership, plays an important role in her 
repositioning to a position of power as resistance to her partner’s oppressive 
control of the relationship. Thought and action are inserted into Carmen’s 
relationship in new ways that offer potential for transformation.   
The sedimentation of husband-wife practices as lines of force 
I offer an analysis of Annie’s account of her heterosexual relationship where, I 
suggest, “the sedimentation of husband-wife practices and knowledges” (Davies 
et al., 2002, p. 310) in one particular area of the relationship, result in 
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“sedimentations of lines of force” (Davies et al., 2002, p. 312). The lines of force 
are the productions of power that keep the relationship caught in a space that 
limits Annie’s preferred practices for relationship. Neither partner seems to be 
changing in regard to a particular aspect of the relationship, even though Annie 
uses an implicit knowledge akin to a safe, sacred place to try and connect with her 
partner for change. 
In discussing this idea of sedimentation in Annie’s relationship, I begin in the 
second meeting of the first focus group, where Annie responds to the narrative 
research document. I will then move back to the first meeting where Annie 
discusses the reason for sedimentation in her relationship: 
I guess I just feel disappointed because when I saw your research 
[document] I thought, “I communicate well with my partner”. I 
communicate openly on most topics, but not the decision making. When I 
read it [narrative research document] I thought, “O, he [Brian] really tapped 
into the hardest part of our relationship”. . . . It [narrative research 
document] just brought up what I struggle with the most in our relationship. 
We don’t make decisions. I’m not entirely blaming my partner, because 
some decisions are mutual, but we both wait for each other, and so it’s not 
resolved. Some of the really big ones I think he could make, and he doesn’t, 
or at least take some initiative.  
Annie has named decision-making as an area of difficulty in her heterosexual 
relationship. As we continue with Annie’s account of her heterosexual 
relationship it becomes clearer as to why this is a difficulty, and how it might 
contribute to sedimented husband-wife practices. To understand more on this area 
of decision-making I refer to Annie’s words:   
I think decision making would be our biggest weakness. He’s very passive. . 
. . I am actually thinking my husband is not . . . stereotypically male, he’s 
not a powerful man, or an aggressive man. [While growing up] he was 
actually told what to do a lot. Even though he is highly intelligent he is a 
very, very poor decision maker, so I am the one wasting all this energy. . . . 
On the big things he trusts me, which is a valuable part of the relationship, 
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but he doesn’t enter into . . . I just go “whooo” [screams loudly]. . . . He just 
doesn’t come to decisions; I waste heaps of energy. That is why I have been 
very passive [in this meeting] thinking, “I could almost cry here”. It’s really 
hard living with someone so passive. It’s his strength and his weakness, 
because he’s not dominant and powerful and aggressive and bullying, but he 
is just so passive. . . . He is a well rounded, thinking, intelligent, creative 
person. But he doesn’t take a leadership role in our family. . . . We talk, but 
we don’t come to any decisions . . . so I’m left feeling open all the time and 
it’s quite vulnerable. . . . It’s really, really hard to live with that . . . it’s hard 
in a marriage, so hard in a friendship. 
This story of Annie’s appears different to other stories of patriarchal control and 
domination, such as Hannah’s and Carmen’s stories, but in hearing the emotion in 
Annie’s words I realise that her story speaks of the relationship as powerfully and 
painfully constitutive for her. I initially struggled to understand how I could 
analyse and understand Annie’s story of relationship, then I remembered Davies 
and her colleague’s guiding words: “To understand how relations of power are put 
and held in place we examine not violence, but the specific forms of knowledge, 
or ‘rationalities’, that make any particular form of power seem reasonable or 
inevitable” (2002, p. 298). 
On an initial reading of Annie’s words the rationality that appears to me is the 
expectation or belief that “leadership is male”, a possible connection to the 
traditional idea and practice that the male is the “head of the home” (Balswick & 
Balswick, 1999, p. 91; see Rankin Mahoney & Knudson-Martin, 2009, p. 22) who 
makes the decisions. However, I also offer an alternative reading based on the 
transcript and points of clarification Annie made when she sought me out after the 
second focus group meeting.  
I ascertain one dominant rationality from the above account that may be at work 
in Annie’s sedimented relationship with her partner. “The marriage-between-
equals discourse” is the name given by Hare-Mustin (1994, p. 29) to a discourse 
that makes it possible in marriage for male domination and female subordination 
to be concealed. One of the key reasons for this concealment, Hare-Mustin (1994, 
p. 30) argues, is essentialising the differences between men and women. These 
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essentialist ideas “disguise what is taking place; they obscure operations of 
power” (Hare-Mustin, 1994, p. 30). With Annie’s story there is not only the 
essentialising of men as “stereotypically . . . powerful . . . aggressive . . . dominant 
. . . bullying”, but there is the contrasting essentialising of her partner as “highly 
intelligent . . . well rounded, thinking, intelligent, creative . . . passive . . . very 
poor decision maker”. I suggest that this essentialising of her partner is obscuring 
the operations of power that are taking place, which Annie may have recognised 
more readily if he was “stereotypically male”. Because her partner is not 
“stereotypically male”, and hence not “powerful, dominant, aggressive”, the 
operation of power is obscured, and Annie identifies the non decision-making, in 
the main, as an element of her partner’s “passive” personality, rather than of 
power relations.  
In this essentialising of Annie’s partner not making decisions I think there is an 
important taken-for-granted knowledge, a rationality, which keeps power 
functioning silently and invisibly. This rationality is the western idea, derived 
from certain social and psychological sciences, that people have an essentialised 
and permanent set of traits, from which truth and meaning can be ascertained 
about their “real nature”, behaviours, and potential trajectory in life (Geertz, 1979; 
Rose, 1998, 1999a; McNamee, 2004). This rationality is so pervasive that to 
think, to see, to speak, in other ways would likely be unfathomable for many. 
Davies et al. (2002, p. 298), in regard to the obscurity of the power behind taken-
for-granted knowledge write, “The lines of force of power relations make us see 
and speak in certain ways, though they themselves do not see and speak”. I 
propose that this taken-for-granted rationality of essentialised personality traits is 
not only blinding Annie to the operations of power behind such knowledge, but it 
is also keeping her blind to the operations of power in the relationship with her 
partner expressed through the “passive” non decision-making.   
There are two other rationalities at work in Annie’s account. These are the ideas 
that emotional connection and equally shared leadership are important practices 
for her heterosexual relationship. These rationalities appear to be much the same 
idea as a safe, sacred place. During the second meeting of the first focus group 
Annie says the following in regard to emotional connection in her relationship: 
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[My partner] will often say we talked about something, “it was really great 
we talked about” . . . I said “no I didn’t”. It’s because . . . he’s not 
connecting emotionally. I, being a fairly emotional person, realise from 
learning, that’s what’s missing. We can talk, and talk, and talk, oh, didn’t 
get anywhere. Then I’ve gone, “you didn’t understand what I felt, you 
understood what I thought, but you did not connect with me”. 
In conjunction with this emphasis on emotional connection Annie spoke of her 
hope for “shared leadership together” in her heterosexual relationship. Annie says, 
“Leadership is putting things in place so that they will work, for example, filling 
the car with petrol . . . shared responsibility for relationship and domestic duties”.  
Annie’s account of her heterosexual relationship now includes other concerns 
along with the non decision-making of her partner. The absence of emotional 
connection with her partner, along with her recognition that she desires emotional 
connection, and her hope for shared leadership in the relationship, are now 
important aspects of Annie’s account of her heterosexual relationship. In the first 
focus group meeting Annie gave a simple, perhaps humorous, but nonetheless real 
example of the absence of shared leadership and responsibility in the relationship. 
Yesterday I had to buy a kettle, and I said [to her partner], do you have any 
opinion, and he said, “No”. And I said, “well, actually, I don’t have any 
opinions about kettles either” (group laughter). I didn’t want to make any 
decision on a kettle, but I did, because I went to the catalogue and I went, 
“that will do”, cos’ I don’t really care. 
While this example from Annie on the absence of shared leadership and decision-
making may appear trivial on its own, in the context of Annie’s overall account it 
serves to show what is important for Annie – a partner who is involved with her in 
the relationship. This involvement means emotional connection, shared leadership 
and decision-making.  
The two rationalities, emotional connection and shared leadership, join with the 
rationality of Annies partner’s essentialised traits and the power produced in the 
relationship through his  withdrawn non-involvement, to produce Annie’s 
subjectivity. To recap on Annie’s subjectivity from her words mentioned earlier; 
 154 
Annie mentions almost crying as she listens to the other women in the focus 
group talk about their relationships. Annie uses the word “hard” a number of 
times to name the emotional difficulties of living with a partner who lives closely 
with passivity. Her sense of pain and frustration is expressed in the scream Annie 
lets out as she responds to Hannah’s input. Annie also mentions vulnerability and 
“feeling open” because she and her partner talk, “but we don’t come to any 
decisions”. I suggest Annie’s pain, and the subject position she finds herself in, 
leave her feeling like she has limited options left in regard to how she can change 
the relationship. In regard to their story of sedimentation of husband-wife 
practices and knowledges Davies et al. (2002) write something that is perhaps just 
as applicable to Annie: “His wife is completely silenced, and made vulnerable. 
Not through a state of domination based on ‘economic, political, or military 
means’ but on the sedimentation of husband-wife practices and knowledges” (p. 
310).  
Even though Annie has provocatively, in an agonistic sense, hinted that change 
for the relationship is required according to her two knowledges of emotional 
connection and shared leadership, her sedimented knowledge of her partner’s 
essentialised traits, and his sedimented passive practices of power, continue to act 
as lines of force that paralyse the relationship. To play on the words of Foucault, 
the relationship is not agonistic as in a permanent provocation, but is more “of a 
face-to-face confrontation that paralyses both sides” (2002b, p. 342).  
The lens of governmentality  
As applied to this study, governmentality is the encounter between any of the four 
technologies defined by Foucault; technologies of power, the self, production, and 
sign systems (2000a, p. 224-225; 1971/2000b, pp. 337-339; 2002b, p. 341; 
1978/2002e, pp. 219-220). Each of these technologies is arranged around a 
rationality that is governed by a goal (Rose, 1998, p. 26). Technologies of power 
conduct the conduct of others toward a goal; technologies of the self operate on 
the self toward a goal; technologies of production produce, transform, or 
manipulate things toward a goal; technologies of sign systems permit the use of 
signs, meanings, and communication systems toward a goal. Governmentality 
employs these technologies “for acting upon the action of others towards certain 
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ends” (Rose, 1999a, p. xxi). I now apply the concept of governmentality, as an 
action of patriarchal power, and as a lens on Hannah’s relationship, and then on 
the relationships of Ali and Sarah, followed by Carmen then Annie, as the 
excerpts from the focus group meetings have presented them in this chapter.   
I analysed Hannah’s relationship as a state of domination because of the control 
and violence practised by her partner. In the face of this domination Hannah 
stayed in the relationship in the hope that the relationship would change according 
to her preferences. Looking at Hannah’s relationship through the lens of 
governmentality, I suggest she joins a technology of the self with a technology of 
production. While the technology of production, a safe, sacred place, was an 
original goal Hannah had for her relationship, the technology of self came about 
because of Hannahs partner’s use of a technology of power with her. 
Technologies of the self concern Hannah’s efforts on the relationship, and even 
though she does not explicitly say it, I suggest, work on herself as well. This work 
on Hannah’s relationship and self is constituted and maintained by the technology 
of power in which her partner engages, and Hannah’s hope that the technology of 
production, a safe, sacred place, may come about in the relationship.  
With both Ali and Sarah, a technology of self operates in response to their 
partner’s utilising a technology of power. Ali and Sarah change their positions and 
work on the relationship with their partners as a result of the technology of power 
governing their approach to conducting relationship. In their application of a 
technology of self both Ali and Sarah hold onto the technology of production, a 
safe, sacred place, as a hope for their relationship. Ali has been alerted to a 
technology of sign systems that works alongside her partner’s technology of 
power for government. According to Ali she notes the type of crisp, clipped, and 
unembellished form of communication her partner prefers. Consequently, Ali, in 
response to these two technologies, power and sign systems, adjusts her 
positioning with the use of email.  
In Ali’s and Sarah’s relationships governmentality is a form of power that is 
productive. It produces possibilities (Davies et al., 2002, p. 297), “traverses and 
produces things” (Foucault, 1980, p. 119). Ali and Sarah creatively utilise a 
technology of sign systems to produce a different strategy of response to the 
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governmental practices reproduced by their partners. Ali, in using email, makes 
use of signs within it, such as the exclamation mark, to communicate her opinion. 
And Sarah changes the way she communicates with her partner by letting things 
go, not forcing, and producing patience, so that she can still achieve her goals 
with her partner. In this process of governmentality, and the responses to it from 
Ali and Sarah, noticeable are “the ways we [women might] become governable 
and actively engage in the conduct of our own and others’ conduct. . . . [Thus], 
women might be said to be powerful, even when they are complicit in their own 
subjection” (Davies et al., 2002, pp. 295, 312).  
Governmentality, on the basis of patriarchal discourses, can be seen from the 
transcript where Carmen says, “For so many years I thought my role as a woman 
was to be quiet and just do whatever needs to be done”. Through the three 
technologies of power, self, and production, the governmental development of a 
woman partner who does not upset the patriarchal status quo, is apparent here. 
Then later, in the envisaged monologue to her partner, Carmen says, “But I’m 
now saying we are a team, we’re a family, and I want to share this with you as 
well . . . two is better than one”. At this point Carmen has taken up a different 
technology of production of heterosexual relationship. It is this technology of 
production, in conjunction with a technology of power, a governmental action, 
which Carmen responds to her partner with as “a ‘conduct of conducts’, and a 
management of [new] possibilities” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 341) for her heterosexual 
relationship.  This is indicative of the change in Carmen’s positioning.  
In Annie’s heterosexual relationship patriarchal governmentality is in place 
through the non-decision-making, lack of emotional connection, and no shared 
leadership. In the words of Davies et al., “the repeated, minute accretions of 
everyday practices can generate lines of force” (2002, pp. 312) that paralyse 
Annie’s relationship in these areas. A technology of power results in the 
relationship being shaped by an impasse. While the technology of power may 
have invited Annie into a technology of the self, where work on Annie’s 
subjectivity and self may have moderated the impasse, it does not appear from 
Annie’s story that this invitation to work on self is taken up. Instead Annie, to use 
Foucault’s word, agonistically challenges her partner about his contribution to the 
relationship and domestic requirements. This can be seen as Annie voicing a 
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preference for her partner to practise a technology of the self and change the 
deadlocked relationship practices on his part. However, his stuck response keeps 
the relationship dominated by a technology of power that privileges patriarchal 
productions of heterosexual relationship and keeps Annie’s preferred practices 
away. 
Where does this analysis leave a woman in heterosexual 
relationship?  
The dual analysis, offered from the perspective of the power/knowledge nexus, 
and through the lens of governmentality, on the first focus group women’s 
heterosexual relationships, come to the same conclusion. Unless a male partner 
positions himself to cooperate with a woman partner, a woman partner’s 
knowledge and egalitarian goals for the relationship will not be implemented. 
From a governmental perspective, even where a male partner is seen as 
cooperating with a woman partner, it is possibly only because she has applied a 
technology of self, adjusted her positioning and subjectivity, in relation to the 
male partner. But, as can be judged from Hannah’s situation, this adjustment does 
not always work for a woman partner. Whatever way the first focus group 
women’s heterosexual relationships are analysed, from a governmental, or 
power/knowledge perspective, the consequences are unethical in response to an 
egalitarian ethic sought by the women.  
In the context of government, the women, in initiating moves towards a safe, 
sacred place are, I argue, practising an ethic both on their own self and for the 
relationship. Valverde defines ethics as “the reflexive government of the self by 
the self” (2004, p. 77; cf. Foucault, 1984/2000c, pp. 282, 284). The focus group 
women, while being governed by the collision between patriarchal power, and 
their implicit knowledge of relationship, are also governing their own selves, as 
selves that hope and desire for a safe, sacred place. The women in each situation 
either change their subjectivity and positioning to keep the hope alive for the 
relationship as they would like it, and/or they continue to bear the physical or 
emotional pain that comes from carrying the unequal load of the relationship. 
While the women hope for an ethical relationship to come about, they continue in 
a relationship that is unethical. 
 158 
Back to deconstruction as double: A double ethical 
position 
To reiterate briefly, double deconstruction involves two applications: one, a 
deconstruction from within the system being deconstructed; second, overturning, 
any binary hierarchy that may exist in the system, and the inclusion of a 
completely new concept into the system that was not previously present, thus 
removing any hierarchy. In this chapter, through Foucault’s power/knowledge 
nexus, and governmentality, I have offered a deconstruction of heterosexual 
relationship as a person who is involved in a heterosexual relationship. This 
deconstruction has highlighted the unethical patriarchal practices of power that 
privilege the male partner and subject the female partner to subject positions that 
are unjust. These subject positions position the female partner as subservient to 
her partner. Hence, for her to hold hope of realising her preferred expressions of 
heterosexual relationship she needs to adjust and manoeuvre her position in the 
relationship.   
However, the implicit knowledge of the women’s preferred expressions of 
heterosexual relationship contributes to the emotional pain of not having a 
relationship as they would prefer, and/or, as I have suggested, the implicit 
knowledge is the grounds for the women to change their position and practices in 
the relationship. Whatever position is taken by the women, their preferred 
expression of heterosexual relationship is either not realised, or only partially 
realised, leaving the women subservient to various practices of patriarchy. Hence, 
the deconstruction of heterosexual relationship in this chapter not only 
deconstructs patriarchal practices as unethical, but it also acts as a deconstruction 
of the preferred expressions for heterosexual relationship of the first focus group 
women. In the terms of Caputo (1997a, p. 78) on deconstruction, “A 
deconstructive reading . . . settles into the distance between what the author 
consciously intends . . . that is, what she “commands” in her text, and what she 
does not command, what is going on in the text . . . behind her back”.  
The first focus group women “command” a safe, sacred place for their 
relationship, but what they do not command, what is going on behind their backs, 
I suggest, are the practices of power from patriarchal discourses. These practices 
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of power constitute the women both before and after any adjustment and 
manoeuvring of their subjectivity in an effort to realise a safe, sacred place for 
their relationship.  
Because of the dominant and here unrecognised position of power held by 
patriarchal practices in heterosexual relationship, to overturn the hierarchy of 
patriarchal practices controlling the women’s preferred expressions would not 
necessarily effect change. I argue that the actual point of entry of patriarchal 
practices into heterosexual relationship needs addressing. This point to be 
addressed is the male partner’s position in heterosexual relationship. The next 
chapter takes up this addressing of the male partner’s position in heterosexual 
relationship.   
In concluding this chapter I return to the first focus group women’s preferred 
expression of heterosexual relationship represented in the idea of a safe, sacred 
place. This conclusion serves as an introduction to the ethical basis for the 
continued deconstruction in the next chapter. 
A place of hope 
In writing this chapter, it has become clear to me that, on one hand, a safe, sacred 
place is an implicit knowledge working with power, and on the other hand, a safe, 
sacred place works with hope. The glimpses the women have received of a safe, 
sacred place in practice have provided them with hope that it can materialise in 
their heterosexual relationships more consistently. In this chapter, while I have 
conducted an “archaeological dig” of a safe, sacred place as an implicit 
knowledge of the first focus group women that allies with power, I have, 
alongside this, also conducted an “archaeology of hope” (Monk, Winslade, 
Crocket, & Epston, 1997).  
Much of the second and third focus group meetings were responses to two 
questions, one of which was, “what can men do to help grow the hope for equal 
space in a relationship?” Indeed the women did respond to this question, 
suggesting that their partners join them in this safe, sacred place of egalitarian 
conversation and partnership. Then finally, after the three first focus group 
meetings, and with careful effort and time in preparation, and with the support of 
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the first focus group women, I included the following in the bridging document 
(Appendix D):  
Thinking about what the women value in their relationships with male 
partners, I heard how they spoke about hopes, aspirations and dreams they 
hold . . . I was struck by the energy and enthusiasm they had for the task of 
sharing their stories and connecting with each other. . . . As I participated in 
this . . . I became aware that these women trusted me with the sacredness of 
their stories. I was aware that as a man I could have been seen as 
representing those who had hurt them, in some cases quite violently. . . . 
“Why would they trust me, and be so open in talking about their lives?” I 
think it was because they valued and hoped for egalitarian relationships with 
their partners. Their enthusiasm I think not only reflected what was 
happening between them with each other, but it reflected what they hoped 
for and had experienced at times with their partners. 
A safe, sacred place is not only a place implicated with power, but it is also a sign 
and place of hope that reflects the aspirations and dreams the women have for 
relationship with their partners. Ali, Sarah, and Sue, in the focus group suggested 
that their partners were responding in varying degrees to the invitation to meet 
them at this place. Hannah however had to leave the particular relationship. In 
Annie’s and Carmen’s relationships, at the time of the focus group meetings, there 
was no report on the response of their partners to the invitation.  
This chapter highlights the adjustment and re-positioning that is required by the 
women for change in their relationship to occur. Along with this adjustment, the 
production of patriarchal power that resists such change is indicated. This 
production of patriarchal power and resistance to change invites the question, “If 
the relationship is so difficult and costly to change why persist with it?” As I have 
proposed in the bridging document, I think the women’s hopes, aspirations, and 
dreams for relationship are part of the answer. And, I also recognise in my 
position as a man, I am not able to adequately answer that question. But I am in a 
position to suggest that men change and take up an invitation to join their women 
partners in a safe, sacred place of egalitarian heterosexual partnership. As 
Benjamin writes, “In the realm of heterosexual relationships . . . cooperation is 
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unlikely unless “dominant masculinity” as a structure of men’s entitlements is 
successfully challenged by an alternative care-based masculinity” (2003, p. 15). It 
is to this conversation that I turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8. A double deconstruction: 
Inviting men to respond otherwise 
 
From the first focus group I took the bridging document (Appendix D) into the 
individual interviews with five men. The men received this document at least one 
week before their interview. One of the aspects that the women talked about in the 
first focus group, in naming their preferred relational space and declared in the 
bridging document, is a safe, sacred place. A safe, sacred place is the relational 
space that I theorise men are invited to, for responses that are ethical and 
egalitarian.     
As a man who had witnessed the discussions of the first focus group I was well 
positioned to ask questions of the men. These questions, included in the bridging 
document, were designed as a reading guide, and to obtain their responses to the 
material produced in the document: What is there in this document that stands out 
for you or maybe catches your attention in surprising ways? Why is it that women 
partners can feel there is no option other than to speak this way – “nagging”? Is 
there anything men can do about this that is fair and helpful for both men and 
women? The excerpts in this chapter come from the interviews as the men 
answered these questions and reflected on their heterosexual relationship practices 
and experience.     
My approach to deconstruction as double continues in this chapter. By joining the 
first step – overturning a hierarchy – with part of the second step – the inclusion 
of a new concept – I vary from Derrida’s original linear two-step proposal. I take 
this step to approach deconstruction in this way because of unrecognised 
inequality that heterosexual relationship may produce between the male and 
female partners. I use the concept of a safe, sacred place as the new concept for an 
expression of heterosexual relationship that is egalitarian. This deconstructive 
step, while instructed by deconstruction as double, is the application of another 
approach to deconstruction: deconstruction as affirmative response to the Other 
(Derrida, 1995a, p. 168; Caputo, 1997a; Critchley, 2007; Smith, 2005). This 
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chapter moves from deconstruction as ethic to deconstruction as shaping an 
ethical relationship.   
I situate this ethical relationship in Derrida’s “democracy to come” (1993/1994, 
pp. 81-82, 2003/2005a, pp. 88-92, 148-149), where the predominant figure is “the 
other” (Levinas 1961/1969, 1974/1998) as those toward whom hospitality and 
justice are to be practised (Derrida, 1993/1994, pp. 211-212, 2003/2005a, pp. 88, 
149). I suggest an appropriate ethical response to the Other is with the practices of 
obligatory love and becoming love. I read the men’s interviews transcripts to trace 
how the two practices of obligatory love and becoming love are visible or absent 
and how these shape their heterosexual relationships. I analyse the interview 
transcripts with the above in mind in order to investigate and show a possible path 
towards egalitarian heterosexual relationships – meeting a woman partner at a 
safe, sacred place. 
As I identify the two practices of obligatory love and becoming love, I am aware 
that I step in and out of strategic essentialism and relational externalising.  I step 
into strategic essentialism when, for example, I write of a man appropriating his 
experience of shame as a guide to his relational ethics. I step into relational 
externalising to speak about the shaping effect of discourse when, for example, I 
write of a man being shaped by self and relational understandings that are 
produced from biologically deterministic discourses.  
The analysis in this chapter is divided into two distinct parts: Obligatory love 
guides the analysis first, followed with becoming love. I suggest that obligatory 
love be divided into three distinct ethical expressions: recognition of privilege, the 
ability of not-knowing, and as space and interested distance.  
Obligatory love as recognition of privilege 
In interpreting Derrida and Dufourmantelle (2000) for his practice in counselling, 
Jenkins (2009, p. 25) says of hospitality, “The practice of hospitality requires that 
we recognise our privilege and attend to the needs and feelings of those who may 
be experiencing disadvantage and marginalisation.” Recognising our privilege as 
men is arguably one of the most difficult aspects of obligatory love because of the 
familiar liberal humanist assumption that there is equality between men and 
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women. An alternative explanation, but still with the assumption of equality, is 
noted by Pease, “As most men’s beliefs about male superiority are experienced as 
being natural and normal and are institutionalised and culturally exalted, they 
generally do not notice their advantages” (2010, p. 95). Even if a man is to 
recognise his privilege, the change is difficult. Hegemonic patriarchal power can 
have far-reaching effects on the identity of men when they are faced with the 
possibility of recognising and changing their privileged position. Acker (2006, p. 
455) writes, “Advantage is hard to give up: Increasing equality with devalued 
groups can be seen and felt as an assault on dignity and masculinity”. Additional 
to this difficulty is the personal threat that men may experience in response to the 
autonomy of women and the contradiction this autonomy offers to men’s 
culturally derived sense of women being their possession (Pease, 2010, pp. 106-
107). Many men do not want to change their patriarchal socially derived interests 
because they have internalised and essentialised those interests as their own, 
separating the personal from the political (White, 1996, p. 163). 
An important requirement for ethical change and gender justice, I suggest, is the 
discursive reconstitution of men’s social and personal identities so that their 
interests are non-patriarchal (Pease, 2002b, p. 172).   
Ethics are not at odds with self-interest; rather, it changes our sense of what 
constitutes our self-interest. Such a view enables us to move away from a 
repressive view of ethics as simply something that stops us from doing what 
we want toward a reconstitution of our self-interest as ethical beings. 
(Pease, 2002b, p. 174) 
I suggest an important place to begin work toward men’s self-interest becoming 
ethical is recognising privilege and attending to those who experience 
marginalisation in men’s familial relationships, beginning with women (Connell, 
2000, pp. 203-204). “It is men’s relationship with partners, daughters, mothers 
and sisters that will provide the basis upon which men will come to support 
change” (Pease, 2010, p. 107). In these familial relationships, we as men can 
begin to change inequality and privilege by a “generous love” (Jenkins, 2009, pp. 
24-25) to our partner as an expression of ethical heterosexual relationship. 
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Struggle with emotional engagement  
In this study an ethical heterosexual relationship is understood as situated in the 
possibilities of a safe, sacred place. I read Peter’s interview transcript to look for 
examples of where he has been invited by his partner to a relational space akin to 
a safe, sacred place. How Peter responds to this invitation assists in grasping how 
obligatory love has, or has not been practised with his partner. Where I regard 
Peter as resisting or struggling with this invitation I discern the discourses at 
work, “the corridor of voices” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 121), which capture him into 
resistance to practising obligatory love.  
In the following excerpt Peter alludes to relational space akin to a safe, sacred 
place: 
Women say they don’t know what their fellows [partners] are thinking. [The 
women partner might suggest] “I don’t know, you don’t tell me anything.” 
So the words that we [my partner and I] use to describe connecting, like 
connecting with each other, [are] more [appropriate] than just listening to 
me. But if we have a particularly busy couple of weeks, and we haven’t 
spent time together, she is a much better barometer of our togetherness than 
I am. I will eventually notice, but hardly ever before her. Now that fact in 
itself annoys her. 
Having read the bridging document of women discussing the repetitive pattern 
labelled, in patriarchal terms, as “nagging” Peter is reticent to name his partner’s 
response as nagging. He regards his forgetfulness as the initiator of this repetitive 
pattern.  The comments above are made in the context of this forgetfulness and 
“nagging” theme, and serve as a bridge to what Peter believes his partner wants 
from the relationship – connection with him, also named “togetherness”. Peter 
recognises the safe, sacred place possibilities, but also acknowledges his struggle 
with achieving such relationship practices. 
“Impotence” and discourses of biological determinism  
To further establish this recognition and struggle with the idea of a safe, sacred 
place in Peter’s story I move to further discussion that came just after his words 
above:  
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Where I think it relates to this nagging response for my partner . . . me not 
listening, nagging, [that] is her frustration . . . often comes to a head when . . 
. she feels I don’t make the effort to engage with her in an emotionally 
intimate way. . . . “It hasn’t changed you know. We have had this 
conversation before and nothing has changed”. My memories of those times 
[is] . . . the resolutions are that I open up more . . . there is a lot more 
connection. . . . Part of what frustrates me when my partner does have those 
moments, is that I know she’s right. . . . There is this sort of . . . an 
impotence in being able to sustain this kind of [emotional connection]. 
The plot in Peter’s story is made visible at this point. He recognises his partner’s 
call for emotional engagement, but he is unable to sustain that connection with her 
due to what he names “impotence” in reference to his emotional connection skills. 
The use of “impotence” by Peter is startling, particularly with its obvious 
connections to discourses of sexual virility and reproductive ability. In current 
mainstream patriarchal cultures not many men would openly disclose an 
experience of impotence. Yet, here is Peter using this word. The allusion between 
sexual connection and emotional connection is clear. Peter suggests he is 
emotionally and relationally impotent – unable to engage with his partner through 
reproducing longevity of emotional and relational connection, even after her 
invitation. The word impotence suggests that there is a force beyond Peter’s 
ability or knowledge to change. He alludes to biological forces at work, as with 
sexual impotence, which prevent him from connecting with his partner as she 
would prefer.  
To begin a wider deconstructive reading of Peter’s use of the word impotence I 
refer to Spivak’s (1974, p. lxxv) writing on metaphors and deconstruction: 
If a metaphor seems to suppress its implications, we shall catch at that 
metaphor. We shall follow its adventures through the text and see the text 
coming undone as a structure of concealment, revealing its self-
transgression, its undecidability. 
During Peter’s interview the metaphor “impotence” suppressed its implications. 
However, I now recognise at least three implications of the metaphor. First, there 
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is the implication that emotional and relational skills and practices are essentially 
and biologically determined. Second, Peter’s use of impotence alludes to failure to 
achieve the hyper-masculine sexual practices (Tiefer, 1997). However, Peter 
indicates impotence relates to his inability to be emotionally close to his partner 
and monitor levels of closeness in that relationship. Hence, thirdly, impotence 
equates to the non-achievement of hyper-femininity and its practices. I join these 
three implications together to “catch at that metaphor” of impotence. In Peter’s 
declaration of impotence (which the corridor of voices, winks, nods, and nudges 
us to think about sexual prowess and its absence), we have this intersection 
between sexual impotence and relational and emotional impotence. Impotence, 
from a hyper-masculine sexual context, is regarded as a failure of masculinity. 
The use of impotence, in regard to the hyper-feminine, concerns success at 
avoiding practices of femininity. However, in some kind of ironic subversion, the 
use of impotence by Peter is potently successful at hyper-masculinity in being 
impotent in practices of femininity through the use of discourses of biological 
determinism.   
Peter recognises his partner’s invitation to emotional engagement but his 
unrecognised struggle is not with his “abilities” to sustain that relational 
connection, it is with discourses that potently constitute Peter as impotent to 
sustain connection. I now turn to recognising the essentialist discourses of 
biological determinism in Peter’s words which, in turn, make way for further 
discussion of Peter’s ironic hyper-masculine success at impotence. I begin with 
further reference from Peter in regard to his partner’s desires for the relationship:  
She wants me to be more in tune with our relationship. . . . But what I think 
about that is, it’s the relationship as she perceives it, or that closeness as it . . 
. helps her feel loved. Because the way she feels loved and the way I feel 
loved primarily are not the same. . . [I am to look after] her needs. There is a 
responsibility for me to act in accordance with how she likes to receive, and 
you know, conversely her for me. You are familiar I guess, with the five 
love languages thing [Chapman, 1995]? 
Peter’s reference to Chapman (1995), and the idea that he and his partner’s 
relationship is about getting needs met, suggest a “corridor of voices” (Bakhtin, 
 168 
1986, p. 121) and a “theory [that] produces people” (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 620). 
Both Chapman’s book and the idea of needs-based relationship are rationalities 
that draw discursive power into Peter’s life and relationship, supporting 
essentialist ideas and a discourse of biological determinism. I suggest needs-based 
relationship ideas and associated discourses when practised effectively can 
contribute to relationship, but they can also limit and obscure relationship 
possibilities. Peter acknowledges the difference between his partner and himself, 
based in the ideas from Chapman’s book that people have different preferences 
for how they experience love. A man’s recognition that his partner might 
experience love in a different way to him, and the practice of expressing that love 
as she prefers, can contribute valuably to the relationship. The popularity of some 
self-help relationship books which emphasize difference as needs suggests these 
ideas make sense of what people struggle with in their relationships. Certainly, in 
Peter’s case, with his reference to Chapman (1995), it appears that this text makes 
sense of the difference between how he and his partner feel and express love.   
Davies (1998) argues that discourses can be utilised for purposes that are useful to 
us without that discourse defining our identity. A needs-based discourse, such as 
that Peter refers to, can possibly be utilised for obligatory love, but as Davies also 
suggests, discourses should be examined for “any unintended negative effects” (p. 
136). A needs-based discourse can constitute people as believing the need they 
identify as theirs must be met by their partner. This can lead to an approach that is 
contractual, where partners only meet needs if their own are met. Argument can 
occur as to whose position on needs is the truth (Bird, 2004, p. 253). Both 
partners’ identity can become so connected with the need that the need can 
become a totalising description of themselves (Sinclair & Monk, 2004; Talbot, 
2012, p. 69). Any of these unintended effects of a needs-based discourse can 
result in conflict that constitutes both individuals in the relationship and their 
relational subjectivity.  
While these problems are potential by-products of a needs-based discourse, one of 
the greatest dangers is when couples have access to it as the only discourse 
available for them to live their relationship by. When this occurs the needs-based 
discourse can quickly become dominated by a discourse of biological 
determinism. The determinism of needs-based discourse as the only discourse 
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available for Peter is noted when he returns to the impotence metaphor soon after 
the above discussion:  
My impotence in that area, it is a frustration . . . we talk about it and we both 
agree. . . . You can commit all your faculties to agreeing and in three or four 
months time the whole thing blows up again. I think fundamentally people 
remain the same, with the same ingrained traits. I think my partner and I 
will always have the same kind of struggle with the same kind of issues in 
our marriage. 
In regards to the dominance of biological determinism, for explaining the 
difference in male and female experience, Kimmel writes “a large number of 
people believe that the differences in male and female anatomy are decisive and 
provide the basis for the differences in men’s and women’s experiences” (2008, p. 
19). Once a needs-based discourse is connected to biological determinism, the 
couple are constituted by discourse as believing their needs, how they express and 
feel love for each other, is based in their pre-determined biological differences, 
thus limiting the relationship possibilities. Hence, while a needs-based approach 
to heterosexual relationship can provide explanations for difference, it can also 
limit the couple and produce “stuckness” for what is available. In Peter’s case, he 
takes up a position on his relationship and reproduces the idea of needs because he 
does not appear to have another discourse to step into in order to question the 
discourse he uses.  
The language Peter uses, “I think fundamentally people remain the same, with the 
same ingrained traits”, is a clear connection to a biologically deterministic and 
essentialist view of people where change is not possible. Not only does the needs-
based discourse, when connected to biological determinism, limit available 
options for a couple in heterosexual relationships, it excludes the possibility of 
transformation. Peter is resigned to discursive ideas that human beings have a pre-
determined essentialist nature, and hence, to himself remaining emotionally and 
relationally impotent. The coming together of “specific forms of knowledge”, 
people remain the same with the same ingrained traits, from deterministic 
discourses, and “how relations of power are put and held in place” (Davies et al., 
2002, p. 298) are evident in Peter’s conclusions about the “impotence” and the 
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relationship with his partner. While it appears Peter initially chose the word 
“impotence” to describe his relational practices, one can say the word chose Peter 
because of the presence and power of the essentialising and deterministic 
discourse reproduced in his life. These same discourses that Peter reproduces, 
giving him hyper-masculine success at impotency, also provide success for not 
recognising male privilege. If people “fundamentally . . . remain the same with the 
same ingrained traits” what better word is available than “impotence” when it 
comes to the “impossibility” of transformation?  
Assumptions of equality that make male privilege invisible 
A further rationality available to Peter is the assumption of equality between men 
and women, that keeps male privilege invisible. By utilising the work of Chapman 
(1995) to make sense of his relationship Peter is reproducing a liberal humanist 
discourse. Chapman’s idea of “five love languages” suggests people have an 
essentialised nature that is the “basis . . . for equality of opportunity and the right 
to self-determination” (Weedon, 1997, p. 77). Additional to this, Chapman does 
not address gender or power which insinuates that every individual is 
“ungendered” (Hare-Mustin, 1991, p. 65). While a love language perspective can 
be helpful for heterosexual couples in producing love and thoughtfulness and 
mitigating inequality, because gender and power are not addressed it is possible 
for “liberal discourses of equality to work against women’s interests” (Weedon, 
1997, p. 108). Hence, Weedon suggests, to find whose interests a discourse serves 
we look at that “discourse in operation, in a specific historical context” (p. 108).  
I return to Peter’s transcript referred to earlier to look for the “discourse in 
operation” with its rationality of assumed equality. In response to his own 
comment about his partner’s desire for him “to be more in tune with the 
relationship”, Peter, says “but what I think about that is, it’s the relationship as she 
perceives it, or that closeness as it . . . helps her feel loved”. This comes straight 
after an earlier comment from Peter that his partner wants connection and 
“togetherness” for their relationship. Informed by Chapman’s text and the liberal 
humanist discourse it reproduces Peter then begins to argue for his rights in the 
relationship based on an assumption of equality between partners:  
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The way she feels loved and the way I feel loved primarily are not the same. 
. . . There is a responsibility for me to act in accordance with how she likes 
to receive [love], and you know, conversely her for me. 
As Peter utilises Chapman’s text for making sense of his relationship he 
propounds a quid pro quo understanding of the relationship, where he and his 
partner give love in return for receiving love, according to each other’s rights, as 
their preferred love language determines. However, while such actions look equal 
they do not engage with privileged patriarchal male power as it maybe practised 
in the relationship. Toward the end of our conversation the topics of power and 
vulnerability come up, which lead to a disclosure of Peter’s privileged position:  
Going back to this idea of vulnerability in terms of it being about power . . . 
I haven’t really articulated it in this way, so it might be a bit convoluted. I 
don’t know that my impotence in that arena is about my wanting control. 
Maybe it is in an unspoken way. In my head I can readily agree with what 
my partner is saying to me, being upset with me not engaging with her in 
that way. I’m not unwilling to do it, and in fact engage with it on that level. . 
. . I don’t know, at my stage of life, you know, job, mortgage, own business, 
kids, you know, life’s busy. It’s an energy thing. You know, when your 
resources are down you close up because you got to protect things. 
Peter briefly moves into a reflexive position, where he reflects differently on his 
positioning, and he reflects on some effects of that positioning for his partner. 
This reflexive stance can happen when a discourse is intersected with another 
discourse, creating the opportunity to think differently, and hence bring about 
change in one’s actions. In Butler’s (1993, p. 10; 1995, p. 135) terms, agency is 
possible when reiteration of discursive norms is interrupted or redefined. Peter’s 
words, “I haven’t really articulated it in this way, so it might be a bit convoluted”, 
suggest entry into new thinking for Peter, which can be taken as an indication that 
discursive norms might be interrupted. Peter continues, “I don’t know that my 
impotence in that arena is about my wanting control. Maybe it is in an unspoken 
way”. The discursive norm of impotence concerning Peter’s relational skills with 
his partner is interrupted as Peter joins it with the ideas of vulnerability and 
power.  
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The possibility of the impotence being about Peter “wanting control” to avoid 
vulnerability with his partner lessens the production of power from the discourse 
of biological determinism. In doing so, the idea of impotence and its allusion to 
actions being determined without opportunities for personal agency are 
questioned. The intersection of biological deterministic discourses with discourses 
that explain Peter’s impotence actions in another way occurs with Peter briefly 
reflecting in more detail on the engagement with his partner.  
I suggest the intersection of different discourses has produced two small steps for 
possible change with Peter, and one major step, where he accesses another 
discourse that resists change. First, Peter begins to separate out what happens in 
his body when engaging with his partner about her desires for the relationship. He 
agrees with her, “in my head”, about her desires. Peter can think differently with 
his partner about their relationship, and he does engage with her at some “level”, 
thus suggesting that there are other levels where engagement could occur. 
Secondly, he acknowledges the effects of his actions for his partner with his 
reference to her “being upset” with him not engaging with her as she would like. 
This recognition of the effects of one’s behaviour for the Other can lead to change 
and “reaching towards the world of the other” (Jenkins, 2009, p. 118).  
However, these two small steps that could be catalysts for bigger steps to change 
are quickly annulled when Peter calls on a different discourse, with similarities in 
production, to a biological determinism discourse. Peter says, “I don’t know, at 
my stage of life, you know, job, mortgage, own business, kids, you know, life’s 
busy. It’s an energy thing”. I see two possible readings for understanding this new 
approach from Peter. Peter has got to another place where he feels impotent – the 
demands of his busy life apart from the relationship with his partner. Perhaps, the 
impotency at the relationship level is a repercussion of an impotency at the level 
of Peter’s busy and committed life outside the relationship with his partner. From 
Peter’s words, I suggest, discourses of a market ideology, or neoliberalism, 
capture Peter, render him impotent, time and energy-wise, to emotional 
engagement with his partner, and place him in a position of primarily being the 
economic provider for the family. Connell (2011) writes insightfully of the effects 
on family relationships of market forces, arguing that “economy and home are 
now interwoven in new ways” (p. 57). In referring to the general effect of this 
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market economy on people, Connell, states “these are not simple or easy changes, 
but often involve great tension in people’s lives as they face conflicting pressures 
and impossible demands” (p. 55). Peter’s words allude to this tension and pressure 
which contribute to producing his heterosexual relationship.  
A second reading of Peter’s words is that his new discursive repertoire of business 
and the demands of life is another hyper-masculine ploy to avoid the feminine of 
his partner’s preferred relationship expressions. Whatever way one interprets 
Peter’s words, it is his woman partner who is left with keeping alive the hope for a 
different relationship, and who retains the responsibility for the relationship’s 
survival.  
From my readings of Peter’s account of his heterosexual relationship it is obvious 
that male privilege is not totalised. Peter’s story is an example of how discourse 
can position a man as both privileged and non-privileged. This dual positioning 
can be the experience of many men, but so often it is the pain or non-privilege that 
is responded to at the expense of their privilege and its effects (see Johnson, 1997, 
pp. 174-180). For change to occur, the privileged position that men hold requires 
recognition and an ethical response.  
For example, with Peter’s situation, if he wanted agency to define his 
heterosexual relationship along the lines his partner desires, he could begin to 
enter into dialogue with her, not only about her hopes as he has already done, but 
he could begin to address with her the constraints he feels are placed upon him 
which limit those possibilities. Such a dialogical conversation could potentially 
discursively reconstitute Peter’s social and personal identities away from 
patriarchal interests toward a reconstitution of himself, in relation to his partner, 
as an ethical being (Pease, 2002b, pp. 172, 174). In this way, unrecognised male 
privilege as a player in the production of relational subjectivity can begin to be 
addressed.  
When Peter’s story of relationship is read along with the associated defining 
discourses, it can too easily be read as a story of disadvantage and loss of agency 
– a requirement to primarily live as economic provider for his family. Men may 
regard their disadvantage or loss as personal, without connecting it to the privilege 
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they have (Pease, 2010, p. 103) and the oppressive effect it has for women. When 
men unlearn their privilege as disadvantage and pain, they may see the specific 
oppressive effects of their privilege for their heterosexual partners. It is then 
possible to turn to their partners in dialogue, not for their partners to solve the 
problem, but that the conversation may continue and not be shut-down.   
This ethical stance fits with ideas of social justice and long-term benefits for all 
(Connell, 2011, p. 24; Pease, 2008, p. 12-13), and with Derrida’s (1993/1994, p. 
81) vision of “a democracy to come”. I argue for the ethical stance of recognising 
privilege as one possible aspect of obligatory love. I now turn to another 
suggestion for obligatory love, the ability of not-knowing.     
Obligatory love as the ability of not-knowing  
I take ideas on subordinating love to knowledge, generated by Davis (2002) in a 
post-colonial critique of the colonial mission with its benevolence toward the 
indigenous peoples of the world, and apply those ideas to gender in heterosexual 
relationships. Davis argues that what appears as love is driven by knowledge 
based in the benevolent assumption of what is best for the colonised people.  
Davis’s (2002) critique of benevolence as love is instructive, particularly with the 
connections between romantic love and “chivalry”, where patriarchal discourses 
lead the man to believe his love is saving his dependent partner (Millett, 2000, p. 
37-38). This fits with Spivak’s (1990, pp. 19-20) observation of “phallocentrism . 
. . a certain sort of understanding that the hero of this scenario, of this narrative, 
has been in fact western man”.  When “love” transmits benevolence, the subject 
can be regarded as the hero who has come to save, benevolently, the other in their 
marginalised and non-privileged position (Davis, 2002, p. 149). Or, as Kristeva 
(1987, p. 182) describes this practice, “violence of mystical dualism [is 
committed]. Its unifying kindness prepares the reign of the subject that has been 
unified by his own judgment, no longer affective but knowing”. Davis (2002, p. 
149) summarises this critique of love as benevolence which is founded in 
knowledge: 
Romanticized unity and its presumed benevolence always threaten violence 
in the context of unequal power relations. . . . [L]ove, as a feminist anti-
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imperialist strategy, must fall into its own alienated history – situated within 
systems of domination – in order to comprehend the impossibility of its 
epistemological basis.  
As I will show in the analysis of the research data that follows, Davis introduces 
the idea of love that has the ability of not knowing what the other wants, which 
can work within the context of unequal power relations. Love must work as an 
ethic that acknowledges the other as one who speaks for themself, and to whom 
love responds by listening. Understanding the other does not happen in totality at 
any one moment, either from any disclosure by the other, or by knowledge the 
subject has of the person (Davis, 2002, pp. 146-147). The practice of love and 
understanding for the other is an ongoing project. One aspect of obligatory love is 
the practise of an ongoing act of not-knowing – an ongoing curiosity to engage 
with the other and hear what they prefer in a relationship.  
The path that is right for everybody, and a curiosity to engage the 
Other  
A hint of the practise of benevolence – the male hero coming to save his partner 
with love informed by knowledge – is available from the transcript of Russell’s 
interview. Russell also provides an example of how to approach loving one’s 
partner in a non-colonising way. I enter Russell’s account where he expresses 
what he has learned for application to his second heterosexual relationship in 
contrast with his first:  
I have learnt more about my partner’s needs. . . . Upon reflection, that is 
probably because I have tried to find out more, and she has been willing to 
come forward with that information, whereas, in my first relationship it 
wasn’t something you did, so you just went on a path that you thought was 
right for everybody, and it turned out not to be the right path. . . . It is almost 
an auto pilot thing. 
This excerpt from Russell shows ethical movement from one relationship to 
another. The first sentence, “I have learnt more about my partner’s needs” 
indicates a learning posture by Russell toward the Other, his partner. He 
continues, “I have tried to find out more”. There is a curiosity to engage with his 
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second partner around what she wants from the relationship. Russell is expressing 
a not-knowing approach to his partner as the Other who can speak for herself. 
Russell treats his partner as a “concrete other” (see Benhabib, 1987, p. 86-87), 
that is, he regards her position as unique. In seeking out her voice on what she 
wants from the relationship Russell recognises the possibility of difference from 
that of his position on the relationship.   
The contrasting auto pilot metaphor that Russell applies to his practices with his 
first relationship is an insightful way to describe the determining effects of 
hegemonic patriarchal discourses that constitute men. Pease (2010, p. 95), 
following Derrida’s (1967/1974) use of phallocentrism to describe the privilege 
that is associated with the male phallus, says that this privilege operates at the 
discursive level and refers to the “assumed dominance of masculinity and male-
centredness across multiple sites of cultural and social relations”. The idea that 
“you just went on a path that you thought was right for everybody”, is an example 
of the “assumed dominance of masculinity and male-centredness”; in Davis’s 
(2002) terms, colonising knowledge that benevolently knows what the other 
needs. This approach fits within the category offered by Benhabib (1987, pp. 86-
87) as “the generalised other”, that understands the other from the position of the 
subject, with a particular emphasis on what might be held in common and 
assumptions of equality of rights and obligation.  
I continue with further learning from Russell, in regard to engaging curiously with 
one’s partner about their preferred relationship practices as love that comes from a 
position of not-knowing. Before Russell changed his approach to his second 
partner he took a reflexive stance:  
[I realised that] there is a pattern forming here and it is me. I’m not meeting 
her needs, so what is it? What is it about me that is actually causing this to 
happen? 
These reflexive questions can be the beginning of ethical movement. Russell is 
thinking about both his position in the relationship and the Other, in his partner, 
and her relationship preferences. Russell continues in this reflexive position: 
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Why is it? . . . I was actually saying “what is it that it means to be in a 
relationship where both parties are happy with the relationship, and not just 
assuming things?” Not just saying, “well okay, cos’ you have got this 
feeling of love for someone that that means that’s it!” That is your panacea 
and the relationship will work happily ever after. Obviously it did not work 
last time, so why was it going to work this time? 
In this reflexive stance there are at least three shifts that can lead to Russell taking 
a different position on the relationship. First, he recognises the importance of “not 
just assuming things”. This is movement away from taking “a path that you 
thought was right for everybody”. Second, as a result of “not just assuming” 
Russell recognises the Other, in his partner, in the relationship. He seeks answers 
to how “both parties [can be] happy with the relationship”. Third, Russell 
questions his own basis for relationship, in the “feeling of love for someone” that 
is supposed to be the “panacea” for relationship. The reflexive recognition of his 
own basis for relationship, and of his partner in the relationship, is a shift that 
begins the possibility of a different relationship for Russell and his partner. In the 
context of Lyotard’s and Therbaud’s (1979/1985, p. 100) game metaphor for 
justice, Russell is beginning to “invent new moves, perhaps new rules” for his part 
in the relationship. Russell reflexively asks questions that challenge the 
relationship he has with dominant discursive knowledge of heterosexual 
relationship and love. He then moves onto mentioning a source of different 
knowledge and its effects: 
Reading Gary Chapman’s book [1995] . . . that was revolutionary . . . to 
recognise differences. To actually recognise there are differences in people 
around me. Recognise that in my kids . . . and particularly in my partner. . . . 
Seeing what her primary love language [is], has just been the greatest thing 
ever. 
Différance and discourse 
I notice the different discursive practices in the interpretation and application of 
Chapman’s book. The practice of différance and the constituting power of 
discourse stand out here. Peter, captured by a dominant patriarchal discourse, I 
suggest, interpreted Chapman’s text according to Benhabib’s (1987, p. 86) 
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“standpoint of the generalized other”. The moral categories that fit the practice of 
relationship according to the generalised other, Benhabib (1987, p. 87) writes, 
“are those of right, obligation and entitlement”. In Peter’s interpretation of 
Chapman’s book, he is cognizant of his own rights to be loved in his heterosexual 
relationship. Russell highlights difference, the different ways people feel and 
express love. “Our differences in this case complement rather than exclude one 
another”, Benhabib (1987, p. 87) writes, in discussing the standpoint of the 
concrete other. Russell questions the whole idea of a generalised and universal 
knowledge that is “right for everybody”, and he questions the part he personally 
plays in that. In the steps of undoing his constitution by dominant patriarchal 
practices, Russell asks questions of himself and his discursive practices that 
perhaps begin to answer Butler’s question:  How do “we become available for 
transformation of who we are, a contestation that compels us to rethink 
ourselves?” (1995, p. 132). Russell’s questions, which challenge his previous 
discursive practices and knowledge, open the door to knowledge from a different 
discourse. Both Peter and Russell speak of love and both read the sign offered 
from Chapman’s book differently – différance and discourse at work. 
Knowledge’s invitation to know for the Other 
Russell now continues with the discussion of how he uses Chapman’s text: 
To actually understand what mine is [love language]. . . to actually help 
[emphasis added] my partner understand what hers is, and then to make a 
conscious decision that I actually want to love her that way so that she feels 
the most loved.  
The sincerity of Russell’s language is not under question. However, there is also 
benevolence present in the language. The knowledge Russell has gained has 
invited him to know, and the word “help” suggests benevolently knowing for his 
partner. The “hero” has stolen his way into the process with Russell’s new 
knowledge about love and relationship. From being in a not-knowing position 
when Russell was earlier asking his reflexive questions, he is now in a knowing 
position of what can save his relationship, and perhaps his partner with it. I 
suggest love dressed up as benevolent knowledge has crept into the relationship 
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with Russell’s desire to help his partner understand how she best experiences 
love.  
This love as benevolent knowledge can repeat the dangers of romantic love and so 
continue the control and limitation of what becomes possible in the relationship. If 
dialogue is not entered into there is a danger that Russell’s new knowledge can 
repeat the problem of going “on a path that you thought was right for everybody”. 
The “violence of mystical dualism” can easily occur because “unifying kindness 
prepares the reign of the subject” (Kristeva, 1987, p. 182). As Davis (2002, p. 
149) puts it, “romanticized unity and its presumed benevolence always threaten 
violence in the context of unequal power relations.” Even in Russell’s account of 
heterosexual relationship practices, where he shows reflexivity in critiquing and 
changing his original position on love and knowledge of his partner’s preferences, 
he still gets captured into the desire to use new knowledge benevolently to help 
his partner within the context of their relationship.  
Unless patriarchally constituted power relations produced in heterosexual 
relationships are recognised and addressed, they will continue to play a part in 
expressions of those relationships. One way of addressing patriarchal power 
relations, as an expression of obligatory love, is the suggestion of not-knowing 
and engaging in dialogue with a woman partner as concrete Other. In this way, 
she is positioned to express her desires and preferences for the relationship.    
Another suggestion for obligatory love, which can supplement the previous two 
suggestions, is love as space and interested distance. This practice can help 
prevent the “romanticized unity” and “threaten[ed] violence” (Davis, 2002, p. 
149) when the male heterosexual partner discovers new knowledge and is curious 
to engage with his partner. I now turn to theory for obligatory love as space and 
interested distance before applying it to material from the men’s interviews.   
Obligatory love as space and interested distance 
I have taken the idea of obligatory love as space and interested distance from 
Toye (2010, pp. 46, 48), who writes:  
 180 
The establishment of a certain kind of space which allows for words to 
emerge and for an ethical relation to take place creates the possibility of a 
relation that does not reduce the other to the self. Yet this process of 
distancing and spacing is a very particular one: of interested rather than 
disinterested distance. (p. 46). 
Love, therefore, I propose, is an ethical concept that names not only a 
particular qualitative relation between self and an Other, but a particular 
distance or spacing between them. (p. 48).  
In the application of love as space and interested distance to material from the 
men’s interviews, I utilise an interpretation of shame experienced by the male in a 
heterosexual relationship. The shame is an embodied sign that he is too close; he 
has overstepped the ethical space or distance between himself and his partner.  
I take up a number of perspectives on shame that I think are valuable for this 
study. One of those perspectives is that of Epstein from his work in Melanesia. He 
writes, “instead of starting from some theoretically-grounded definition of shame . 
. . [rather] start with the vernacular terms themselves and . . . trace out their 
meanings as [they emerge] in various social contexts” (1984, p. 46). The social 
context for my study is shame experienced by a male in the context of 
heterosexual relationship. This experience of shame I would name “privilege 
shame” – the shame experienced by a male as he has disconnected from his 
relational ethics (Jenkins, 2009, p. 68). This shame stands in contrast to what 
might be called “victim shame” which can be experienced by the abused as the 
result of abuse. Privilege shame and victim shame fit closely with Weingarten’s 
categories of “righteous shame and toxic shame” (2003, p. 169). Toxic shame is 
the self attacking shame that seems to bypass perpetrators of abuse and is taken in 
by the victim. Righteous shame, Weingarten (2003, p. 168) helpfully develops 
from the Greek word aidos (see “Aidos”, 2010; Schneider, 1977/1992, pp. 21-22), 
which is associated with integrity, personal honour or values, that are guided by a 
sense of shame. The shame studied in this section, I emphasise, is shame 
experienced by a man, and is interpreted by him as a guide for the expression of 
important personal values in the social context of heterosexual relationship.  
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A second guideline I take from Epstein’s (1984) approach is to begin with the 
vernacular terms for shame. From the interview with a man, I utilise his 
vernacular terms for shame, which contrast with the terms I use, and which open 
the way for shame as a guide to his reclaiming relational ethics (Jenkins, 2009, pp. 
67-68). This relational and value-based approach to shame fits with that of Probyn 
(2005) whose work guides much of the analysis in this section. Probyn writes, 
“Shame is an affect of proximity. . . . [I]t teaches us about our relations to others” 
(pp. 34-35).  
Another topic for theorising space and interested distance between heterosexual 
partners that briefly appears in the men’s interviews is that of silence. I interpret 
silence between heterosexual partners, when it is initiated by a woman partner, as 
a sign that space is needed for her. The silence is not an invitation to fill the space 
with knowledgeable talk, but rather it is an invitation to respond otherwise. There 
are two brief moments from the men’s interviews where this silence can be 
theorized and inform men’s practice in heterosexual relationships. 
Shame, indicative of interest in practising personal values   
Probyn (2005, p. ix) states that “shame is not usually thought of in a positive 
light”. It was with this thinking about shame that I introduced the topic of shame 
into the research conversation. However, the man I was interviewing, Andrew, 
responded in a positive manner about shame:  
I tend to feel shame more than embarrassment in those sorts of things. . . . 
When it is an area where I might have more pride in the fact that this is in an 
area where I normally work well . . . particularly [as] an encouraging and 
affirming person . . . then, if I snapped or said a passing comment that I 
haven’t thought through, that has been interpreted as a negative, that is 
when I feel the shame. . . . A comment that was actually not misunderstood, 
but should never have been said, or was said in a context that just does not 
work or fit. There is a real shame of the fact that you know I just, I wish that 
wasn’t me, that wasn’t part of who I was. 
Andrew connects interest and personal values with shame. He connects shame to 
his interest in the value of practicing as “an encouraging and affirming person”.  
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In her work on shame, Probyn utilizes the work of Tomkins, a seminal researcher 
of shame who developed the notion of shame as productive and intimately 
connected to interest. Shame, Tompkins (1995, p. 134) argues, “operates only 
after interest or enjoyment has been activated”. Shame associated with interest, 
Probyn writes, includes personal values:  
The things that make me ashamed have to do with a strong interest in being 
a good person. . . . What makes shame remarkable is that it reveals with 
precision our values, hopes, and aspirations, beyond the generalities of good 
manners and cultural norms.  (2005, p. x) 
The shame operates for Andrew after he has established personal ethics around 
how he is interested in behaving in his relationships. When Andrew’s actions in 
relationship cross the boundaries of his personal relational ethics he feels shame. 
Andrew makes a clear connection between his personal values regarding his 
desired actions – “encouraging and affirming” – and his sense of self or identity. 
In response to his actions not matching his values, Andrew says, “I wish that 
wasn’t me, that wasn’t part of who I was”. Probyn also regards shame as 
indicating when some important aspect of personal identity or sense of self is 
crossed, “Whatever it is that shames you will be something important to you, an 
essential part of yourself” (2005, p. x). Probyn’s and Andrew’s language fits with 
Spivak’s ideas of strategic essentialism. The idea of connecting shame to personal 
values and a valued sense of self is strategically essentialist, which can be helpful 
for re-establishing ethical practice.  
Shame, indicative of a breach of ethics in relationship with the 
Other  
Andrew continues to talk about shame in the relationship with his partner: 
I think the place where I feel shame the most in that sort of thing [with his 
partner] is when an issue has been raised, or a conflict. . . . And instead of 
accepting [what his partner has to say] . . . in the justification or the heat of 
things, actually throwing up things about my partner’s inadequacies, back at 
her, that is where I feel the most shame. It really is an abuse of power. 
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While clear connection can be made in this stanza to Andrew breaching his 
personal ethics of performing encouragement and affirmation toward others, in 
the context of heterosexual relationship there is another core ethic to note. The 
abuse of power in heterosexual relationships is the breaching of an egalitarian 
ethic that is central to ethical heterosexual relationships. Andrew has named abuse 
of power even though he does not overtly state that one of his personal ethics is to 
not abuse power. It is almost a tag line at the end of this story. But it is a tag line 
that recognizes the gravity of his abusive words to his partner. Shame has guided 
Andrew to recognise his serious breach of ethics.  
Shame also brings Andrew back to an ethic that is important to him in the context 
of his heterosexual relationship. In reflecting on his actions referred to in the 
above account, Andrew says, “I have acted out of self-preservation instead of 
another understanding. That is where I feel the most shame”.  Andrew had 
previously declared that he has a value of “love being other-person centred”. This 
is probably what Andrew is referring to with his words “another understanding”. 
The part shame plays here is significant in rerouting Andrew’s active breach of 
ethics back to recognition of a core relational ethic, “love as being other-person 
centred”. The importance of shame in this context cannot be ignored. As Probyn 
writes, “I want everyone to understand that shame is interesting and important: we 
cannot live without it, nor should we try” (2005, p. ix). In the context of 
heterosexual relationships it is important for men to hold the possibility of 
interpreting shame as indicating they have breached relational ethics, and shame is 
a call back to those relational ethics. 
Shame, indicative of epistemological violence in relationship space 
Shame can be used as an indicator that interested distance has been breached in 
the context of obligatory love within heterosexual relationships. In Andrew’s 
situation, it is the abuse of intimate knowledge that he has of his “partner’s 
inadequacies” that breach that space. In the previous discussion with Russell, 
interested distance was threatened by his enthusiasm to “help” his partner with 
knowledge of how she might feel more loved – something she may well already 
know from her own experience and knowledge. In both scenarios, knowledge and 
ignorance propagate getting too close, or abusing the partner with lack of respect 
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for their own voice and relational resources. I suggest shame can be a relational 
resource for men in regard to any form of knowledge abuse that violates the 
relational space between partners. 
Shame, a guide to learn and to reconciliation  
Shame, as a relational resource for knowledge abuse, is addressed by Probyn 
(2005, pp. 105-106) with her discussion on shame in the context of reconciliation 
between indigenous women and white women in Australia:   
Shame has the task of making . . . interest urgent. . . . Shame works at a 
bodily level to open and close connection: shame is a switching point 
rerouting the dynamics of knowing and ignorance. But unlike empathy, 
shame does not permit any automatic sharing of commonality; rather, it 
poses deep limits to communication. This marking of incommensurability 
may, however, produce localized action, reconciliation performed in local 
realities, bringing the past into the present. It certainly produces interest that 
overwhelms the possibility of remaining in ignorance.  
Shame helps Andrew recognise an “automatic sharing of commonality” with his 
partner, with the failure to practise his preferred relational ethic – “love as being 
other-person centred”. Hence, the shame has posed “deep limits to 
communication” with his partner. In talking of his response to the shame that 
comes from the breach of relational ethics Andrew says:  
I will hold on a bit more to shame [as opposed to guilt] . . . I have got to re-
establish my relationship back with the person. So, I have got to go and say, 
“Sorry”. 
And sometime after that, he says: 
There is times when shame will actually make me go quiet and so in some 
ways for me I wouldn’t say anything more because I will just make it worse. 
So there is times when it is not necessarily helpful [with] the facts that I 
should actually apologise quickly. I need that time and space. . . . It is not 
shutting down . . . it is actually internalizing it.  
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It seems for Andrew, that where there are not deep limits to communication 
during his breach of relational ethics, there are after the breach. The recognition of 
his breach of relational ethics, the incommensurability between himself and the 
other person, is used by Andrew, possibly for learning and reflection, as indicated 
with “I need that time and space. . . . [I]t is actually internalising it”. This position, 
where Andrew “hold[s] on a bit more to shame” is, I suggest, one of deliberately 
using shame as an informative tool in the reconciliation process with his partner.  
Andrew uses shame as a reflexive tool to guide and teach him about his breach of 
ethics and what is needed in the reconciliation process. Jenkins (2009, p. 68), 
writes that the experience of staying with the shame for a man who has used abuse 
“might foster accountability for his actions and an ethical reclamation with a sense 
of integrity”.  And, as Probyn (2005, p. 106) writes in regard to reconciliation 
events in Australia, “The reconciliation events produced shame that posed a 
challenge to learn, and not to know”. I suggest shame in Andrew’s story issues the 
same challenge, which Andrew appears to take up in regard to obligatory love as 
space and interested distance between him and his partner.  
With, or without shame, “a challenge to learn”, a learning posture, may be a 
concrete way to maintain space and interested distance by the male partner, in 
regard to a woman partner in a heterosexual relationship. 
Silence when the conversation ceases  
There are two other practices that come out of the men’s interviews which I think 
can be helpful in holding a learning posture and makes possible obligatory love as 
space and interested distance. One of the men, Chris, recognises when he is 
shutting-off his partner in conversation. He states that it is mainly his partner who 
alerts him to this, but also, “I am able to assess it myself because you notice the 
conversation has ceased”.  It is this noticing that the conversation has ceased that I 
want to theorise as silence. In Chris’s case, as a result of the shut-off, his partner 
ceases to participate in the conversation by remaining silent. The female partner in 
heterosexual relationships could also go silent for other reasons, such as those 
referred to previously – men delivering “saving knowledge”, or using knowledge 
to overtly abuse.  
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While the silence of women is often a response to oppression, and it is essential to 
recognise the oppressive aspect, I want to recognise something else that is “absent 
but implicit” (White, 2000, pp. 35-58; see Carey, Walther & Russell, 2009; 
Duvall & Béres, 2011, p. 99), which may also be present in the response of 
silence by women. In the same vein as White’s idea of “the absent but implicit” in 
therapy, in qualitative research Mazzei (2007, p. 2) theorises silence as the 
“absent presence”.  Silence is present in qualitative research but it is usually 
ignored, along with what that silence might be speaking. With the silence of 
women in heterosexual relationships, in the midst of oppression, I suggest there 
may be an “absent presence” in their silence, other than what might be interpreted 
as acquiescence to the oppressive acts.  
Silence can be regarded as one way for women in heterosexual relationship to 
speak up so that their voice might be heard. As Chris says, “I am able to assess it 
myself [the shut-off] because you notice the conversation has ceased.” Mazzei 
says “speaking without speaking is understood as a view of silence that places it 
not in opposition to speech, but that positions silent speech on a continuum with 
voiced speech” (2007, p. 40). Silence is a discursive move (Mazzei, 2007, p. 41) 
which can be regarded as resisting the positioning offered by the first speaker 
when the second speaker does not want to take up the position offered them.  
Clair (1998, p. 147) repeats a story of an indigenous widow in mourning, who 
kept for twenty four years the imposed two year mourning period of silence for 
women in her community. In commenting on this story, Clair (1998, p. 147) 
writes, “Her silence speaks to us; it speaks of oppression; it enunciates defiance; it 
articulates resistance. . . . [I]t evidences creativity; it demonstrates control; it 
languishes in frustration. . . . It is both a local story and the collective story of all 
women”. 
I include this brief story and the comments from Clair because it gives me, a man, 
a glimpse into the multi-subjective world of women when patriarchy and men 
dominate conversations and living space. Combined with Clair’s comments, I 
think the story poignantly articulates the power of silence to speak clearly into 
oppression. When silence is understood as giving voice to something it can 
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contribute to the speaking subject re-positioning to a learning posture in relation 
to the subject who is silent.  
When a woman in a heterosexual relationship goes silent – as the conversation 
ceases – the male partner can contribute obligatory love by learning what a female 
partner may be voicing in her silence. He can invite her into a speaking space to 
articulate her knowledge of the relationship. In the words of Mazzei (2007, p. 42), 
who utilises Dauenhauer’s (1980, p. 19) ideas, “attentiveness to the practice of 
keeping silent . . . might lead to a better understanding of the to-be-said and the 
ought-to-be-said, embedded in what-is-said dialogue”. 
The everyday discipline of listening and formulaic ways of 
response  
In his interview, Chris coined the phrase “everyday discipline of listening” as a 
preferred way for men to learn to consistently respond to their partners. This 
response is one important way men can respect and honour the alterity of their 
partners as a concrete Other. This “everyday discipline of listening”, Chris says, is 
in contrast to the “formulaic” ways men relate to their partners, where the female 
partner is regarded as an object of treatment who is expected to respond gratefully 
to romantic patriarchal knowledge and practices.   
These two contrasting practices appropriately sum-up this section on obligatory 
love. The “formulaic” response represents what obligatory love is intended to 
recognise and address in patriarchal heterosexual relationships: male privilege, 
assumptions of equality, oppressive unequal power relations, epistemological 
violence, breaches in respectful relational ethics, and controlling conversational 
practices. The “everyday discipline of listening” response reflects valued practices 
of obligatory love, such as entering into dialogue with a woman partner while 
being positioned in a respectfully curious learning posture. In moving to analysis 
that concerns becoming love in the men’s interviews, I begin where the analysis 
involving obligatory love has brought this discussion, dialogue between partners.   
Becoming love as dialogical conversation 
Becoming love, specifically for this study, involves conversations taking a 
dialogical form in contrast to those dominated by patriarchal power. Becoming 
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love, I propose, can be core to the production of a safe, sacred place. In 
developing conversational practices that fit with love in a safe, sacred place I use 
the work of Bakhtin (1984, 1986, 1990, 1993) on a dialogic approach to 
conversation. Becoming love, as a dialogic approach to conversation, is not only a 
respectful and negotiable approach to conversation with the other, it also 
recognises the constitutive nature of language in conversation. Hence, becoming 
love positions a male partner as not only recognising the constitutive nature of 
language, but also, through the conduct of dialogical conversations he and his 
partner will be in a process of becoming different. Emerson (1997, p. 221), a 
Bahktinian scholar, provides a metaphor for dialogical conversation that sits close 
to my ethical notion of becoming love; dialogical conversation is likened to 
“making art and creating love”. The constituent elements of this artistic and 
loving process, as dialogical conversation, are important to the analysis of the 
men’s interview material.   
One of the elements in this process is “Outsidedness” (Emerson, 1997, pp. 207-
264), or what Bakhtin (1990, p. 22) names “excess of seeing”. Outsidedness 
involves taking a step outside of a conversation to make sense of what the other in 
the conversation sees (White, 2009). This relates particularly to understanding 
language as historically and socially situated. In the practice of outsidedness, 
respect is given to the other by allowing room for the contribution of difference 
and multiplicity in dialogue (Sullivan, 2007, pp. 109-110; White, 2009). Intimacy, 
understood as shared or co-created meaning, and not as an individual or 
relationship quality (Weingarten, 1991), is an important partner with outsidedness 
in the artistic and loving dialogic process (White, 2009). 
Outsidedness and intimacy can be understood for this section’s analysis as men 
reflecting on the bridging document from a different social and discursive location 
to the women of the first focus group, with an endeavour to understand the 
women’s meaning, and to contribute meaning that does not impose new meaning. 
There is “mutual-meaning making” (Weingarten, 1991, p. 286), where value is 
contributed to each person in dialogue; a dialogue that can be regarded as both 
ethical and intimate (Sullivan, 2007, p. 111; White, 2009).  
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Another important component of the dialogic process is “answerability” 
(Emerson, 1997, p. 218; White, 2009). Answerability refers to the requirement to 
respond to the uncertainty of truth and meaning by not closing down 
conversations with responses that have fixed truth or meaning. Answerability 
protects from the possibility of either partner overriding the other with some form 
of dominating truth. A practice that is employed with answerability is the 
“loophole” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 233). The loophole is the tentative use of language 
that provides space for the other in the conversation to amend meaning according 
to their understanding.     
Finally, the dialogic process is only meaningful to those “who are related by some 
common conditions of life” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 166). Heterosexual relationship is 
one common condition of life that can allow for dialogical conversation. Another 
is the common conditions of this study. The common conditions of this study 
allow for the use of the dialogic elements – outsidedness, intimacy as mutual-
meaning making, answerability and the loophole – to serve as the analytical bases 
for becoming love, and for aspects of this analysis to continue into Chapter Nine.  
My approach to analysis for the dialogic process concerns the responses to the 
bridging document (Appendix D) of two of the men interviewed. Hence, it is not a 
pure dialogic process where both parties can continue in dialogue. But 
nonetheless, two of the men’s responses serve to illustrate the constituent 
elements of dialogical conversation, and make it possible for application to 
heterosexual relationships.  
Outsidedness, potential mutual-meaning making, the loophole   
As with all the men interviewed, at the beginning of the interview with Chris I 
asked him, “what stood out in the bridging document and caught your attention in 
surprising ways?” Chris’s response is to the topic in the bridging document 
related to conversations shaping relationship and identity: 
This is my answer to that question. I was unaware of the power of 
conversation in influencing individuals, especially in relation to behaviour, 
self-esteem, and identity, and how important that was. . . . I think a lot of it 
was to do with, the way the women were talking about how, I guess, how 
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they felt when they were being shut-down, when they were told they were 
nagging. . . . It was almost changing like their self-view, and then also their 
view of the relationship. . . . I don’t know whether it is a male thing, but I 
don’t generally consider conversation to be that powerful in terms of 
shaping.  
Outsidedness, intimacy, and the loophole, are the aspects of dialogism I see in 
Chris’s response to the bridging document. First, he accepts what the women of 
the first focus group have to offer in regard to conversation shaping identity. He 
believes what they have to say as genuinely being their experience. This equates 
to “outsidedness” (Emerson, 1997, pp.207-264), or “excess of seeing” (Bakhtin, 
1990, p. 22); Chris has been able “to make sense of the moment, based on what 
can be seen by another” (White, 2009, “Dialogism and the aesthetic act,” para. 2). 
A further helpful interpretation of outsidedness comes from Anderson (1997, p. 
138-144), who makes the point that an important part of her dialogical approach 
to doing therapy is to “trust and believe” the clients. This “trust and believe” 
approach appears to be that taken by Chris in his response to the bridging 
document.  
Secondly, while he accepts what the women say through the bridging document, 
Chris acknowledges his different position to the women: “I don’t know whether it 
is a male thing, but I don’t generally consider conversation to be that powerful in 
terms of shaping”. Chris, I suggest, is not denying the experience of the women in 
this statement, rather, he is stating his experience and knowledge, which come to 
him as a man from a different social and discursive location. Importantly, from a 
dialogical process, Chris is not subjugating the women’s position and experience 
to his. He states his position and social location as different to that of the women 
after he acknowledges and witnesses what the women have to say. In so doing, if 
the dialogue with the women of the first focus group were to continue, Chris has 
opened up the possibility of intimacy as mutual meaning-making. 
My final point in regard to Chris’s response to the bridging document is to how he 
has utilised words in leaving a “loophole” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 233) for meaning to 
be adjusted in the dialogue. Chris’s use of the term, “I guess”, half way through 
the above excerpt, might suggest some tentativeness in his response to the 
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bridging document that allows for an amendment to meaning from the first focus 
group, if that were possible. The tone of Chris’s whole response above is one of 
new learning from the women and the bridging document. This tentativeness and 
new learning suggest an openness to responses back to him, to further dialogue. 
White (2009, “A Bakhtinian approach to dialogue,” para. 1), says of Bakhtin’s 
approach to dialogue, “Bakhtin’s view of language extends beyond the written or 
spoken word alone to embrace . . . [that] which includes a consideration of tone, 
sound and body language as it is interpreted in dialogue.” I interpret Chris’s 
response to the bridging document as having a dialogical tone, and in so doing I 
suggest becoming love in action is illustrated.  
A metaphor as the practice of outsidedness   
I continue in discussion of the dialogical process as becoming love with a 
metaphor offered by William. This metaphor comes from William’s reflections on 
the bridging document topic conversations shaping relationship and identity. 
William briefly reflected on each of his committed heterosexual relationships in 
regard to how he may have shaped those relationships and his partners. He then 
introduces the metaphor of a sculpture to illustrate heterosexual partners shaping 
each other:  
It is almost like sculpture . . . we are sculpting each other in the 
conversations and day to day lives . . . you do little bits here and there. You 
get a little mallet out and you tap away. You don’t sort of get a hammer out 
and take great chunks because that is very damaging. . . . I would like to 
think that I am looking at my partner in twenty or thirty years, and thinking, 
she has developed in interesting ways, and I would like to think I have had a 
role in that. . . . I think you can express that a bit generally. Any time you 
are in contact with someone you are shaping that sandstone just a little tiny 
bit. It may not be much, but you just don’t know that you might be walking 
through with a chisel, and you might accidentally take a chunk out of 
someone without realizing it. 
Like Chris, but with some difference, I suggest in this excerpt William has utilised 
the dialogical practice of outsidedness. William shows acknowledgement and 
respect for the idea of conversation and relationship shaping identity by his 
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considered and sincere engagement with the idea through the use of the sculpting 
metaphor. While William’s use of this metaphor can be questioned in terms of 
possible power production, he is engaging with the women’s idea from his social 
location and discursive position as a man. William brings his unique perspective 
to the idea with a metaphorical form that provides him with meaning. While 
William is appropriating meaning for himself, he is not taking away from or 
subjugating the meaning the women originally intend, that conversation and 
relationship shape identity. William’s metaphor does not reflect “patriarchal 
discourses of life and identity” that favour individualism, but he stays with the 
“relational understandings of life” (White, 2007, p. 30) that the women presented 
– partner’s shaping each other. While William practises outsidedness through the 
use of the sculpting metaphor, that metaphor does require some critique. 
Care, uncertainty, and humble mutual practice  
It is a strange coincidence that William uses a sculpting metaphor from the artistic 
world to engage with the idea of conversation and relationship shaping identity, as 
Bakhtin (1993, p. 64) does, to shape and explain the dialogical process. William 
has helpfully emphasized the danger of misshaping and injuring people in 
conversation with his use of the sculpting metaphor. However, he also uses a 
violent metaphor with the use of tools for shaping, “you get a little mallet out and 
you tap away”, which is better than the “hammer” that “take[s] great chunks” out 
of people. The metaphor, even though amended, conjures up a painful and 
unwelcome process for dialogical conversations. This potentially painful process 
contrasts with Bakhtin’s (1993, p. 64) use of the sculpting metaphor to explain the 
dialogic process as “[love] linger[ing] intently over an object, to hold and sculpt 
every detail in it, however minute.” Anderson (1997, pp. 134-136) suggests 
Bakhtin’s explanation of the sculpting metaphor for dialogism reflects care, 
humility, and uncertainty in practice. 
The art form of sculpting is a helpful metaphor from William, clearly fitting with 
a Bakhtinian metaphor for dialogic processes. But William’s use of tools, the little 
mallet tapping away, may suggest a “mastery” approach to relationship (Shotter, 
2003, pp. 461-462), that stands in contrast to Anderson’s (1997) understanding of 
Bakhtin’s design for dialogue. In the same vein as Anderson, Shotter (2003, p. 
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462) suggests a “disorienting” approach to dialogical relationship. Disorientation 
can arise because of the presentation of unfamiliar knowledge and different 
practices for relationship and life. The disorientation is best responded to by 
staying in responsive dialogue with the other, and not resorting to the known and 
familiar of giving solutions or explanations from our knowledge repertoire 
(Shotter, 2003, pp. 461-463). The art form, or sculpture, maybe an appropriate 
metaphor for dialogue, but the process does not require mastery or 
foreknowledge. Dialogue is a process sculpted by a humble approach, and a 
deliberate practice of two people together, carefully, “making art and creating 
love” (Emerson, 1997, p. 221). 
Answerability to come     
With his application of the sculpting metaphor William has attempted to co-
construct meaning with the women of the first focus group. Whether William has 
engaged and contributed meaningfully for the women of the first focus group 
cannot be known. But, because of the “common conditions” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 
166) of “simultaneous but different [research] space” (Holquist, 2002, p. 21) 
William’s, and Chris’s, attempts at mutual-meaning making have opened the 
possibilities for further dialogue with the women of the second focus group. Both 
Chris’s contribution and William’s metaphor, situated within a dialogical process, 
are answerable to the women of the second focus group. The women from the 
second focus group do respond to William’s metaphor. This response is taken up 
and discussed in the next chapter.    
Double deconstruction and the democracy to come 
In this chapter I have invited men in heterosexual relationships to an ethical 
heterosexual relationship. This invitation serves as the second part of a double 
deconstruction begun in the previous chapter. This second part of the double 
deconstruction has intended to overturn the hierarchy of patriarchally dominated 
heterosexual relationship practices and to introduce a safe, sacred place as the new 
concept for heterosexual relationship. Utilising the idea of Derrida’s democracy to 
come with its priority given to the other, and poststructural ethics on responding 
to the other, I developed the practices of obligatory love and becoming love as 
ethical responses men can make to their partners in heterosexual relationships. 
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These two practices of love, when taken up by men, serve to re-position men in 
heterosexual relationships so that patriarchal practices might be minimised and an 
egalitarian heterosexual relationship made possible. 
Deleuze and the first and second focus groups 
Chapters Five through to this chapter have been written as a response to the data 
produced by the first focus group. This response has focussed on their relational 
subjectivities that are shaped by patriarchally controlled heterosexual relationship 
practices, and on their preference for heterosexual relationship to be expressed in 
an egalitarian and ethical manner, as indicated in the invitation to a safe, sacred 
place. In Chapter Six I made use of Delueze’s thought to give priority to the ideas 
and knowledges of the women involved in this study. In the following Chapter 
(Nine), this practice is continued with priority given to the thought and 
knowledges of the second focus group of women as they respond to the document 
from the men’s interviews (Appendix G) and the bridging document (Appendix 
D) from the first focus group. But first, I conclude here by acknowledging the 
priority of the first focus group by once again joining the ideas of Deleuze with 
theirs as an expression of hope that the women’s ideas and knowledges may 
continue to be effective.   
Based on the application of Spinoza’s provocative statement “we do not even 
know of what a body is capable” (Deleuze, 1968/1990, p. 226), Deleuze’s 
philosophy always looked to ask the question “how might we think about things 
in ways that would open up new regions for living” (May, 2005, p. 3)? I conclude 
with the same form of question regarding the first focus group and their idea of a 
safe, sacred place. Of what is a focus group of six women capable? What may 
they cause us to think about that would open up new regions for men and women 
to live ethically and lovingly in heterosexual relationship? 
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Chapter 9. Resistance stories 
 
I close off the data generation with a final contribution from the second focus 
group of women. Following the format of data generation and now in the thesis I 
hope to make a small contribution of accountability as suggested by Pease (1997, 
p. 147). I invited the second focus group women to respond to the bridging 
document generated by the first focus group (Appendix D) and the men’s 
interviews document (Appendix G). Between one and two weeks before the 
second focus group met I emailed or posted to the women these two documents 
and a further document (Appendix J) that briefly outlined the three stage process 
of data generation. Appendix J included outsider-witness questions to guide the 
group discussion. I introduced the discussion: “My hope is that you can speak of 
what interests you particularly, without a sense of particular expectation or 
evaluation”.  
My approach to analysis in this chapter is to take a double-listening (White, 2006) 
position that hears both dominant stories of patriarchal practice, and stories of 
resistance from the second focus group. Thus, the second focus group story can be 
read as “double-storied” (Denborough, 2006, p. 116).  
From their reading of the bridging document, and in solidarity with the women of 
the first focus group, the stories the second focus group women tell are of the 
effects of dominant patriarchal practice that shaped their identity, or subjectivity. 
On the other hand the women also tell stories of resisting patriarchal constitution 
or reclaiming a valued subjectivity. This same double-storying continues with the 
women’s response to the men’s interview document. The women respond to 
Andrew’s story – laughing with his partner about her scratching the car – as a 
story that stands outside of patriarchal practice. The women challenge the 
sculpture metaphor from William, offering instead, a dance metaphor that 
indicates agency and freedom, particularly for a woman partner. In the last section 
of the chapter I include a spectrum of strategies the women offer for achieving 
egalitarian heterosexual relationship. These strategies are taken from their 
concluding observations of the bridging document and the men’s interviews 
document.  
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Responses to the bridging document 
I tell three stories of resistance from each of the women. These stories express 
their resistance to, and/or reclamation of their identity, or subjectivity, in response 
to their partners’ patriarchal practices. These stories are told in response to the 
women’s reading of the bridging document.  
Migration of identity 
The difficult and painful transition people can experience in moving from the 
effects of an abusive relationship to a place of experiencing and reclaiming a 
preferred identity is given the metaphor of “migration” by White (1995, pp. 99-
104). The women of the second focus group each talk of this “migration” from 
patriarchal abuses to an identity, or subjectivity, that is free of abuse and 
reclaiming of practices for living that they value.    
In a response to her reading of the bridging document, Alice says: 
It has an impact. What one person does has an impact on the other. If you 
tried talking and you are not heard then you are left with no choice but to 
nag. . . . That is what I ask myself repeatedly through this [reading the 
bridging document]: “Who is this relationship for?” 
Alice’s question, “who is this relationship for?” acts as her guide for 
understanding the bridging document. Alice then continues her reflections on the 
bridging document. As a guide to understanding her own relational subjectivity 
Alice resonates with Hannah’s story (first focus group) of her partner not using 
her name in the constitution of her identity:   
Personally I have [lost my identity]. . . . It used to bug me that my partner 
would not use my name. . . . I think in some ways I have [lost my identity]. 
That is what I have only come to terms with in the last couple of days, 
because I still can’t leave. I’ve left [physically] but I haven’t left.  
Alice connects with Hannah’s experience of namelessness when her partner 
refused to use her name. This “namelessness” has constitutive power for their 
subjectivity. Alice continues to explain why she still experiences a loss of identity 
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after physically leaving her partner. She expresses the difficulty of emotionally 
leaving the relationship because her identity is still connected to the man.  
Alice continues with further exploration of her experience of identity in the 
context of this relationship:  
To honour myself as a person, to take myself out of the situation, which was 
basically neglect. . . . [He was neglecting] me, the relationship, the needs of 
the family, material needs, like money, house. . . . It was not knowing my 
identity. I think the depression came about from the neglect, and that 
nothing changed. . . .That feeds into a depression cycle. . . . I would put my 
needs on the table but they weren’t heard. In fact the opposite would 
happen. That is where the neglect comes in. . . . [I tried] to change my 
mindset, and in the end if that does not make a difference then I honour 
myself by taking myself out [of the relationship]. . . . It’s been a process 
though. It was nine months ago, physically nine months ago, but 
emotionally [I’m] still doing it. . . . Cutting it off [the relationship] because 
in the end, it’s the relationship that we have that is good for my partner, but 
it still is not what I want. . . . That is my original question like, who is the 
relationship serving? Who does it work for? Does it work for both of them 
[both partners], or just one? . . . It worked well for him [Alice’s partner]. 
Alice ties her experience of her relationship to her question “who is this 
relationship for?” In standing in solidarity with the first focus group, the answer to 
the question makes visible patriarchal male privilege in Alice’s heterosexual 
relationship. Alice “speaks herself into existence” (Davies, 1990-1999, p. 25) as a 
woman who both experiences the effects of patriarchal practices and enacts 
resistance to those practices. Alice’s practice of resistance is to physically leave 
the relationship, and to do so in honour of her identity: “I honour myself by taking 
myself out”. Then, Alice talks of the difficult process of emotionally leaving the 
relationship after physically leaving her partner nine months previously. In 
commenting on the migration of identity process, White (1995, p. 100), says “in 
this space, as in any migratory process, women characteristically go through a 
range of experiences, many of them difficult . . . confusion and disorientation 
reigns”. While Alice does not name the emotions she experiences, she indicates 
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the difficult struggle of leaving the emotional attachment to the relationship. The 
migratory process is difficult for Alice – feelings of “confusion and 
disorientation” may or may not be part of it. Nonetheless, Alice’s story indicates 
that while physically resisting patriarchy may take courageous steps, the 
migratory process of emotional resistance, recovering a preferred relational 
subjectivity, takes many more difficult steps – some of which may bring 
confusion and disorientation.       
Sandra’s story of resistance joins with Alice’s story, as the bridging document  
and the women’s discussion in the second focus group opened up a “reflecting 
surface” (White, 2011, p. 119) that provided opportunity to remember and reflect 
on personal stories of resistance to patriarchal abuse. Sandra gives a personal 
account that resonates with the bridging document story of Hannah’s identity 
being constituted by patriarchal relationship practices:      
I was thinking also about identity. It wouldn’t be such an extreme [as 
Hannah’s], but it is really this thing about, my partner told me sometimes, 
I’m controlling and I’m not tolerant. . . . I was completely stunned, because 
I was thinking that is absolutely not correct. That is not true! But, on the 
other side [I] was asking [myself], “am I really doing this?” [I was] asking 
myself a question, “am I doing this?”. . . . Men are more in [a] position [of] 
never asking the question. If they are doing something, it is always “you are 
the one [who is doing something wrong]!”. . . . A lot of time in [my] 
relationships, it’s more that they are blaming me for something I am not 
doing. But they are not asking themselves what is their [part in it]. . . . It is 
really interesting because I am going through this process now with my 
partner, ex partner. To look at our relationship and what went wrong . . . [I] 
ask him now, “did you really think that I was controlling and intolerant?” 
Now he says, “no, you are not”. This is something, my god, and I was 
sitting there all the time wondering what else can I do? How much more 
tolerant do I have to be? I was really tolerant in most of those cases.  
Sandras partner’s oppressive accusations and the exercise of power invited Sandra 
to practise self-surveillance in response to those accusations. In articulating the 
therapeutic importance of recognising resistance when working with people who 
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have experienced abuse, Wade (1997, p. 23), writes “alongside each history of 
violence and oppression there runs a parallel history of prudent, creative, and 
determined resistance”. Parallel with Sandra’s story of accusations and self-
surveillance is a story of resistance. Sandra expresses opposition to her partner’s 
accusations with her statement, “I was thinking that is absolutely not correct. That 
is not true!” She cites the unfairness of the accusations where the men in her life, 
in “blaming me for something I am not doing . . . are not asking themselves what 
is their [part in it]”. These statements reflect a “parallel history” of resistance with 
the history of patriarchal attempts at constituting Sandra’s subjectivity. The 
resistance continues to the present time for Sandra, when she confronts her ex-
partner and asks him “did you really think that I was controlling and intolerant?” 
This is a question that puts into action the resistance Sandra had positioned herself 
in throughout the relationship. The question positions her partner as accountable 
to Sandra for his accusations. In concluding with the self-witnessing statement – 
“I was really tolerant in most of those cases” – Sandra reclaims a subjectivity that 
is no longer abused by accusation that is made from a privileged position.     
Deidre, the third woman in the second women’s focus group, also tells a story of 
resistance to patriarchal abuse in her heterosexual relationship. Her story is in 
solidarity with the first focus group and connects with the topic in the bridging 
document, conversation and relationship shaping identity.  
Straight after Alice had completed her story, Deidre talked of her experience of 
her partner centring his ideas:  
I was in a relationship where he wasn’t neglectful but he knew what he 
wanted and he thought that I should want the same. And that if I did not 
want what he wanted there was something wrong with me. . . . I think I 
doubted myself. I thought, what is wrong with me? Why don’t I want to 
spend time with him? I musn’t love him, but I knew I loved him. I just did 
not want what he wanted. I could not make him want what I wanted. I could 
only put on the table, “this is the kind of relationship that I want”. He would 
go, “O, yeah, yeah, that is what I want too”. But that wasn’t how he would 
act or behave. So, in the end I said we just want different things. “No, no we 
don’t”, he would say. He didn’t want to hear it because it was too scary for 
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him to hear it. Sometimes that might be perhaps why guys don’t listen, or 
they shut down. They don’t want to hear what their wife or partner has to 
say. Maybe it challenges something for them. 
I hear in Deidre’s words, Levinas’ “reduction of the other to the same” 
(1961/1969, p. 43). When there are unequal power relations an attempt to reduce 
the Other to the same can result in abuse. In the context of inappropriate 
expressions of love, Davis (2002, p. 149), writes “romanticized unity and its 
presumed benevolence always threaten violence in the context of unequal power 
relations”.  Deidre says “I doubted myself”, in regard to her partner’s thinking that 
she “should want the same” as him for the relationship. Deidre’s resistance to this 
“reduction of the other to the same” (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 43) is noticed in her 
not wanting to spend time with her partner, and in her putting “on the table . . . the 
kind of relationship that I want”.  Deidre’s resistance, not only takes these two 
forms but, I suggest, it is also in how she presents the kind of relationship she 
wants. The use of the term, “put on the table”, is colloquial for a mediatory and 
dialogical approach to a conversation, where the other party in the dialogue can 
then respond by placing their response back “on the table” as part of the 
negotiating process.  
Deidre’s approach to dialogue, as she reports it, in Bakhtinian terms, is not 
monologic, but rather, a dialogical approach. A monologic approach may be 
indicative of that taken by Deidre’s partner: “This performs a kind of discursive 
‘death’ of the other, who, [is] unheard and unrecognised” (Robinson, 2011, July 
19, Polyphony and Dialogism, para. 6). Deidre, in resistance to this possible 
monologic approach, puts her preference “on the table” as an invitation to 
dialogue and negotiation with her partner: “In a fully dialogical world-view, the 
structure of the text should itself be subordinate to the right of all characters to be 
treated as subjects rather than objects” (Robinson, 2011, July 19, Polyphony and 
Dialogism, para. 15). I suggest, in resistance to potential monologic control of the 
relationship, Deidre is dialogically offering an opportunity for her partner to relate 
to her as a subject with her own preferences for the relationship. If this 
opportunity were taken up, Deidre and her partner, and not patriarchy, would 
define the “structure of the text” of their heterosexual relationship. However, her 
partner does not take up Deidre’s invitation. At the end of the excerpt, Deidre 
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expresses continued resistance to patriarchal productions of power by making 
meaning of the problem of the relationship in ways that are separate from her 
identity – “it was too scary for him to hear it. . . . [T]hat might be perhaps why 
guys don’t listen, or they shut down. They don’t want to hear what their wife or 
partner has to say”.    
The three women in the second focus group, Alice, Sandra, and Deidre, tell 
personal relationship stories of patriarchal privilege and abuse that define their 
subjectivities in painful and subjugating ways. In parallel with these stories, they 
tell stories of resistance that indicate a journey to preferred subjectivities with, or 
without, their partner’s participation.        
Responses to the men’s interviews document 
The second focus group women’s resistance to patriarchal productions of power 
continues with their selection of one story that they liked from the men’s 
interviews (Appendix G) and one that they did not like. The first selection is 
Andrew’s story of his response to his partner scratching their car. The second 
selection is the sculpting metaphor for relationship offered by William. In 
choosing these two stories the women were responding to a question I asked, 
“What stands out for you as you reflect on the men’s interviews document?” 
A story of preferred relationship practice 
Deidre introduces her preference for Andrew’s story: 
What stood out for me in the document, probably because it relates to some 
of my past, and some of the things I dealt with, was the bit about Andrew. 
How he said his wife scratched the car, and she was terrified in telling him 
about it. However when she did, that jumped out at me. . . . They laughed 
about it together. . . . Being able to be yourself. 
Alice responds to Deidre’s comments: 
Yeah, I liked that too. I just think that shows the potential if that connecting 
is working well, and she has got this history of being terrified. . . . What 
would have happened if he had’ve reacted [to her with judgement]? 
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Both Deidre and Alice are clear in their preference for this story and their reasons 
for this preference. Deidre ends her caption by stating “[b]eing able to be 
yourself”. This story supports Deidre’s preferred identity claim that she has a right 
to express herself as a unique human being in a heterosexual relationship: In the 
terms of my analysis above, in a heterosexual relationship “all characters [have 
the right] to be treated as subjects rather than objects” (Robinson, 2011, July 19, 
Polyphony and Dialogism, para. 15). Deidre recognises, in Andrew’s story, an 
opportunity for a woman in a heterosexual relationship to be free of abuse, to 
experience laughter, instead of experiencing her subjectivity being shaped by 
control and abuse. The practice of a man not blaming a mistake or accident on his 
woman partner and, contrary to patriarchal practice, responding to her with 
humour as an equal, is a preferred practice for heterosexual relationships 
recognised by Deidre.   
Alice’s question in response to Andrew’s practice – “what would have happened 
if he had’ve reacted?” – recognises the potential for patriarchally abusive 
responses to a woman in a heterosexual relationship. Because of male privilege 
that comes with the production of patriarchal power the man’s responses matter 
when it comes to the female partner’s experience of self and preferred 
subjectivities. Alice’s question indicates that a man can respond either critically or 
with affirmation to his partner, and his response has powerful constitutive effects. 
Two examples of those contrasting responses and effects are Deidre’s and Alice’s 
reported experiences of abuse in their heterosexual relationships, and Andrew’s 
account where Deidre acknowledges the laughter, and recognises the sense of 
agency for a preferred identity. Without naming it, Alice’s question invites the 
idea that patriarchally produced male privilege can define a heterosexual 
relationship and the subjectivity of a woman partner. The question acknowledges 
that a man can relate to his partner in ways that may include abuse or affirmation. 
Hence, Alice and Deidre choose Andrew’s practice of responding to his partner as 
he did, in resistance to the patriarchal alternatives of abusive belittlement or 
reprimand that treat a woman partner as an object.  
While Alice’s question invites the possibility of understanding that because of 
male privilege a man can choose how to respond, this knowledge of privileged 
choice is invisible in Alice’s and Deidre’s responses to Andrews story.  This 
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invisible privilege Andrew has to define the terms of the relationship is indicative 
of invisible male privilege. Alice and Deidre express resistance to patriarchal 
abuse through their choice of Andrew’s story as naming a preferred relationship 
practice. In cooperation with Alice’s and Deidre’s resistance, the invisibility of 
patriarchally produced male privilege is good reason for men to join women in 
resisting and confronting that privilege and oppression (Mullaly, 2010, p. 293).       
A story of resistance to violence and abuse 
As indicated in the previous chapter, an important component in dialogical 
conversation is “answerability” (Emerson, 1997, p. 218; White, 2009) of which 
the “loophole” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 233) is a strategic component. Answerability 
concerns the approach in dialogical conversation of being tentative with truth and 
meaning. This approach makes space for the other person to respond with their 
understanding. In the previous chapter I indicated that this answerability process 
may occur with a second focus group response to two of the contributions from 
the men’s interviews: Chris’s thoughts on everyday listening and William’s 
sculpture metaphor for heterosexual relationship as shaping subjectivity. The 
second focus group participate in this answerability process with a response to 
William’s sculpture metaphor. Alice questions the metaphor:  
I found myself reacting to the metaphor of sculpting and the mallet. . . . I 
have put, “there is too much power”. . . . It sort of goes against autonomy. . . 
. The mallet holder [has too much power] even though they are saying they 
both have got a mallet. . . . I am reacting to that. . . . It is almost more 
enmeshing, rather than keeping separateness. . . . You know, just being with 
people is going to affect us. But yeah, I don’t know, maybe it is just a 
violent metaphor because it involves a mallet and blows. Maybe it is just 
something about the violence.  
Alice introduces the idea of the mallet working on a sculpture as being a violent 
metaphor for how people shape each other in conversation and relationship. My 
critique of this metaphor in the previous chapter, which is sequentially predated 
by Alice’s critique, takes the same position as Alice’s critique. I noted that 
Bakhtin (1993, p. 64), in referring to art as a metaphor for the dialogical process, 
emphasizes the care and attention that goes into that process. This care and 
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attention perspective seems to be the different meaning Alice is taking as she 
responds dialogically to William’s sculpting metaphor. Like other rhetorical 
devices, “metaphor allows different listeners to hear the same passage of speech 
in radically different ways” (Adams, Towns, & Gavey, 1995, p. 396). Alice, in 
reading William’s metaphor differently is not discounting his idea. Rather, Alice 
is stating an alternative meaning for the metaphor. This alternate meaning makes 
possible recognition of the metaphor’s limitations, and begins a process of 
looking for another metaphor that allows for understandings of heterosexual 
relationship that fit with Alice’s preferences. This dialogical process, where 
meaning can be recognised and altered, is important to heterosexual relationships. 
Deliberately or inadvertently, the male partner can introduce rhetorical devices 
into the conversation that support patriarchal discourses of male entitlement and 
privilege (Adams et al., 1995).  
Alice continues, as she works on understanding her reaction to the sculpting 
metaphor and the search for a more appropriate one:   
Maybe that mallet is like believing what somebody else says [about me]. So 
that is the way I am taking it. . . . It is like giving the other person power. . . 
. To have autonomy [is a personal goal], that I say what I want and who I 
am. I haven’t had it [autonomy]. I have had somebody else, in my childhood 
experience particularly, saying this is how you are going to be. . . . It is quite 
a violent metaphor. . . . Rather than being a beauty . . . like a dance. . . . In 
that [a dance metaphor], each has still the autonomy to say “I don’t want to 
dance anymore”, and actually sit down. 
Alice states her reasons for disliking the sculpting and mallet metaphor, and 
alludes to heterosexual relationship “being a beauty . . . like a dance”. By 
introducing the dance metaphor into the conversation Alice expresses resistance to 
ideas and practices from the sculpting metaphor that represent too much of her 
history of abuse. The sculpture metaphor suggests the person with the mallet 
produces power that limits the possibilities for agentic movement by the person 
being shaped. This limiting of agency is connected to the constitution of Alice’s 
subjectivity with her words, “what somebody else says. . . . [T]his is how you are 
going to be”. In positioning theory terms, Alice recognises subject positions, and 
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the importance of accepting or refusing them when it comes to power and the 
constitution of subjectivities. As an acceptable metaphor for heterosexual 
relationship, the dance metaphor offers more space for personal agency in 
refusing or accepting subject positions. The dance metaphor invites equality, 
while the sculpture metaphor can be understood as one partner shaping another. 
Thus, with the dance metaphor for heterosexual relationship, one has room to say 
“what I want and who I am” – the exercising of agency in naming one’s preferred 
identity. The dance metaphor appears to fit much more with Emerson’s idea of 
dialogical conversations as two people together “making art and creating love” 
(1997, p. 221).   
Alice’s response to, and recognition of unequal power relations and violence in 
the metaphor offered by William, serves to illustrate the importance of the 
“answerability” (Emerson, 1997, p. 218; White, 2009) space provided in 
dialogical conversations. With this space in operation, those who do not have the 
same privilege as their conversational partner have the opportunity to be heard, 
and the adjustment of meaning can occur for the production of preferred relational 
subjectivities. The second focus group response to William’s sculpture metaphor 
not only serves as an example of the importance of dialogical conversations, but 
also, as an act of resistance to a metaphor that can be interpreted as validating 
patriarchal abuse.   
A spectrum of strategies  
Both the first focus group and the second focus group women offered resistance 
strategies to challenge the patriarchal constitution of heterosexual relationship in 
their partner’s practices. I have selected three resistance strategies offered by the 
second focus group that I think a man can take up in joining a woman partner in 
resisting the patriarchal constitution of heterosexual relationship.  
Discursive empathy 
The first of these strategies comes from Deidre. Deidre’s comments come in the 
context of a conversation about the research method of individually interviewing 
men in preference to using a focus group for them. Deidre’s comment is generic, 
related to any form of relationship:  
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Sounds like it is harder for the guys . . . this whole relating stuff. . . . 
[Relating] doesn’t come as naturally to them. Like, I can sit here and talk 
until the cows come home about this stuff. 
From her social location as a woman, Deidre’s empathic understanding of the 
struggle many men have with conversations in relationship raises the idea of 
“discursive empathy” (Sinclair & Monk, 2004, p. 342; 2005). Discursive empathy 
acknowledges the struggle and pain people experience, but it extends this 
acknowledgement beyond the individual by locating the struggle or problem in 
socio-cultural and political contexts (Sinclair & Monk, 2005). As White (1997, p. 
223) suggests, “We can explore the ways in which identity, subjectivity, and 
relationship are all products of cultural knowledges and practices”. In the context 
of therapy, Sinclair and Monk say that “discursive empathy points to developing 
an awareness of the discourses and positioning of ourselves and of our clients” 
(2004, p. 343). Discursive empathy acknowledges the different locations of 
different people “amongst a sea of discourses” (p. 343). This discursive empathy 
is what Deidre’s words can be interpreted as providing, in acknowledging the 
difference between her and many men in being able to relate, or talk helpfully 
about a relationship.  
Each of the five men interviewed, in varying ways, struggled with relating to their 
heterosexual partners in an egalitarian manner through conversation. One of my 
personal struggles in writing about the men interviewed has been to acknowledge 
male privilege and the oppression or restriction this has caused their partners, 
knowing that many men do not see that they are privileged. Individual men feel 
the struggle, vulnerability, and anxiety about their heterosexual relationships and 
the idea of male privilege seems foreign and unfair to them (Brooks, 2003, pp. 
166-167; Parker, 2003, p. 228; Rampage, 2003, p. 203). But, as Pease (2010, p. 
103) writes, “Men can be both privileged and miserable at the same time”. It is 
important to acknowledge the struggle that many men experience in many aspects 
of life, and also, in this study, in regard to heterosexual relationship conversations, 
without diminishing the knowledge that being male has generally privileged men 
in relation to women. An emphasis on the individual unhappiness and lack of 
fulfilment in men’s lives can be used to deny the existence of privilege, and can 
act as “significant obstacles to the struggle for equality” (Pease, 2007, p. 503). An 
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acknowledgement of struggle for men without an awareness and 
acknowledgement of their privilege changes nothing of the oppression and 
inequality that the privilege has maintained.  
In response to literature on men and masculinities where men, the fissures 
between men, and the pain men experience are the focus, Macleod (2007), states 
that this focus “never undoes the masculinity/femininity binary . . . [and] women 
once again become invisible” (pp. 9-10); thus male privilege in relation to women 
is not addressed. The focus in addressing both men’s pain and the privilege men 
participate in must occur together, with patriarchy and power treated as the 
dominant signifiers (MacLeod, 2007; McLean, 1996, p. 24; Pease, 2002a, p. 47). 
Taking this discursive approach to men’s pain, struggle with egalitarian 
relationship practices, and privilege, is an act of discursive empathy. The cultural 
and discursive positions that men take up in patriarchal discourses is where the 
problem of pain and privilege is produced. Taking a discursive empathy approach 
is a strategy that can provide men with agency as they work to re-position 
themselves culturally and discursively (Sinclair & Monk, 2005, pp. 344-346) for 
egalitarian relationship practices.   
I’m the toilet cleaner: How egalitarian are these egalitarian 
relationships? 
During general discussion about this study, male privilege and equality in 
heterosexual relationships entered into the second focus group conversations. 
From this context, Alice offers a story from her own experience of the practice of 
male privilege and inequality: 
I have written a question here . . . we are talking about . . . egalitarian and 
non-egalitarian relationships. And I have got this question, “who cleans the 
toilet?” It’s expectations isn’t it, I think. . . . The reason is, the experience 
was, even after I have separated . . . my partner was getting ready doing a 
whole lot of cooking for a family occasion. So I went over there, [to his 
residence] and said to him “how could I help?” And he said “clean the 
toilet”. 
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In commenting on this request for her to clean the toilet, Alice states what she 
experiences as her position or role in the family, “I’m the toilet cleaner”. 
Immediately, Alice follows this with the question, “How egalitarian are these 
egalitarian relationships?” With this question, Alice brings into focus the purpose 
of this study – addressing inequitable heterosexual relationship practices. I read 
Alice’s commentary and question as indicative of unrecognised male privilege in 
practice. Instead of, perhaps, asking Alice what she might like to do, or offering 
her the opportunity to work alongside him in the kitchen in preparing for the 
family occasion, her partner assigns Alice the task of cleaning the toilet. “Who 
cleans the toilet?” is a question that invites the exploration of how inequity can 
occur and be addressed in the household chores of heterosexual couples.  
The question, “who cleans the toilet?”, reflects something of the work of the 
feminist consciousness raising groups in the 1970s where “women’s roles and 
experiences” were examined (Enns, 1993, p. 6), particularly the disproportionate 
amount of household labour they worked at (Ehrenreich, 2000). One important 
point about this household labour was not so much that it was demeaning, but that 
it resulted in an inequitable relationship, with the woman partner constantly being 
the one to clean-up after her male partner (Ehrenreich, 2000). As then, when 
women were beginning to address these inequities in households, so now, where 
the female partner carries out household labour that cleans-up after her male 
partner, it is regarded as a production of power (Parker, 2003, p. 226). This 
production of power is “doing gender” (West & Zimmerman, 1987) where 
women are constituted as inferior to men or “designed” to privilege men. While 
questions regarding who cleans the toilet and the like in regard to household 
chores are not new, they remain critical to understanding gender relations and 
power, and hence, equality in heterosexual relationships.    
The question, “who cleans the toilet?”, also takes me back to Chapter Five with 
Sue. The toilet was the only room Sue could go to for solace and to have space to 
work out how to respond to her partner and develop a strategy to get him involved 
in the family. The toilet is where Alice is told to go to, to clean, by her separated 
partner after volunteering help in preparing for a family occasion. In each case, 
the woman partners are positioned to end up in the toilet because of discrepancies 
in the production of power. I suggest that these two stories are symbolic of the 
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inequality between men and women in heterosexual relationship, and the 
inappropriate exercise of power afforded by male privilege through patriarchy. 
The question, “who cleans the toilet?”, is specifically symbolic for this study in 
that it invites both heterosexual partners to answer any question to do with the 
tasks and roles each attends to in their household. Answers to this question, and 
others like it, can make the way possible for asking why a particular person is the 
one to do certain tasks. These “why” questions can open conversations on the 
topic, and begin the process of exposing assumptions, or to use Alice’s words, the 
“expectations” that the woman partner will be “the toilet cleaner”.  
This study emphasizes the centrality of conversation to produce egalitarian 
heterosexual relationships. Alice’s question is a symbolic, and practical, reminder 
of the conversational requirement for ethical heterosexual relationships. 
Heterosexual relationship conversations that are “ongoing” (Cultrane, 1989) and 
“open” (Benjamin, 2003) are integral to the continual negotiation of meaning and 
practices within the relationship. Alice’s question, “who cleans the toilet?” can 
then be reframed as, “how have you both arrived at a place of deciding who cleans 
the toilet?” This requirement, that egalitarian heterosexual relationships be framed 
by dialogic, open and ongoing conversations between partners brings us to the 
final strategy, offered by Sandra.  
Dialogical conversations must recognise power inequity and 
privilege  
In the context of discussing the contribution this study might make to men and 
women and heterosexual relationships, Sandra said, rather pragmatically, “The 
only thing which needs to happen is that men and women are coming together and 
talking together”. 
I highlight this comment because it fits with how I concluded the previous 
chapter, and have reiterated in this chapter, that dialogical conversations are 
important to ethical heterosexual relationships. There are two points I add to 
Sandra’s suggestion, and to the idea of dialogical conversation.  
First, in the process of talking together, men are required to recognise the power 
and privilege that has been afforded them in gendered relationships and 
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conversations. The assumption of equality needs to be exposed and replaced by 
recognition of gender inequality, so that conversations, “men and women . . . 
talking together”, can be equitable and ethical. To help with this process of 
equitable conversation I suggest the “partnership accountability” model offered by 
Hall (1996) following Tamasese and Waldegrave (1996). In this approach the 
model of hierarchical accountability upwards is reversed. The group who has 
suffered injustice is the one to whom the group(s) who have practised injustice are 
accountable. “The best judges of injustice are the groups that have been unjustly 
treated. Thus, the women are accorded the role of guardians of gender equity” 
(Tamasese & Waldegrave, 1996, p. 55). Sandra’s suggestion, that men and 
women come together and talk together, is essential for ethical heterosexual 
relationships. But, for equitable conversation to occur, the acknowledgement of 
power and privilege inequity is required, which in turn can be addressed by 
adopting a partnership accountability model.  
The second point I raise supports Sandra’s suggestion by highlighting the 
obligation that men talk with women about egalitarian relationships, and not just 
with other men. When men do not include women in conversation about resolving 
any gender-based problem, including problems in heterosexual relationship, the 
real possibility of not addressing power and privilege can occur. I take this idea 
from writing on the “men’s movement” (Flood, 2007), where only a minority of 
men within that movement belong to pro-feminist groups who address male 
privilege and power in relation to women. While not addressing power and 
privilege is one concern when women are not included in conversations on 
gender, the other major ethical concern is that women’s voices are excluded from 
that conversation (Hearn, 2004, p. 50). In the light of the rise of interest in men 
and masculinity studies over recent years, Macleod makes the fine point that there 
is a danger that the dominant signifier in gender relations becomes men again, and 
not patriarchy. “Patriarchy, thus, recedes into the background and with it an 
understanding of gendered power relations, while debates about men and 
masculinities become foregrounded” (2007, p. 10). In the context of heterosexual 
relationships, patriarchy, as the “structural dominance of women by men in all 
aspects of life” (Rahman, 2007, p. 468), needs to be addressed between women 
and men in conversation. MacLeod highlights another point, in speaking of 
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patriarchy as a “network of patriarchies” (2007, p. 10). As a network of 
patriarchies, patriarchy is understood as power that is “exercised from 
innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations” 
(Foucault, 1976/1998, p. 94). An understanding of power and patriarchies as a 
discursive network that produces oppression for both men and women can help 
keep the focus on that network of discourses as the producer of men’s and 
women’s pain and oppression. In this way, the preference is not for men to 
exclude women in talking about their pain, but that “men and women are coming 
together and talking together” in resisting patriarchal discourses and working 
toward egalitarian relationships. The second focus group, in offering the three 
strategies, contributes to this resistance to patriarchal discourses and the abuse 
reproduced by men positioned in them.    
In double-listening (White, 2006) to the stories of the second focus group I have 
written a “double-storied” (Denborough, 2006, p. 116)  account of their stories of 
resistance to patriarchal abuse and control. These resistance stories express a 
journey toward and/or reclamation of preferred identities. Preferred heterosexual 
relationship practices from the focus group’s reading of the men’s interview 
document, and a metaphor that strengthens the possibility of agency for women in 
heterosexual relationship contribute to the resistance stories. The resistance stories 
conclude with three strategies for ongoing resistance that men can take up for 
practising egalitarian heterosexual relationships.    
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Chapter 10. Giving an account of myself 
 
I have borrowed the term that titles this chapter from Butler’s title (2005), “giving 
an account of oneself”. Butler (2005) suggests a view of ethics that recognises 
social and cultural conditions, and is dependent upon relational scenes of address 
for the emergence of the ethical subject, where accountability concerns making 
plain what one has done and the reasons for the action taken (pp. 6-8, 13-14). The 
story of my emerging ethical subjectivity is instigated from relational “scenes of 
address” (Butler, 2005, p. 9) with the first and second focus group of women. I 
put a voice to my emerging ethical subjectivity by stating how I have been 
accountable in making plain what I have done as a result of these two relational 
scenes of address. My action, dependent upon these relational scenes of address, 
is ongoing learning from the women in the two focus groups and from the many 
theorists read and applied in this thesis. In this chapter, this learning is typified 
through my theorising one moment during the data generation, pausing at that 
moment as an act of accountability to look at discourse in operation, and 
theorising what is in operation using a number of strategies. First, I introduce 
theory that weaves with Butler’s view of ethics.  
Equality and difference  
Along with the ethic of giving an account of myself, theory for recognising 
unequal relationship practices and for the equal inclusion of difference in 
relationship, underpins the analysis of the one moment during the data generation. 
The feminist poststructural scholar, Weedon, writes: 
The principle of equality of opportunity for women and men in education 
and work, once established, has not proved any great threat to the balance of 
power in a society where patriarchal relations inform the very production 
and regulation of female and male subjects. It is possible for liberal 
discourses of equality to work against women’s interests and it is only by 
looking at a discourse in operation, in a specific historical context, that it is 
possible to see whose interests it serves at a particular moment (1997, p. 
108). 
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Regardless of any principle that suggests men and women are equal, at a local 
level, the level of “a discourse in operation”, is where one can see if equality is 
being practised or not. As Weedon suggests, at a local discursive level it is 
possible that women’s interests are not being served. Dominant liberal humanist 
and patriarchal discourses may not recognise inequality at a local level because of  
the idea of a commonality or sameness between men and women (being human 
with an essential nature). Alternatively, men and women are regarded as so 
different (equal but different, with difference being less than men), that a 
statement like Weedon’s, suggesting women’s interests are not being served, is 
treated as incongruous. 
To shed further light on the above reference from Weedon, and as a response to 
the ideas of dominant discourses, I refer to Grosz, another feminist poststructural 
scholar, who pays tribute to Derrida’s contribution to feminism:  
[Derrida] . . . bequeathed to feminist thought and politics a conceptual 
infection, a germ of an idea . . . difference . . . neither as a relation of 
sameness, equivalence or identity, nor as a relation of opposition or 
dichotomy [emphasis added] . . . that transformed it [feminism] from its 
nineteenth-century impulse to equal inclusion into a twenty-first-century 
impulse to proliferate and maximise difference. (Grosz, 2005, p. 91-92) 
In the context of my study, what feminist poststructuralism has highlighted, with 
its fresh emphasis on the proliferation of difference, is not the traditional emphasis 
on equality of rights for women, or equal roles between men and women within 
the heterosexual relationship and the family. Rather, it has found where equality 
does not exist, and is often disregarded. In the conversational practices of 
heterosexual relationships, where difference can be expressed and explored, and 
different subjectivities constituted with language, discourses have been exposed 
that produce power which suppress and minimise a poststructural conception of 
difference; that minimised difference being the ideas, knowledges, and interests of 
women in regard to contributions to heterosexual relationship and life.  
In the moment during the data generation – which I introduce shortly – the focus 
is on an interaction between Sue (the first focus group) and myself that can be 
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regarded as an everyday conversational practice where difference is unrecognised 
and its expression hindered. I use this moment to understand that equality is not 
equality until discourses in operation are exposed for their production of power 
that suppress and minimise difference. I argue this moment and my theorising of 
it offer me an opportunity for the emergence of ethical subjectivity.  
Ethics as an account of relational response 
Butler (2005, p. 21) writes “the question of ethics emerges precisely at the limits 
of our schemes of intelligibility”. When confronted with thinking about my 
interaction with Sue, I was taken to the limits of my schemes of intelligibility in 
recognising and understanding the effects of language and discursive production; 
the cultural and social conditions for ethical relational practices. The words of 
Foucault on the focus of criticism make clear what happened for my thinking and 
actions when confronted by those limits: 
Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: 
showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that 
what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to 
make harder those acts which are now too easy. (1981/2002c, p. 456) 
When confronted with my thinking about Sue’s and my interaction, I began to 
think with critical and informed thinking from theorists that uncovered thought, 
exposed the obvious and taken for granted, and which made it harder to return to 
what was too easy. 
The relational context for my learning 
The following dialogue occurred between Sue and me during one of the first focus 
group meetings. I asked Sue how she got a change to occur in the relationship 
with her partner. Sue provided a metaphor to explain the process of helping her 
partner change, and how she put the metaphor into practice. Sue concluded her 
point with the following:  “[I would] get him to talk to me first about things he 
wanted to, and then gradually work him around. You know, women are very 
manipulative”. To this statement I responded, “Are you manipulative or are you 
being smart about getting what you need?” “Maybe it is that”, was Sue’s 
equivocal response to my statement. I go on to read this fragment through a series 
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of overlapping theories: reproduction of patriarchal knowing (Lather, 2007); 
deconstructive ethics (Lather, 2007; Caputo, 1997b); salvation (Lather, 2007), 
colonisation (Rober & Seltzer, 2010), and therapy (Paré & Larner, 2004); 
gendered power (Davies et al., 2002); and feminist standpoint epistemology 
(Dankoski, 2000; Marecek, 1989). I then return to the relational scenes of address 
where my learning and ethical subjectivity began to emerge. And I reconsider my 
responsibility to respond ethically to the address of the Other.     
An intentionally admirable, but relationally unsuitable ethic 
My original reason for the statement posing as a question – “Are you 
manipulative or are you being smart about getting what you need?” – was a 
critique of the word “manipulative”, which I think is derogatory when it is used to 
describe the actions of women working to get what they want in a patriarchal 
context. In a gendered context the use of the word “manipulative”, to describe 
women’s actions, lacks the recognition of power relations between men and 
women. Sue is calling on the terms of dominant discourse in describing women in 
this way. My purpose with the statement posing as a question was to affirmatively 
correct the injustice I heard; Sue speaking as she accepted a patriarchal 
interpretation of her actions. But upon review, I suggest that while the intention I 
held was admirable, the process was ethically and epistemologically unsuitable. 
The intended politics were feminist; the process and effects were patriarchal, 
knowing what is best for an Other.   
After the above interaction with Sue, I read on feminist postfoundational 
approaches to research (Lather, 2007). This began a movement from the 
“knowing” position a patriarchal discourse offers to the less certain and more 
respectful position a feminist discourse offers for conducting and interpreting 
research. Weedon (1997, p. 134-135) writes of the conflict and change which 
competing discourses can offer:    
The meaning and the social and political implications of a reading will be 
determined by the position within the discursive field from which the critic 
reads and the knowledges inscribed in the discourses with which she reads . 
. . discourses which are in competition for meaning. It is the conflict 
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between these discourses which creates the possibility of new ways of 
thinking and new forms of subjectivity.  
Weedon’s words name my conflicting but energising discursive experience after 
reading Lather (2007). I had come into the conversation with Sue informed by a 
number of discourses, but patriarchy, being the dominant discourse in my life, 
won the “competition for meaning” (Weedon, 1997, p. 135), and would not easily 
let go. However, after I had read Lather (2007) the conflict for my allegiance 
between a patriarchal discourse and a feminist discourse was underway, creating 
“the possibility of new ways of thinking and new forms of subjectivity” (Weedon, 
1997, p. 135). “Criticism”, to use Foucault’s (1981/2002c, p. 456) term in context, 
was beginning, along with the emergence of the new ethical subjectivity.  
Epistemology and deconstructive ethics  
 I now explore in more detail the learning that came with this emerging ethical 
subjectivity. “Self-reflexivity”, stemming from an “engagement” (Lather, 2007, p. 
126) with an ethical epistemology from poststructural feminist scholarship, 
sparked the emergence of a critical ethical subjectivity. 
A question that I asked about my response to Sue was, “Who is getting to make 
meaning in this dialogue between Sue and me?” To extend this question beyond 
the subject to discourse, I asked, “Which discourse is at work in my response to 
Sue?”  My response to Sue had the effect of placing me in a position of power, 
where I am the one who makes meaning of Sue’s story – a privileged researcher 
speaking from a patriarchal ethic and epistemology. Without any quest to 
understand Sue’s reason for using the word “manipulative” I voiced my 
interpretation of it. Looking back, I would have preferred to respond to Sue’s 
story from a position of less certainty: “In postfoundational thought, as opposed to 
the more typical mastery project, one epistemologically situates oneself as curious 
and unknowing” (Lather, 2007, p. 9). This curious and unknowing position 
recognises a need for positional awareness and self-conscious, partial knowing 
(Harraway, 1988; Lather, 2007). 
The curious and unknowing position I now advocate is supported by the ethical 
practice of deconstruction. My response to Sue’s use of the word “manipulative” 
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was what I had supposed was deconstructive. However, a poststructural feminist 
approach to deconstruction maintains a position of uncertainty, while focussing on 
one’s responsibility to the other (Lather, 2007, pp. 146-147). In utilising the work 
of Derrida (1979, pp. 101-102), Lather (2007, p. 146) suggests deconstruction is 
about doubly effacing both “the knower’s mastering point of view and the 
authority of the metastory”.  My response to Sue was from the position of a 
knower with a “mastering point of view” with “the authority of the metastory” 
that a patriarchal all-knowing discourse offers. What this “mastering” and 
“metastory” discourse does not recognise is “that we often do not know what we 
are seeing, how much we are missing, what we are not understanding, or even 
how to locate those lacks” (Lather, 2007, p. 146). I was learning that to engage in 
research conversations, or everyday conversations, from a discursive position that 
offers sure interpretations of both language and story limits the possibilities for all 
involved in the conversation. In continuing the effacement metaphor for 
deconstruction; if “double effacement” is the removal of the mastering knower 
and the metastory of knowledge, then the additive in deconstruction is the 
responsibility to the other in the conversation (Caputo, 1997b, p. 149; Lather, 
2007, pp. 146-147).   
Deconstruction emphasizes not my rights but the right of the Other One to 
be different . . . even as it is moved by the plight of the one who is left out, 
ground under, excluded, erased, or silenced, and hence by that Other’s right 
to be heard, to be addressed, to be given standing. . . . To that claim of the 
Other, corresponds the responsibility of deconstruction. (Caputo, 1997b, p. 
149)     
I learned that my approach to Sue was not deconstructive. My intervention with 
Sue could be understood as “nihilistic” and “sceptical” (Caputo, 1997b, p. 145) of 
Sue’s knowledge, emphasizing my interpretive rights over Sue’s. Deconstruction 
is, rather, an ethical action that erodes the privilege and undercuts the certainty 
(Lather, 2007, p. 146) of the subject, while offering space for the voice of the 
other to be heard.   
The reading of postfoundational feminist scholarship (Lather, 2007) along with 
other relevant poststructural sources (for example Caputo, 1997a, 1997b), lead to 
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my engagement with a different discourse, that enabled the ethical critique of my 
response to Sue, the emergence of a new ethical subjectivity. Further theorising of 
my response to Sue helps strengthen the development of the emerging critical 
ethical subjectivity.    
Ideas from salvation, colonisation, and therapy 
Popkewitz (1998), from the context of education, argues that pedagogical research 
within education and the social sciences, when focussing on certain ideas of 
progress and redemption, which are the effects of power, can easily smother the 
possibility of transformation by re-inscribing the very practices and rules that 
need to be stood-up-against. Lather (2007, p. 169) calls this “the dangers of 
academic salvation work”. This dangerous orientation describes my response to 
Sue. The offer of redemption or salvation from certain discursive positions infers 
that the offerer comes from a position of knowledge and power superior to that of 
the potential receiver of salvation. The “god trick . . . the view from above” is how 
Harraway (1988, p. 589) names this “salvation” practice. My intentions were 
grounded in a sense of justice for Sue. While the merit of this position might be 
said to be worthy, the practice of it was ethically untenable because I did not 
respect and investigate Sue’s knowledges and position. With a paraphrase of 
Sawicki (1988, p. 166), Lather (2007, p. 108) suggests an alternative to this well-
intentioned, but unethical practice: “a deconstructive problematic tries to trouble, 
to look for dangers, normalising tendencies, tendencies toward dominance in spite 
of liberatory intentions”. In the different context of therapy, and highlighting the 
gap between intentions and practice, Morss and Nichterlein (1999) warn of the 
incongruence between an analysis of society as oppressive and the therapeutic 
contract as intentionally optimistic about emancipation. To highlight the 
unlikelihood of therapy delivering complete freedom, and the extreme claims of 
some therapies, Morss and Nichterlein (1999, p. 173) draw examples from other 
areas of life where such extreme claims have been made: “Where else have we 
encountered such extremes of black and white, of death and life? In 
fundamentalist religious movements, and in fundamentalist political movements; 
in crusades against alcohol, against drugs; salvation, redemption”.  
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To make a claim that one can offer justice or freedom is questionable ethics 
because of the improbability of being able to deliver such. On the other hand, 
engaging in “a deconstructive problematic” not only “tries to trouble, to look for 
dangers, normalising tendencies, tendencies toward dominance” (Lather, 2007, p. 
108) in research and conversation, but it can open the way for a person to have 
space to discover their own preferred identities for living (Duvall & Béres, 2011, 
pp. 82-83; Madigan, 2011, p. 36).    
Another problem I identify with my response to Sue, that takes the “salvation” 
danger a step further, is the “colonizer position” (Rober & Seltzer, 2010). While 
Rober and Seltzer write from a family therapy context, the principle they suggest 
is relevant to feminist research practices and ethics.  As a basis for their position 
Rober and Seltzer (2010) refer to the work of Aimé Césaire (1955/1972) on the 
effects of colonialism. In summarising Césaire’s work, Rober and Seltzer say 
colonialism not only robbed “colonized peoples of their natural resources but, 
perhaps more destructively, robbed them of confidence in their own strengths and 
resources” (p. 124). Since the original work of Césaire in 1955, others have 
written about the effects of colonisation on the indigenous peoples around the 
world (see Anderson, 2002; Fanon, 1967, 1968; Nandy, 1983; Stoler, 2006). What 
is of interest for this study is that much of the undermining of indigenous people’s 
reality, self-confidence, and existence as they knew it, came from more 
“benevolent” colonisers such as missionaries, teachers, and those in caring 
positions; well-intentioned people desiring to help and protect the colonised 
people (Rober & Seltzer, 2010, pp. 124-125). The comparison can be made 
between the “benevolent” colonisers and a well intentioned researcher in research 
or therapy where the skills and knowledges of the “colonised” are not respected 
and honoured and further investigated. While such colonising practices can vary 
in the effects they have in people’s lives and culture, the ethics of these practices 
are always questionable. Also, from the domain of therapy, Paré and Larner 
(2004, p. 4) caution that practitioners of postmodern approaches to therapy 
“should engage in constructive self-critique” least their approach “unfold along 
colonial dynamics”.  
After theorising my response to Sue from ideas of salvation, colonisation, and 
therapy, I learn, not only of the importance of self-critique, but also of the 
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possible effects for the other when one speaks for them and does not engage with 
them around their preferences for relationship and life. Theorising of my response 
to Sue, as a learning process, continues with reference to gender, arguably, the 
social and cultural condition (Butler, 2005) that is most relevant to my emerging 
ethical subjectivity.   
Recognition of gendered power and privilege   
With reference to the knowledge/power link (Davies et al., 2002; Foucault, 1980; 
Delueze, 1986/1988b, p. 83), and positioning theory (Harré & van Langenhove, 
1999), I use the interaction with Sue to show how conversations between men and 
women can too easily produce privilege and power that unethically limit 
conversational and relational possibilities.   
In commenting on Foucault’s conception of power, not as a possession of any 
group or person, but as “relations between forces . . . it is simply operational” 
(Deleuze, 1986/1988b, p. 27), Bordo (1993, p. 191) writes:  
This “impersonal” conception of power does not entail that there are no 
dominant positions, social structures or ideologies emerging from the play 
of forces; the fact that power is not held by anyone does not entail that it is 
equally held by all. It is “held” by no one; but people and groups are 
positioned differently within it. No one may control the rules of the game. 
But not all players on the field are equal.   
When men take up positioning, in relation to women, production of power from a 
patriarchal discourse is very possible. Because power is relational a woman can 
resist in various ways, but if recognition of the inequality and power present in the 
game is not readily available a woman may play with limited awareness of what is 
being played out. This inequality can be seen in “everyday practices” (Davies et 
al., 2002, p. 312) between men and women. My response to Sue is one such 
example of an everyday practice where my “rationality”, or “implicit knowledge” 
(Davies et al., 2002, pp. 298-299) of Sue’s “need for justice” introduced unequal 
power relations into the conversation. However, Sue’s response to my 
question/statement on the word “manipulative” – “maybe it is that” – might 
suggest resistance to playing the game entirely on patriarchal terms. 
 221 
“The forms of rationality through which the particular relations of power 
manifest” (Davies et al., 2002, p. 299) are helpful for analysing power relations in 
conversations. Rationalities provide meaning to events (Davies et al., 2002, p. 
294), and can often be connected with morality (Rose, 1999b; Davies et al., 2002, 
p. 303). Rationalities have a relationship with legitimate authority in diverse 
spheres of government including pedagogy and the family. Rationalities that 
underlie “particular relations of power” have clear connections to the values or 
morals that “should guide the exercise of authority: freedom, justice, equality, 
responsibility” (Rose, 1999b, p. 26). 
In the conversation with Sue, my knowledge of the word “manipulative” in the 
context of gender relations was informed by the implicit knowledge that Sue’s use 
of this word to describe herself and women was morally unjust. The moral 
rationalities of justice, and responsibility to do something about the injustice, 
worked with patriarchy to privilege me as the one to give Sue the justice she was 
owed. In questioning Sue’s use of the word “manipulative”, I put my knowledge 
and understanding before hers, thus producing power in the conversation that 
placed Sue in a “one down” position. By being positioned as one down, Sue was 
left with limited positions for a response to my question. Because of my 
production of power, whatever Sue’s response might be, her response would 
either contribute to a production of power, or reinscribe patriarchal power. Along 
with this confined positioning offered from my position of “moral authority”, I 
also positioned Sue as lacking such moral authority and knowledge. 
After I questioned Sue’s use of the word “manipulative”, and suggested she was 
smart about getting what she needed, her response to me was, “maybe it is that”. 
With this equivocal response, Sue is possibly repositioning herself, as having a 
different opinion to me, even a different moral authority to me, while not directly 
opposing or agreeing with my opinion. Sue produced power in her response to me 
with this equivocal response. With the response – “maybe it is that” – Sue 
destabilises my moral authority as being the one with the only possible 
meaningful opinion. At the same time, in not directly opposing me, Sue creates a 
space for dialogue about possible new meaning, and an invitation to change the 
status of power in the game. While I positioned Sue unequally, Sue’s response 
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invites me to reconsider my position, and perhaps, play a different game, where 
our relationship is more important than my moral authority or opinion. 
The use of power/knowledge and positioning theory in this analysis of Sue’s and 
my interaction around the word “manipulative” shows how an everyday practice 
between men and women can be unequal, privileging the man to re-produce 
patriarchal power, and positioning the woman with limited options for 
responding. This is a personal learning for me of the privileged “acts which are . . 
. too easy” (Foucault, 1981/2002c, p. 456) for men in relation to women. Further, 
because of Sue’s equivocal response to my questioning of the word 
“manipulative”, one expression of my emerging ethical subjectivity takes the form 
of learning to listen for and valuing the slightest ways women might resist mine, 
and any man’s, offered subject position. 
Privilege and subjugated knowledges    
I complete the theorising of Sue’s and my interaction with reference to the 
“subjugated knowledges” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 81-82) of those who are not in a 
privileged position in their social and cultural context. Subjugated knowledges 
can be defined as those that have been “disqualified . . . insufficiently elaborated . 
. . naïve . . . located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of . . . 
scientificity” (Foucault, 1980, p. 82), which do not reflect “the predominant 
modes of thought” (Riger, 1992, p. 734). This definition fits neatly with my 
suggestion that I had a correct understanding of the word, “manipulative”. Being 
caught in patriarchal thinking, I used privilege to pursue my knowledge at the 
expense of Sue, whose knowledges were subjugated.     
Even though its argument is essentialist, feminist standpoint epistemology offers 
ideas for reflexion for those caught up in dominant patriarchal thinking and 
practices. Feminist standpoint epistemology argues that it is because women’s 
knowledge has been subjugated that they can offer clearer and more helpful 
knowledge concerning relationship situations and events (Dankoski, 2000, p. 8). 
Standpoint theory argues that people who are members of a subordinated group 
know how to live in both their own world and the world of the dominant group. 
Those in the dominant group do not need to know or are not aware of any world 
of a subordinate group separate from their own dominant world (Dankoski, 2000, 
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pp. 8-9). Harding (1991, pp. 119-133) presents a number of arguments as to why 
women’s lives, rather than men’s, should be the starting point for research with 
human beings. These arguments are all based in the idea that because of women’s 
non-privileged social position, they have a privileged epistemological position for 
understanding sociality (Marecek, 1989, pp. 372-373). Women, and those who do 
not have privileged patriarchal positions, have had to work within patriarchy, 
possibly utilising other discourses, for their survival. 
Returning to the relational scenes of address 
Beginning and ending with women’s lives in the context of heterosexual 
relationships, the research design for this study was designed to address privilege 
and recognise power relations. I suggest this design made it possible for me to 
learn of what is possibly subjugated knowledge women have for their 
heterosexual relationships, in the idea of a safe, sacred place. It seems to me, in 
hearing the first and second focus group women talk of this place from different 
epistemic positions and vantage points, that they might have some useful 
knowledge about how a heterosexual relationship might work effectively and 
lovingly. Certainly, the women’s knowledge and egalitarian conversational 
practices, along with the theorising their ideas have prompted for me as 
represented in this thesis, suggest relational possibilities that are ethical and 
loving in contrast to patriarchally produced alternatives. 
This theorising and application to my learning from the interaction with Sue 
typifies the learning from the relational “scenes of address” (Butler, 2005, p. 9) 
with the first and second focus group women. Through feminist poststructural 
theory I located the stories of the first and second focus group women in social 
and cultural conditions – patriarchal discourses. As a result of being addressed by 
the women of the first and second focus groups I became constituted as 
recognising a problem, the invisibility of patriarchal power that privileges men 
and disadvantages women in heterosexual relationships (Knudson-Martin & 
Rankin Mahoney, 2009a; Pease, 2010).  
The emergence of a new ethical subjectivity for me was produced through theory 
(St. Pierre, 2011, pp. 614, 620) as a result of being relationally addressed with the 
stories from the women of the first and second focus groups. As Butler writes, 
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“The terms by which we give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible 
to ourselves and to others are not of our making. They are social in character” 
(2005, p. 21). Desmond Tutu, in referring to African idiom and a word from the 
Nguni languages in Africa, succinctly names the process I have written about here 
in regard to my emerging ethical subjectivity. The Nguni word that depicts our 
human interdependence is ubuntu, which can be translated, “A person is a person 
through other persons” (Tutu, 2005, p. 25).  As a result of this study both theory 
from people and people in relationship with me, have produced an emerging 
ethical subjectivity for me.  
I return to Foucault’s thoughts on uncovering thought and thinking differently as 
transformation:  “As soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way 
they have been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, 
very difficult, and entirely possible” (1981/2002c, p. 457). With the emergence of 
an ethical subjectivity, not only was my transformation underway, but the 
transformation of this study was beginning to emerge. This transformation takes 
the form of an ethical response to the women of the first and second focus groups 
as a critical ethical and political engagement with injustice and unethical practice 
in heterosexual relationship. 
Responsiveness to the address from Other(s)  
In a development of Butler’s view of the emergence of the ethical subject, 
especially in the context of responding to the other, Thiem (2008, p. 4) writes:  
Responsibility framed as accountability turns responsibility into a 
narcissistic endeavour that centers on the subject and the subject’s moral 
status. By instead foregrounding the dimension of responding to an address 
by the other, the agent’s justifiability, moral guilt, or glory take second seat 
to the concrete address and actions that need to be determined. . . . 
Responsibility . . . [framed as] . . . responsiveness [is] not primarily as a 
matter of justifying and evaluating actions but as a matter of being 
addressed by others and of having to respond and – more specifically – of 
having to respond well.  
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In this chapter I have endeavoured to indicate how I have been responsive to Sue. 
I paused at a moment of discourse in operation, and used a number of interrelated 
theories to recognise the address from the Other and to endeavour to respond well.   
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Chapter 11. Deconstruction and the 
Future 
Deconstruction offers not a plan for the future, but a means of getting there 
(Scott, 2005, p. 129) 
This thesis deconstructively repositions heterosexual relationship from patriarchy 
to a philosophical place that opens possibilities for a man to engage in ethical 
egalitarian practices that affirmatively respond to a woman partner as Other 
(Derrida, 1995a, 1985/2008; Peeters, 2010/2013, p. 160). I first provide a review 
of how this deconstructive thesis has addressed the research questions. Finally, I 
discuss the implications of this thesis as deconstructive means toward a possible 
egalitarian future for both heterosexual relationships and gender relations in 
general.   
Addressing the research questions 
I restate the research questions with which I began this study:   
1. What are the available discourses by which heterosexual couples live their 
relationships?  
2. What are the discursive practices (language and positioning) of couples 
that produce relational subjectivity?  
3. How can I help heterosexual couples to investigate the discursive 
production of relational subjectivity in my work as a counsellor?  
4. What are some of the ideas and practices required for an egalitarian 
heterosexual relationship?  
5. How do people change subject positions within a heterosexual 
relationship? 
The results chapters, Five through Ten, address these questions. By taking 
different positions on heterosexual relationship, Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, 
provide a picture of the effects of the dominance of patriarchal discourses in 
constituting heterosexual relationship practices and a women partners’ relational 
subjectivity. In Chapter Five I explore relational subjectivity as Sue responds and 
repositions herself in relation to the patriarchal withdrawing and controlling 
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language practices of her partner. I show how, by accommodating to and utilising 
different skills and knowledges that might be regarded as acceptable to patriarchy, 
Sue is able to position herself in ways that get her preferences addressed.  
In Chapter Six I introduce the experienced and preferred relational subjectivities 
of women in the first focus group. The experienced relational subjectivities 
concern the women’s experience of their partners not listening or distancing 
themselves from matters of importance to the women. The preferred relational 
subjectivities are expressed through gendered subjectivities as the women position 
themselves as listening, supporting, and caring for each other in relation to topics 
that arose in the focus group discussions. With the use of performativity of gender 
theory (Butler, 1990/2006) I deconstruct rigid gendered positions offered by 
patriarchy, through analysing my own gendered practices in conversation with the 
women.  
I begin a double deconstruction (Derrida, 1972/1982a, 1972/2002) in Chapter 
Seven, which responds to patriarchal abuse that the women discuss even while 
they hold on to a preferred notion of heterosexual relationship as a safe, sacred 
place. The women constantly reposition their subjectivities in response to their 
partners’ patriarchal relationship practices, as they hold onto a hope for 
heterosexual relationship as a safe, sacred place. Hence, deconstruction of both 
patriarchal practices and a preferred egalitarian and safe idea for heterosexual 
relationship serves to investigate the discursive production of relational 
subjectivity.  
Chapters Eight and Nine address the final two research questions, on ideas and 
practices for egalitarian heterosexual relationship, and how a person might change 
subject positions. Through a discussion of a moment in a gendered relationship 
Chapter Ten addresses language and positioning in ways that are applicable to 
heterosexual relationship.  
Deconstruction means that a new concept needs to be put in place, and the system 
under deconstruction relocated (Derrida, 1972/2002, 1985/2008). This part of the 
deconstructive process occurs in Chapter Eight, where I suggest that heterosexual 
relationship be relocated to the new concept of a safe, sacred place. I align this 
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safe, sacred place with Derrida’s “democracy to come” (1993/1994, 2003/2005a), 
where the Other is responded to with ethical and egalitarian practices. 
In taking up the women’s suggestion of relocating heterosexual relationship to a 
safe, sacred place, I offer deconstructive means in Chapter Eight that a male 
partner can take up to establish ethical egalitarian relationship practices. These 
deconstructive means I name as obligatory love and becoming love. As actions of 
obligatory love, I suggest that men practise: recognising male privilege in the 
constitution of heterosexual relationships; relating to their partner from a position 
of not knowing what their partner’s preferences for the relationship are; and 
responding to this not knowing by creating respectful interested space between 
their partner and them. As an action of becoming love, I suggest men practise 
dialogical conversation with their partners that allow for the co-construction of 
meaning. 
In Chapter Nine my analysis shows the second focus group women demonstrating 
solidarity with the first focus group women. This solidarity takes the form of 
resistance to a male partner’s practices of heterosexual relationship that are 
unethical, disrespectful of a woman partner’s position and preferences, or that 
have harmful constitutive effects. For the second focus group this resistance is 
practised with a woman repositioning her subjectivity as separate from her 
partner; putting her preferences for the relationship on the table for discussion; 
questioning her partner about his abusive conversational practices; or leaving the 
relationship. The analysis of the women’s discussion also offered strategies for 
men to join with women in resisting patriarchy and working toward egalitarian 
relationships. 
Finally, in Chapter Ten I take one moment from a conversation with Sue to show 
patriarchal discourse in operation within the research itself. A number of 
interrelated poststructural theories are applied to that moment. These theories 
recognise the detrimental and colonising practices of patriarchy, and invite 
recognition of the address from the Other. 
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Deconstructive means toward an egalitarian future 
The above overview is a linear progression of the development of this thesis in 
addressing the research questions. The discussion that follows on the implications 
for this thesis, while conducted in a linear fashion are, in practice, non-linear and 
interdependent. As a guide, I use an interpretation of Derrida’s understanding of 
ethical action: “Derrida insists that politics requires decision-making that is 
accountable to the Other, that acknowledges its own impossibility, and that is thus 
subject to absolute risk” (Mansfield, 2006, p. 473). This statement is supported by 
Derrida’s thinking on aporia, with its implications for ethical action – the 
ambiguity that comes with needing to take responsible action when one cannot 
see, or foresee, the availability of a right decision (Derrida, 1993; Wang, 2005; 
Raffoul, 2008, p. 285; Kotzé & Crocket, 2011, p. 49). I match words and ideas 
from this Mansfield quote to the implications of this study under the headings: 
politics, accountability, the other, the impossibility and risk of ongoing new 
ethical action. I suggest the implications of this study as deconstructive means 
toward an egalitarian future are both pertinent to heterosexual relationship 
practices and the wider story of gender relations. I offer possibilities that 
constitute a potential route toward a respectful inventiveness for egalitarian 
relationships between men and women. I discuss the value of inventiveness later 
as a contribution of this thesis, but for now, I propose a route toward it that 
constitutes a contribution to offering a possible deconstructive means toward an 
egalitarian future.   
Politics  
Patriarchy confers both an invisible male sense of superiority and an invisible 
male privilege. Pease (2010) writes, “As most men’s beliefs about male 
superiority are experienced as being natural and normal and are institutionalised 
and culturally exalted, they generally do not notice their advantages” (p. 95). A 
major step for a man in any form of gender relations is to recognise patriarchally 
conferred invisible privilege. I suggest deconstructive means for making visible a 
male sense of superiority and male privilege.     
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Making visible the socially constructed self  
In realising the implications of Derrida’s thinking on aporia for multicultural 
education, Wang (2005) writes that one of the impasses of such education is the 
“strong commitment of mainstream students to the rhetoric of the individual” (p. 
55). While this commitment secures a sense of “the self”, it justifies a “refusal to 
encounter the other . . . in which one sees the individual but not his or her culture, 
[thus erasing] the concreteness and singularity of the person in social contexts” (p. 
55). I suggest that men captured by patriarchy often have the same commitment to 
the rhetoric of the individual, which makes invisible the social and discursive 
context for their self-understanding and their recognition of the Other. Wang 
(2005) continues with her experience of those committed to the rhetoric of the 
individual: 
[They] often find the notion of a socially constructed self difficult, even 
threatening, to think about. . . . Only when an individual becomes aware of 
social and cultural limitations can he or she make responsible choices about 
how to negotiate these limits. Dwelling in the aporia between individuality 
and relationality, we need to articulate a contextualised sense of 
individuality that is both socially situated and personally creative. (p. 55) 
Even though it may be difficult – an aporia – I suggest that the relocation of 
men’s self-understanding from the “rhetoric of the individual” to a 
“contextualised sense of individuality that is both socially situated and personally 
creative” is important for making visible patriarchally conferred male privilege. I 
offer three suggestions as means towards this visibility.  
First, I suggest that men ask the question raised by Foucault (1988/2002d, p. 403), 
as he sought to undertake an historical analysis of the relationship between 
thought and practices in western society: “what are we today?”. In Chapter Eight I 
introduced the struggle Peter had in changing his actions toward his partner. I 
suggested that one of the possible reasons for this struggle was that Peter practised 
relationship according to a pre-determined essentialist nature which kept him 
emotionally and relationally stuck. This essentialist position is one possible 
answer that might be given to Foucault’s question. But I have argued in this 
thesis, in the context of patriarchal practice in heterosexual relationships, that 
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men’s self understanding be separated from “discover[ing] something about 
‘given’ nature” (White, 1997, p. 223), the rhetoric of individuality, and placed 
within historical socio-cultural productions of patriarchal discourses. This 
relocation to historical socio-cultural productions helpfully explains dominant 
male privilege and practices, and can contribute to freeing a man from debilitating 
deficit self-understandings that limit the possibilities for change. By repositioning 
in discourses outside of patriarchy, men can experience personal agency in regard 
to preferred ethical practices for conducting relationship and for new self-
understanding.  
In Chapter Nine I introduced discursive empathy (Sinclair & Monk, 2004, 2005) 
as a tool men can engage with for reading their discursive, socio-cultural location. 
As a second suggestion to help men relocate their self-understanding, discursive 
empathy is a tool for not only helping men read what they might struggle with in 
common with other men, but it can help them recognise the prevalence of male 
privilege in relation to women. Hence, I suggest men not only use discursive 
empathy for themselves but also in relation to women. In this way, men can begin 
to see the effects for women of patriarchal male privilege. Discursive empathy can 
be conceived as a man producing openness to women’s stories of oppression; as 
Wang (2005) says, “The creativity of the self in his or her movement is 
preconditioned by openness to the other” (p. 55). Pease (2002b) suggests “social 
empathy” as an important practice for men in understanding the effects of their 
“structural power and privilege” (p. 173). I prefer to use “discursive empathy”, 
because its poststructural location suggests the possibility of a man not only 
recognising his and a woman’s position in discourse, but it opens the possibility 
for a man to change his subject position for respectful ethical responses to a 
woman in each conversational encounter. One such example of this recognition 
and change by a man, I suggest, is offered by Chris, recorded in Chapter Eight. 
Chris, while recognising his different discursive location as a man, does not 
permit this location to interfere with his position on offering acknowledgment and 
witness to the stories of oppression from the first focus group. 
One other contribution of this study for helping men move their self-
understanding from the “rhetoric of the individual” to a contextualised socially 
situated self is to acknowledge their personal pain and to locate it with the 
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position they take up in the relations of gender offered by patriarchy (Pease, 
2002b, p. 173). This step can address the “misframing” (Kimmel, 2010) of men in 
individualised positions where the focus is on personal pain without any 
recognition of men’s positioning and social location in patriarchy (Pease, 2002b, 
p. 174).   
Shame is a common painful experience in relationship for many men (Jenkins, 
2009) and is an experience that can point to important relational values which a 
man may have stepped away from (Probyn, 2005; Schneider, 1977/1992; 
Weingarten, 2003). Probyn writes, “Shame is an affect of proximity. . . . [I]t 
teaches us about our relations to others” (2005, pp. 34-35). While the voice of 
shame in men’s experience often speaks so loudly that only the pain is heard, I 
suggest that men also listen to shame as a pointer to important relational values 
that they may have stepped away from. In doing this, they can use shame 
helpfully to support the practice of those values. This approach to working with 
shame is taken up by Jenkins (2009) in his work to help men change their practice 
of using violence and abuse in heterosexual relationships. As indicated by 
Andrew’s use of shame, recorded in Chapter Eight, shame is a tool that can be 
effectively used by a man, who has breached any relational value of importance to 
him, to step back into practising those respectful relational values.   
As men begin to recognise their own history of privilege and pain, there is the 
possibility that they then “form alliances with the oppressed”, and in so doing 
“recreate themselves as subjects in their ethical activity” (Pease, 2002b, p. 174). 
In making visible the invisible of their socio-cultural history, and then by 
participating with the oppressed against oppressive practices, men can form new 
self-understanding.  
Accountability 
An important step in this process of men stepping out of patriarchal privilege and 
control is not to assume a woman will want to dialogue on matters related to 
gender. Women are capable, without the assistance of men, in working out how to 
live while still being oppressed with marginalised positions (see Davies et al., 
2002), as the women involved in this study show. However, to work toward 
egalitarian gender relations collaboration is required. For example, Segal (1994), 
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and hooks (2000), both feminists, argue that to transform the social inequalities of 
gender it is important that men and women form alliances and work together. 
“Alliance politics” is the name Pease (2000, p. 111) gives this political 
cooperation between men and women. While men can initiate this alliance, with 
their acknowledgement of privilege and the associated oppression of women, it is 
important, considering the violent history of gender relations, that men respect the 
right of women to invite them, or not, into further conversation and participation 
in the alliance. 
Dialogue between women and men 
Three findings in this study help contribute to clarifying the grounds for dialogue 
between women and men as they progress toward egalitarian gender relations. 
First, in Chapter Nine I refer to Sandra from the second focus group who said, 
“The only thing which needs to happen is that men and women are coming 
together and talking together”. While this statement may appear to be making an 
obvious point, it is important that the dialogue occurs between men and women, 
and not men using their privilege to talk among themselves about gender 
relations. In support of this point I refer to, Glen, a woman research participant 
(Pease, 2000) on the possibility of a coalition between feminists and pro-feminist 
men in working toward egalitarian gender relations:   
The old patterns are hard to break, when men get together in men’s groups. 
They are so deeply ingrained. For five thousand years you have been trained 
as the dominant ones and so it is very understandable that when you would 
get together, those patterns would emerge and that unknowingly, 
unconsciously and unwittingly, you would perpetuate them. (cited in Pease, 
2000, p. 112) 
A second point that I offer in contributing to the dialogue between men and 
women, I take from a comment made by Alice from the second focus group: “I’m 
the toilet cleaner! How egalitarian are these egalitarian relationships?” Alice, in 
volunteering to help her ex-partner, was not consulted in regard to her preferences 
for work in preparing for a family occasion; she was told what to do – to clean the 
toilet. Alice’s ex-partner made assumptions that did not allow for consultation or 
dialogue on the part Alice might play. In any dialogue with women, we as men do 
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well to guard against making assumptions. A respect for any difference from the 
way a man sees and understands is important in any dialogical process. This 
respect for difference is built into Bakhtin’s dialogical process with the concepts, 
“answerability” (Emerson, 1997, p. 218; White, 2009), and the “loophole” 
(Bakhtin, 1984, p. 233): no one dominates the conversation with a hold on the 
truth, and language is used tentatively in regard to meaning, which allows for the 
other in the conversation to alter meaning according to their perspective. This 
approach invites the Other, with their point-of-view, into the conversation.  
A final point, as a contribution to the dialogue between women and men in the 
process of accountability for men in gender relations, comes from a phrase coined 
by Chris in his interview: “everyday discipline of listening”. This discipline refers 
to a particular listening; a listening for alterity, difference, or singularity, which 
invites responses from a man that are not formulaic, or guided by colonising 
patriarchal knowledges. These three points on dialogue between men and women 
as a form of accountability for men, I argue, are strengthened when men recognise 
a woman as Other, whether that be in heterosexual relationships, or gender 
relations.  
The Other 
Derrida writes: 
That which defies anticipation, reappropriation, calculation – any form of 
pre-determination – is singularity. There can be no future as such unless 
there is radical otherness, and respect for this radical otherness. It is here – 
in that which ties together as non-reappropriable the future and radical 
otherness – that justice . . . participates in the future. (Derrida & Ferraris, 
1997/2001, p. 21) 
Derrida gives the name, “singularity”, to Levinas’ (1961/1969, 1974/1998) 
concept of the other (see Perpich, 2008). Singularity means that the other is not 
singular, but multiple and different every time we engage with the other. The 
other is an intersection of multiple positionings and becomings that we cannot 
know in advance. Consequently, in the context of Derrida’s thinking on ethical 
action in relation to the Other, decision-making that is accountable is not 
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dependent on pre-arranged formulae, systems, or what might have worked 
previously. Rather, it relies on singular encounter-to-encounter respectful 
responses by the subject with the Other (Derrida, 1992, 2001/2005b, p. 128-129; 
Wang, 2005, pp. 49-52). Hence, Raffoul writes, “Ethical responsibility is thus a 
matter of invention, not application of a rule” (2008, p. 284). Caputo brings 
together Derrida’s thinking on the practice of invention and ethical responsibility 
to the other: “Derrida is neither an essentialist nor a conventionalist, but an 
inventionalist . . . which means that deconstruction keeps an inventionalist eye 
open for the other” (Caputo, 1997a, p. 131).  
In this thesis, I argue that a deconstructive means toward an egalitarian future has 
as its “inventionalist eye open for the other” men recognising male privilege and 
relocating their self-understanding from the rhetoric of individuality to a historical 
socio-cultural context. At the invitation of women, men form political alliances 
with women in resistance to patriarchy and its effects for relations of gender. 
Integral to this recognition, relocation, and resistance process, men recognise each 
woman as Other, and in so doing, as an egalitarian ethic, practice an ethic of 
respect. From this position, men can practise invention with respectful responses 
in each encounter with a woman as Other.   
The impossibility and risk of ongoing new ethical action  
Where “event” is to be regarded as the ongoing arrival of the Other that cannot be 
calculated for (see Derrida, 1993, pp. 33-34; 2003/2005a, p. 148; Rafoul, 2008, p. 
287, fn. 25), Derrida (2003, p. 35), writes “an event or invention is possible only 
as im-possible”. The “im-possible” and risk with the implications for this study as 
deconstructive means toward an egalitarian future is that egalitarian relations 
between men and women are dependent upon a man’s practice in each single 
encounter with a woman. There is no plan or formula that makes the path clear as 
to what a man must do for an egalitarian relationship with a woman other than, in 
each encounter, “invent” respectful ethical responses to her address as Other.   
There is no “politics” of law or ethics without the responsibility of a 
decision. In order for the decision to be just, it is not enough for it to apply 
existing norms or rules, but it must take the absolute risk, in each individual 
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situation, of rejustifying itself, alone, as if for the very first time. (Derrida, 
2001/2005b, p. 128) 
In this thesis, I have suggested a platform on which a male partner can stand so 
that he can practice heterosexual relationship in a respectful, ethical egalitarian 
manner in each encounter with a woman partner. Particularly, in Chapter Eight, 
under the idea of obligatory love, I suggest that men: recognise their privilege and 
its oppressive effects for women; take up an unknowing approach, in regard to 
what a woman prefers in relationships, as a helpful position for learning what her 
preferences are; and, in conjunction with this unknowing position, maintain a 
position of interested space, where the male partner holds respectful interest in his 
partner’s interests, and also invites her into agentic space for practising  
relationship as she prefers. These suggestions may be applicable to gender 
relations generally. But the “invention” of new respectful ethical responses with 
each encounter between a man, and a woman as Other, as an ongoing 
deconstructive means to an egalitarian future is, I argue, constructed on the 
platform of these three actions of obligatory love.   
Hope for the future 
One important feature of completing this study has been my personal movement 
from the “rhetoric of the individual . . . to a contextualised sense of individuality 
that is both socially situated and personally creative” (Wang, 2005, p.55). The risk 
that comes with change has not lessened during this process, but the study has 
established new knowledge and meaning that is situated with the “socially 
constructed” self. This knowledge makes the risk that comes with change 
addressable, even with the associated struggle and disorientation that comes with 
“thinking [and doing] altogether differently” (Derrida, 1982b, p. 326). As Wang 
(2005, p. 53) says, “The openness to something other and different is the 
precondition for any transformative learning, and disequilibrium is necessary for 
reaching another level of understanding”.   
Responding to the address of the Other, at times, can seem impossible, as the 
dominance of patriarchal practices are so evident in heterosexual relationships and 
in gender relations generally. Kimmel (2010) cites, for example, men responding 
to their identity problems unethically, violently, blind to racism and sexism. 
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However, alongside the impossibility, there is the address of the Other that invites 
men into new thinking for ethical ways of doing gender relations.  From his 
experience of doing something that is new, Derrida writes:  
It is a matter of looking for something that is not yet well received, but that 
waits to be received. . . . [E]ach time I have attempted to make a gesture that 
was . . . bizarre or untimely, it was because I had the impression that it was 
demanded, more or less silently, by other areas of the field, by other forces 
that were still in the minority, but that were there. . . . [T]here is a sort of 
calculation in the incalculable here, and the untimeliness is a sort of 
timeliness still in the making. (Derrida & Ferraris, 1997/2001, p. 16) 
Derrida hints at the possible in the impossible in his own experience of taking 
risks to achieve something new: “other forces that were still in the minority, but 
that were there” and, “there is a sort of calculation in the incalculable here” and, 
“the untimeliness [of the action] is a sort of timeliness still in the making”. As 
Derrida can be understood as framing hope in the language of the im-possibility 
of taking a risk to achieve something new, so Connell, a world renowned 
sociologist and gender researcher, offers hope in regard to changing gender 
relations: “Inviting men to end men’s privileges and to remake masculinity to 
sustain gender equality, strikes many people as a strange or utopian project. Yet 
this project is already underway. Many men around the world are engaged in 
gender reforms” (2011, p. 21). The contribution I wish to make with this thesis is 
to suggest that it stands as some evidence that there is hope, a possibility in the 
impossible, for a safe, sacred place, a democracy to come, in heterosexual 
relationships and gender relations.  
In ending, I turn to Cornell, a significant feminist philosopher in the application of 
Derrida’s work to law and justice (see Caputo, 1997b; Cornell, Rosefeld, & 
Carlson, 1992; Benhabib, Butler, Cornell, & Fraser, 1995), who suggests:      
There is a deep, profound, and even scary sense in which the future and our 
responsibility for the future cannot be in any other hands but our own. It is 
up to us to take on the task of bringing into existence a timeliness still in the 
making. (Cornell, 2005, p. 71) 
 238 
To some, the conversations heterosexual couples conduct may not seem 
important, a “bizarre or untimely” topic for research, or a “utopian project”. But, 
for the women involved in this study, and many others, I now have “the 
impression that it was demanded”. The conversations conducted in heterosexual 
couple or gendered relationships matter, as that is where invisible patriarchal 
power does much of its work in shaping the relationship with unfair effects. This 
thesis concludes that while the democracy to come is still in the making, every 
time a man recognises his patriarchal privileging and its effects, and engages in 
respectfully inventive ethical conversation with a woman, the democracy to come 
is being brought into existence.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
First focus group further written information on the research 
Further written information on the research 
“Heterosexual couples, gender discourse, and the production of relational 
subjectivity”. 
Thankyou for expressing interest in this research project. This research is toward a 
Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Waikato in Hamilton, New 
Zealand. I will outline in the following a little about myself and the reason for this 
research, my research topic, the research method, safeguards and confidentiality 
procedures for participants, and the process you will be involved in if you wish to 
participate in this research.  
A little about me 
My name is Brian Morris. I am currently a lecturer in counselling at Tabor 
College Adelaide, where I have been since 2004. Before being at Tabor I was 
involved in counselling in private practice at Clovercrest Baptist Church in the 
northern suburbs. Before getting involved in counselling I had some time to study 
full-time, and worked with the Salvation Army. I am a parent and have been 
married for 27 years.  
Reason for this research 
My main area of interest is couples and family counselling and it is from my 
experience in counselling and teaching in these areas that my interest in the topic 
for this research came about. I want that this research will contribute to more 
effective counselling and teaching in the area of couple’s relationships, and 
positively to the relationship between women and men generally. 
Research topic 
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As you would have read in the invitation to participate in this research, this 
research is exploring the experience of women and men in heterosexual 
relationships, including the types of conversations they have with each other, what 
produces the couple’s experience of the relationship, and how an egalitarian 
relationship might be conducted. 
I realise for many people this is a personal and sensitive aspect of their lives so I 
will have in place safeguards and confidentiality procedures as far as the 
participant’s information and identity is concerned. I will detail these later in this 
information letter after I have further explained the details and procedure of this 
research.  
Research method 
If you agree to participate in this research you will be involved in the first of three 
stages of the research. That will be a focus group that will meet three times for 
two hours each discussing the above topics. I will be facilitating this focus group 
of six women with various questions that will help stimulate the discussion of the 
topics. The focus group meetings will be video and audio taped so that I can 
transcribe the discussions in a way that most accurately represents what each 
participant has said. After the first two meetings and from my transcription of 
those meetings I will write a letter to each woman involved in the focus group 
outlining the essence of the discussion and highlighting a significant aspect of her 
contribution to the discussion. Those letters will also help contribute to what is 
discussed in the next focus group meeting. After the third focus group meeting I 
will write a concluding letter to each woman once again outlining the essence of 
the discussion from that meeting and clarifying from each of them what 
information they want taken to the next stages of the research. Pseudonyms will 
be used when the information is offered to the next two research stages. The final 
two stages of the research involves a group of men who I will individually 
interview around suggestions and themes that have been offered by the first focus 
group, and then a second focus group that will discuss the reflections of the men 
and the themes and suggestions offered by the first focus group.  I plan to conduct 
all this research at my work address, Tabor College Adelaide Goodwood Campus, 
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164 Goodwood Rd, Goodwood, because a comfortable room is available there for 
video and audio taping.  
Safeguards and Confidentiality  
From the tapes of the three focus group discussions I will write up transcripts 
from which I will then send to each woman a letter outlining the essence of the 
previous meeting’s discussion. Each woman can check this letter for accuracy that 
it correctly represents what was discussed within the group. The video and audio 
tapes and transcripts of the three discussions are confidential and the only persons 
who will be able view or listen to the tapes or see the full transcripts are myself 
and my two supervisors in New Zealand, Dr Elmarie Kotzé and Dr Kathie 
Crocket whose contact details are at the end of this information sheet. All 
transcripts, documents and tapes related to the research will be stored securely. 
Withdrawal from being a research participant in this first stage of the research can 
occur anytime up until two weeks after the participants receive my final letter 
outlining the previous third focus group meeting. To withdraw you can complete 
and post to me in the reply paid envelope the form attached at the end of this 
information sheet, “Notice of withdrawal from participation in the research”.  If 
you do need to withdraw for any reason whatsoever this is entirely appropriate 
and acceptable in this research. 
Your confidentiality is assured during and after this project on the grounds that I 
will not deliberately reveal any information gained from this project to anyone 
through my doctoral thesis, or through being published, or presented at 
professional conferences, other than my supervisors. In doing this I will use 
pseudonyms, which you and I can decide on, which will indicate your sex, but I 
will not use any other identifying features except that which is given in the actual 
group discussions and which you state I can use. 
Process for Participants 
If after reading this information sheet you choose to participate in this research 
you can read and sign the attached informed consent form and return it to me in 
the reply paid envelope. After I have received the informed consent form I will 
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then send you a schedule of possible times for when the focus group meetings can 
be held on which you can mark your preferred times and send it back to me. 
When I have received six time schedules back that indicate the same time then I 
will contact those six women regarding the time the meetings are to be held. If 
you are not one of those six I will contact you to let you know, and then see if you 
want to be a reserve for the research or whether you would prefer to withdraw 
your offer of participation.  
Kind regards, 
Brian Morris 
Contact details for Brian’s supervisors are: 
 
 Dr Elmarie Kotzé (Email: elmariek@waikato.ac.nz) and  
 Dr Kathie Crocket (Email: kcrocket@waikato.ac.nz) 
Department of Human Development and Counselling 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton  
New Zealand 
Phone: 0011 or 0018 647 838 4176 
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Appendix B 
First focus group research consent form 
Research Consent Form. (Focus Group One). 
Research Title:  Heterosexual couples, gender discourse and the production of 
relational subjectivity.  
Researcher: Brian Morris.  
I have read and understood the information for participants in this research which 
was given to me by Brian and have met with him to discuss this research.  
I confirm that: 
I understand that this project is guided by the University of Waikato’s Human 
Research Ethics Regulations. Brian has given me information about how he will 
take responsibility to safeguard my rights and ethical entitlements. 
I agree to the video and audio taping of the focus group which will be facilitated 
by Brian. I understand that any recordings or written notes of the focus group will 
be kept securely and used for the purposes of this research project. I agree that the 
material as it is used in Brian’s doctoral thesis may be published, or presented at 
professional conferences by Brian. 
I understand that not all of the material transcribed from the video and audio 
recordings of the focus group will be used in Brian’s thesis. 
I understand that the material discussed in the focus group is confidential and 
cannot be discussed or used outside of that focus group except, that material 
which I personally disclosed, and for use by Brian in his doctoral thesis and any 
published material or presentations at conferences. 
I understand that the video and audio tapes and transcripts along with this consent 
form will be accessible to Brian’s supervisors to enable them to hold Brian 
accountable to professional standards and ethics and to provide safeguards to all 
participants. The supervisors will not reveal any identifying information about the 
participants to any other person.  
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Contact details for Brian’s supervisors are: 
 Dr Elmarie Kotzé (Email: elmariek@waikato.ac.nz) and  
 Dr Kathie Crocket (Email: kcrocket@waikato.ac.nz) 
Department of Human Development and Counselling 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton  
New Zealand 
Phone: 0011 or 0018 647 838 4176 
I understand that I have the right to remove or alter identifying information from 
my transcripts (if I choose to read them) but not change the content of the 
discussion as recorded in the transcript in ways that alters the meaning of the 
discussion. This also applies to the letters Brian will send to us after each 
discussion group which outline the essence of the previous meeting’s discussion. 
My preferred way of Brian sending me the written material and letters during the 
actual research process is recorded on the form attached to the end of this research 
consent form.  
I understand that I will be participating in three focus group meetings for two 
hours each which Brian will be facilitating, and that I have been notified what the 
general themes will be for discussion in those meetings.  
I understand that I may withdraw from this research at any time up until two 
weeks after I receive the final letter from Brian outlining the essence of the 
discussion in the final focus group meeting. I understand that to withdraw from 
this research all I need to do is mail to him the “notice of withdrawal from 
participation in research” which is attached to the information sheet Brian has 
previously given to me. I understand that I do not need to provide an explanation 
for my withdrawal.  
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I understand that if I want counselling after participating in this research I may 
contact Brian who will arrange for me to be referred to a reputable counsellor.  
I understand that I can ask questions at any time and that these will be welcomed. 
This can be when we meet to conduct the research or via telephone or email as 
follows: (deleted for this thesis appendix) 
Both the mobile and email are confidential. 
I understand that I have received the information I believe is necessary for me to 
give informed consent to participating in Brian Morris’ research project and I 
agree to the terms outlined. 
Signed: _________________________________ 
Name: __________________________________ 
Date: _______________________ 
Preferred way of written communication being sent to me and returned to 
Brian during the research process is: 
Email. 
Ordinary post. 
Registered post. 
Courier. 
(Circle the mode you prefer). 
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Appendix C 
Notice of withdrawal from participation in research 
Notice of withdrawal from participation in research 
“Heterosexual couples, gender discourse and the production of relational 
subjectivity”. 
Researcher: Brian Morris. 
I …………………………………………………… wish to withdraw from the 
research being conducted by Brian Morris.  
I know I do not need to give any reason for this decision to Brian. 
I wish/do not wish to discuss my reasons for withdrawing. (circle your 
preference). 
I know that I can discuss my reasons for withdrawing directly or in writing with 
Brian or his supervisors. 
I understand that my information given thus far in this research will not be used in 
the thesis unless I discuss this with Brian and agree on the details of this. 
Please contact me/do not contact me to discuss this further. (circle your 
preference). 
Preferred means of contact: 
………………………………………………………………… 
I understand that Brian will be able to note in his thesis statistical information 
relating to my withdrawal. That is, he will be able to state the number of 
participants and what stage of the research they withdrew from, without giving 
any identifying information. 
Signed: …………………………………….. 
Date: ………………………………………. 
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Appendix D 
The bridging document 
Bridging Document. For Brian Morris’ PhD Research. 
Hi …., 
Thanks again for agreeing to participate in this research with me. 
As I mentioned previously to you this document contains more information on the 
research I am undertaking with women on their experience of their relationship 
with their male partners. This next stage, involving you as one of the participants, 
is centred on discussion and reflection on this document with me. When you and I 
get together for the interview on… it is this document and your responses to it that 
I would like to discuss with you.  
This document focuses on what I particularly noticed and learned from three 
group discussions I had with the women. In preparation for writing the document 
I asked myself some questions. These are listed below: 
1. What was it in the accounts of their experience that caught my attention in 
surprising ways?  
2. Why was I surprised by these specific aspects of their experience? 
3. Is there something from the accounts of their experience that would help 
me learn about their values, hopes, aspirations, dreams for their 
relationships with their male partners?  
4. As a result of witnessing these women’s accounts of their experience in 
relationship with their male partners what effects has this had for me? For 
example, concerning my own relationships and conversations with people? 
Although there was much that caught my attention in surprising ways in the group 
discussions, here I have decided to tell you about three aspects which opened my 
eyes to women’s experience of their relationship with their male partners.  
1. First, there is the experience the women called “shut off”. This happens 
when they are trying to have a conversation with their partner. This 
‘shutting off’ seems to be expressed in three main ways: 
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 When a man cuts his partner off from talking or expressing her 
opinion at all; 
 When his partner is making a request for time or help with 
something, and he doesn’t complete the listening process and 
just tries to fix ‘the problem’ quickly; 
 When the couple are making major decisions or buying 
something, the man can make the decision, without much 
consultation and discussion with his partner. 
2. The second aspect that caught my attention was the women’s experience 
of being called a ‘nag’, or the experience of stepping into what others 
called a ‘nagging’ response, when they had no other options to get their 
partner’s attention.  
One of the questions we explored in the group was, “why do women at 
times step into a ‘nagging’ response”? Ali talked about experiences of 
powerlessness and using ‘nagging’ as a last resort. She says, “I thought 
that is probably how I feel when I am nagging. It is that sense of I can see 
this situation slipping away here so I am just going to go hell for leather 
until something changes”. 
Carmen talked about women’s experience of unfairly being defined as a 
‘nag’ or as ‘nagging’ by their male partners. She says, “men can actually 
misuse the word nagging to shut you down so that a request, or something 
you need to ask for, or a job that needs to be done [gets the response from 
them], ‘O stop nagging”. Carmen went on to describe the effects of this 
definition, “then you feel devalued because you feel that next time you 
better be quiet because it is not going to be understood, you are going to 
be called a nag…[that] takes away…your spontaneity, your individuality 
as a person, and value”.  
3. A third aspect that caught my attention from the women’s account of their 
experience in relationship with their partners is how they see themselves 
influenced by that relationship. Hannah tells her story of identity in 
relationship with her partner and other people. While growing up Hannah 
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learnt about mutual respect and equality between men and women from 
her parents’ relationship which gave shape to a confident, happy and 
sociable story for her life. Then from her relationship with her partner 
who used abuse and control, Hannah says, “I feel devalued…. I feel like I 
am being cut down as a person, dissected and limited, some things are not 
okay to say….I doubt my own ideas and judgements, my own 
beliefs….The last eighteen months he would not use my name. So I lost 
my name….His description of me was who I was”. Hannah went on to 
explain how she later called on others and their knowledge of her to re-
construct her identity, “when we split up I had to actually build myself up 
and remember who I was. I had to do a lot of journaling to remember 
what I was like, and talk to my family and my school friends. I contacted 
a lot of my school friends and actually talked to them about what they 
remembered about me, things we had done, interests we had”. 
Sarah also speaks of being influenced by relationship, but differently to 
Hannah’s experience. “It is so encouraging. I feel like when my partner 
hears my ideas and says stuff like, ‘O that was really good!’ It’s affirming. 
I come up with good ideas, I have good thoughts, and I think he feels the 
same….So it becomes this thing where you are walking away into other 
situations more confident, because even if they do not like my idea there, I 
know somebody at home does”. 
In reflecting on the three aspects of the discussions that caught my attention – 
being shut-off, the ‘nagging’ definition and, relationship influencing how we see 
ourselves – I wondered what is was about these that got me thinking differently, 
opening up new ideas for me?   
 
The shutting-off stood out for me because it kept coming up in the discussions as 
something that gets a grip on the relationship with painful effects for the women. 
With this, the hope for equal opportunities in conversations with their partner 
diminishes. 
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When the word ‘nag’ came up in the discussions I felt very uncomfortable with it. 
The word ‘nag’ was always derogatory in my experience of its use in describing 
women or their speech. So I was surprised when some of the women used the 
word to describe their own behaviour toward their partner’s at times. We explored 
this idea, and I learned this was used as a last resort to engage in a conversation 
with their partner. I was left with the question, “Why though… why does this 
happen?”  
I wonder if we can think about this question together. Why is it that women 
partners can feel there is no option other than to speak this way – ‘nagging’? Is 
there anything men can do about this that is fair and helpful for both men and 
women?  
Before doing this research I adhered to the idea (without thinking about it much) 
that identity was stable, individually based, and influenced while a person is 
growing up as a child and teenager. In doing preparatory reading for this research 
I read much on the idea that identity is not necessarily stable, but is shaped by 
relationships and the conversations within those relationships throughout one’s 
life. This actually made sense to me as I could see how my partner and I had 
influenced each other’s identity in various ways over our married life. It made 
even more sense to me when I got involved in discussions with these women, and 
heard them talk about changes in their identity and how they saw themselves as a 
result of their relationship with their partners. I have already given some examples 
of this from the women when their partners take an active role (either affirming or 
derogatory) in the relationship conversations, but here is an example where the 
two partners can both have a bearing on each others identity and sense of self. 
Annie spoke of feeling disappointed because aspects of the research had “tapped 
into the hardest part of our relationship …decision-making….[The research] just 
brought up what I struggle with the most in our relationship. We don’t make 
decisions, and I’m not entirely blaming [my partner] because some decisions are 
mutual, but we both wait for each other, and so it’s not resolved”.  
Thinking about what the women value in their relationships with male partners, I 
heard how they spoke about hopes, aspirations and dreams that they hold. 
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As I sat and listened to the women and participated in the conversation I was 
struck by the energy and enthusiasm they had for the task of sharing their stories 
and connecting with each other. There were not only painful stories, some of 
which I have referred to above, but there was a sense of joy in being able to 
connect and listen to each other. As I participated in this and listened I became 
aware that these women trusted me with the sacredness of their stories. Here they 
were talking about sacred aspects of their lives and they trusted me. I was aware 
that as a man I could have been seen as representing those who had hurt them, in 
some cases quite violently. I must admit I felt an unexpected and surprising 
privilege in being able to listen and participate as I was.  
In asking myself the question as to why they would trust me, and be so open in 
talking about their lives, I think it was because they valued and hoped for 
egalitarian relationships with their partners. Their enthusiasm I think not only 
reflected what was happening between them with each other, but it reflected what 
they hoped for and had experienced at times with their partners. This egalitarian, 
safe, sacred relationship with their partners came up as a topic constantly. They 
called it “a safe, sacred place”. Sarah reflects on this, “what actually makes that 
strong connection is that equal discussion, that space where you both feel 
accepted and loved and I think that is not an easy thing that just happens, but that 
is something I have always wanted…. I think the biggest problem was that early 
on I actually did not know that was what I was looking for….[We have] named it 
over these discussions”.  
Ali continued to talk about this safe, sacred place and sums up the importance of 
such a place for these women when she said, “For women I think we seek that 
from our friends and sometimes we do find that through our friendships, but what 
we are really wanting is that same level of intimacy in the conversation with our 
partner….It makes me feel like who I am is important…it’s almost like you take 
away from that place a sense of yourself….your contribution, your language, your 
ideas, your thought, your personality, your creativity, all these things are valued in 
that place because someone else is giving you the time to do that…what could be 
better in life? That’s such an amazing place!” 
So, what effects have these discussions had on me? 
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I became aware when and how I responded in hurtful ways to my partner - 
particularly the shutting-down behaviour. My partner and I were having a 
discussion at home, and she was making a suggestion about something concerning 
our home. I went into “shut down mode” and cut her off with some terse 
comment. I realized I had just done exactly as the women in the focus group had 
named and discussed – I had “shut off” my partner. I had assumed she was 
coming with a set agenda and wanted done something that she wanted just to 
discuss with me.  
I can remember I actually heard the voices of the women in my head about men 
closing off when they assume their partner’s ideas are already set in concrete. 
Fortunately I was able to swallow my embarrassment and shame - which I am 
sure would like me to have continued arguing and ‘win the point’ - and apologise 
to my partner, adjust and listen to her suggestion. The interesting conclusion to 
this is that after listening to her I was actually able to see her position and agree 
that her idea had possibilities. And in case you are wondering whether this story 
has any continuing substance, sometime after this event I read a letter my partner 
had written to our family where she said the research was actually changing our 
relationship for the better. 
I conclude this document with a similar story from one of the participants in the 
focus group whose partner came to much the same realization that I did above. 
Sue tells the story that when her partner came with the short answer to fix a 
problem or issue she wanted to discuss with him she would feel, “cut off and shut 
down and it just took all the joy out of it”. Eventually her partner came to her 
when he became aware of this effect of his behaviour and said, “I keep ending the 
conversations don’t I? I keep spoiling this”.  
As a result of participating in the focus group with the women I have made some 
change already and am continuing to make movement toward watching and taking 
care in my conversations with my partner. I am doing this because I am beginning 
to realize how powerful my responses can be in shaping a relationship and the 
identity of each person within that relationship.  
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When we meet, perhaps it might be useful if we start our conversation with a 
question similar to the one I asked myself. What is there in this document that 
stands out for you or maybe catches your attention in surprising ways? 
Cheers, 
 
Brian. 
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Appendix E 
Men’s interviews further written information on the research 
(stage two, men’s interview). 
Further written information on the research 
“Heterosexual couples, gender discourse, and the production of relational 
subjectivity”. 
Thankyou for expressing interest in this research project. This research is toward a 
Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Waikato in Hamilton, New 
Zealand. I will outline in the following a little about myself and the reason for this 
research, my research topic, the research method, safeguards and confidentiality 
procedures for participants, and the process you will be involved in if you wish to 
participate in this research.  
A little about me 
My name is Brian Morris. I am currently a lecturer in counselling at Tabor 
College Adelaide, where I have been since 2004. Before being at Tabor I was 
involved in counselling in private practice at Clovercrest Baptist Church in the 
northern suburbs. Before getting involved in counselling I had some time to study 
full-time, and worked with the Salvation Army. I am a parent and have been 
married for 27 years.  
Reason for this research 
My main area of interest is couples and family counselling and it is from my 
experience in counselling and teaching in these areas that my interest in the topic 
for this research came about. I want that this research will contribute to more 
effective counselling and teaching in the area of couple’s relationships, and 
positively to the relationship between women and men generally. 
 
Research topic 
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As you would have read in the invitation to participate in this research, this 
research is exploring the experience of women and men in heterosexual 
relationships, including the types of conversations they have with each other, what 
produces the couple’s experience of the relationship, and how an egalitarian 
relationship might be conducted. In particular where this research will concern 
you, if you agree to participate, is the response of men to women’s experience of 
their relationship with men. What I will be seeking from you in the interview will 
be your responses and comments on themes and suggestions offered by a 
women’s focus group which discussed the above topics in an earlier stage of this 
research. I realise some of the responses and comments participants may make 
could be quite personal so I will have in place safeguards and confidentiality 
procedures as far as the participant’s information and identity is concerned. I will 
detail these later in this information letter after I have further explained the details 
and procedure of this research.  
Research method 
If you agree to participate in this research you will be involved in the second of 
three stages of the research. That will be an interview with me that will run for 
one and a half hours which will be focussed on the ideas mentioned above. I am 
planning to interview five men in total around these ideas. The interview will be 
video and audio taped so that I can transcribe the discussion in a way that most 
accurately represents what has been discussed. After the interview and after I have 
transcribed the conversation between myself and the participant I will send to 
them a copy of this transcription for them to review and revise. In conjunction 
with this I will also send a letter covering some of what other men in their 
interviews have said, using pseudonyms, so that each male participant can have 
some idea of what the other men have contributed, but within the bounds of 
confidentiality. This letter will also detail suggestions from me that can be offered 
to a second women’s focus group that will compose the third stage of this 
research. Each man can respond to this letter with their ideas for what is to be 
offered to the women in the third stage of the research. In response to this I will 
then write each man a concluding letter outlining what will be taken to the next 
stage of the research under a neutral pseudonym that will help protect 
confidentiality.  
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This third stage of the research involving a second focus group of women will 
discuss the reflections of the men from their interviews, and the themes and 
suggestions offered by the first focus group of women.  I plan to conduct all this 
research at my work address, Tabor College Adelaide Goodwood Campus, 164 
Goodwood Rd, Goodwood, because a comfortable room is available there for 
video and audio taping.  
Safeguards and Confidentiality  
From the tapes of the interview I will write up transcripts which I will then send 
to each man along with a letter as referred to above. Each man can check the 
transcript for accuracy so that it correctly represents what was discussed within 
the interview. The video and audio tapes and transcripts of the interview are 
confidential and the only persons who will be able view or listen to the tapes are 
myself and my two supervisors in New Zealand, Dr Elmarie Kotzé and Dr Kathie 
Crocket whose contact details are at the end of this information sheet. All 
transcripts, documents and tapes related to the research will be stored securely.  
Withdrawal from being a research participant in this second stage of the research 
can occur anytime up until three weeks after the participants receive the 
transcripts of their interview. To withdraw you can complete and post to me in the 
reply paid envelope the form attached at the end of this information sheet, “Notice 
of withdrawal from participation in the research”.  If you do need to withdraw for 
any reason whatsoever this is entirely appropriate and acceptable in this research.  
Your confidentiality is assured during and after this project on the grounds that I 
will not deliberately reveal any information gained from this project to anyone 
through my doctoral thesis, or through being published, or through being 
presented at professional conferences, other than my supervisors. In doing this I 
will use pseudonyms, which you and I can agree on, which will indicate your sex, 
but I will not use any other identifying features except that which is given in the 
actual interviews and in your revised transcripts. 
Process for Participants 
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If after reading this information sheet you choose to participate in this research 
you can read and sign the attached informed consent form and return it to me in 
the reply paid envelope. After I have received the informed consent form I will 
then send you a schedule of possible times for the interview on which you can 
mark your preferred times and send it back to me. The first five time schedules I 
receive back will be how I will choose the men for the interviews. If you are not 
one of those five I will contact you to let you know, and then see if you want to be 
a reserve for the research or whether you would prefer to withdraw your offer of 
participation. 
Kind regards, 
Brian Morris 
Contact details for Brian’s supervisors are: 
 Dr Elmarie Kotzé (Email: elmariek@waikato.ac.nz) and  
 Dr Kathie Crocket (Email: kcrocket@waikato.ac.nz) 
Department of Human Development and Counselling 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton  
New Zealand 
Phone: 0011 or 0018 647 838 4176 
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Appendix F 
Men’s interviews research consent form 
Research Consent Form. (Men’s interviews). 
Research Title:  Heterosexual couples, gender discourse and the production of 
relational subjectivity.  
Researcher: Brian Morris. 
I have read and understood the information for participants in this research which 
was given to me by Brian and have met with him to discuss this research.  
I confirm that: 
I understand that this project is guided by the University of Waikato’s Human 
Research Ethics Regulations. Brian has given me information about how he will 
take responsibility to safeguard my rights and ethical entitlements. 
I agree to the video and audio taping of the interview which will be facilitated by 
Brian. I understand that any recordings or written notes of the interview will be 
kept securely and used for the purposes of this research project. I agree that the 
material as it is used in Brian’s doctoral thesis may be published, or presented at 
professional conferences by Brian. 
I understand that not all of the material transcribed from the video and audio 
recordings of the interview will be used in Brian’s thesis. 
I understand that the material discussed in the interview and used with 
pseudonyms in conjunction with other research participants is confidential and 
cannot be discussed or used outside of the research context except, that material 
which I personally disclosed, and for use by Brian in his doctoral thesis and any 
published material or presentations at conferences. 
I understand that the video and audio tapes and transcripts along with this consent 
form will be accessible to Brian’s supervisors to enable them to hold Brian 
accountable to professional standards and ethics and to provide safeguards to all 
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participants. The supervisors will not reveal any identifying information about the 
participants to any other person.  
Contact details for Brian’s supervisors are: 
 Dr Elmarie Kotzé (Email: elmariek@waikato.ac.nz) and  
 Dr Kathie Crocket (Email: kcrocket@waikato.ac.nz) 
Department of Human Development and Counselling 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton  
New Zealand 
Phone: 0011 or 0018 647 838 4176 
I understand that I have the right to remove or alter identifying information from 
my transcripts and to revise them after the interview as I deem appropriate for fair 
representation of my voice. This also applies to the letter Brian will send to me 
with the transcript after the interview. My preferred way of Brian sending me the 
written material and letters during the actual research process is recorded on the 
form attached to the end of this research consent form.  
I understand that I will be participating in one interview with Brian for one and a 
half hours and that I have been notified what the purpose of this interview is.  
I understand that I may withdraw from this research at any time up until three 
weeks after I receive the transcript of the interview from Brian. I understand that 
to withdraw from this research all I need to do is mail to him the “notice of 
withdrawal from participation in research” which is attached to the information 
sheet Brian has previously given to me. I understand that I do not need to provide 
an explanation for my withdrawal.  
I understand that if I want counselling after participating in this research I may 
contact Brian who will arrange for me to be referred to a reputable counsellor. 
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I understand that I can ask questions at any time and that these will be welcomed. 
This can be when we meet to conduct the research or via telephone or email as 
follows: (Deleted for this thesis appendix) 
Both the mobile and email are confidential.  
I understand that I have received the information I believe is necessary for me to 
give informed consent to participating in Brian Morris’ research project and I 
agree to the terms outlined. 
Signed: _________________________________ 
Name: __________________________________ 
Date: _______________________ 
Preferred way of written communication being sent to me and returned to 
Brian during the research process is: 
Email. 
Ordinary post. 
Registered post. 
Courier. 
(Circle the mode you prefer). 
  
 303 
Appendix G 
Men’s interviews document 
PLEASE NOTE: (This document was sent in landscape orientation to the men. It 
is copied for this thesis appendix in portrait orientation. As in the original 
landscape copy of this document, in this appendix, all records from the men’s 
transcripts align with the relevant questions in the right hand margin). 
Dear Peter, Chris, Andrew, Russell, and William,  
Thankyou to each of you for your willingness to spend time with me offering 
reflections on the document from the women’s focus group and discussing your 
own practices of relationship with your partner. The interviews with each of you 
have contributed very helpfully to the research because you were prepared to 
speak openly of yourself, and your knowledge and experience in relationship.  
This document is a summary of the themes and ideas that I have brought together 
from each of our interviews. I apologise that it has taken some time to get this 
document to you. The collation of information from the interviews and the 
crafting of this document has taken longer than I expected. 
I invite you to read this document, for your own interest’s sake, and also to check 
that it includes fairly aspects of our conversations. I will then take it forward, with 
the first focus group document, to the final focus group of women for their 
reflection and learning. If you could get your response back to me via email, or 
letter, within two weeks, I would greatly appreciate that. Please let me know if 
that will not be possible for you. 
I have arranged the information in this document into a number of themes that 
were common across most, if not all our interviews. In doing this I have only 
included some of your responses from our discussions. If there are responses from 
your interview with me that you would like to have seen included in this 
document, or you want to add or change something, then I invite you to let me 
know when you get back to me in your response to this document. In the column 
to the right of the following pages I have occasionally included questions and 
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responses that reflect my own curiosity and learning at this stage of the research. I 
would appreciate any reflections you want to offer to these. 
In the first section of this document I have focussed on the responses from you 
each to three of the themes in the women’s focus group document. You possibly 
will remember those themes:  
 on the practice of ‘shut-offs’,  
 ‘nagging’ responses, 
 the influence of the relationship and conversations on the 
identity of     the women. 
After this section the document then focuses on the other themes which came up 
consistently in our discussions. These will be clearly headed as you read through 
the document. 
Responses to Women’s focus group document. 
 
a). Shut-off 
The presence of ‘shut-off’ when in conversation 
with your partner was something that each of you 
recognised. Some of you tended to employ ‘cut-
offs’ when your partner was endeavouring to share 
an opinion, usually when the relationship was not 
your central focus at that moment. The most 
common way for you to engage in ‘shut-off’ was 
through the ‘fix-it’ position before the listening 
process was completed in a way that was 
satisfying to your partner.  
 
 
I have a couple of questions 
in response to this 
recognition: What relational 
effects have you noticed 
when this ‘shut-off’ is 
employed? Have there 
perhaps been other ways of 
listening or ‘fixing it’ that 
you have noticed or 
employed?  
  
William, you made a reflective comment about the 
effects of cutting off through moving into a fix-it 
position, “how disempowering the idea or the 
I found William’s comment 
offered me new 
understanding about the 
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attempt to find solutions can be, when your 
partner is trying to talk to you about something”.  
 
Along these lines, Chris you expressed how you 
had learnt anew the power of conversations to 
shape people’s experience by reading how the 
women represented in the focus group document 
felt when they were shut down or told they were 
nagging.  
effects of cutting off my 
partner, or anyone. What can 
you imagine are some of the 
other effects, when having a 
conversation, that being 
shut-down or being called a 
‘nag’ may invite into a 
women’s experience?  
  
b). Nagging 
Most of you had a comment to make on nagging 
and why it occurred or why men refer to it as 
‘nagging’. You suggested, Andrew, when a 
woman moves into a ‘nagging’ response she is 
asking her male partner, “Well have you heard 
me?” Connected to this thought was the idea from 
William that the ‘nag’ response “comes from a 
sense of powerlessness for the woman”, and by 
not listening the male partner is endeavouring to 
control her position in the conversation at this 
time. Peter, you said, “I guess in the nagging she 
feels she is not being respected… not being 
listened to. And ultimately I guess that is an issue 
of power. If I choose not to listen then I’m holding 
the power, and she is powerless because no matter 
how she voices or what she does, action won’t get 
taken on that”. Chris, you suggested a reason men 
might refer to their partner’s requests or voice as 
nagging or ‘a nag’, is a tool to shut them down so 
I am curious about this 
relationship between the 
‘nagging response’, shutting 
down our partners, and 
power. As I re-read the 
women’s focus group 
document what is referred to 
as the ‘nagging response’ 
seems to me to be a call for 
connection. Whereas I 
wonder, when I read these 
responses here and look at 
my own relational history, 
whether it perhaps is 
interpreted by men as 
enacting power, and thus we 
offer responses that limit 
connection, and keep the 
position of power in regard 
to our partners?   
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that men can be left alone. William, after reading 
the women’s focus group document and in 
reflecting on a relationship you had been involved 
in, before your current relationship, you could see 
that as you isolated yourself emotionally from 
your partner she responded to this isolation with 
‘nagging’ as she did not know what else to do to 
repair the relationship. “That sense of nagging as a 
response to powerlessness makes me think that 
perhaps I had more power in my relationship, my 
first relationship than I thought I had”. 
Our combined reflections 
have led me to the following 
questions: If we experience 
our partners stepping into a 
nagging response now, what 
might you suggest we do to 
offer respect and listening to 
them? If we were to consult 
the focus group women what 
do you think they might 
suggest?  
  
c). Relationship and conversation shaping identity 
I have included here some responses from the 
interviews where more time and in depth 
discussion was dedicated to this theme.  
 
Chris, you said, “I was unaware of the power of 
conversation in influencing individuals especially 
in relation to behaviour, self-esteem and identity, 
and how important that was”.  
I can identify fully with 
Chris here. Until I began this 
research I did not understand 
the extent to which language 
shaped people’s experience. 
Needless to say I try and 
watch what I say very 
closely now. I have become 
more aware too of the 
potential effect of other 
people’s words in shaping 
my own identity and 
experience.  
  
Andrew, you gave an example of how your 
partner was shaped by her Father’s abuse which 
resulted in her experience of men being perceived 
within the limits of abuse and control, ringing true 
with some of the expressions in the focus group 
I have some questions 
around this captivating 
moment in your relationship, 
Andrew. What do you think 
this experience opened up 
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document. You then talked about how over time in 
your relationship with each other, this changed, 
and she became more responsive to the shaping 
that came from relationship and conversation with 
you. A big turning point was after she scratched 
the motor car, and was terrified in telling you 
about it, you were relaxed about it, and both of 
you were able to laugh about it.  
for your partner as far as her 
hopes and dreams for 
relationship with you were 
concerned? What were you 
standing for in terms of your 
partner and the relationship?   
  
Andrew, you also mentioned how your partner has 
offered influence to you, “particularly in some of 
those insecurities which were to do with learning 
difficulties. She has nurtured me very well in 
those things as well….It’s certainly not a one-
sided thing”.  
I wonder where Andrew’s 
two nurturing stories take 
each one of us? They offer 
me an opportunity to reflect 
on reciprocal care and 
nurturing in relationship with 
my partner.  
  
Finally, William, you suggested a metaphor, 
sculpting, which reflects how our relationships 
and conversations shape us. “We are sculpting 
each other in the conversations and the day to day 
lives”. You took the metaphor further and 
suggested that a gentle tapping of a mallet might 
reflect helpful shaping that happens in our 
relationships, but that the blows of a hammer will 
be damaging taking chunks out of people. This is 
related to any contact with people, you said, “Any 
time you are in contact with someone you are 
shaping that sandstone just a little tiny bit. It may 
not be much but you just don’t know that you 
might be walking through with a chisel and you 
This metaphor has helped 
me be more aware of my 
conversations. I am often 
aware of when someone is 
taking “a chunk” out of me 
during a conversation. This 
metaphor has once again 
alerted me to my 
responsibility to watch what 
I say so that I do not take 
chunks out of others, but that 
the shaping effect of my 
engagement with them is 
sculpting in a way that 
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might accidentally take a chunk out of someone 
without realising it”.  
contributes beauty to their 
form.   
  
I want to move now from this focus on responses 
to the women’s focus group document to other 
themes I have noted from our interviews, and 
finally, the action you have taken for the 
relationship with your partners.  
 
  
Friendship and honouring in relationship 
The first theme that came out of some of the 
conversations with you was the notion of your 
relationship being based in friendship and 
honouring of each other as opposed to romantic 
notions of heterosexual couple relationships. 
Peter, you and your partner early in your own 
relationship after you had witnessed the end of 
close friend’s marital relationship, “were 
confronted with this idea that there is no 
guarantee” in couple relationships. In reflecting on 
this you and your partner decided that, “I can say 
that I will love you, [but] can I say that I will love 
you in twenty years time? Well actually you can’t. 
It’s a romantic notion that sounds nice, but 
actually I can’t say that, because I don’t know 
what will happen”. You both came to the 
commitment of saying, “the only guarantee that I 
can make to you is that today I will make 
decisions that honour you”.  
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Russell, you were expressing to me this same 
movement in your own understanding of couple 
relationships using a play on the words “in-love”. 
Together we paraphrased this as meaning “moving 
from a romantic understanding of love to a strong 
friendship base”. In reflecting on what really 
makes a relationship work you said, “What is it 
that it means to be in relationship where both 
parties are happy with the relationship, and not 
just assuming things, and not just saying, “okay”, 
because you have got this feeling of love for 
someone that’s it. That is your panacea and the 
relationship will work happily ever after. 
Obviously it didn’t work last time, so why was it 
going to work this time?” After this reflection 
Russell you went on to talk about how you 
realised you had a choice to make about the 
relationship with your partner. This choice is 
referred to later in this document. 
 
  
Cultural and societal ideas 
Through our conversation, Chris and I were able 
to make more visible how cultural and societal 
ideas play a role in how we do relationships. In 
participating in counselling before you got 
married, Chris, you learned that the western 
culture you were raised in ascribes power to men. 
And men may not be aware of this until they move 
into a major relationship where that power has 
been misused in various ways. Russell, you also 
Understanding and coming 
to terms with patriarchy 
during this research has been 
new learning for me. This 
has been integral to 
understanding the 
discrepancies between men 
and women in regard to 
power and privilege in 
society and heterosexual 
relationships. What I have 
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talked about this without initially being aware that 
your behaviour was culturally influenced. In 
reflecting upon your first marriage and now in 
your current relationship, you observed that your 
“second marriage was going to end the same way 
as the first…there is a pattern forming here and it 
is me”. In our continued discussion we developed 
our understanding further from your experience 
and observation of the “auto pilot” or, “this is how 
men do it, and this is how women do it” approach 
to relationship that is culturally driven. We 
eventually came to a position of seeing that 
patriarchy “fits the description” of these cultural 
influences on couple relationships that we had 
discussed.  
found most helpful in 
addressing it is that it is not 
about ‘bagging’ men, or 
feeling guilty or even angry 
about patriarchy, but finding 
ways to help men and 
women to recognise its 
distancing and damaging 
effects on their relationship 
and resist its influence 
together.  
  
In elaborating on how present and pervasive 
cultural and societal ideas are in our lives William 
who supports “domestic and social equality” but 
acknowledges the personal struggles between 
working toward this and being caught into non-
egalitarian practices at times said, “it is interesting 
from the point of view of a guy who thinks that 
equal relationships are a good thing, and who 
thinks that he doesn’t do to badly in that respect, it 
is still interesting to see that nobody escapes the 
social milieu they find themselves in”.  
Is this recognition of the 
pervasiveness of cultural 
ideas (eg. patriarchy) in our 
lives one of the ways that 
can help us question the 
practices attached to them, 
such as ‘cut-offs’? Does this 
recognition help us build 
egalitarian relationship 
practices through friendship, 
honouring, and considerate 
conversations?  
  
Partner awareness  
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With different emphases a quite common theme 
was how each of you gave attention to your 
partners. Peter and Russell, you both referred to 
reading you had done which helped you turn 
toward ascertaining and endeavouring to meet 
your partner’s relational needs. Chris, you used 
the phrase “everyday discipline of listening” as a 
way of both developing and practising partner 
awareness which is essential to learning about 
your partner and learning from your partner. And, 
William you gave some indicator on how this 
might be required to happen at times with your 
partner when discussing concerns that are 
important to her but do not carry the same weight 
of importance with you as the male partner. “I 
have got to be aware that when we are discussing 
stuff that is going to be important for her …that I 
don’t dismiss those sorts of concerns. I have to try, 
even if I don’t understand what the emotion is, I 
have to understand the impact and the importance 
it has for her”. 
  
Vulnerability 
While vulnerability can be abused by either 
partner in the relationship it came through from 
some of you as a position men can learn to take 
more often in the relationship, both in helping our 
partners, but also in learning something from 
them. Andrew, you referred to humbling yourself 
[vulnerably], as part of a spiritual act you 
participate in with your partner, and in admitting 
you make mistakes and apologising to her. In 
I find placing myself in a 
position of vulnerability with 
my partner difficult at times 
because I get caught into 
‘who has the power’ in the 
relationship. My 
conversations with each of 
you, and with the women’s 
focus group, along with 
some reading, have helped 
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doing this you evened out the power inequity that 
can exist in intimate relationships, and placed 
yourself in a position where your partner could see 
that you were approachable on concerns she had 
about the relationship with you. Peter, you talked 
about how difficult vulnerability is in your couple 
relationship even when you know it is something 
that will enrich the relationship. You agreed that 
the sense of power that can be experienced in 
couple relationships can interfere when a member 
of the couple may need to place themselves in a 
position of vulnerability in the relationship.   
me understand that power is 
not attached to people but to 
the ideas we practice our 
relationships by.  For 
example patriarchal ideas 
would have us enact certain 
practices of power in our 
relationships. If we want to 
practice relationship 
according to egalitarian ideas 
then power becomes 
something far more 
negotiable between two 
equals. This understanding 
of power has lessened the 
threat of vulnerability for 
me, opening new ways of 
doing relationship with my 
partner.     
  
Action taken for the relationship 
This could be coined action that is turning toward 
the relationship in contrast with action that is 
turning away from the relationship.  
 
  
a). Self-reflection 
Every one of you indicated that you had done or 
continue to do serious self-reflection on your 
relationship and the part you play in it. Peter, I 
have already mentioned the reflection you 
I am reminded here of an 
email one of the women 
from the focus group sent me 
after that was completed. 
The core of her comment 
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participated in when early in your relationship you 
witnessed the demise of a friend’s relationship. 
Chris, counselling was a catalyst for you taking a 
reflective position on your relationship. Andrew, 
you take a reflective position on how you respond 
to your partner when she has raised a concern with 
you. Often, as a deliberate act, you will raise the 
concern again later, after the pain from the initial 
moment has lifted, which serves to help your 
partner know that you have heard her and you are 
working on the issue raised. Russell, I have 
mentioned your reflective work around the “auto-
pilot” mode of conducting a relationship as you 
became aware that your current relationship was 
heading in the direction of your first. And, 
William, you commented on the impact of the 
focus group document for you saying, “It helps me 
be more self-aware…in the context of 
relationships…that sense that the way we do 
things impacts our partners, and the way that we 
sometimes aren’t aware. I think that self-
awareness in relationships is really what was of 
interest for me. It has been a very good reflecting 
tool…that sort of self-reflection is invaluable.”  
was that for men to change 
they needed to engage in 
serious self-reflection on the 
relationship with their 
female partners, and the 
impact they as men have on 
that relationship. From my 
own experience and from the 
discussions I have had with 
each of you this certainly is 
important groundwork for 
change.  
  
b). A deliberate choice for the relationship  
What I also noted from our discussions in regard 
to action that you took for the relationship was, 
deliberately making a choice for the relationship. 
While each of you have done this in different 
ways and something of your choices has been 
articulated in this document I will mention three 
It was special to hear how 
each of you made a choice 
for the relationship. After 
reading the transcripts of our 
discussions, and in preparing 
this document, it is apparent 
that that choice had with it 
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examples here that I think resonate with your 
individual responses. 
implications for how you 
would conduct yourself in 
the relationship.  
  
Russell, you spoke of three choices that lay before 
you when you realised that your relationship was 
“slipping away”. The choice “to do nothing about 
it”; the choice “to make the break then and there” 
and end the relationship; and the third possibility, 
“this is something we want to rescue and we want 
to make a commitment to make it work again”. In 
a number of places in this document I have 
referred to the action you then took after making 
this third choice for your relationship. 
What is it that you value 
Russell that you should 
choose for the relationship? 
What is it that each one of us 
values that we should choose 
for our relationship with our 
partners? How is that value 
being practiced in the 
relationship now? 
  
William you talked about deliberately having a 
dialogue with yourself at times to make sure you 
question unhelpful assumptions when having a 
conversation with your partner. “You need to 
speak honestly [in your conversations] but I think 
it is important that you sometimes need to think, 
‘is what’s going through my head, is it what I 
really think, is it something that I just take for 
granted’. You know it’s almost as if you have got 
to have a dialogue with yourself about your 
assumptions [before you converse with your 
partner]”.  
 
  
Finally, Chris, you talked about the need to 
deliberately reciprocate the effort women put into 
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a relationship. You said, “If you are appreciating 
and realising the effort that is being put in then I 
think you should be reciprocating that. [Men] need 
to realise the value women hold in the 
relationship, and how much that feeds them…I 
think if you are improving that, and working at 
that then I think it is freeing for them [your 
partner] to be, to try new things, to bring up 
suggestions, to do things”.  Andrew, you gave an 
example of this reciprocity in your relationship. 
Because you cook, one of the things you do is 
cook for your partner and her friends when they 
meet at your house. In commenting on this you 
said, “To actually go to the effort of putting as 
much effort in for her, as [I would] a group that I 
really am more interested in, that’s important 
because it says I honour and recognise the value of 
that [your partner’s] group”.  
 
I want to say thankyou to each of you for your contribution to the ongoing 
conversation about relationship practices available to us as men in heterosexual 
relationships. Thankyou for the stand each of you are taking for the relationship 
with your partner, and for the reflections you have shared with me about the 
purposeful action you are taking for relationship. I hope that it has been a helpful 
experience for each of you, and even productive in some way for you and your 
relationships. It has contributed very beneficially to my research, and to me 
personally, and will continue to do so, for which I am most appreciative of you 
each. Thanks again! 
As I suggested earlier, if there is anything that you would like to see changed or 
added then let me know and I will work with that. If you could get this back to me 
within two weeks of receiving it that would be great.  Cheers,  Brian. 
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Appendix H 
Second focus group further written information on the research 
(third stage, second focus group). 
Further written information on the research 
“Heterosexual couples, gender discourse, and the production of relational 
subjectivity”. 
Thankyou for expressing interest in this research project. This research is toward a 
Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Waikato in Hamilton, New 
Zealand. I will outline in the following a little about myself and the reason for this 
research, my research topic, the research method, safeguards and confidentiality 
procedures for participants, and the process you will be involved in if you wish to 
participate in this research.  
A little about me 
My name is Brian Morris. I am currently a lecturer in counselling at Tabor 
College Adelaide, where I have been since 2004. Before being at Tabor I was 
involved in counselling in private practice at Clovercrest Baptist Church in the 
northern suburbs. Before getting involved in counselling I had some time to study 
full-time, and worked with the Salvation Army. I am a parent and have been 
married for 27 years.  
Reason for this research 
My main area of interest is couples and family counselling and it is from my 
experience in counselling and teaching in these areas that my interest in the topic 
for this research came about. I want that this research will contribute to more 
effective counselling and teaching in the area of couple’s relationships, and 
positively to the relationship between women and men generally. 
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Research topic 
As you would have read in the invitation to participate in this research, this 
research is exploring the experience of women and men in heterosexual 
relationships, including the types of conversations they have with each other, what 
produces the couple’s experience of the relationship, and how an egalitarian 
relationship might be conducted. If you agree to participate in this research the 
part you will be involved in will be the third and final stage which is a women’s 
focus group. In this group participants will respond to themes and suggestions 
offered by another women’s focus group (stage one of the research), and 
responses and reflections offered by men, who I interviewed (stage two), to those 
themes and suggestions from the first women’s group. 
I realise that some of the material to be discussed could be personal for many 
people so I will have in place safeguards and confidentiality procedures as far as 
the participant’s information and identity is concerned. I will detail these later in 
this information letter after I have further explained the details and procedure of 
this research.  
Research method 
If you agree to participate in this research you will be involved in the final of three 
stages of the research. This will be a focus group that will meet once for two 
hours discussing the information I outlined above from the previous two stages of 
this research. I will be facilitating this focus group of six women with the 
offerings from the previous stages of the research. The focus group meeting will 
be video and audio taped so that I can transcribe the discussion in a way that most 
accurately represents what each participant has said. After I have transcribed the 
discussion I will then send to each participant a copy of this transcription from 
which they can review and revise their own contribution so that they feel their 
voice is most adequately represented in the transcript. The only proviso on this 
revision is that the meaning of the discussion is not altered and no other 
participant’s contribution is altered. These revised transcripts will need to be 
returned to me within twenty one days of the participants receiving them. That 
will conclude the participant’s involvement in this research. I plan to conduct all 
 318 
this research at my work address, Tabor College Adelaide Goodwood Campus, 
164 Goodwood Rd, Goodwood, because a comfortable room is available there for 
video and audio taping.  
Safeguards and Confidentiality  
From the tapes of the focus group discussion I will write up transcripts which I 
will send to each woman for them to check that it correctly represents their 
contribution to the group discussion. The video and audio tapes and transcripts of 
the discussion are confidential and the only persons who will be able view or 
listen to the tapes are myself and my two supervisors in New Zealand, Dr Elmarie 
Kotzé and Dr Kathie Crocket whose contact details are at the end of this 
information sheet. All transcripts, documents and tapes related to the research will 
be stored securely. 
Withdrawal from being a research participant in this third stage of the research 
can occur anytime up until three weeks after the participants receive the transcript 
of the focus group meeting. To withdraw you can complete and post to me in the 
reply paid envelope the form attached at the end of this information sheet, “Notice 
of withdrawal from participation in the research”.  If you do need to withdraw for 
any reason whatsoever this is entirely appropriate and acceptable in this research. 
Your confidentiality is assured during and after this project on the grounds that I 
will not deliberately reveal any information gained from this project to anyone 
through my doctoral thesis, or through being published, or presented at 
professional conferences, other than my supervisors. In doing this I will use 
pseudonyms, which you and I can agree on, which will indicate your sex, but I 
will not use any other identifying features except that which is given in the actual 
group discussion and which you state I can use. 
Process for Participants 
If after reading this information sheet you choose to participate in this research 
you can read and sign the attached informed consent form and return it to me in 
the reply paid envelope. After I have received the informed consent form I will 
then send you a schedule of possible times for when the focus group meeting can 
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be held on which you can mark your preferred times and send it back to me. 
When I have received six time schedules back that indicate the same time then I 
will contact those six women regarding the time the meetings are to be held. If 
you are not one of those six I will contact you to let you know, and then see if you 
want to be a reserve for the research or whether you would prefer to withdraw 
your offer of participation.  
Kind regards, 
Brian Morris 
Contact details for Brian’s supervisors are: 
 Dr Elmarie Kotzé (Email: elmariek@waikato.ac.nz) and  
 Dr Kathie Crocket (Email: kcrocket@waikato.ac.nz) 
Department of Human Development and Counselling 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton  
New Zealand 
Phone: 0011 or 0018 647 838 4176 
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Appendix I 
Second focus group research consent form 
Research Consent Form. (Focus Group Two). 
Research Title:  Heterosexual couples, gender discourse and the production of 
relational subjectivity.  
Researcher: Brian Morris.  
I have read and understood the information for participants in this research which 
was given to me by Brian and have met with him to discuss this research. 
I confirm that: 
I understand that this project is guided by the University of Waikato’s Human 
Research Ethics Regulations. Brian has given me information about how he will 
take responsibility to safeguard my rights and ethical entitlements. 
I agree to the video and audio taping of the focus group which will be facilitated 
by Brian. I understand that any recordings or written notes of the focus group will 
be kept securely and used for the purposes of this research project. I agree that the 
material as it is used in Brian’s doctoral thesis may be published, or presented at 
professional conferences by Brian. 
I understand that not all of the material transcribed from the video and audio 
recordings of the focus group will be used in Brian’s thesis. 
I understand that the material discussed in the focus group is confidential and 
cannot be discussed or used outside of that focus group except, that material 
which I personally disclosed, and for use by Brian in his doctoral thesis and any 
published material or presentations at conferences. 
I understand that the video and audio tapes and transcripts along with this consent 
form will be accessible to Brian’s supervisors to enable them to hold Brian 
accountable to professional standards and ethics and to provide safeguards to all 
participants. The supervisors will not reveal any identifying information about the 
participants to any other person. 
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Contact details for Brian’s supervisors are: 
 Dr Elmarie Kotzé (Email: elmariek@waikato.ac.nz) and  
 Dr Kathie Crocket (Email: kcrocket@waikato.ac.nz) 
Department of Human Development and Counselling 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton  
New Zealand 
Phone: 0011 or 0018 647 838 4176 
I understand that I have the right to remove or alter identifying information from 
my transcripts but not change the content of the discussion as recorded in the 
transcript in ways that alters the meaning of the discussion. My preferred way of 
Brian sending me the transcripts after the focus group meeting is recorded on the 
form attached to the end of this research consent form. 
I understand that I will be participating in one focus group meeting for two hours 
which Brian will be facilitating, and that I have been notified what the purpose 
will be for that focus group meeting.  
I understand that I may withdraw from this research at any time up until three 
weeks after I receive the focus group transcript from Brian. I understand that to 
withdraw from this research all I need to do is mail to him the “notice of 
withdrawal from participation in research” which is attached to the information 
sheet Brian has previously given to me. I understand that I do not need to provide 
an explanation for my withdrawal.  
I understand that if I want counselling after participating in this research I may 
contact Brian who will arrange for me to be referred to a reputable counsellor.  
I understand that I can ask questions at any time and that these will be welcomed. 
This can be when we meet to conduct the research or via telephone or email as 
follows: (Deleted for this thesis appendix) 
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Both the mobile and email are confidential.  
I understand that I have received the information I believe is necessary for me to 
give informed consent to participating in Brian Morris’ research project and I 
agree to the terms outlined. 
Signed: _________________________________ 
Name: __________________________________ 
Date: _______________________ 
Preferred way of written communication being sent to me and returned to 
Brian during the research process is: 
Email. 
Ordinary post. 
Registered post. 
Courier. 
(Circle the mode you prefer). 
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Appendix J 
Second focus group, research design summary and discussion 
guide  
Questions for second focus group. 
Before going on to the questions for our focus group, I will briefly outline the 
project so far to give the history of how the two documents I have sent you came 
about.    
The women’s group document. 
The first document is the culmination of three focus group sessions with six 
women held over a period of two months toward the end of 2008. In those three 
sessions we discussed a number of relationship themes which emerged from their 
experience of heterosexual relationships with their partners, or ex-partners. In 
between the first and second sessions and the second and third sessions I sent 
them each a summary document of the previous session which they would check 
for accuracy and then accept or reject as a reliable representation of the session. A 
major focus was how the women’s experience was shaped by conversations with 
their partner, particularly where there was a power imbalance as to who directed 
and controlled the conversations. After the final session, in conjunction with my 
research supervisors I sent the participants the document you now have which 
summarises the core themes of our three discussions. They each approved and 
accepted this document as a reliable representation of the themes discussed over 
the three meetings we had together. 
The men’s document. 
The women’s group document was then taken to separate interviews I had with 
five men as an invitation for them to respond by exploring their own experience 
of the identified dimensions of heterosexual relationship(s). In these interviews I 
used questions much like what I have prepared below, for your exploration, to 
invite the men to reflect on and respond to the women’s focus group document. 
The second document you have is a summary of those five interviews with the 
men conducted during mid 2009. After I interviewed each man I sent him a 
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transcript of our interview, then he would accept it or suggest some alteration 
according to his memory of the interview. After all five interviews, in conjunction 
with my research supervisors, I then prepared the document you have which 
summarises the main themes and ideas from all the men’s interviews. I also 
added, in a right margin some of my own questions and thoughts in conjunction 
with the summary and responses from the men. This document was sent to the 
men so they could check that their contribution to this document was a fair and 
reliable representation.   
The next step in the process. 
The research design concludes the consultations with a third stage of presenting 
these documents from the previous two stages of the research to a new focus 
group of women.  I invite the women in this second group to reflect on and 
respond to both these documents. My intention in this structure is to enable a final 
perspective to be offered by a women’s group. This final stage is the part I am 
inviting you to engage in.    
The names in the two documents you have are pseudonyms. And I invite you also 
to come up with a pseudonym for yourself that can be used with any documents 
that will be viewed outside of this focus group, including my thesis. 
Your part in the research. 
The position I am inviting you to take in regard to these two documents is that of 
a witness to the women and men whose ideas and discussions led to these 
documents. I am interested in and would like to invite you to discuss your first 
impressions, anything that particularly stands out for you, and ideas that you hold 
after having read these documents. Below I offer four types of questions that can 
act as an initial invitation for reflection on each group/document. If you have your 
own questions in response to these documents you are welcome to bring them as 
well, or you can shape the questions below to suit.  My hope is that you can speak 
of what interests you particularly, without a sense of particular expectation or 
evaluation. 
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Questions for the first document. The Women’s Focus group. 
1. After you have read the first document of the women’s focus group, 
may I ask what stands out for you if you reflect on the document? This 
could be something specific or an overview or an impression. Was 
there anything that captured your attention that stayed with you, or 
invited you to think about something they said? 
2. As you read through the document or if you reflected on it afterwards 
were there any images, metaphors, pictures that came to mind that 
might help me grasp something of your response to the document?  
3. Connecting back to the first question. If something did stand out for 
you, or captured your attention, or invited you to think about 
something they said do you have an idea why it did so?  
4. As you read the document or reflected on it may I ask you where, if 
anywhere, did this document take you in regard to your thinking about 
relationships?  
Questions for the second document.  Interviews with the men. 
1. After you have read the second document of the men’s interviews, 
may I ask what stands out for you if you reflect on the document? This 
could be something specific or an overview or an impression. Was 
there anything that captured your attention that stayed with you, or 
invited you to think about something they said?  
2. As you read through the document or if you reflected on it afterwards 
were there any images, metaphors, pictures that came to mind that 
might help me grasp something of your response to the document?  
3. Relating back to the first question, if anything did stand out or invited 
you to be curious, either by its presence or absence in the document, 
may I ask you, why it did so? 
4. As you read these two documents or reflect on them can you tell me 
what meaning you make of the documents, heterosexual relationships, 
or on relationships in general, or anything else...?  
Thanks for your time with this research thus far, and for your willingness to 
participate. I look forward to meeting with you and the other women in the group 
and sharing in conversation about your responses to these documents and the 
ideas they offer about relationships. 
Brian. 
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Appendix K 
First focus group first meeting narrative research document 
First Focus Group, meeting one, narrative document.  
Dear Ali, Carmen, Hannah, Annie, Sue, Sarah, 
First of all I want to say thankyou so much for your contribution to this first 
meeting we have had. As I said toward the end of the meeting that just hearing 
each of you speak about your experience was a powerful learning for me. I am 
honoured and privileged by the sharing of your stories and hope that I will do 
these justice.  
To briefly explain the purpose and format of this document: First of all it is 
intended to be a brief summary of the group discussion around the themes and 
ideas that were discussed by each of us and, secondly, some questions that are 
possible areas of further discussion that you might like to take up when we meet 
next time. I acknowledge that this document is a summary of the group’s 
discussion, which I have taken from my transcription of the meeting, and hence 
you may have said something of importance that I have not picked up and 
included here. If this is so don’t hesitate to include them in your feedback to me 
the next time we meet.  
The group discussion touched on several questions such as for example: 
 Can you share with us the kind of words and tone of language you and 
your partner use, or used, when talking about an important decision to be 
made?   
 Would this tone and words be the same for all conversations about 
important decisions? 
 Would there be differences depending on the decision to be made? 
 Are there situations where either of you controlled the conversation? 
Carmen: You spoke of the tone in a conversation being dependent upon the times 
when insecurity starts having a voice in your relationship, and the conversation 
and decision being focussed on something that either of you might feel personally 
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attached to. You gave the example of your partner wanting to buy something that 
he really had become “personally connected” to, but you had suggested this was 
not possible financially, to which he would initially respond with frustration in his 
tone (a kind of growl was the noise you made to imitate this), and then after 
thinking about it himself, you said he would calm down and agree with you. 
Sarah: In taking up the themes that Carmen had introduced you spoke of how in 
your experience the tone of language is associated with conversations around 
something that is “very precious to you”. You went on to say, “In some of my 
experiences you know my partner won’t necessarily always understand straight 
away, and then I may explain things which obviously will make sense, but for me 
it can get quite frustrating. I can get more tense, my tone kind of raises, my voice 
raises or it lowers, but it is usually a direct stress related thing where I feel 
anxious, so that is sort of, ‘why don’t you just understand’? But I think that’s 
because there is a really big personal investment in it, and that’s usually when I 
think it occurs in big decisions.” Then Sarah, you suggested, that this probably 
goes for your partner when conversing with you as well, as you both, when 
bringing something for discussion and a decision to be made presume the partner 
has also been thinking about it. Then you talked about the importance of “having 
the opportunity to communicate enough.”  
Sarah, you went on to explain “communicate enough” to mean the following, “If 
you don’t spend enough time communicating its just sort of shut off, then it can 
really deflate your confidence in the relationship about, can I make these big 
decisions with someone, who am I going to talk to? And, like not to get too big 
but, leading to a point where maybe you turn to other people with your bigger 
decisions instead of your partner”.  
I note that this being “shut off” is referred to off and on throughout our first 
meeting. I wonder then, whether this is a practice that happens often, or is 
significant in relationships, to be discussed further by the group? If so, perhaps the 
following questions can contribute to the discussion. How can “shutting off” not 
have the final say about the relationship, and for equal opportunities in the 
conversation between partners? What can men do to help grow the hope for equal 
space in a relationship?  
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Hannah: You joined in and spoke about “shutting off”. “If you’re shut down all 
the time then you can’t share decisions with your partner, you havn’t got a choice. 
And if you shut down on every front, then there is no partnership anymore.” You 
also said how the threat of physical violence leaves you without a choice in a 
heterosexual relationship, and even when this is not present, your experience 
spoke of men ending the relationship when you bring into the conversation topics 
that they don’t want to talk about. Hannah, do you think this leaving the 
relationship is an action that stands against, staying in the relationship, or hanging 
in there when the going gets tough? 
Sarah: You then spoke and elaborated on your experience by describing how your 
partner, even though “he’s not aggressive”, would sometimes use his power as a 
man to try and control conversations to show that he knows what is going on. This 
frightened you, and eventually he got counselling at your suggestion. How was 
this for you Sarah, to experience him taking up your suggestion? Would he have 
been able to recommend this to himself or was it your suggestions that brought 
this idea forward?  
Sue: you talked about how early in your marriage your partner would retreat from 
your wanting to have a conversation with him on important matters to you, 
“especially to do with the kids”, and that would leave you with the feelings of 
frustration and anger. You spoke of how writing down the things that gave rise to 
the frustration, what your partner had said, and talking about this with God at the 
same time, would help settle the frustration and anger. “And then I would rip it up 
and throw it away, and then I’d be calm enough to go out and have a sensible 
conversation”. “Gradually”, you said Sue, “I think he began to enjoy the talking 
out, eventually we learned to talk everything out.” Looking at the way in which 
the “talking out” aspect of the relationship developed, is there an incident that 
stands out as very significant when you did not have to invite him back but he 
instead turned towards the dialogue? 
Ali: You said how Sue’s experience resonates with you a bit. That early in your 
relationship it took a lot for you to get your partner to the point that “he was 
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actually listening and wanting to engage”. But at times he did not want to be 
engaged and talk about what you were raising, so he would escape because he’d 
never experienced the type of conversation you wanted to engage him in. 
However now, you said Ali, “we have worked it out, so now we don’t get to that 
point.” Earlier you referred to one of those ways I think, of conducting an ‘open’ 
conversation between each other by the use of emails when he is at work. You 
mentioned how the email provides “that space in between, so he has time to look 
at it and respond if he wants to, or we can talk about it when you get home if it is 
important enough”. You mentioned later that some of your verbal discussions can 
get “very energetic” and that sometimes, not as often now though, he may still not 
want to engage, and escape the conversation. What are your thoughts Ali, about 
what the email provides for your partner, for you, and for the relationship?  
Annie: You spoke of your partner taking a passive stance, especially in the area of 
making decisions. You made the distinction between your partner communicating 
clearly and intelligently to an audience in his employment, and the 
communicating required in his personal responsibilities, especially decision-
making at home. Annie, you said this passive stance then positions you to make a 
decision and, “…I just resent that it ends up being me.” What does that 
resentment speak of Annie? Does the resentment speak of the discomfort of being 
positioned to step up into making a decision, or a resentment that passivity got the 
last word in the relationship? Does it speak of a sadness of what gets left out of 
the relationship, or does it speak more of the hopes and possibilities you hold for 
the relationship?  
I mentioned earlier about the “shutting off” idea that gets a grip on how 
relationships are conducted, and that because it appeared throughout the group’s 
discussion it might be a possible further topic to take up when we next meet. 
Some further questions around this theme that could contribute to the discussion 
are: What happens for you when responsibility and meaning in the relationship 
cannot be negotiated any longer and shutting off takes over the relationship? How 
are you placed when this happens? What would you prefer shared responsibility 
or negotiation to look like? Has there ever been a time when what you prefer a 
conversation to look like has happened? How do you feel at times like this? 
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Carmen: You spoke of how you are in a similar situation where you take on 
“more and more things as far as responsibilities”, and you spoke of your partner 
being focussed on “one-track, the business” referring to his employment situation, 
and how “there are many things that are not important to men”. Carmen, is it your 
experience that women are being responsible for much of what happens in the 
home, while the men tend to maintain responsibility mainly for employment or 
the work outside of domestic and relational responsibilities? If so, how does this 
position women? How is this for you?  
Toward the end of the first hour Ali you raised a point, but before you could 
continue and explain your situation I unfortunately interrupted you. You said, “I 
feel like I pretty much drive the relationship, and drive the decisions …” 
(Unfortunately I interrupted you there, and I apologize). If I had given you the 
opportunity to complete, may I ask, what would you have said? 
One example, that the group raised, where this driving of the decisions happens 
was the area of finances. Some of you shared how often the responsibility for 
organising the finances will fall with you. For some, you do all of the finances, for 
others of you the finances are shared with your partner. May I ask, regarding the 
finances (and other relational and home responsibilities) have you just taken these 
responsibilities on because “someone has got to do it” or have you been able to 
have a conversation around this with your partner and come to an agreement you 
are both happy with? In conjunction with the discussion around finances Ali and 
Sarah, raised the idea of “letting go”, where your partner has capably managed the 
finances when you have been ill, or when you have asked him to do a task, “he’s 
fine” with it. 
With the idea of “letting go”: What do you let go of? When do you know it is the 
right time to let go of something? What knowledge do you use to make the 
decision of letting go of something?  
 
Sue: You used the metaphor of the gopher as your partner and yourself as the bird 
swooping and giving information and ‘the gopher’ would then hide again, but 
then you would work at inducing ‘the gopher’ out of the hole so a conversation 
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could take place. Do you see this as a woman partner taking responsibility for the 
health of the relationship, or steps towards an equal sharing of the relational and 
home responsibilities? What are your hopes for these investments you make in the 
relationship? This is obviously open for discussion if you would like to take this 
up when next the group meets. 
When it came to the experience of the relationship each person in the group had 
much to share. I will now briefly summarise this with some questions added on 
that you might like to take up for discussion when we meet next.   
Sarah: You shared how the controlling angry behaviour that your partner 
sometimes exerted would leave you scared and shocked. At your suggestion he 
got counselling. What made it possible for you to respond to him from a position 
of suggesting he get counselling and stop the inappropriate power use? How was 
it for you to step into such a position? Then a little later on you said in relation to 
your partner getting counselling, “I just thought it was so amazing that he was 
willing first of all to go there, he was really scared …. In so many ways he is such 
a hero to be able to do that in my eyes because that’s so huge.” Do you hear these 
words as admiration on your part Sarah, as a result of your partner participating in 
counselling, in contrast to the fear and shock you have also experienced in this 
relationship? 
I don’t know if you are interested in talking further about this range of emotions 
Sarah, but if you are I have included some questions which may help with this. 
How did your partner going to counselling result in such a change in emotions for 
you? Did these emotions then impact on how you related to him? Is there a 
relationship between how the two of you relate to each other and the changes the 
counselling brought about?   
Ali: Early in our discussion in regard to you and your partner communicating via 
email you said, “But I think it’s quite nice, it’s that writing thing, but I send it and 
say this is what I’ve been thinking, do you think we should do this?” 
What is it about this way of communicating that makes it special, for you and the 
relationship, and maybe for him? What does this emailing make possible that 
would not have been there if you had not explored this way of communicating? 
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Whose idea or suggestion was it to talk in this way? How did you come to an 
agreement that this was a helpful way of talking? 
Annie: You spoke of your partner not taking “a leadership role in our family”. 
You went on to describe how your partner enjoys talking and being with you, “but 
we didn’t come to any decisions, we didn’t…so I’m left feeling open all the time 
and its quite vulnerable, like I think, I could decide to pack up and go overseas 
and he’d go ‘that’s great’…. Yes, so it’s really, really hard to live with that.” 
Annie, I wonder, does this mean that he doesn’t want to take control and, in not 
doing this, is acting against dominant ideas of male leadership?  Or, is he acting 
from a power position by not saying clearly how these ideas are for him? Are 
there ideas around leadership that you would prefer to hang on to, and others that 
you would like to negotiate with your partner?   
In the second half of the second hour together we spent time talking about your 
experiences in response to your partner’s varying expressions of anger, even when 
these expressions are rare or a small percentage of time. I have already mentioned 
some of the discussion from this time in the meeting, and I will now outline the 
other contributions from the group.   
Carmen: You began this part of the discussion by talking about your experience of 
the feelings of confusion and hurt when your partner takes on a position in your 
relationship that you do not expect, and it is harmful to you. You said, “It’s almost 
like a double, like two people sometimes and that kind of confuses me, and it 
hurts me because it’s almost, like it’s a stranger, because it’s not the person I feel 
safe with….that can be actually quite harmful, you know can cause some 
wounds….It’s such a shock because we get along so well. I’ll just do my role and 
I’ll do whatever and then this side comes up, and I find that really difficult to live 
with.”  
This sharing by Carmen then opened the way for the sharing of equivalent type 
experiences from others in the group. 
Hannah: Earlier in the conversation you shared how your partner brings violence 
into the relationship. At this point in the discussion you shared how you began to 
take self-defence classes so you could feel confident in protecting yourself. You 
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also mentioned how you learnt not to show fear and “be calm and matter of fact 
and casual”, and to “wear clothes he didn’t like, to say, ‘right I’m not under your 
control…I’m making this decision”. The important thing to you was that he did 
not know what you were feeling and that you gave him the message that you were 
in control. If I may ask, where did the ideas, the skills and knowledge, come from 
for you to re-position yourself in relation to him like this? How important a 
development was this for you and the relationship? Were these skills the ones that 
kept you safe in the relationship?  
Annie: You commented on the cane laundry basket having a kick from your 
partner in the side of it, and how this event while not leaving you feeling unsafe it 
did threaten your emotional state. Your children also commented on this kick in 
the basket that your partner had put there. Does your partner now use this as a 
reminder of how he prefers not to act? Or is this something that is not talked about 
in your house? 
Ali: You talked about an incident where you and your partner had a heated 
discussion in front of your children recently. The experience for you was one of 
asking, “who is that person that is saying that?” Were these words speaking of 
your non-recognition of your partner’s presentation of himself? What else did 
these words speak of for you?  
Sarah: You expressed confusion, I think, at the unpredictable behaviour of your 
partner when first he would display much anger, and then afterwards he would 
return very apologetic and “almost cowering”. You mentioned how for you this 
behaviour was just “so odd”, and wondered why if he felt bad about doing this 
behaviour why he would do it in the first place. You explained later, how at times 
when your partner is expressing anger, “you feel extremely clear headed at that 
time…all the radars are going…this is not a good situation, you need to calm 
down, you need to leave, lets sort this out….This is almost instinctive…you just 
know you have to get them either out or deal with this….Its like you can feel that 
its going to, could be danger…” How did you know that you needed the radar 
going for your safety? How do you get this radar operating? Have you 
successfully used this radar in the past?  
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Hannah: In response to Sarah here you explained how you never had this radar or 
warning system operating in your relationship. You expressed how you did ask 
the question, “who is this person, where did they come from?” You went on to say 
in response to this, “I just ignored him. And then sometimes he would walk out. 
And I’d go, ‘why have you left?” You said, how you were “totally 
bamboozled”…. “I was totally confused” by his behaviour,   but you did not 
experience fear until he became physically violent. You explained how you did 
not have this radar for danger or experience fear because, “I hadn’t seen my father 
be angry with my mother….I’d not been fearful of my dad, and my mum had 
never been fearful of my dad.” I wonder Hannah, even though your relationship 
with your parents did not teach you about fear, and physically violent 
relationships where fear is present, how it may have prepared you to know what 
you do not want in a relationship? Is there something that you took from your 
parent’s relationship with each other, and with you, that has contributed in helpful 
ways to your relationships?  
I really appreciated the group’s open sharing around this topic of unpacking your 
experience when your partner expresses anger and takes up a power-full position 
in relation to you. Anything from fear through to surprise and shock at the 
unexpected behaviour from your partner describes the experience of yourselves in 
response to your partner’s position at times like this.  
The additional questions I would like to ask that we may take up in the next 
meeting are: Are there alternate position(s) to the one he is offering you when he 
is in this power-full position? Obviously when hearing your stories it is different 
for each relationship, but what do you use to read the situation with your partner? 
How do you know what to do?  
How can men be challenged and made aware of the effects of their actions? What 
do you think needs to happen for this to be possible? 
Finally I just want to say thankyou again for your contributions to this research. 
And, once again, if you think I have missed anything important in this document 
from the first focus group meeting, then please let me know when we meet next 
time.   
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I look forward to meeting up with you all again on November the 4th. 
Cheers, 
Brian. 
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Appendix L 
First focus group second meeting narrative research document 
First focus group, meeting two, narrative document. 
Dear Sue, Sarah, Annie, Ali, Hannah and Carmen, 
Thankyou very much for your very helpful contribution to the second meeting we 
had. I have found the two times we have met together now most exhilarating and 
a great opportunity for me to learn much about your experience. It is a unique 
opportunity for me and I am indeed privileged to be doing this research with you.  
In this narrative document I hope I do your stories justice, and that the questions I 
put forward are helpful for you to take your stories further along in a way that is 
beneficial for you. 
In the first part of the first hour of our second meeting I sought your feedback to 
the first narrative document that you had received after the first meeting, and 
whether I had missed anything significant from that meeting. 
Carmen: Your immediate response was that the document was helpful for 
“remembering what we all said”, and that “even beyond some of the things that I 
shared it made me think”. You went on to say how in your thinking it helped you 
understand what was happening for you, particularly in the area of being shut 
down, and that you were trying to find a solution to this.  
Sarah: You mentioned how the “questions were really clear and they helped. I felt 
that they helped push it further.” That the document “gave me a moment to kind 
of process what you (Brian) were asking.” You spoke of the difference in answer 
you would have given if the questions were asked “on the spot. The answer would 
be very different probably it wouldn’t have been very reflective.” But later on 
gave you the opportunity to say “more of what I wanted to say.”  
Hannah: You responded to the document by agreeing with Carmen and Sarah, 
saying “Both of those things,” in reference to remembering what we had all said 
in the first meeting, and how the questions were clear and helped you process 
what we had been discussing in that meeting. 
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Annie: You spoke of feeling disappointed because the document “tapped into the 
hardest part of our relationship…decision-making”. You went on to talk about 
this, saying how the document “just brought up what I struggle with the most in 
our relationship. We don’t make decisions, and I’m not entirely blaming (my 
partner) because some decisions are mutual, but we both wait for each other, and 
so it’s not resolved. And some of the really big ones I think he could make and he 
doesn’t, or at least take some initiative.” Reflecting on this Annie, what aspects of 
the decision-making do you value?  
As a part of the conversation with Annie I also asked the whole group then how I 
as a male researcher could work in a way that is respectful and validating of your 
feelings?  
Hannah: Your response was to suggest that this was happening by saying, “I 
guess listening, and the fact that you have shown us in the document that you 
have picked up and noticed things”. 
Sue: You commented how the discussion is validating for each of the women in 
this group because of the common problems you are sharing. You said, “we have 
all had problems communicating at some time, we don’t as women with women, 
but we have all had with the one’s we love the most, nearest and dearest, the 
opposite sex.” There were much sounds of agreement around this idea from the 
group.  
After this we then moved into discussion for the rest of the first hour around the 
shutting off theme that had arisen from the first meeting and highlighted in the 
first document. The questions in that document related to shutting off and having 
the final say in the relationship or for equal opportunities in discussion.  
Sarah: You said how it helps if your partner understands that you are “just 
sounding things out, and that they don’t presume it is sorted, so they don’t shut it 
down.” You continued to explain how, sometimes you negotiate with you partner 
when you are sounding things out and he thinks this is what you actually want to 
do, that you at times feel “is it worth it, is it worth explaining or justifying why 
I’m explaining this, or should I just leave it and talk to someone else?”  
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If I could ask a question of this Sarah? What does this last sentence in the, “is it 
worth explaining”, or “justifying why” speak of?  
You went on to explain in regard to talking to someone else, “I won’t do it 
anyway, which defeats the purpose of that communication.” And in regard to 
sounding things out and men growing hope you said, “what men can do to help 
grow that hope is … I feel more hope when I know that it is a safe forum for me 
to sound things out. And lots of things come out of that when we are talking in 
that kind of zone. Things come out that I didn’t even think of that help me. You 
know it’s the idea of doing something alone or together. Two heads are better than 
one kind of thing.”  
Sarah, you talked about how you “just want to resolve things” at times, and that it 
might be confusing for a man trying to work out which you were doing, sounding 
things out, or resolving things. You suggested it might be helpful to let them 
know when you want to resolve things or just sound them out.  
Carmen asked a question around the difference between men and women when it 
came to giving information and discussion around important decisions, where 
some women can tend to “embellish … explore and listen” whereas men tend to 
say, “Just tell me what you want me to do and I’ll do it … don’t bother me with 
all the details.” You also mentioned Carmen that some women you know get to 
the point and do not embellish or explore. 
Some discussion ensured around the idea that these differences are constructed in 
society and the way we talk in our everyday conversations, because we do see 
where these differences are not simply divided down traditional gender lines. 
Sue, you then came in with comments from your own relationship where “it’s like 
turning on the light” for your partner when he realised his impact on the 
relationship when he tried to fix things quickly without further discussion. You 
said Sue how when he came with the “short answer” to “fix it” it would kill the 
discussion and the opportunity of solving the problem together. You were “cut 
off” and “shut down” at times like this, “and it just took all the joy out of it.” You 
then went on to say how your partner from his own reading and counsellor 
training realised what he was doing and said, “I keep ending the conversations 
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don’t I. I keep spoiling this.”  This then gave more room for exploration and open 
discussion in your relationship.  
Sarah, you raised the point then that “the equal opportunities … opened up 
things” for your partner. You gave the example of shopping today for a mattress 
where he did the sounding board thing with you, and that during the day both of 
you were communicating with each other equally even to the point you said, “I 
think he was sort of a bit surprised by today, and he suggested things I wouldn’t 
have thought of.” The equal opportunities are positive in that “he doesn’t have to 
have a solution…. He has got opportunities to discuss things… and have 
suggestions from the female that they wouldn’t have thought of.” After some 
further discussion you went onto say Sarah how this type of process builds the 
relationship, “I think that once the man does that it fosters a really good 
environment, they feel encouraged and trust to do it again.”  
How would you describe this kind of talk Sarah, and what would you call the 
“other” kind of talk? What do you see as the difference? What does the one bring 
into the relationship that the “other” kind of talk doesn’t? 
Sarah, you said, “It’s weird isn’t it. It’s almost like you feel like you’ve got this, 
sounds terrible, but you’ve almost got like these little secrets and you can see how 
potentially it could help not only you but them and the relationship. And you can 
see all this thing in a whole matrix thing, it makes sense, you can see it all. If only 
they will just understand and come and meet me in this place.” The difficulty you 
said is then getting them into this place, “but when you get there it is great”. 
Conversely to this you shared how easy it is for shutting off to quickly separate 
the two of you. It only needs to happen a few times and then you do not persist in 
trying to connect, you end up doing your own thing, “and then it wouldn’t be very 
enjoyable”.  
If it is okay, I have some questions for the whole group around these ideas. What 
specifically is it, that makes sense, that can potentially help you, them and the 
relationship? What is it, do you think, that stops men from understanding and 
meeting their partners “in this place”? What is “this place” like?  
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Hannah: You took up the theme of shutting off creating a “big distance” between 
you and your partner, “When they shut me down then you are getting further and 
further apart, and then you eventually break-up”. In reference to the “sounding 
things out” mentioned earlier you said, “it’s more sort of a brainstorming. Like, 
what do you know, what do I know, what have you heard, and just …gathering 
information.” You talked about part of being in a relationship was valuing what 
your partner wants to say and wanting to hear what they have to say. You gave an 
example of something a partner may say when they are not in this valuing 
position, “O, well I don’t care, (or) I’m not interested, (or) you can do something 
on your own”, this leaves you with the idea that, “okay well I’m not valuable”. 
If I may ask you a few questions around this valuing theme Hannah?  Is it right to 
say that when your partner was not in a valuing position in relation to you, that 
this left you in a de-valued position? What effect does this have on your identity? 
When this happens in the relationship what do you do? 
Ali: You referred to a question in the first narrative document concerning you and 
your partner’s communication where you sometimes use email, and how this 
related to the shutting down theme being discussed at this time. With email you 
said how it protects against you embellishing too much while providing the 
opportunity to use the “dot point” approach which gives the information needed 
for your partner, but you can still communicate something of what you are feeling 
without “the flourish that I would if I verbalised it because often I go off on 
tangents.” This provides your partner with “the space for him as a male to take 
this stuff on, and sometimes solve it, but sometimes just reflect for a bit longer on 
what I said, and because I have been a bit more succinct maybe it meets his need 
for not having the embellishment that he sometimes finds frustrating”.  
You thought the email was working because it gave you the “opportunity to be a 
bit cheeky” communicating emotion without getting emotional, being kinder and 
not have the chance to be angry.” The email also provided you with the 
opportunity to have a protected conversation without the kids being present. The 
emails are part of the process, making it possible to move “onto the next stage of 
the discussion”. 
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Sue: You said when you want to discuss something important with your partner 
you give him little bits of information at a time, so that he has time to think about 
it in between the times you give him the information, and eventually you can have 
a discussion around the point you raised.  
Ali: You talked about your partner having a telephone conversation with his 
mother. In a rather humorous way you told how when he gets off the phone to his 
mother all he could say was that “we are going for lunch on Sunday”. But you 
knew there was more to it than that, so you devised a plan by taking notes of the 
conversation from what he says on the phone, then when the phone call is 
completed you repeat back to him what he said which then sparks his memory of 
what his mother said to him. Now he remembers what these telephone 
conversations are about because he knows you “like this stuff”.  
Ali: you then further illustrated how your partner does things that are important 
for you in the context of reporting to you conversations that are had at school 
meetings. “He literally now takes pages and pages of notes and writes down 
exactly what people said, because he knows when he gets home that reporting to 
me is the most important thing …”. As a result of this you said, “I just feel so 
connected to him because he’s made that effort”. You felt your partner did this 
because, “it helps our relationship. I don’t think he really cares about the other 
stuff.” You confirmed that it was because he cared about you. 
You also shared Ali how specific you are in your requests of your partner to do 
what is important for you, and the frustration you feel when you don’t get the 
information back that you would like, or he attempts to shut down the 
conversation. The example was, “this may not be important to you but it’s really 
important to me, and I need you to do it”. Then you said how when he does it it’s 
rewarding for both you and him, and it helps him to do this again for you.  
A question in regard to the specific position you take when he attempts to shut 
you down or has not done what is important to you. How do you manage to take 
steps to challenge this “shut down” or “this is not important enough” position? 
Where do you find the other position to take, that of refusing the “shut down” or 
“this is not important enough” invitation? How do you plan the invitation you 
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communicate to him that he needs to consider what is important to you? What 
hopes do you hold when you communicate the expectations?  
There are two things that stand out for me from this section in our conversations: 
First, is your resourcefulness to get what is important to you when you are unable 
to do it yourself, and secondly, the part your male partner plays in doing what is 
important for you. I have two questions related to these ideas which anyone in the 
group can respond to if you want:  
If you see this gaining what is important to you as significant, what drives this 
resourcefulness?  And, what do you think happens for your partner that he would 
change and work hard at doing what is important for you?  
Annie: you then came into the conversation and offered information from your 
relationship concerning being shut down and how men can offer hope to a 
relationship. You shared in regard to your partner how “he is not connecting 
emotionally”. You shared how he is not empathic with you, giving the example of 
a recent difficulty you have had with an assignment where while you had a good 
discussion around the problem he did not once empathise with your emotional 
position concerning the problem. You then gave examples from your partner’s 
family concerning their non-connection emotionally as a family. How when they 
meet, or when they telephone each other, it is not for connecting purposes but for 
other reasons such as wanting to give something away or talking politics, “when 
I’m with them I just think, no one’s talking, they are talking politics, and they are 
talking about success and all these things, no one’s talking to each other. I get 
quite frustrated”.   
 
Your partner’s mother connected with people, but now that she has died, the men 
cannot connect emotionally. Because of the parents’ missionary history, and the 
sons including your partner, all being separate from the parents for a great deal of 
time it was always intensely emotional for the children either when they were 
separate from their parents or when they were together. So you are saying the best 
way to deal with all this emotion was to keep it in, as you said, in regard to the 
parents and the children while they were growing up, “when they are with them 
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it’s intensely emotional, you are not going to let it all out, and when you are not 
with them it’s intensely emotional so you are not going to let it out, so you are just 
on this tightrope the whole time … as young boys growing up ….there is that 
history of not communicating the whole hurt.”  
You went on to explain Annie, that your partner expressed more emotion than any 
of his brothers, but that it is still held in because it may open a “floodgate” if it is 
expressed completely. You mentioned how he does not show empathy when you 
are struggling with something, and as I read your story through the transcript, I 
also wonder if part of the story is that your partner does not disclose any emotion 
to you, especially pain or hurt.  
That was the conclusion of the first hour. In the second hour we decided to just go 
around the group and answer any of the questions from the first narrative 
document that each of you may want to answer. 
Sarah: You responded first of all to the question about your partner taking up 
counselling at your suggestion or would he have been able to recommend this to 
himself? You said you did not think he would have “initiated” counselling, but 
that he did respond to your “advice” to get counselling.  In terms of what made it 
possible for you to suggest he get counselling and how was it for you to step into 
such a position, you responded that early in the relationship he got angry and 
suggested he get counselling. He “agreed that he was getting angry”. After trying 
a couple of different counselling places and during pre-marriage education it was 
clearly revealed that anger was a concern, one of the educator’s suggested he do 
some anger management training at a men’s health organisation. This is where 
you said he was challenged by a counsellor who asked him “are you happy to be 
called an abuser?” She was “suddenly very specific … which stepped it up a 
level”. You felt that it was “that specificness (which) made him address it”. In 
terms of him as hero, you said “I think what it was for me is that I see he’s trying 
to create the new path for his life…which is really difficult, which why in my 
mind I see him as a hero, and then yes it does change the relationship.” You 
talked about how the problem is for you now to “trust him again…I have to re-
learn to trust him”. Your partner’s anger is “a weakness and every now and then 
he might need counselling to refresh….Our relationship is positive because for me 
 344 
I feel a sense of safety, and a knowledge if worse comes to worse he’ll go back to 
the counsellor.”  
Sarah, you said you needed the radar for safety as well as your intuition, and 
assessing social situations. You related this to “the flip” your partner would make 
and how it initially surprised you, but you soon picked up “this is a bit 
dangerous”. So you became sensitive to this, and would not ignore it and “push” 
him to the point where he may have been physically violent. You would let him 
go for a walk, and have some space. It was from your mother that you said you 
learnt to be aware of social situations, with advice such as not walking alone at 
night and being extra cautious in social settings by knowing an escape route if you 
needed one. Thinking about how can men be challenged, you said: “the biggest 
thing is that men need to understand that change isn’t weakness….Men need to 
teach boys that introspection is not weakness.” You referred to men seeming to 
change but it is often just “a front”. What is needed, is for men to get “internal” 
and “deeper”, and you used your own partner as an example of someone who is 
changing by going internal and deeper. The other point you made regarding men 
being challenged is that “society does not treat men’s emotional needs the same as 
women.” Society might label a man’s emotion by saying, “he has just got a 
temper, but sometimes it’s not as explored as deeply as with women.” You are 
saying that women will often go deeper and explore these things whereas with 
men it is often just labelled and not addressed. 
Carmen: You spoke of how at the beginning of a relationship you take the roles in 
the home that need to be done while the husband is the provider outside of the 
home. This specifically related to you because you had been married 33 years, and 
now your partner is wanting to “reclaim the role of the male, and take control 
from somewhere that he had handed over to me so to speak”. You felt he is acting 
out of insecurity on his part, and that while his responses to you are hurtful and 
confusing for you, you also are able to respond to him in a way that is respectful 
but gently challenging of his behaviour. You expressed how you feel that he is 
threatened by the loss of power, whereas for you it is about intimacy and 
relationship. You said it is like you saying to him, “listen to me, I am not trying to 
get my own way”. However, “… it’s like a bit of a power play because he has got 
to hold on because, ‘I’m the man here, you know I got to stand my ground, I can’t 
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listen, … I can’t take on what you are saying because it’s like I’m surrendering 
my role as man by actually hearing what you are saying.’” You summarised your 
position in relation to your partner here by saying, “I want to get along with you, I 
want to have this level of intimacy where I can be honest with you, and you not 
shoot me down or cut me down or be sarcastic, and then really make me feel like I 
want to withdraw from you and just shut up. I want to make you understand that 
what I’m saying is important. It’s very important to both of us.” In saying this 
Carmen you were not only talking about your own relationship concerns, but also 
indicating how important it is to sort through these types of concerns early in a 
relationship.   
Carmen you talked about women taking on more and more responsibilities in the 
relationship. You related this to the above point where the male partner early in 
the relationship “abdicates some of the roles and some of the authority by 
allowing the woman to make a lot of the decisions”. For thirty three years you 
have taken responsibility for a number of things, he has not shown great interest 
in what you are doing, and now you would like to share some of these roles and 
responsibilities with him. You said while his responses to you can be frustrating 
and hurtful, you are being “assertive” and saying, “no this is not okay 
anymore….I want to share this with you as well. I want to have your input, that 
you may provide valuable things like insight and ideas … to make the choice even 
better because … two is better than one”. You want to say, “I’m not against 
you…but he doesn’t see it, it’s like a blockage there…he puts a wall up…. He 
thinks I’m trying to gain power”. But what you are trying to convey to him, even 
though he may not hear it, is, in your words, “can you listen to me … I’m getting 
frustrated, I’m telling you because I want things to be better. I want you to 
understand I am on your side. We’re on the same side together”. You continued to 
say that, “I’m not going to at this point in my life be insecure or threatened or 
intimidated”. You invite him into a more egalitarian type relationship with you by 
using some of your counselling skills, which you said he does not like. You 
actually have challenged him about shutting you down, but he continually seems 
to see that your invitation is about power and not relationship, particularly 
“intimacy”.  
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In terms of how men can be challenged, you said that men need to realise that 
their partners, “want intimacy …. “I just want to get along…. Realise we are on 
the same side”. Sue you responded to this by suggesting that “it’s almost at the 
heart of it in a way, because everybody here is trying to… offer intimacy, inviting 
it all the time”.  
Is intimacy the issue here for all of you, the heart of your concerns when it comes 
to your relationship with you partner? It became clear from the second meeting 
that intimacy is important to a woman partner. What do you think needs to happen 
for the male partner to see that your invitations are just that, invitations, and not 
some kind of power struggle where insecurity and threat seem to be strongly 
present for him? 
Hannah: You confirmed for your own relationships that intimacy was important, 
“it’s just trying to get close and not have distance really, that is what it’s about”. 
About skills and knowledges you said: “From counselling and then reading and 
learning, and observing other people’s behaviours and what worked and what 
didn’t”, you had learnt from picking up from your partner when his behaviour did 
not match what he was saying. 
Ali: You spoke of the power and control that had been a theme in this meeting, 
saying, “I don’t always think that it’s just men what have this power and control 
stuff. I think that sometimes I exhibit those behaviours and I don’t necessarily like 
that. I’m not quite sure where I picked that up from, but I read that (in reference to 
the first narrative document where you said you drive the relationship and the 
decisions) and I thought mmm, I acknowledge that causes issues in our 
relationship too. I do like to have a lot of power and control and so it is about 
driving decisions and driving the relationship and sometimes that can be good, but 
sometimes I think it isn’t always a gender thing. It is about that quality of valuing 
the relationship and valuing the journey that that partnership is on rather than 
power or any particular gender or person”.   You gave an example of how at times 
you take control by sharing things with other women and making decisions while 
not acknowledging that your partner would have a place in those decisions and he 
feels left out and hurt. You then went on to say how you felt that trust was 
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important, “when we’ve talked about this stuff and it’s got to a deep level, trust is 
the word that comes out, like letting go…and I think that is a key thing for me”.  
A few questions that came up for me while I was typing: Are there different types 
of power and control for men and women? If so, how do men use their power and 
control, and how do women use their power and control?  Regarding trust, is it 
something we give away blindly, or is it something that we gain evidence for 
before we can bring its presence into a relationship? If it is the latter, how do we 
and our partners then make space for trust to enter into the relationship?  
Soon after this the ‘official’ session finished, but, Sue then challenged me, “In a 
scale of women’s relationships, if we were alone like this even with you, if we 
were sitting here with a cuppa talking we would go beyond even this wouldn’t 
we?” To which there was a strong general sound of agreement from the group as a 
whole.   
Sarah: You said how “we’d be trying to sort each other out …and that’s how 
women grow quickly, I reckon because they get all this kind of feedback all the 
time”.  
Annie: You shared about how it must be for me with six women sharing in the 
room by comparing it with if there were six men in the room with you. You 
illustrated this difficulty by drawing on your recent experience when negotiating 
with a male lecturer about an assignment, and how hard it was to get an apology 
from him.  
 
We then talked briefly about the power imbalance that exists between men and 
women and how I felt it would be far more difficult for a woman in a room with 
six men than it is for me. We also discussed the idea that it took the male lecturer 
twenty five minutes to give an apology, but I felt that a woman would give me an 
apology without my asking. This was to illustrate the power imbalance that exists 
between men and women.  
Annie: you responded by saying that your female friends were impressed with 
your speaking to the lecturer as you did, and that you did not see it as a power 
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imbalance because, “I would always negotiate something like that if it was 
important to me. So I don’t see it as imbalance, but the imbalance was the effort, 
it just took so long”.  
Sarah: you responded then saying that you felt this was a difference between men 
and women where women will look internally to deal with a concern, whereas 
men do not do this.  
Carmen: you also responded suggesting that men seem to struggle to admit 
“weaknesses” and “apologising” when it is needed. 
Sarah: you responded by saying to the above context and understanding of 
weakness, “that if men could learn that weakness is actually a strength”. This is 
something women do, admit fault and improve themselves, but men don’t seem to 
recognise this as a strength.  
Sue: you raised the question of, “are we doing that with little boys? Are we 
teaching then to be like that? Where is it coming from?” 
We talked briefly as a group about these questions, and Sarah added that her 
partner was “going to teach my boys about being able to be strong in that 
weakness, and that you can make mistakes…”.   
Hannah: added that schools and kindergartens are where they inadvertently teach 
boys and girls to be different socially, how they relate, and deal with emotions. 
Sarah then cited research from psychology that supported these observations of 
babies being treated differently based on people’s perceptions of their gender.  
In this brief time after our ‘official’ ending I think some further clarity was given 
to the answer to the last two questions of the first narrative document. How can 
men be challenged and made aware of the effects of their actions? What do you 
think needs to happen for this to be possible? In summary you have said, they 
need to embrace change, understand weakness is strength, admit their faults, 
improve themselves – grow, go deeper internally.  
I have one last question for us on this before my concluding comments regarding 
our next meeting: What do you think men need to do to look past the shame, 
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insecurity and threat that so often come when suggestions like those above are 
offered?  
Can you come to the next meeting (Tuesday the 2nd of December, 7pm) prepared 
with a pseudonym that I will use in place of your actual name in any public 
documents associated with this research? To make it easier for me, and perhaps 
you, if the pseudonym could be a relatively short name, that would be great. Also 
in the next meeting, if it is okay with each of you, if we could look at this 
document and respond to any questions from it in the first hour, then in the second 
hour look at what aspects of your stories, and the ideas and suggestions, we want 
to take forward to the next two stages of the research.  
Thanks again for your wonderful contributions to this research. I appreciate it 
very much. 
I am looking forward to our discussion next week. 
Cheers, 
Brian. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
